

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA  
AT LOS ANGELES



THE GIFT OF  
MAY TREAT MORRISON  
IN MEMORY OF  
ALEXANDER F MORRISON

Digitized by the Internet Archive  
in 2008 with funding from  
Microsoft Corporation



THE  
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA



THE  
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA :  
ITS ORIGIN, AND AN ACCOUNT OF ITS PROGRESS  
DOWN TO THE DEATH OF LORD RAGLAN.

BY  
A. W. KINGLAKE.

NEW EDITION.

VOL. V.

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS.  
EDINBURGH AND LONDON.  
MCMVIII.

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

ЗО МИМ  
АМЯОЧЛАС

АМЯОЧЛАС ЗО МИМ  
ЗИЛДОДА ЗО ДА  
УКАРАДУ

D K  
214  
K 59 i  
1901  
v. 5

## C O N T E N T S.

---

### THE BATTLE OF BALACLAVA.

#### CHAPTER I.

##### I.

	PAGE
The task of selecting English generals of cavalry, . . . . .	1
Choice made by the Government, . . . . .	2
Lord Lucan, . . . . .	3
Lord Cardigan, . . . . .	11
Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan regarded conjointly, . . . . .	15
Lord Cardigan's attitude of antagonism to Lord Lucan, . . . . .	19
His complaints, . . . . .	19
Lord Raglan's severe answer to them, . . . . .	19
Lord Raglan's appeal to the good feelings of Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan, . . . . .	20
What made it possible for the Government to do as it did, . . . . .	21

##### II.

Isolated position of the forces defending Balaclava, . . . . .	28
Increasing strength and boldness of the Russians in the valley of the Tchernaya, . . . . .	28
The Balaclava position, . . . . .	29
The town, . . . . .	29
The inner line of defence, . . . . .	30
The plain of Balaclava, . . . . .	32
Conception of the outer line of defence, . . . . .	35

432732

CHAPTER I.—*continued.*

The works constituting the outer line of defence, . . . . .	37
Slight nature of the works, . . . . .	37
Armament of the works, . . . . .	38
How manned, . . . . .	38
The Kamara Height left in possession of the enemy, . . . . .	38
Inherent weakness of the ‘outer line,’ . . . . .	39
The force immediately available for supporting the Turks, . . . . .	39
Sir Colin Campbell’s confidence, . . . . .	40
Defects in the subsidiary arrangements of the Allies, . . . . .	42
Mentschikof’s purpose, . . . . .	43
The forces collected for this enterprise, . . . . .	43
The object of the contemplated attack, . . . . .	44
Distribution of the Russian force, . . . . .	45
Tasks assigned to each column, . . . . .	45
24th Oct. Information of the enemy’s approaching attack, . . . . .	46

## III.

25th Oct. The hour before daybreak, . . . . .	48
Advance of Lord Lucan and his Staff, . . . . .	48
Break of day. Two flags seen flying from the fort on Can- robert’s Hill, . . . . .	48
The import of this, . . . . .	48
Fire opened, . . . . .	48
Orders to our cavalry, . . . . .	49
Vigilance evinced by the Turks, . . . . .	49
The English soldier’s want of vigilance, . . . . .	49
The outlying picket, . . . . .	51
Lord Lucan and Sir Colin Campbell, . . . . .	52
Intelligence sent off to Lord Raglan, . . . . .	52
Lord Lucan’s disposition of the cavalry and horse artillery, . . . . .	52
The enemy pursuing his design, . . . . .	53
General Gribbo seizing Kamara, . . . . .	54
And opening fire on the Redoubt No. 1, . . . . .	54
Advance of Semiakine, . . . . .	55
Of Levontsky, . . . . .	55
Of Sندery, . . . . .	55
Of Ryjoff, . . . . .	55
The emergency in which Lord Lucan had to act, . . . . .	56
His decision, . . . . .	57

CHAPTER I.—*continued.*

The Russians suffered to establish their batteries without hindrance from our cavalry, . . . . .	57
Artillery fire, . . . . .	57
Maude's troops sent back, . . . . .	58
The guns on Canrobert's Hill silenced, . . . . .	58
Continued resistance of the Turks, . . . . .	58
Dispositions made by General Semiakine for storming, . . . . .	58
Canrobert's Hill, . . . . .	59
The work stormed, . . . . .	59
Overwhelming strength of the Russians in point of numbers, . . . . .	60
Close fighting between the Turks and the Russians, . . . . .	60
The fort at length carried, . . . . .	61
Abandonment by the Turks of the three next redoubts, . . . . .	61
Their fight under fire of artillery, and pursued in some places by Cossacks, . . . . .	62
The enemy entering four of the redoubts, . . . . .	62
And establishing himself in three of them, . . . . .	63
Fresh disposition of our cavalry, . . . . .	63
Observations upon the first period of the battle, . . . . .	63

## IV.

Lord Raglan, . . . . .	67
His dispositions, . . . . .	67
General Canrobert also on the ridge, . . . . .	71
His dispositions, . . . . .	71
Apparent difference of opinion between him and Lord Raglan, . . . . .	71
Lord Raglan's disposition of our cavalry, . . . . .	72
General tendency of the French and English dispositions, . . . . .	72
Isolation of Balaclava, . . . . .	73
Position of Liprandi's infantry at this time, . . . . .	73
The Odessa regiment an index of the enemy's changing resolves, . . . . .	73
The Russian cavalry, . . . . .	73
Jabrokritsky's force, . . . . .	74
Liprandi secure for the time against any attack by infantry, . . . . .	74
The period of licence thus enjoyed by him, . . . . .	74
The forces now threatening Balaclava, . . . . .	75
Their strength, . . . . .	75
The forces that could be forthwith opposed to them, . . . . .	75
Liprandi's inaction, . . . . .	76

CHAPTER I.—*continued.*

## V.

Liprandi's supposed design, . . . . .	76
The advance of the Russian cavalry, . . . . .	77
Campbell's arrangements for defending the approach by Kadiköi, . . . . .	77
Squadrons of Russian horse advancing towards the gorge, . . . . .	78
Campbell's altered dispositions, . . . . .	79
Flight of the Turks, . . . . .	79
Position of Campbell after the flight of the Turks, . . . . .	79
His words to the men, . . . . .	80
Their answer to his appeal, . . . . .	80
Continued advance of the detached Russian squadrons, . . . . .	80
Campbell wielding his 93d, . . . . .	81
The fire from their line, . . . . .	81
Its effect, . . . . .	81
Altered movement of the assailing squadrons, . . . . .	81
Campbell's counter-maneuvre, . . . . .	81
Its effect, . . . . .	81
Retreat of the horsemen, . . . . .	81
Feebleness of the attack undertaken by these Russian squadrons, . . . . .	82
Real nature of the trial sustained by our troops on the hillock, . . . . .	82
The new foe encountered by the Turks in their flight, . . . . .	83

## VI.

Want of arrangements for an effective look-out, . . . . .	85
Advance of the main body of the Russian cavalry, . . . . .	85
Its change of direction, . . . . .	86
Its sudden discovery of a great opportunity, . . . . .	86
March of Scarlett's dragoons, . . . . .	87
Sudden appearance of the enemy's cavalry on the flank of Scarlett's dragoons, . . . . .	89
Scarlett's resolve, . . . . .	90
The order he gave, . . . . .	90
'Scarlett's three hundred,' . . . . .	90
Ground taken to the right, . . . . .	91
The 5th Dragoon Guards, . . . . .	91
The 4th Dragoon Guards and the Royals approaching, . . . . .	91
Scarlett's dilemma, . . . . .	92
His decision, . . . . .	93

CHAPTER I.—*continued.*

Lord Lucan, . . . . .	93
The part taken by him after hearing of the advance of the Russian cavalry, . . . . .	93
Meeting between Lord Lucan and General Scarlett, . . . . .	95
The communications between them, . . . . .	95
Lord Lucan's part in the attack, . . . . .	96
Positions of the six squadrons at the moment anterior to Scarlett's charge, . . . . .	96
The numbers of the Russian cavalry confronting Scarlett, . . . . .	97
Deliberate and well-executed manœuvre of the Russian cavalry, . . . . .	98
Their advance down the slope, . . . . .	98
Their slackening pace, . . . . .	99
Their halt, . . . . .	99
Surmise as to the cause of the halt, . . . . .	100
Deployment effected by the Russians on each flank of their column, . . . . .	100
Scarlett's task, . . . . .	102
The great numbers of military spectators who were witnesses of the combat, . . . . .	104
Distinctive colours of the uniforms worn by the Russians and the English dragoons, . . . . .	104
The group of four horsemen now collected in front of the Greys, . . . . .	105
Scarlett's deviation from the accustomed practice, . . . . .	108
The order he gave his trumpeter, . . . . .	109
Scarlett's advance, . . . . .	109
His distance from his squadrons, . . . . .	109
Russian officer in front of the column, . . . . .	110
Scarlett sweeping past the bridle-arm of the Russian officer, and driving into the column, . . . . .	111
General Scarlett in the column, . . . . .	112
Elliot's encounter with the Russian officer in front of the column, . . . . .	112
The three horsemen riding with Scarlett, . . . . .	113
The ancient friendship between the Scots Greys and the Inniskilling Dragoons, . . . . .	113
The distinguishing characteristics of the two regiments, . . . . .	114
The temper of the Greys at this time, . . . . .	115
Unavoidable slowness of the advance in its earlier moments, . . . . .	115
Progress of the advance, . . . . .	116

CHAPTER I.—*continued.*

Involuntary extension of our line whilst advancing,	116
The Russian horsemen resorting to firearms,	116
The officers who charged with the Greys,	117
The officers who charged with the 2d squadron of the Inniskillings,	117
Colonel Dalrymple White,	117
Major Clarke of the Greys,	118
The charge of the three hundred,	118
The manœuvres of the two Russian wings,	140
The circumstances under which they were attempted,	141
Lord Lucan,	142
His order to the 4th Dragoon Guards,	142
His alleged direction to another regiment,	142
The order of narration,	143
The 4th Dragoon Guards,	144
The Royals,	147
The 5th Dragoon Guards,	150
Change in the bearing of the combatants,	152
Efforts made to rally the Greys,	153
The order given by Scarlett to Major Conolly,	155
Hunt's squadron of the Inniskillings,	155
The officers present with the squadron,	155
Major Shute,	156
Captain Hunt,	156
Position of the squadron,	156
Major Shute's order,	156
The charge of Hunt's squadron of the Inniskillings,	156
The 4th Dragoon Guards,	158
The breaking of the column,	159
Retreat of the whole body,	159
Attempts of our dragoons to rally,	160
The pursuit of the enemy by our dragoons,	160
Fire of artillery,	161
Results of the fight between the Russian cavalry and Scarlett's Brigade,	161
The admiration excited by the exploit of Scarlett's Brigade,	162
Comments upon the fight,	163
The time occupied by the fight,	165

CHAPTER I.—*continued.*

## VII.

The Light Brigade at the time of Scarlett's engagement,	166
Its neutrality,	166
Impatience of the brigade,	166
And of Lord Cardigan,	167
The surprise with which the neutrality of the Light Brigade was observed,	167
The cause which palsied the Light Brigade at the time of Scarlett's engagement,	169
Incident making the error more signal,	174
By bringing into public contrast the qualifications of Lord Cardigan and Captain Morris,	175
Lord Lucan's message of reproof to Lord Cardigan,	179

## VIII.

Lord Raglan's instantaneous perception of the new phase into which the battle had passed,	180
The change wrought in the position of the Russians by the defeat of their cavalry,	181
Lord Raglan's purpose,	182
Lord Raglan determining to use his cavalry,	185
'The third order.'	185
Lord Lucan's construction of it,	186
The impatience and anger amongst men of the Headquarters Staff,	188
'The fourth order,'	189
Captain Nolan,	190

## IX.

The position of the Russian army at the time when Nolan reached Lord Lucan,	192
Intentions of Liprandi at this period of the action,	195
Lord Raglan's perfect apprehension of the state of the battle,	195
Two points in the enemy's position available for attack,	196
The valley that lay between them,	197
Position of our cavalry at this time,	197
Arrival of Nolan with the 'fourth order,'	197

CHAPTER I.—*continued.*

The ‘fourth order,’ . . . . .	198
Lord Lucan’s reception of the order, . . . . .	200
The altercation between Lord Lucan and Nolan, . . . . .	201
Lord Lucan’s determination, . . . . .	208
Lord Lucan’s order to Lord Cardigan, . . . . .	209

## X.

Dispositions for the advance of the cavalry down the North valley, . . . . .	213
Lord Cardigan and his Staff, . . . . .	214
Advance of Lord Cardigan and the Light Brigade, . . . . .	217
Captain Nolan appearing in front of the brigade, . . . . .	218
His probable object, . . . . .	218
Nolan’s fate, . . . . .	220
Question as to the degree in which blame justly attached to Nolan, . . . . .	221
Significant retreat of the Odessa battalions, . . . . .	223
Catheart, . . . . .	225
Gradual awakening of the Russians to the opportunity offered them, . . . . .	227
Powerful fire opened upon the advancing brigade from both flanks, . . . . .	228
Officers acting with the two regiments of the first line, . . . . .	229
Continued advance of the brigade, . . . . .	230
The pace, . . . . .	230
Lord Cardigan’s rigid way of leading the brigade, . . . . .	231
Increasing difficulty of restraining the pace in the first line, . . . . .	232
State of the first line, . . . . .	232
Casualties in Lord Cardigan’s personal Staff, . . . . .	232
Continued advance of Lord Cardigan and his first line, . . . . .	233
The advance of the three regiments acting in support, . . . . .	237
Officers present with the 11th Hussars, . . . . .	237
With the 4th Light Dragoons, . . . . .	238
With the 8th Hussars, . . . . .	238
The order in which the ‘supports’ advanced, . . . . .	238
The near approach of our first line to the battery, . . . . .	248
Lord Cardigan’s charge into the battery at the head of his first line, . . . . .	249
Forces encountered by Morris, . . . . .	251

CHAPTER I.—*continued.*

<b>His charge,</b>	<b>252</b>
Morris wounded and taken prisoner,	254
Other incidents in this part of the field,	256
Continued advance by Lord Cardigan in person,	257
His isolation,	258
His advance towards a large body of Russian cavalry,	258
Endeavour to take him prisoner,	259
Lord Cardigan disengaging himself from his Cossack assailants,	260
The devotion with which he had been leading his brigade,	261
Lord Cardigan's return through the battery,	262
His predicament,	262
<b>His retreat,</b>	<b>263</b>
Operations by the remnants of the first line,	267
Men of 17th Lancers,	267
Men under Captain Jenyns,	268
Men of 17th Lancers,	268
Mayow's assumption of command over these,	269
Mayow's order to the men,	269
Men under O'Hara,	270
Mayow's charge,	270
His advance in pursuit,	270
<b>His halt,</b>	<b>271</b>
Feelings with which the French saw our Light Cavalry advance,	271
The Chasseurs d'Afrique,	272
The celebrated 4th regiment of the Chasseurs d'Afrique,	272
General Morris,	273
His determination,	274
D'Allonville's attack,	274
Losses sustained by the 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique,	276
The brilliancy of their achievement,	277
The 11th Hussars,	277
The 4th Light Dragoons,	279
Their entrance into the battery,	280
The combat which there followed,	280
Farther advance of Lord George Paget,	282
The 8th Hussars,	283
State of the battle at this period,	284
The retreat of the Russian cavalry,	287
The need there was of fresh troops in order to clinch the victory,	288

CHAPTER I.—*continued.*

Lord Lucan, . . . . .	289
The question now forced upon his attention, . . . . .	291
His decision, . . . . .	292
The Greys and the Royals ordered to fall back, . . . . .	292
Their losses at this time, . . . . .	292
The Heavy Brigade halted on ground chosen by Lord Lucan, . . . . .	293
General Scarlett and Colonel Beatson, . . . . .	293
The Light Brigade fading out of their sight, . . . . .	294
The full import of Lord Lucan's decision, . . . . .	294
Our Heavy Dragoons at this time, . . . . .	295
The Light Brigade, . . . . .	296
Colonel Mayow and his fifteen lancers, . . . . .	296
Their junction with the 8th Hussars, . . . . .	296
Liprandi's battalions on the Canseway Heights, . . . . .	297
Three squadrons of Lancers seen forming in rear of the 8th Hussars, . . . . .	297
Colonel Shewell the senior officer in this emergency, . . . . .	298
His charge, . . . . .	298
Defeat and flight of the Russian Lancers, . . . . .	301
Shewell's retreat, . . . . .	301
The 11th Hussars and the 4th Light Dragoons, . . . . .	304
Their retreat, . . . . .	305
Approach of the Russian cavalry in pursuit, . . . . .	305
Lord George Paget's appeal to his regiment, . . . . .	305
Its effect, . . . . .	306
Discovery of a body of Russian cavalry formed up across the line of retreat, . . . . .	307
Means for meeting the emergency, . . . . .	307
Position of the interposed force, . . . . .	310
Its formation and apparent strength, . . . . .	311
Its sudden change of front, . . . . .	311
Advance and sudden halt of the column, . . . . .	312
The nature of the collision which then occurred, . . . . .	313
Continued course of the two retreating regiments, . . . . .	316
Lord George Paget's inquiry as to the fate of the first line, . . . . .	320
The escape of Sir George Wombwell, . . . . .	320
The escape of Captain Morris, . . . . .	321
Morris and Nolan, . . . . .	323
The remnants of the brigade at this time, . . . . .	325

CHAPTER I.—*continued.*

Lord Cardigan's address to the men, . . . . .	325
The first muster of the Light Brigade after the charge, . . . . .	325
The killing of the disabled horses, . . . . .	326
The losses suffered by the brigade, . . . . .	326
The supposed fate of Captain Lockwood, . . . . .	328
The small number of prisoners taken by the Russians, . . . . .	329
The small amount of loss sustained by our troops after closing with the enemy, . . . . .	330
Who brought the first line out of action? . . . . .	330
And who brought out the supports? . . . . .	331
Interview between Lord Raglan and Lord Cardigan, . . . . .	332
Lord Raglan's opinion of Lord Cardigan's conduct in the charge,	332
Interview between Lord Raglan and Lord Lucan, . . . . .	332
General Liprandi's questions respecting the exploit of the Light Brigade, . . . . .	335
Duration of the Light Cavalry combat, . . . . .	337
Lord Raglan's opinion of the charge, . . . . .	337
General Bosquet's criticism on the charge, . . . . .	338

## XI.

Liprandi's counter-march of the Odessa battalions, . . . . .	339
Deliberations of General Canrobert and Lord Raglan, . . . . .	340
The determination of the Allies, . . . . .	342
Close of the battle, . . . . .	343

## XII.

The kind of importance which can be attached to the battle of Balaclava, . . . . .	343
Summary of the battle, . . . . .	344
The loss of ground sustained by the Allies, . . . . .	349
The casualties resulting from the battle, . . . . .	350
Trophies taken by the Russians, . . . . .	350
Treatment of the prisoners taken by the enemy, . . . . .	350
With whom the victory? . . . . .	351
The effect of the battle upon the self-confidence of the Russians,	352

CHAPTER I.—*continued.*

## XIII.

Lord Cardigan, . . . . .	354
His theory as to the duty of an officer circumstanced as he was, . . . . .	357
His statements and explanations, . . . . .	359
His written explanations of the course he took in retiring, . . . . .	359
Counter statements, . . . . .	361
The definite question thus raised, . . . . .	361
The question not yet ripe for decision, . . . . .	362

## CHAPTER II.

26th October, . . . . .	367
Effect of the Balaclava battle upon the spirit of Liprandi's force, . . . . .	367
Upon other Russian troops, . . . . .	368
Upon the garrison of Sebastopol, . . . . .	368
Object of the attack there planned, . . . . .	368
Circumstances giving an interest to the 'Lesser Inkerman' combat, . . . . .	369
The enemy's dominion over the northern part of Mount Inkerman, . . . . .	369
His plan of attack, . . . . .	370
General Evans and his resources, . . . . .	370
Troops occupying the Careenage Ravine, . . . . .	371
The Victoria Ridge, . . . . .	371
Captain Singleton's three field-pieces there placed in battery, . .	372
Federoff's advance, . . . . .	372
His engagement with our pickets and continued advance to Shell Hill, . . . . .	373
His guns on Shell Hill, . . . . .	374
And engaged by those of Evans, . . . . .	374
Continued pressure upon our pickets, . . . . .	374
The spirit in which they fought, . . . . .	375
The policy of Evans, . . . . .	376
Advance of the separate column, . . . . .	377
Captain Goodlack's adventure with the enemy, . . . . .	377
Progress of the combat in the Careenage Ravine, . . . . .	380
Continuation of the enemy's efforts on Mount Inkerman, . . . . .	380

CHAPTER II.—*continued.*

Defeat of his columns advancing in support, . . . . .	382
His entire defeat on Mount Inkerman, . . . . .	383
The retreat and pursuit, . . . . .	383
Mr Hewitt's fire from the Lancaster gun, . . . . .	384
The enemy also defeated in the Careenage Ravine, . . . . .	384
Lord Raglan on the Victoria Ridge, . . . . .	385
Close of the combat, . . . . .	385
Duration of the combat, . . . . .	385
Its results, . . . . .	386
Its pith, . . . . .	386
Its effect upon the soldiery of our 2d Division, . . . . .	386
Incursion of Russian cavalry horses, . . . . .	388

## CHAPTER III.

The Dormant Commission entrusted to Sir George Cathcart, . . . . .	389
State of Cathcart's feelings and temper on the 4th of October, . . . . .	390
Withdrawal of the Dormant Commission, . . . . .	391
The high tone with which Cathcart met the announcement, . . . . .	392
Lord Raglan's gratification at the change, . . . . .	392
The effect of the Dormant Commission not necessarily removed by its withdrawal, . . . . .	393

## CHAPTER IV.

26th October. Lord Raglan providing against the occurrence of a disaster at Balaclava, . . . . .	394
The two plans which seemed open to him, . . . . .	394
His directions to Captain Tatham, R.N., . . . . .	395
The advantages of abandoning Balaclava, . . . . .	395
Lord Raglan's inchoate resolve, . . . . .	395
Conclusive objection interposed by the Commissary-General, . . . . .	396
Lord Raglan's efforts to provide means of defending Balaclava, . . . . .	396
Sacrifices necessitated by the retention of the place, . . . . .	396
26th October to 2d November, . . . . .	397
Continuation of the enemy's apparent designs against Balaclava, . . . . .	397
And of Lord Raglan's exertions for its defence, . . . . .	398
The enemy's now settled purpose, . . . . .	398

## A P P E N D I X.

---

Note	I.—Respecting the Period when Colonel Darby Griffith, the Officer commanding the Greys, received the Wound which disabled Him, . . . . .	399
Note	II.—Explanatory Statements laid before Mr Kinglake by Lord Lucan, . . . . .	402
Note	III.—Statement laid before Mr Kinglake by Lord Cardigan, . . . . .	405
Note	IV.—Statement laid before Mr Kinglake by Lord Cardigan, . . . . .	406
Note	V.—Record of Military Services of General William Ferguson Beatson, . . . . .	412
Note	VI.—General Scarlett's Staff, . . . . .	417
Note	VII.—The Strength of the Body of Russian Cavalry under General Ryjoff which engaged General Scarlett's Brigade, . . . . .	418
Note	VIII.—Papers relating to the Recall of Lord Lucan, . .	422
Note	IX.—The Nature of the Litigation in the Suit of the Earl of Cardigan <i>v.</i> Lieutenant-Colonel Cal- thorpe, . . . . .	433
Note	X.—Memoranda relating to Sir George Cathcart and the Dormant Commission, written in 1864 by the late Colonel the Honourable Gilbert Elliot, who was Aide-de-Camp to Sir George in the Crimea, . . . . .	436
Note	XI.—Respecting the part taken by Captain Nolan (see p. 219) at the time immediately preceding his Death, . . . . .	437

# THE BATTLE OF BALACLAVA.

---

## CHAPTER I.

### I.

BEFORE entering upon the narrative of a battle in which the English division of horse took a principal part, it seems right to speak of the selections that were made by our governing authorities when they undertook to name the general officers who were to be entrusted with cavalry commands in the army despatched to the East. If a minister were unhappily forced to cast his eyes over a crowd of officers who had none of them rendered war service, and to try to draw out from among them the three or four gifted men who could best be entrusted to act in the field as generals of cavalry, it would be senseless to blame him for failing in so hard a task ; but when it so happens that within recent years the State has carried on war, there surely is one test of fitness which has such paramount

CHAP.  
I.

The task of  
selecting  
English  
generals of  
cavalry:

CHAP.  
I.

value, that the neglect to apply it can hardly be deserving of pardon, or even, we would say, of indulgence. Has the officer whose name is submitted done recent service in the field? Has his service been brilliant? Has he shown his prowess in action as a cavalry officer? Has he in any rank, however humble, taken part in cavalry fights? Is he of the age for a cavalry man? Is he either under thirty-five, or else a man so fresh come from the performance of cavalry feats that the question of age may be waived? If the minister finds that all these questions must be answered in the negative by a portion of the candidates, whilst others can answer affirmatively, it would surely appear to follow that he has already effected some progress towards a selection of the right names, because he can thenceforth confine his investigation to the merits of those officers who have served in the field, and eliminate those who have not. To our own countrymen, more especially, the principle might be expected to recommend itself, because it so happened that, notwithstanding the long duration of the peace which had been existing between the great Powers of Europe, England had a superb list of cavalry officers in the early prime of life who had done brilliant service in the field.

choice  
made by  
the Gov-  
ernment.

Well, elimination proceeded — a choice was made ; but it was with an actually inverting effect that these operations took place. Incredible as it may seem, it is nevertheless true that, in nominating general officers for cavalry com-

mands in the East, the names of the men who had done service in the field were all set aside, and that from the peace-service residue exclusively the appointments in question were made.

The officer entrusted with the charge of our cavalry division was Lord Lucan. To his want of experience in the field there was added the drawback of age ; for he had attained to a period of life at which no man altogether unused to war service could be expected to burst into fame as a successful cavalry general ; but by nature Lord Lucan was gifted with some at least of the qualities essential for high command ; and his fifty-four years, after all, however surely they may have extinguished the happy impulsiveness which is needed for a wielder of the cavalry arm. can hardly be said to have impaired his efficiency in the general business of a commander. He enjoyed perfect health ; he saw like a hawk ; and he retained such extraordinary activity of both body and mind, that perhaps the mention of his actual age makes it really more difficult than it might otherwise be to convey an idea of the tall, lithe, slender, and young-looking officer, pursuing his task of commander with a kind of fierce, tearing energy, and expressing by a movement of feature somewhat rare among Englishmen the intensity with which his mind worked. At every fresh access of strenuousness, and especially at the moments preceding strenuous speech, his face all at once used to light up with a glittering, panther-like aspect, resulting from the sudden fire of the

CHAP. eye, and the sudden disclosure of the teeth, white,  
I even, and clenched.

At an early period of his life, and whilst still almost a boy, he had the honour to be encouraged in his career by the Duke of Wellington, and even to receive words of counsel and guidance from the lips of the great captain. In later years, he had had the spirit and enterprise to join the Russian army whilst engaged in military operations, thus giving himself the advantage of seeing a campaign ; \* and I cannot but believe that the time thus spent was more conducing to warlike efficiency than many a diligent year employed in peace service at home. Independently of the general advantage derived from a glimpse of reality, Lord Lucan gathered from his experience of that campaign on the Danube some knowledge of a more special kind in regard to Russian troops ; and there is reason for inferring that his mode of handling the English cavalry in the Crimea was in some measure influenced by the impressions of his earlier days. A quarter of a century before, he had come back from the Danube campaign with a low opinion of the Russian cavalry, but with a high respect for the infantry—more especially, it seems, for the infantry when gathered in heavy column ; and he not only carried those opinions with him to the Crimea, but continued,

\* In the war of 1828-9 against the Sultan, Lord Lucan was attached to the Staff of Prince Woronzoff ; and I have heard that he was graciously chided by the Emperor Nicholas for too freely exposing his life.

when there, to hold them unchanged, and even, C H A P.  
I. perhaps—though unconsciously—to make them —— the basis of his resolves.

Lord Lucan's intellectual abilities were of a very high order, and combined as they were with the extraordinary energy of which I have spoken, they might seem to constitute power. Experience, too, had shown that he could apply these qualities effectively to at least one grade of military duty, for at the time when he exercised a Lieutenant-Colonel's command his regiment was in excellent order.

No military duties in peace-time could suffice to absorb such energies as those which Lord Lucan possessed; and during a period of many years immediately preceding the Russian war, he had engaged himself in the conduct of large agricultural operations, carried on upon his own estates both in England and Ireland. With him, the improvement and culture of land had not been a mere quiet resource for dawdling away the slow hours, but a serious and engrossing business, eliciting sustained energy. In executing his designs for the improvement of his Irish estates, he pressed on, it appears, with a great strength of purpose, which overthrew all interposed obstacles; and that ruthlessness perhaps was a circumstance which might be numbered amongst the reasons for giving him a command, because the innovating force of will which he evidenced was a quality which had at the time a special and peculiar value. At the commence-

**CHAP.  
I.**

ment of operations in the field, it is difficult for any man who is not of an almost violent nature to prepare troops long used to peace service for the exigencies of actual war by tearing them out of the grooves in which they have long been moving. Of course, the grave task of choosing our cavalry generals was converted, as it were, into guess-work by the determination to take them exclusively from the list of those officers who had never served their country in the field ; but apart from that grave objection, and the objection founded on age, Lord Lucan was an officer from whom much might be reasonably hoped, if the soundness of his judgment could be inferred from the general force of his intellect, and if also it could be taken for granted that he would prove willing and able, after having long had his own way, to accept the yoke of military subordination in the field, and to bear it with loyalty and temper.

Lord Lucan had one quality which is of great worth to a commander, though likely to be more serviceable to a commander-in-chief than to one filling a subordinate post. He had decision, and decision apparently so complete that his mind never hankered after the rejected alternative. His convictions once formed were so strong, and his impressions of facts or supposed facts so intensely vivid, that he was capable of being positive to a degree rarely equalled. When he determined that he was right and others wrong, he did not fail also to determine that the right and the

wrong were right and wrong with a vengeance. In summing up before the House of Lords an argument attempting the refutation of a despatch sent home by Lord Raglan, he spoke in a way which was curiously characteristic. He did not dilute his assurances with the language of moderation. ‘My Lords,’ he said, ‘I believe I have now answered every charge contained in Lord Raglan’s letter. I pledged myself to refute every accusation; I said that I would not leave a word unanswered. I believe I have fully fulfilled the undertaking I gave—have not left two words together, but have torn the letter to rags and tatters.’ Coming from Lord Lucan, this language was no vulgar brazenry: it represented the irrepressible strength of his real though mistaken conviction.

From the qualities observed in this general officer at the time of his appointment, it might have been difficult perhaps for a minister to infer the peculiar tendency which developed itself in the field; but what happened was—that, partly from the exceeding vigour of his intellect, partly from a naturally combative, antagonistic temper, and partly, perhaps, from the circumstance of his having been long accustomed to rural and provincial sway, Lord Lucan in the Crimea disclosed a habit of mind which was calculated to endanger his efficiency as a subordinate commander. He suffered himself to become an inveterate critic—an inveterate critic of the orders he received from Headquarters; and, since it happened that his

**CHAP.**I.

criticism almost always ended in his coming to a strong disapproval of his chief's directions, he of course lost that comfort of mind which is enjoyed by an officer who takes it for granted that his chief must be right, and had to be constantly executing orders with the full persuasion that they were wrongly conceived. Plainly, that was a state of mind which might grievously impair a man's powers of action in the field, not only by chilling him with the wretched sensation of disapproving what he had to do, but also by confusing him in his endeavours to put right interpretations upon the orders he received.

It was never from dulness or sloth, but rather through a misaiming cleverness, that Lord Lucan used to fall into error. With a mind almost always apparently in a confident and positive state, he brought it to bear in a way which so often proved infelicitous, that his command in the Crimea was made on the whole to appear like that of a wrong-headed man ; but I imagine that this result was in no small measure produced by the circumstance of his being almost always in an attitude of oppugnancy ; and there is room for believing that under other conditions, and especially if detached, and acting for the time independently, he might have evinced a much higher capacity for the business of war than he found means to show in the Crimea. There, at all events, he was not at all happily circumstanced ; for besides being wholly unarmed with the authority which is conferred by former services in the

field, he had so yielded to his unfortunate habit of adverse criticism as to be more often fretted than animated by the orders which came down from Headquarters; and, on the other hand, he had under him a general officer commanding one of his brigades, who was rather a busy antagonist than a zealous and devoted lieutenant.

CHAP.  
I.

It must be remembered, moreover, that the control of a large body of cavalry in action carries with it one peculiar source of embarrassment. If the general commanding leads a charge in person (as Murat was accustomed to do), he loses, of course, for a time his power of personally directing the troops not included in his first line, and so abdicates during the interval one of his principal functions as a general. If, on the other hand, he clings to his power as a general, and declines to narrow his authority during several critical minutes by taking the part of a leader, he must be content to forego a large share of the glory which attaches to cavalry achievements. He may deserve and attain the high credit of seizing the happiest moments for successively launching his squadrons; but in combats of horse, the task of actually leading an attack is plainly so momentous a business that it would be difficult for any man coming new to field service to build up any lofty repute as a general of cavalry, by ordering other people to charge.

Therefore, for general as well as for special reasons, Lord Lucan's command was one of an embarrassing kind; but despite the inherent diffi-

CHAP. I. culties of his position—despite all the hindrances created by himself, and the hindrances created by others—he was a diligent, indefatigable commander,—always in health, always at his post, always toiling to the best of his ability, and maintaining a high, undaunted, and even buoyant spirit, under trials the most depressing. He expended a prodigious industry upon his duties. It may be that he was not perfectly consequent, or that his measures were wrong or ill-timed, or, again, that he was unduly thwarted ; for certainly the result seems to have been that, in proportion to the energy exerted, his mind left no great trace of its action ; but if a man's power of commanding could be safely inferred from mere words, the collection which has been made of Lord Lucan's divisional orders would be a striking example of vigour applied to the management of cavalry in a time of the heaviest trials. Disliking apparently every sacrifice, however temporary, of the controlling power, he did not take upon himself to lead in person any cavalry charge ; and therefore the degree in which he may have been qualified for that very peculiar kind of duty must of course be a subject of conjecture rather than proof ; but his composure under heavy fire was so perfect that, even in an army where prowess evinced in that way was exceedingly general, it did not escape observation. ‘Yes, damn him, he's brave,’ was the comment pronounced on Lord Lucan by one of his most steady haters.

This is not the place for giving the general tenor

of Lord Lucan's services as commander of our CHAP.  
cavalry in the Crimea; but I have sought to pre- I.  
pare for my account of the action in the plain of  
Balaclava, by conveying beforehand some impres-  
sion of the officer who there commanded our  
cavalry. Some such glance was the more to be  
desired because Lord Lucan's abilities were evi-  
dently of a higher order than those he found  
means to disclose by the part he took in the  
battle.

It should be understood that Lord Lucan did  
not thrust himself into the command of our divi-  
sion of horse. All he had asked for was to have  
charge of a single infantry brigade.

The English division of horse numbered two  
brigades, one of which comprised the Light Ca-  
valry, the other our Heavy Dragoons. The Light  
Brigade, as we know, was commanded by the Earl  
of Cardigan.

Lord Cardigan, when appointed to this com-  
mand, was about fifty-seven years old, and had  
never seen war service. From his early days he  
had eagerly longed for the profession of arms, and  
although prevented by his father's objections from  
entering the army at the usual period of life, he  
afterwards—that is, at about twenty-seven years  
of age—was made a cornet in a cavalry regiment.  
He pursued his profession with diligence, absent-  
ing himself much from the House of Commons  
(of which he was at that time a member) for the  
purpose of doing orderly duty as a subaltern in  
the 8th Hussars. Aided partly by fortune, but

CHAP.  
I.

partly by the favour of the Duke of York and the operation of the purchase system, he rose very quickly in the service, and at the end of about seven years from the period of his entering the army, he was a lieutenant-colonel.

He had a passionate love for the service—a fair knowledge, it is believed, of so much cavalry business as is taught by practice in England—a strong sense of military duty—a burning desire for the fame which awaits heroic actions—and, finally, the gift of high courage. Lord Cardigan's valour was not at all of the wild, heedless kind, but the result of strong determination. Even from his way of riding to hounds, it was visible, they say, that the boldness he evinced was that of a resolute man with a set purpose, and not a dare-devil impulse. He bore himself firmly in both the duels he fought; and upon the occasion which opposed him to an officer against whom he was bitterly angered, he shot his foe through the body.\* His mind, although singularly barren, and wanting in dimensions, was not without force; and he had the valuable quality of persistency. He had been so constituted by nature, or so formed by the watchful care which is sometimes bestowed upon an only son, as to have a habit of attending to the desires and the interests of self with a curious exactitude. The tendency, of course, was one which he shared with nearly all living creatures; and it was only from the extraordinary proportions in which the attribute existed, and

\* Without, I think, killing him.

from the absence of any attempt to mask the propensity, that it formed a distinctive peculiarity. When engaged in the task of self-assertion or self-advocacy, he adhered to his subject with the most curious rigour, never going the least bit astray from it, and separating from it all that concerned the rest of creation as matter altogether irrelevant and uninteresting. Others before him may have secretly concentrated upon self an equal amount of attention ; but in Lord Cardigan there was such an entire absence of guile, that exactly as he was, so he showed himself to the world. Of all false pretences contrived for the purpose of feigning an interest in others he was as innocent as a horse. Amongst his good qualities was love of order ; but this with him was in such morbid excess, that it constituted a really dangerous foible, involving him from time to time in mischief. One of his quarrels was founded upon the colour of a bottle ; another upon the size of a tea-cup. In each case the grievance was want of uniformity. To his formulated mind the distinction between lawful and right was imperceptible. A thousand times over it might be suggested to him that he ought not to have been sleeping on board his yacht—a yacht with a French cook on board—when not only all the officers and men under him, but also his divisional chief, were cheerfully bearing the hardships and privations of camp life ; but a thousand times over he would answer that he indulged himself thus with the permission of Lord Raglan ; and the lawfulness of the practice

CHAP.

I.

being thus established, he never seemed to understand that there could remain any question of propriety, or taste, or right feeling.

With attributes of this kind, he was plainly more fitted to obey than to command. Having no personal ascendancy, and no habitual consideration for the feelings of others, he was not, of course, at all qualified to exert easy rule over English gentlemen, and his idea of the way to command was to keep on commanding. There surely was cruelty in the idea of placing human beings under the military control of an officer at once so arbitrary and so narrow; but the notion of such a man having been able to purchase for himself a right to hold Englishmen in military subjection is, to my mind, revolting. Lord Cardigan incurred a series of quarrels, and was removed from the command of his regiment; but afterwards, by the special desire of the Duke of Wellington, he was restored to active service.

There can hardly have been any well-founded expectation that Lord Cardigan would be able to go through a campaign without engaging in quarrels; and never, surely, by action or speech, did he convince the dispensers of military authority that he was a man who would be competent to meet the emergencies of war with the resources of a fruitful mind. I imagine that the first active Bishop or Doctor of Divinity whom the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards might chance to have met on horseback would probably have been much more competent than Lord Car-

digan (whose mind worked always in grooves) to discover and seize the right moment for undertaking a cavalry charge. Yet without the attributes of a commander, a man may be a resolute, faithful, heroic soldier ; and that surely is the kind of glory—it is glory of no mean kind—which can best be claimed for Lord Cardigan. In despite of all the faults which he had manifested to the world when appointed to the command of the Light Brigade, there still remained good grounds for trusting that, as long as he should be acting in the performance of what he might clearly understand to be his duty, he would perform it with precision, with valour, and, if need be, with unsparing devotion.

CHAP.  
I.

If between Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan there could be discovered any points of resemblance, these were not of such a kind as to be conducive to harmony. They were, both of them, contentious ; and whether from natural gifts, or from long habits of disputation, they had both of them powers of a kind which are commonly developed in lawyers, though not certainly in lawyers of the same quality. Lord Lucan was the able, the cogent, the strenuous, the daring advocate, whose opponents (especially if they happened to be in the right) were to be not merely answered but crushed. Lord Cardigan, in his forensic aspect, was of the species which repeats a hundred times over in the same words the same version of the same facts, persistently ignores the whole strength of the adversary's argument, and

Lord Lucan  
and Lord  
Cardigan  
regarded  
conjointly.

---

**CHAP.  
I.**

which also relies a good deal upon what in the courts are called ‘points’ and ‘objections.’ Yet it would seem that he must have been capable of attaining to a higher level; for upon one occasion, when undertaking to defend himself in the House of Commons, he made what the House regarded as a very good speech. Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan were both of them men possessed with exceeding self-confidence, but a self-confidence resulting from very different springs of thought. Lord Lucan’s trustfulness in himself was based upon the consciousness of great ability, and upon that rare vividness of impression as well as that strength of conviction of which we were just now speaking. He was confident because he was positive. On the other hand, Lord Cardigan’s assurance was not, I think, founded upon any quality which could be rightly called self-conceit, but rather upon the corollary which he drew from the fact of his having a given command. He was so extravagantly military in his notions, so orderly, so straight-minded, so given to narrow and literal interpretations, that from the mere fact of his having been entrusted with the charge of a brigade, he inferred his perfect fitness for the task. By the act of appointing him his Sovereign had declared him fit, and he took the Queen at her word. When we see him, by-and-by, side by side with a cavalry officer of warlike experience, at a critical moment, we shall learn to how great an absurdity a man may be brought by this army-list process of reasoning. So far did Lord Car-

digan carry the inference, that once, I see—even in writing—when maintaining his view as to the extent of undisturbed authority which should be possessed by the commander of a brigade, he made bold to bracket himself, as it were, for the purpose of the discussion, with no less a man than Sir Colin Campbell, basing one of his arguments upon the tacit assumption, that because Sir Colin and he both commanded brigades, they were both of them, therefore, entitled to the same degree of latitude.

CHAP.  
I.

It was hardly to be expected with confidence that officers appointed to high cavalry commands without having earned them by serving their country in the field would all at once show themselves able to put sound constructions upon the orders which were to guide them in the presence of the enemy; and the personal qualities of Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan were not of such a kind as to supply in this point the absence of warlike experience. With Lord Lucan the danger was, that his fertile and vigorous mind might bring him into some elaborate and subversive process of reasoning. If, for instance, we should hear him informed he is to be supported by infantry, we must be prepared to find him convinced that the infantry is to be supported by him. On the other hand, Lord Cardigan's endeavours at construing orders were sure to be characterised by an exceeding rigidity, which might be preposterous in one instance, in another superb. If ordered to hold a position, he might

**C H A P.** I. think himself planted as fast as a sentry at the gate of a palace. If ordered to advance down a valley without being told where to halt, he might proudly abstain from supplying the omission, and lead his brigade to destruction.

Lord Lucan was the brother-in-law of Lord Cardigan; but so little beloved by him that in the eyes of cynical London, an arrangement for coupling the one man to the other seemed almost a fell stroke of humour. It might have been thought that, in a free country, the notion of carrying official perverseness to any such extreme length as this must have been nipped in the bud. It was not so. If England was free, she was also very patient of evil institutions, as well as of official misfeasance. She trusted too much to the fitful anger of Parliament, and the chances of remonstrance in print.

In justice to Lord Cardigan—because tending to account for, and in some measure palliate, the act which will be presently mentioned—it should be stated that, some short time before the embarkation, he had had to endure a bitter disappointment, under which he continued to smart during the first two weeks of the invasion. Lord Lucan was to have been left in Bulgaria, and, under that arrangement, Lord Cardigan in the Crimea would have been commander of our cavalry during several momentous days, without being liable to any interference except from Lord Raglan himself; but Lord Lucan successfully insisted upon his claim to be present with the portion of the

division which was likely to come first into the presence of the enemy ; and accordingly Lord Cardigan, though commanding the Light Brigade, had over him his divisional general, and was therefore in a measure annulled.

Lord Cardigan was not a man who would have consciously suffered himself to become at all insubordinate ; but, whilst writhing under the torture inflicted by the annulling presence of his divisional general, he brought himself to imagine that the custom of the service set something like bounds to the overruling authority which should be exercised by a divisional general over his brigadier, and that in some matters at least—as, for instance, in the arrangements of his camp—the brigadier had a right to expect that he would be left to his own discretion.

Accordingly, and at a period of the campaign when it might be imagined that the eternal claims of self would, for a time, be superseded by the warlike ardour of a cavalry leader, Lord Cardigan applied his mind to the object of protecting himself from the interference of his commanding officer. He drew up in writing a lengthy string of complaints on this subject, and submitted them to Lord Raglan.

Lord Raglan judged it his duty to answer this appeal with some severity. In a paper which was addressed, it seems, to Lord Cardigan, but meant to be communicated also to Lord Lucan, the Commander of the forces thus wrote :—

CHAP.  
I.

Lord Car-  
digan's  
attitude of  
antagonism  
to Lord  
Lucan :

his com-  
plaints:

Lord Rag-  
lan's severe  
answer to  
them

## CHAP.

## I.

*BALACLAVA, Sept. 28, 1854.*

‘ I have perused this correspondence with the deepest regret, and I am bound to express my conviction that the Earl of Cardigan would have done better if he had abstained from making the representation which he has thought fit to submit to my decision.

‘ I consider him wrong in every one of the instances cited. A general of division may interfere little or much with the duties of a general of brigade, as he may think proper or see fit. His judgments may be right or wrong, but the general of brigade should bear this in mind, that the lieutenant-general is the senior officer, and that all his orders and suggestions claim obedience and attention.’

Lord Raglan's appeal to the good feelings of Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan.

Lord Raglan, however, determined to try whether it were possible that words of entreaty from himself, addressed alike to Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan, might either allay the animosity existing between them, or render it less embarrassing to the public service; and accordingly, in the same paper, he addressed to both these Generals the following appeal: ‘ The Earl of Lucan and the Earl of Cardigan are nearly connected. They are both gentlemen of high honour and of elevated position in the country, independently of their military rank. They must permit me, as the Commander of the Forces, and, I may say, the friend of both, earnestly to recommend to them to communicate frankly with each other, and to come to such

'an understanding as that there should be no suspicion of the contempt of authority on the one side, and no apprehension of undue interference on the other.' (Signed) 'RAGLAN.'

It must not be supposed, however, that the relations between these two officers involved them in unseemly personal altercations. Lord Lucan with great wisdom and tact took care that the more unwelcome communications which he from time to time made to his brigadier should be either in writing, or else conveyed by the mouth of another ; and Lord Cardigan on the other hand had a sense of propriety in such matters, and was not without power of self-restraint.

But now, why did it happen that England, having under her eyes a brilliant list of cavalry officers from whom she might make her choice, determined to exclude all those who had served in the field, and to place in the respective commands of which we have been speaking two peers between fifty and sixty years old who had neither of them rendered war-service ? One answer is this : There was a divided responsibility. We know what confusions may follow when the War Office and the Horse Guards — the clerk and the counter-clerk — differ ; but this selection of cavalry officers was the result of agreement, or rather, one may say, of a process which goes by the name of 'compounding.' From ancient treaties of peace between the two sides of White-hall it resulted that the Commander-in-Chief at

What made  
it possible  
for the  
Government:  
to do as it  
did.

CHAP.  
L.—the Horse Guards was the authority for advising the appointment and taking the Queen's pleasure upon it ; but that the authorities responsible to Parliament, or, in other words, the Ministry, might take upon themselves to interpose ; and that if they should do so, and do so persistently, then, painful as the surrender would be, their objection should be allowed to prevail.

From this division of power there followed, of course, a corresponding alleviation of responsibility. Lord Hardinge could say that the proposed nominations had been brought to the cognisance of the Ministry, without causing them to interpose their authority as a positive bar to the proceeding. The Ministry, on the other hand, could declare—as, indeed, the Duke of Newcastle very constantly did—that they strongly disapproved the appointments, and never would have made them if they had the full power in their hands ; but that, still, they did not feel it absolutely incumbent upon them to take the somewhat strong measure of interposing.

In the present condition of our State arrangements, one of the best and most graceful uses of an aristocracy is to supply the country in time of war with commanders who have attained to distinction in presence of the enemy, and yet are sufficiently youthful. For a nation to build its hopes upon so narrow a basis, instead of fairly searching out from among the whole community those men who may seem the best qualified to lead its forces, this, no doubt, must be looked

upon as a rude, quaint practice, which is only saved from being preposterous by the fact that no more rational method has hitherto found acceptance ; but in the meantime, the practice, as thus understood, has its value. The adventitious circumstances combine with personal merit, and lift a man into command at the age best adapted for the purpose ; so that the qualities of a Wellesley, for instance, may come to be recognised at thirty instead of at sixty—a difference material to the individual, but unspeakably important to the country ; and in that way (until a better method can be discovered) the legitimate ambition of powerful or wealthy families may subserve the true interests of the State. If Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan had been two nobles of the age of some thirty-three years, who had fought side by side on the banks of the Sutlej, who had inspired their commanders with a high idea of their war-like qualities, and who, by aid of these circumstances combining with their family pretensions, had attained to such military rank and distinction as to be recognised and deserving candidates for high commands, then, indeed, a country which had not yet hit upon any better mode of attaining the object would have had reason to be grateful for the existence of a system which supplied and raised into eminence, at the right time of life, men capable of wielding authority in the field. Far from resting upon any such basis, these appointments deprived the country of the inestimable advantage of seeing her squadrons entrusted

CHAP.  
I.—to men in the prime of cavalry life who had gloriously served in the field, and committed a superbly great stake to two peers of the ages of fifty-four, and fifty-seven, who, so far as concerns that teaching which is imparted by responsible war-services, were now to begin their education, and begin it in the enemy's presence.

However, these two general officers were both of them brave men, and in that, at all events, there was a basis for hoping that, in spite of any misfortunes resulting from the appointments in question, the honour of the service would be sustained. It may be that, in professing to judge of the seed which was sown in the spring, one is governed too much by observing the harvest that was reaped in the autumn; but certainly this double selection of generals does seem as though it were fitted—and that without much help from fortune—to involve the English Light Cavalry in some ruinous, yet brilliant disaster.

There is a circumstance which tends in some measure to account for dereliction of duty on the part of those who were preparing our army for foreign service:—Men who might be supposed the most competent to form an opinion, were persuaded that the force would be used as a support to negotiations, and not for actual warfare.\*

\* I do not include the Duke of Newcastle amongst those who entertained the impression, but certainly the communications made to Lord Raglan—communications extending down to the eve of his departure for Paris—compelled him almost to believe that the period of foreign service would be extremely brief.

The officer appointed to the command of the Heavy Dragoons was Brigadier - General the Honourable James Scarlett. He was fifty - five years of age, and he too, like Lord Lucan and Lord Cardigan, had never done service in the field ; but besides those soldierly qualities of which we shall be able to judge when we see him engaging the enemy, he was gifted with two quiet attributes, which enabled him to appreciate the deficiency, and do all that man could to supply it.

CHAP.  
I.  
General  
Scarlett.

He had modesty as well as good sense ; and knowing that experience, valuable in almost all undertakings, is especially valuable in the great business of war, he did not for a moment assume that, by the magic virtue of his mere appointment to a command, he became all at once invested with the knowledge or the practical skill which men acquire in the field ; and he therefore determined, if he could, to have men at his side who knew of their own knowledge what fighting was, and had even won high distinction.

The officer whom Scarlett chose as his aide-de-camp, was Lieutenant Alexander Elliot. Before the period of his entering the Royal Army, Elliot had served five years in India. He was in the Gwalior campaign, and at the battle of Punniar commanded a troop of the 8th Bengal Light Cavalry. With the same regiment he went through the whole of the eventful and momentous struggle which we call the first Sutlej campaign. He commanded a squadron at the great battle of Ferozeshah ; and at a time when the

CHAP  
I.

62d had been driven back and almost annihilated, he executed a desperate charge, and with his standard-bearer and five troopers penetrated into the Sikh entrenchments. In recognition of his brilliant cavalry service in that war, Lord Hardinge appointed him to a command in his body-guard, and made him honorary aide-de-camp. Being afterwards constrained to leave India by the state of his health, he entered the Royal Army, and it was owing to this necessitated change that he bore no higher rank than that of lieutenant. With all the special knowledge and instincts of a brilliant cavalry officer, he had qualifications of a more general kind ; and if there had been at the time of the invasion a minister so strong and so resolute as to be able to do the thing which is right, a man such as Elliot would have been eagerly laid hold of and entrusted with high cavalry command.

But this was not all that Scarlett was able to do towards arming himself with the experience of men who had done good service in war. Colonel Beatson had fought under Evans in Spain, and had afterwards risen to high distinction in India. Being for the time in Europe, and yielding to the warlike impulses of his nature, he had laid aside those considerations of military rank which might have governed a lower order of mind, and consented to be attached to General Scarlett's Staff as his extra aide-de-camp. Lord Lucan, with that unhappy perversity which was so constantly marring his cleverness, opposed himself to this

last arrangement of Scarlett's, and declared, it seems, that Colonel Beatson must not be considered as having any recognised position in the army.

CHAP.  
I.

I have said that if General Scarlett enjoyed the immense advantage of having two such aides-de-camp as these, he owed the happy idea of thus strengthening himself to his own wisdom and modesty; but it is worth while to say that that last quality of his had a tendency to withdraw our brigade of Heavy Dragoons from its due share of public attention. Concurring with other known causes, General Scarlett's quiet unobtrusiveness did much to prevent his fellow-countrymen from acquainting themselves so fully as they might otherwise have been eager to do with the fight between his brigade and the main body of the Russian cavalry.

On the day of the battle of Balaclava it was not the destiny of General Scarlett to have to act under any great complexity of circumstances, nor to give rise to any kind of public controversy, and it will therefore be easy to see and to understand him in action without having a preliminary knowledge of the man; but in truth his achievement corresponded so closely with the noble and heroic simplicity of his character, that the account of what he did will not fail to carry along with it a true indication of his quality. We shall see him lead his great charge.

## II.

CHAP.  
I.

*Isolated position of the forces defending Balaclava.*

The strength and compactness of the position taken up by the Allies on the Chersonese upland was not at all shared, as we know, by the scanty detachment of infantry which Lord Raglan had been able to spare for the defence of Balaclava. Stationed apart in the plain below, this small force was in such local relation to the Allied army on the Chersonese as to be lying outside, and at the foot of the natural castle from which the main body looked down.\*

Yet Balaclava was the storehouse, the arsenal, the port, whence the English drew all their supplies; and such was the anomalous character of the arrangements which Lord Raglan had been forced to adopt, that, instead of being safely ensconced in the rear of the main Allied camp, the material sources of the English strength lay inviting the enterprise of Prince Mentschikoff's field army, and in charge, so to speak, of an outpost.

*Increasing strength and boldness of the Russians in the valley of the Tcher-naya.*

It, however, seemed feasible to construct a system of field-works which would enable the troops left out in the plain below to withstand an attack for such time as to allow of the needed reinforcements coming down to their aid from the upland; and the English were quickened in their sense of the importance belonging to this part of their task, by the always increasing strength and

\* See Invasion of the Crimea, vol. IV. of Cabinet Edition, pp. 43 *et seq.* and 232 *et seq.*

boldness of the Russian force which had begun to show itself in the direction of Tchorgoun so early as the 7th of October.

Before hearing of the battle of the 25th of October, it is well to have an idea of the ground upon which the security of Balaclava depended, and the arrangements which had been made for its defence.

The string of houses constituting Balaclava extended along a narrow ledge between the eastern side of the little harbour and the western acclivities of Mount Hiblak. Except at the gorge of Kadiköi towards the north, and the narrow strait towards the south leading crookedly into the Euxine, both the town and the harbour were surrounded in all directions by steep lofty hills; and the hills towards the west being a continuation of that Chersonese upland where the main Allied armies lay camped, were within the unquestioned dominion of the invaders.

Partly from this cause, and partly from their command of the sea — including the small but deep harbour, which brought ships of the line close up to the town—the English, at Balaclava, were secure against any attack coming either from the west or the south; and again, towards the east, the ground was not only steep and commanding, but otherwise favourable for defence. Accordingly, from a part of the sea-cliff which is one mile east of Balaclava, and thence north and north-west to the Church of St Elias, in the neighbourhood of Kadiköi, a curve could be

CHAP.  
I.

The Bala-  
clava posi-  
tion:

C H A P.  
I.

---

*The inner  
line of  
defence.*

drawn, extending along a distance of between two and three miles, in which nature had done so much for the defence that, by expending upon it a moderate amount of labour, and arming the works there constructed with a few naval guns of position, our Engineers were enabled to place all this portion of the inner line in a fair state of security, without diverting from the duties of the siege any very large body of men.\* The guns thus planted were manned, it seems, by our Marine Artillery ; and the only bodies of infantry which this line of more than two miles absorbed, were the 1200 marines from our fleet, under the command of Colonel Hurdle, with two companies of the 93d Regiment.†

Towards the north, the hills opened, and the place could be approached by the gorge of Kadi-köi ; but even there, at intervals there were spurs thrown out from the neighbouring acclivities which offered good sites for several small field-works, and by taking advantage of these, our Engineers completed their inner line of defence. The troops on which Sir Colin Campbell relied for the defence of the gorge were the main body —that is, six companies of the 93d Highlanders,

\* The number of guns in battery along this inner line of defence was, I think, 26. The Engineers were confident in the security of the 'inner line,' and at times certainly Sir Colin Campbell shared their belief; but I gather that he was brought into an anxious state of mind by the peculiar responsibility which weighed upon him, and his language in regard to the security of the position was not always the same.

† Our Engineers put the length of the line, taken altogether at 'about three miles.'—Official Journal, p. 41.

with a battalion of Turks and a battery of field-artillery.

CHAP.  
I.

---

In the harbour, there was an English corvette called the *Wasp*; \* and (besides a score or two of English soldiers, having duties of some kind which brought them to Balaclava on the day of the battle) there lay in the town some eighty or a hundred English soldiers, who, although invalided, were not so prostrate as to be unable to handle a musket.

So great was the confidence which most of our people reposed in the strength of this inner line of defence, in the quality of all the troops which manned it, and in the prowess of the veteran soldier who commanded the garrison, that the safety of the ground thus covered cost them little or no uneasiness; and, as a not inexpressive sign of the quiet efficiency with which this part of the defence was made good, I may mention that an officer holding a very high and responsible command, and one, too, which did not at all tend to divert him from this part of the Allied position, was long able to remain unacquainted

\* With the exception of a gunner and a few men in charge, the '*Wasp*' at first had no crew on board. The '*Diamond*' was lying also in the harbour, but she neither had guns nor crew on board, and was in charge, it seems, of a single ship-keeper. Captain Patison, R.N., commanding the '*Simoom*,' a troopship, was the senior naval officer in the harbour. When he became aware that there was likely to be an attack, he ordered his first lieutenant, Lieutenant Selby, to collect the working parties, and get them on board the '*Wasp*,' thereby enabling the corvette, if called upon, to deliver fire from her starboard broadside; and he also directed that one watch should follow him ashore, and take part in the land defence.

CHAP. I. with the very existence of the inner line of defence, and to hear of it for the first time some ten years after the peace. To him in the Crimea this inner line of defence was what oxygen is to a peasant—a blessing unperceived and unheard of, on which his existence depended.

The plain of Balaclava.

The gorge of Kadiköi opens out into a large tract of ground which, though marked in some places by strong undulations, by numberless hillocks, and even by features deserving the name of ‘heights,’ is yet, upon the whole, so much lower, and so much more even than the surrounding country, as to be called ‘the plain of Balaclava.’


This tract of comparatively low ground is the field of the engagement, which we are accustomed to call the battle of Balaclava, but it lies a mile north of the town.\* It has an average length of about three miles, with a breadth of about two, and is hemmed in on almost all sides by ground of from some 300 to 1000 feet high; for, on the north of the plain, there are the Fedioukine Hills; on the east, Mount Hasfort; on the south, the Kamara Hills and Mount Hiblak; on the west, the steep buttresses of the Chersonese upland.

The distinctive feature of the basin thus formed is a low ridge of ground, which, crossing the so-called ‘plain’ in the direction of its length—or, in other terms, from east to west—divides it into

\* See the map; but a glance at the diagram on the following page may aid towards an apprehension of the general features of the field.

two narrow valleys. So completely has this range of heights bridged over the plain, that it served as a natural viaduct, enabling the designer of the Woronzoff road to carry his trace-line across from the Kamara Hills on the east to the Cher-

CHAP.  
I.



sonese uplands on the west without letting it ever descend to the general level of the ground which had to be traversed; and therefore it is that the features which constitute this ridge are distinguished as the 'Causeway Heights.'

CHAP.

I.

From the foot of the Chersonese the North Valley sloped down in an eastern direction till it reached the embankment of the aqueduct, there crossed, at the time, by three bridges. A yet farther descent of only a few yards down the valley brought a rider to the left bank of the river Tchernaya, and to fords by which he might cross it. On the other side of the river, and at a distance of less than a mile, there stood the village of Tchorgoun, where Liprandi, as we know, had established his Headquarters, and gathered his main strength. This North Valley is ground on which the memory of our countrymen has brooded. It was the scene of the Light Cavalry charge.

The South Valley is on the Balaclava side of the 'Causeway Heights.' At its eastern extremity there is a knoll between 500 and 600 feet high, which, being joined to the Kamara Hills by a neck of high ground, juts out over the valley as a promontory does over the sea, and for a feature thus conspicuous men soon found a name. They called it 'Canrobert's Hill.' At the opposite or western extremity of this valley, the road connecting Balaclava with the Chersonese passed up by way of the 'Col.' It is with the slope of a hill-side descending into this South Valley, and with the glory of Scarlett's Dragoons, that England will have to associate her memory of the one great fight between cavalry and cavalry which took place in the course of the war.

It was of so much moment to secure Balaclava

from disaster, that there could not but be a desire to prevent the enemy from coming within the limits of the South Valley ; and considering, on the one hand, the inconvenience of diverting troops from the siege for merely defensive purposes, and, on the other, the configuration of the ground in the plain of Balaclava, men thought that what was wanting in bayonets might possibly be eked out with the spade ; and this idea was the more readily pursued because it happened that —in part from the confidence of the Sultan, and in part from the graciousness of the French Commander—Lord Raglan had obtained the services of some 3000 Turkish soldiers, who might first be employed in constructing the requisite earth-works, and then in manning them. Our Engineers saw that by throwing up a slight work on Can-robert's Hill, and a chain of little redoubts on the bosses or hillocks which mark at short intervals the range of the Causeway Heights, there might be formed an entrenched position which would enable a force of moderate strength to hold the ground against one much more numerous ; and it is evident that the design would have had a great value if the position of Balaclava, when expecting an attack from 20,000 or 25,000 men, had had a small army of 10,000 or 12,000 men to defend it. But no such conditions existed ; for, on the one hand, the Allies, if they could have time to come down, were in no danger at this period of being outnumbered in the plain ; and, on the other hand, there was not only no

CHAP.  
I.Conception  
of the outer  
line of de-  
fence.

## CHAP.

I.

army at Balaclava of such strength as to be able to defend an entrenched position like that which might be formed on the line of the Causeway Heights, but actually no army at all, and no force of any kind that could be charged to support the men placed in the intended works, save only a division of cavalry, with a single troop of horse-artillery. Our Engineers formed an entrenched position which could only have strength upon the supposition that several thousands of the Allied infantry would have time to come down and defend it. Yet, unless there should be a more than English vigilance in the plain of Balaclava, and unless, too, our Division of Cavalry should be so brilliantly wielded as to be able to check and disconcert for some hours the marches of the enemy's columns, there was no good ground for imagining that the strength of this 'outer line,' or the prowess of the brave Osmanlis who were to be placed in its earthworks, could fairly be brought into use.

It would seem, therefore, at first sight, that General de Todleben's severe criticism of the 'outer line of defence' must have been well enough justified; but the truth is, that the scheme was never recommended by our Engineers as a really trustworthy expedient. They chose it apparently as a makeshift which might more or less baffle a hitherto unenterprising enemy; and, at least, their plan had the merit—the then truly enticing merit—of diverting no English forces from the great business of the siege; for if the

outer line of defence had not been adopted, our CHAP.  
cavalry, with its attendant troop of horse-artillery, I.  
would still have been camped in the plain.

On Canrobert's Hill there was thrown up a slight breastwork, with its salient towards the north-east; and along the whole line of the Cause-way Heights there were formed as many as five other earthworks, each smaller and weaker than the one on Canrobert's Hill. Of these six works some were open at the gorge, and some closed, but they used to be all called 'redoubts.' \*

The work on Canrobert's Hill was known as the Redoubt Number One, and the five other works were distinguished by successive numbers; † but the one which, in this way, received the name of Number Three, was sometimes also called 'Arabtabia.'

The works were executed by Turkish labour under the direction of an English Engineer officer. ‡

\* I may usefully mention once more that—like several other words, as, for instance, like the word ship (which may either be used in a very general sense, or else may be taken to designate a three-masted vessel of a particular rig), the word 'redoubt' has practically two meanings, one general, the other distinctive. Lord Raglan—the most accurate of men in his language—constantly used the word 'redoubt' in its general sense, applying it indiscriminately to works which were open at the gorge as well as to those which were not; and so did Sir Colin Campbell.

† I adopt the nomenclature which obtained so generally as to render any other inconvenient; but I may usefully mention that some—and amongst them Lord Raglan—did not include the work on Canrobert's Hill in the numerical designation. With them the work commonly called Number Two would be Number One, and so on.

‡ Lieutenant Wagman, I believe: but I hear Captain Stanton

CHAP.  
I.  
—  
They were of very weak profile, and a horseman, as was proved by the Cossacks, could well enough ride through and through them. Indeed, one of the works was begun, completed, and armed in a single day.

Armament  
of the  
works.

The work on Canrobert's Hill was armed with three 12-pounder iron guns, supplied by Dundas from our fleet; and the three redoubts next adjoining it—that is, the Redoubt Number Two, the Arabtabia or Redoubt Number Three, and the Redoubt Number Four—were each of them armed with two guns of the same sort and calibre.\* The two other works—namely, the Redoubt number Five and the Redoubt Number Six—were unarmed on the day of the battle.

How  
manned.

The works were manned by Turkish troops, one battalion of these being posted on Canrobert's Hill, and a half battalion or wing in each of the Causeway redoubts. †

The Kamara  
Height left  
in posses-  
sion of the  
enemy.

The work on Canrobert's Hill was perilously exposed to any artillery which might be placed in battery on the neighbouring ridge of Kamara; and no arrangements were made for preventing

also took some part. The work completed in a single day was the 'Number Two.'

\* There is a difference between the various authorities which record the number and place of these guns, Lord Raglan putting them at seven, Todleben at eleven, and others at intermediate numbers. I put them, as may be seen, at nine.—'Journal of Operations.' The difference is an immaterial one.

† From information communicated to me by Lord Stanley of Alderley, I have reason to believe that a French officer at the time remonstrated against the plan of leaving the Turks unsupported in such a position.

the enemy from seizing this vantage-ground, for CHAP.  
1. the ridge of Kamara was itself overtopped by crests ranging higher and higher in the direction of Baidar; and it was judged that to attempt to hold more ground would be to add to the weakness of this outer line. As it was, the line of these six earthworks extended over a space of more than two miles; and Canrobert's Hill was so distant from the ground whence supporting forces might be expected to come, as to offer the enemy a licence of some hours' duration for any enterprise in the plain of Balaclava upon which he might think fit to venture.\*

The only force immediately available for attempting to give any support to the Turks was the division of English cavalry, which, along with its attendant troop of horse-artillery (commanded by Captain Maude), was under the orders of Lord Lucan. This division of cavalry comprised some 1500 sabres, and was in high order. It lay camped on the southern slopes of the Causeway Heights, at a distance of not much less than two miles from Canrobert's Hill, but it kept an outlying picket at a spot near the heights of Kamara.

Such, then, was the outer line of defence; and this—only this—was the force which, except after

Inherent  
weakness  
of the 'outer'  
'line.'

The force  
immediately  
available  
for  
supporting  
the Turks.

\* The distance from Canrobert's Hill to the camp of the nearest English division of Infantry was only about four miles going straight; but we shall see that, from the moment of first giving the alarm to that when an English division could be got down to even the more western part of the plain, some hours elapsed.

CHAP.  
I.  
the lapse of some hours, could be expected to come and support it.

Sir Colin  
Campbell's  
confidence.

It is strange, but still true, that for some time before the 25th of October, Sir Colin Campbell had been every day growing more and more confident in the strength of the position. There were moments, no doubt, when he spoke more distrustfully, but in his report of the 20th of October, sent up to Headquarters, he wrote : ‘ I think we ‘ can hold our own against anything that may ‘ come against us in daylight. I am, however, a ‘ little apprehensive about the redoubts if seri- ‘ ously attacked during the night ; ’ and, in a later report, he said, ‘ I fancy we are now very strong ‘ as well as secure.’

It could not but be that, when so wary and anxious a soldier as Sir Colin reported the position secure, he would more or less impart his own trustfulness to Headquarters ; and it is not to be wondered at that, when thus assured, Lord Raglan abstained from weakening his scant resources by sending down any further detachments of infantry.

The Turkish redoubts, though capable of supplying useful aid to an army, had no such means of independent self-defence as to warrant the notion of their holding out without support ; and it is evident that, in the absence of infantry, nothing short of a vigilant and brilliant use of the cavalry arm would enable the Turks to withstand a determined attack. I cannot say whether Sir Colin Campbell’s sense of security was in any

high degree founded upon the cavalry, or whether, for once, he went along with the herd in his estimate of what could be insured by a little upturn of the soil with a few Turks standing behind it.

CHAP.  
I.

A main defect in the arrangements of the Allies was the one under which it resulted that those divisions of infantry on the Chersonese which lay the nearest to the plain below were not the troops of the nation which undertook to defend Balaclava. Bosquet, with two divisions, was so posted on the edge of the Chersonese upland, that, judging from their position alone, his troops might have been naturally looked to as the first to descend into the plain for the defence of Balaclava ; and, besides that General Bosquet was an ardent soldier, and a man most loyal in action, there is no reason for supposing that mere difference of nationality alone would have made the French slow to come down to the aid of Sir Colin Campbell ; but the fact of the interposed force being under the orders of a commander other than Lord Raglan, made a dangerous break in the chain by which the Allies held together. It was only by persuading General Canrobert to allow it, that the nearest of the battalions on the Chersonese could be made to partake in a battle upon the plain of Balaclava ; and the exceeding scantiness of the infantry force which Lord Raglan had been able to spare for the immediate defence of the place made it a thing of great moment that the promptest possible despatch of reinforcements

**C H A P.** I. should not be left dependent upon the result of persuasions addressed to an independent commander, more especially where the commander whose assent thus had to be gained was a man of a hesitating and anxious temperament.

Defects  
in the  
subsidiary  
arrange-  
ments of  
the Allies

Independently of the inherent fault that there was in this outer line of defence, the subsidiary arrangements were far from being calculated to avert a disaster.

One important omission was this: In all the works constituting this outer line, the Turkish soldiery were left without that strengthening help which might have been afforded them by the presence in each redoubt of one or two Englishmen accustomed to rule Orientals; and the want was in no way supplied by sending, instead, a non-commissioned officer of artillery.\* Then, again, since the cavalry was much looked to as an arm to ward off for some time any Russian attack, it would have been well to avoid a severance of authority by placing under one commander the whole of the forces, whether horse, or foot, or artillery, which were charged with the

\* In the mere mechanical business of working a gun the Turkish Topdji is likely to be quite as well skilled as an English artilleryman. What is wanted for converting a herd of Turks into a formidable body of warriors is the presence of a resolute man or boy of a higher station in life, who will undertake to lead them. The singular power that can be exerted over a Turkish force by a dozen, by six, nay even by two young English officers is spoken of in the 'Invasion of the Crimea,' vol. ii. of Cabinet Edition, chap. xiii. Notwithstanding all that had been achieved in the defence of Silistria and on the field of Giurgevo, there was an entire neglect of the means which there produced such brilliant results.

defence of Balaclava; for excellent as was the understanding between Lord Lucan and Sir Colin Campbell, their concord was no equivalent for the advantage which belongs to absolute unity of command.

CHAP.  
I.

---

Above all, if the plan of defence were to rest at all on our cavalry, there was cogent need of an effort to neutralise in some measure the vice of Lord Hardinge's peace-service appointments, and to make arrangements for giving more or less of initiative power in the field to men such as Morris and Elliot, who were practised in war, and knew by their own experience what it was to lead squadrons in battle. No such effort was made.

It was against these defences of Balaclava that Prince Mentschikoff now resolved to direct an attack. So early as the night of the 13th of the month, Colonel Rakovitch, with three battalions, four guns, and a couple of hundred Cossacks, had ventured down from the Mackenzie Heights; and having been suffered at break of day on the following morning to take possession of the village of Tchorgoun, he there established the nucleus of a force complete in all arms, which thenceforth began to gather in the valley of the Tchernaya. On the 23d, this force had been definitely constituted as the 'Detachment of Tchorgoun,' and placed under the command of General Liprandi. The force comprised 17 battalions of foot, 30 squadrons of horse,\* and 64 guns. But besides

Mentschi-  
koff's pur-  
pose:

the forces  
collected  
for this  
enterprise

\* 20 squadrons of regular cavalry, and 10 'sotnias' (or, as I

C H A P. <sup>1.</sup> the troops under the orders of Liprandi, there was a distinct force, commanded by General Jabrokritsky, and comprising some 8 battalions,\* 4 squadrons of horse, and 14 guns, which had orders to co-operate with the Detachment of Tchorgoun. Altogether, therefore, the force set apart for the attack upon the defences of Balaclava comprised 25 battalions, 34 squadrons of horse, and 78 guns. The numerical strength of the force is not to be learned with strict accuracy;† but it seems to have amounted to about 24, or 25,000 men.‡

The object  
of the con-  
templated  
attack.

For a sound appreciation of the battle of Balaclava, it would be well to know what was the object contemplated by the assailant. His pri-

have above called them ‘squadrons’) of Cossacks. A ‘sotnia’ imported only a full ‘hundred’ of mounted Cossacks, but the ‘squadron’ of regular cavalry at the opening of a campaign had a strength of about 156.

\* Literally, 7 and  $\frac{3}{4}$ ths.

† Because, at the period in question, the ‘morning states’ of the infantry had been left uncorrected since the beginning of the month, and the ‘states’ of the cavalry were wanting altogether.—Todleben, p. 388.

‡ On the 25th of October 1854 the most recent ‘states’ of the infantry strength were those which had been furnished at the beginning of the month; and these, together with the estimated reckoning of the cavalry (of which no ‘states’ had been prepared), give a total of 23,425, without counting the artillerymen, who (at 30 men for each gun) would number 2340, making, altogether, 25,725; but it is right to say that General de Todleben (by making a guess at the deductions from strength which may have occurred since the beginning of the month, and by reducing the estimate of the cavalry strength) cuts down the total effective to 20,500 (pp. 388-390). In that estimate, however, he does not, I believe, include the 2340 artillerymen.

mary design was to seize the outer line of defence and the camp of the 93d Highlanders, as well as the camp of the Turks established near Kadiköi.\* It is plain, however, that the enterprise of an assailant who might attain to so much as that would be strangely collapsing if he were to stay his victorious advance without doing all he could to bring ruin upon the English in the small crowded port from which they drew their supplies ; and the possession of a spot from which it would have been practicable to shell Balaclava must needs have been coveted. The destruction of the root which the English had taken in Balaclava may therefore, perhaps, be regarded as the real, though ulterior object of the intended attack.

The force destined for the attack upon the Turkish redoubts was divided into three columns. The left column was commanded by General Gribb  , the centre column by General Semia- kine, the right column by Colonel Scudery ; and, with that last force, General Jabrokritsky's detachment was in close co-operation. Gribb   was to issue from the direction of the Baidar valley, seize the heights of Kamara, and thence take part in the attack directed against Can- robert's Hill. General Semiakine, at the same time, was to advance against Canrobert's Hill, and the Redoubt Number Two, by the road which leads from Tehorgoun to Kadik  i.

Colonel Scudery's column was to issue from

CHAP.  
I.

Distribution  
of the Rus-  
sian force:

tasks  
assigned  
to each  
column.

\* Todleben, pp. 384, 387, 388.

CHAP. I.—the Tractir road, march across the North Valley, and thence advance upon the Arabtabia or Redoubt 'Number Three.'

The main body of the cavalry with its attendant batteries was to enter the North Valley, and there form in columns of attack to await Liprandi's next orders.

A battalion of the Ukraine regimneut, with a company of riflemen and a battery of field-artillery, was to constitute the reserve.

Finally, General Jabrokritsky, though not under the orders of Liprandi, was to cover the intended attack by descending from the region of Mackenzie's Farm and taking post on the Fedioukine Hills.

Notwithstanding the trust they repose in the direct intervention of Heaven, the Turks know how to eke out their faith by means sufficiently human; and being too warlike a people to be careless of the value of foreknowledge in regard to the designs of the enemy, they see the use of a scout. The officer who had the merit of obtaining, at this time, good, decisive intelligence, was Rustem Pasha, the Turkish Brigadier-General. On the 24th of October, a spy employed by him brought back an account which disclosed Liprandi's designs for the morrow. The man announced that troops to the number of 25,000, and of all arms, were to march upon the plain of Balaclava, and he even prepared his hearers to expect an advance from the direction of Baidar. He was carefully examined by Lord Lucan, as well

24th Oct.  
Information  
of the  
enemy's ap-  
proaching  
attack.

as by Sir Colin Campbell ; and, both generals coming to the conclusion that this report was well worthy of attention, Lord Bingham (his father's aide-de-camp) was sent by Lord Lucan to Headquarters with a letter from Sir Colin Campbell conveying the intelligence. Lord Bingham delivered the letter and the tidings it conveyed to the Quartermaster-General, but did not succeed in obtaining an interview with Lord Raglan, who was then engaged with Canrobert. General Airey, it is true, interrupted the conference of the two Commanders, and showed Lord Raglan the letter ; but the answer first elicited was only a message of acknowledgment sent back in the words, 'Very well !' Afterwards Lord Raglan requested that any new occurrence which might take place should be reported to him ; but no fresh orders resulted from the information thus furnished. The truth is that only a few days before, Lord Raglan had been induced by a similar report to send down 1000 men of the 4th Division, who had to be marched back when it proved that the enemy was not advancing.\* He could ill afford to exhaust the time and strength of his men in those marches and countermarches, and he seems to have come to the conclusion that it would be inexpedient for him to be again despatching reinforcements to the outer line of defence in the plain of Balaclava, unless he should learn that the enemy was actually advancing against it.

\* This was on the 21st of October.

## III.

C H A P.

I.

---

25th Oct.  
The hour  
before day-  
breakAdvance  
of Lord  
Lucan and  
his Staff.Break of  
day. Two  
flags seen  
flying from  
the fort on  
Canrobert's  
HillThe import  
of this.

Fire opened.

In accordance with its daily custom, the English cavalry on the morning of the 25th of October had turned out an hour before daybreak; and the men were standing to their horses when Lord Lucan, already in the saddle and followed by his Staff, moved off at a walk towards Canrobert's Hill. Two of the Divisional Staff—Lord William Paulet, I think, and Major M'Mahon, who had now, it seems, been joined by Lord George Paget—were riding some distance in rear of their chief, and had come within about 300 paces of Canrobert's Hill, when a streak of pale light in the horizon before them began to disclose the morning. Presently, there was grey enough to show through the dusk that Canrobert's Hill was not without its standard; but soon, it became almost clear, and presently afterwards certain, that from the flag-staff of the work two ensigns were flying. ‘Holloa!’ said one, ‘there are two flags flying! What does that mean?’ ‘Why, that surely,’ said another,—‘that surely is the arranged signal—the signal that the enemy is advancing. Are you quite sure?’ The questioner was soon answered; for scarcely had he spoken when the fort opened fire from one of its 12-pounder guns. The Staff-officers hurried forward to overtake their chief; and Lord George Paget galloped back at speed to the cavalry camp, where (in the absence of Lord Cardigan, who had the practice of sleeping on board his yacht, and

had not yet come up from Balaclava) he took CHAP.  
I.  
upon himself to mount the Light Brigade. He Orders to  
our cavalry.  
had hardly done this when a messenger came in from the front with an order despatched by Lord Lucan (then reconnoitring with Sir Colin Campbell in the direction of our advanced post) which directed the immediate advance of the cavalry.

Thus it seems that the Turks not only obtained the earliest intelligence of the impending attack, but were also the first to perceive the advance of the enemy. The elevation of Canrobert's Hill may have aided their surveys; but without being watchful and sagacious, they could hardly have succeeded in being beforehand with so keen a soldier as Sir Colin Campbell.

We watched the sweet slumbers of a Cabinet whilst assenting to the cogent despatch which enforced this invasion; but now, in the midst of the campaign, and at a moment when accounts have come in, which announce an attack for the morrow in the direction of the Baidar valley, we may steal before break of day to the ground where the enemy is expected, and there, seek our ideal of vigilance in the outlying cavalry picket.

We shall seek in vain. The English soldier's want of vigilance is so closely allied to some of his greatest qualities (as, for instance, to his pride, and his sullen unwillingness to be put out of his way by mere danger), that our countrymen incline to think of it with indulgence, nay, perhaps, with an unconfessed liking; but if the fault is in some measure natural and characteristic, it has been

CHAP.  
I. aggravated apparently by the empty ceremonies of military duty in peace-time ; for to go on rehearsing men day after day, and year after year, in the art of giving and taking pretended alarms about nothing, and to carry on these rehearsals by means of formulated sentences, is to do all that perverted industry can towards preventing, instead of securing, the ‘bright look-out’ of the seaman.

The relation that there is between standing armies and war bears analogy to that which connects endowed Churches with religion ;\* and, in particular, the Anglican arrangements for securing the infant mind against heresy show a curious resemblance to those which are made during peace for preventing surprises in war-time. Whether aiming at the one or the other of these objects, man tries to secure it by formula. Just as through the means of set questions and answers, the anxious theologian arms children against ‘false doctrine,’ in the trust that, when they come to riper years, they may know how to treat his opponents, so also with him who makes rules for the governance of soldiers in peace-time, the hope,

\* I have been justly reminded by Dean Stanley that the practice of arming young creatures with dogma is not at all confined to established churches ; and, as now corrected, I agree that, although not furnished by the State, any funds provided for a particular worship in a continuous, chronic way, have a tendency to produce the effect mentioned in the text. It seems that in some of the churches got up by subscription the theology professed by the children is much more bold and violent than that which obtains in our Anglican nurseries.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

it seems, is that they may learn to be vigilant CHAP.  
1. against night surprises by repeatedly saying their catechism. The common 'challenge' is brief; but, it being foreseen that he who is appointed to watch may himself require watching, there have been constituted for that purpose the functionaries called 'visiting rounds,' whose duty it is to see that the sentries are at their posts and awake; but, since this very task of supervision has itself also lapsed into form, the result is, that at a military post requiring great vigilance, there goes on, all night, a reiteration of set questions and answers, which tends to avert real watchfulness by suggesting that a mere formal sign of not being absolutely asleep will sufficiently answer the purpose. Men trained to 'look out' as do sailors, are more likely to pierce to the utmost of what eye and ear can reach, than those who are repeating to one another, and repeating and repeating all night, set lessons, of which this is one: 'Halt! who goes there?' 'Rounds!' 'What rounds?' 'Visiting rounds!' 'Visiting rounds advance! All's well!' When these words have been reiterated by the same men a few thousand times, they are as lulling as the monotone waves that beat and still beat on the shore. The truth is, that the object of securing a really keen watchfulness is one which lies out of the true scope of mechanical arrangements. A man's wits may be easily deadened, they can hardly be sharpened, by formula.

Far from detecting the earliest signs of an <sup>The out-lying picket.</sup> advance in force, and being at once driven in, our

**C H A P.** outlying picket enjoyed its tranquillity to the last, and was only, indeed, saved from capture, by the ‘field officer of the day,’ who learnt, as he rode, what was passing, and conveyed to the men of the watch—just in time to secure their escape—that warning of the enemy’s approach which they themselves should have given.

**Lord Lucan  
and Sir  
Colin Camp-  
bell.**

Lord Lucan and Sir Colin Campbell were together a good way in advance; and, as day broke, they saw the enemy’s columns of infantry in march—saw them converging upon the easterly approaches of the Causeway Heights from the directions of Tchorgoun and Baidar. It soon became apparent that, whatever might be his ulterior design, Liprandi’s first object was the seizure of the Turkish defences, beginning with Canrobert’s Hill; and Lord Lucan did not fail to despatch an aide-de-camp to Headquarters with intelligence of the impending attack.\*

**Intelligence  
sent off to  
Lord Rag-  
lan.**

**Lord  
Lucan’s  
disposition  
of the cav-  
alry and  
horse-  
artillery.**

Our cavalry was brought forward; and the guns of Maude’s troop of horse-artillery were got into battery on the right of the Arabtabia or Number Three Redoubt. The Light Cavalry regiments were placed in reserve under the southern slopes of the Causeway Heights; and Lord Lucan, then acting in person with his Heavy Brigade, sought to check the advance of the enemy by ‘demonstrations;’ † but—with the full approval of Sir Colin Campbell, who indeed

\* Captain Charteris was the officer sent.

† ‘Lord Lucan with the Heavy Cavalry moved about, making demonstrations and threatening the enemy.’

seems to have counselled this policy—he determined to confine himself to threats. His threats failed to deter; for the Russians pursued their design like men who had yet found no hindrance; and indeed it seems probable that the firmness of purpose they soon after disclosed was in some measure occasioned by the circumstance of their having detected our cavalry leader in a determination to threaten without striking. Since the ground, in most places, was favourable for the manœuvring of horsemen, with no such obstructions as would prevent them from attempting flank attacks on the enemy's infantry and artillery, it may be that a cavalry officer fresh from war-service would have been able to check Liprandi, and to check him, again and again, without sustaining grave loss; but if a man can so wield a body of cavalry as to make it the means of thus arresting for a time an attack of infantry and artillery without much committing his squadrons, he has attained 'to high art' in his calling; and to expect a peace-service general to achieve such a task, is much as though one should take a house-painter at hazard and bid him portray a Madonna. There were riding amongst our squadrons men well tried in war—men famed alike for their valour and their skill as cavalry officers; and although the perversity of our State authorities laboured, as it were, to neutralise the unspeakable value of such experience by putting the men who possessed it under peace-service generals, yet if Campbell's command

CHAP.

I.

The enemy  
pursuing  
his design.

**CHAP.  
I.** had included that cavalry arm which formed so large a proportion of the scanty resources standing ready at the first for defence, it is imaginable that he would have been able to say a few words to some such a man as Morris or Alexander Elliot, which would have had the effect of checking the enemy without bringing grave loss on our squadrons.\* Such a result would appear to be the more within reach, when it is remembered that Liprandi's advance was in three columns moving upon 'external lines' without speedy means of inter-communication, and that Gribb 's column — the one upon which the whole enterprise much depended—comprised only three battalions of infantry.†

**General  
Gribb   
seizing  
Kamara:**

**and opening  
fire on the  
Redoubt  
No. 1.**

The Russians had begun their advance at five o'clock in the morning. Without encountering the least opposition, General Gribb , moving forward from the direction of the Baidar valley with three battalions, a squadron of horse, and ten pieces of cannon, had been suffered to take possession of the village of Kamara; and when there, he was not only enabled to cover the advance of the assailing forces on their left flank, but also on the high ground above—ground commanding the object of attack—to establish his ten guns in battery, with the purpose of directing their fire, at

\* I refer to Captain Morris (commanding the 17th Lancers) and Lieutenant Alexander Elliot (aide-de-camp to General Scarlett) merely as the two war-service officers of cavalry then in the Crimea whose names first occur to me. They were both of them men who had earned fame in honest war.

† See, in the Appendix, Lord Lucan's view as to this.

close range, upon the work crowning Canrobert's Hill.\*

CHAP.  
I.

Nearly at the same time, Semiakine's forces having advanced from Tchorgoun gained the slopes of the ridge on the north-east and north of Canrobert's Hill. With five battalions (besides a separate body of riflemen) and ten guns, General Semiakine in person prepared to operate against the work on Canrobert's Hill;† whilst, on his right, General Levoutsky took up a like position with three more battalions and ten guns.‡ His goal was the Redoubt Number Two.

At the same time Colonel Scudery, who with the four Odessa battalions, a company of riflemen, three squadrons of Cossacks, and a field-battery, had advanced from the Tractir bridge, was now moving upon the Arabtabia.§

The main body of the cavalry under General Ryjoff, with its attendant troops of horse-artillery,

\* This battery included, besides six light field-pieces of the No. 6 Light Battery, four guns of heavier calibre belonging to the Position Battery No. 4 (Liprandi's despatch, October 26, 1854). The three battalions were the 1st, 2d, and 3d battalions of the Dnieper regiment. The squadron was one belonging to Jeropkine's Lancers.

† With four battalions of the Azoff regiment, one—viz., the 4th—of the Dnieper battalions, the 2d company of the Rifle battalion, four heavy guns of the Position Battery No. 4, and six pieces of the Light Battery No. 6.

‡ The three Ukraine battalions, four heavy guns of the Position Battery No. 4, and six guns of the Light Battery No. 7.

§ On Redoubt 'Number Three.' The riflemen forming part of Scudery's column were of the 4th Rifle battalion, the Cossacks of the 53d Cossack Regiment, and the battery was No. 7 of the 12th brigade.

Advance of  
Semiakine:

of Levout-  
sky:

C H A P.  
I.

was already in the North Valley, and supporting the advance of the columns.

The emergency in which Lord Lucan had to act:

Whilst the Russians were marching upon the heights which they now occupied, and whilst they were there establishing their thirty guns in battery, Lord Lucan, as we see, was present with a superb division of cavalry, and this upon fine ground, which, although, it is true uneven, was still upon the whole very free from formidable obstructions; but, except his six light pieces of horse-artillery, he was wanting in the ordnance arm, and of infantry forces he had none. Thus, then, by a somewhat rare concurrence of circumstances, there was brought about an emergency which enforced, and enforced most cogently, the decision of a question involving more or less the general usefulness of the cavalry arm.

Some are chary, it seems, of acknowledging a condition of things in which cavalry can be used for the repression of the ordnance arm. Others fully agreeing that a body of horse, with its great extent of vulnerable surface, must beware of coming, or at all events of remaining, under the fire of artillery, are yet of opinion that cavalry, after all, is the very arm which, in many contingencies, can best be exerted against the power of ordnance. They say that artillery in march, or engaged in unlimbering, is good prey for horsemen; that artillery established in battery is assailable by horsemen at its flanks; and that, in general, where the country is at all open, a powerful and well-handled cavalry ought to be able to challenge the dominion of artillery by harassing it incess-

santly, by preventing it from getting into battery, and, failing that, by disquieting its batteries when formed.

The decision of Lord Lucan was much governed <sup>his decision</sup> by a sense of the great need there would be for the aid of our cavalry if the enemy, after carrying all the outer defences, should come on and attack Balaclava,\* but it would also seem that his determination—a determination entirely approved, and even, I hear, originated by Sir Colin Campbell—involved a leaning to the first of the two opinions above indicated.

Be this as it may, the result was that, without being met by any hindrance on the part of our cavalry, the Russians were suffered to advance from three points of the compass and converge upon the chain of little redoubts which extended from Canrobert's Hill to the Arabtabia. The thousand or twelve hundred Turks who manned the three works thus assailed saw converging upon them some eleven thousand infantry and thirty-eight guns. Upon the heights of Kamara, which overlooked Canrobert's Hill from the east, and upon the part of the Causeway Heights which overlooked the same work from the north, the enemy placed thirty guns in battery; and he now opened fire upon the work crowning Canrobert's Hill, as also upon the Fort Number Two. He <sup>Artillery fire.</sup> was answered by the Turks with their five 12-pounders;† and, for a while, by our troop of

CHAP.  
I.

\* See Lord Lucan's statement in the Appendix.

† Three on Canrobert's Hill, and a couple on the Number Two Redoubt.

CHAP.  
I.

Maude's  
troops sent  
back.

horse-artillery, but apparently with little effect. Captain Maude, the officer commanding the troop, was horribly wounded by a shell which entered the body of his horse and there burst.

Maude's troop had come into action without a due following of waggons; and, before long, its ammunition was already so nearly exhausted as to leave but a small supply for even one gun.

As soon as Lord Lucan heard this, he ordered that the troop should be withdrawn and kept out of fire until the want could be supplied.\*

The guns  
on Canro-  
bert's Hill  
silenced.

Continued  
resistance  
of the Turks.

Dispositions  
made by  
General  
Semiakine  
for storming

It was hardly to be expected that under the fire of thirty guns, including eight pieces of heavy calibre, the three 12-pounders which formed the armament of Canrobert's Hill would long remain undamaged. The fort became silent, and already the hapless battalion which manned it must have undergone heavy slaughter; but notwithstanding this, and although it became now apparent that the hill was to be attacked by largely outnumbering bodies of infantry, the brave Turks were still unconquered. They moved, indeed, from the unsheltered part of the work to the side where more cover was offered; but there, they stood fast, and awaited the attack of the infantry.†

It was with the five battalions acting under his personal direction that General Semiakine determined to storm Canrobert's Hill. Covered by the


\* Ibid. Maude's severe wound was the reason why Lord Lucan instituted no inquiry as to the cause which led to this want of ammunition.

† This sketch may help to illustrate the attack of the eleven battalions, with thirty guns, upon the two little works, No.

fire of the artillery, and by two companies of riflemen pushed forward in skirmishing order, he advanced rapidly with three battalions of the Azoff regiment, disposed in columns of company, and so ranged in two lines of columns as that the first line was only about 100 paces in advance of the second. In a third line, General Semiakine brought up the 1st battalion of the Azoff regiment and the 4th of the Dnieper battalions, each formed in a 'column of attack.' Advancing in this order, he approached to within about 100 paces of the hill-top, and at once gave the signal for the assault. Then the two foremost lines of columns, led by Colonel Krudener, the commander of the Azoff regiment, and supported by the two One and No. Two, which were defended by about 1000 or 1200 Turks with five guns.

C H A P.  
I.  
Canrobert's  
Hill.

The work  
stormed.



CHAP.

I.

Overwhelming strength  
of the Russians in  
point of numbers.

columns of attack, moved rapidly forward. Encountering no fire of cannon to check them, the foremost of these troops converged from their extended front upon the small object of their attack, swarmed in across the ditch, swarmed over the feeble parapet, and, standing at length within the fort, closed at once with the remnant of the single battalion there bravely awaiting the onslaught. The force which thus stormed the work, and which threw itself upon the remnant of the one Turkish battalion, consisted, as we see, of five battalions ; but on the side of Kamara, the three other Dnieper battalions were so operating that Sir Colin Campbell regarded them as actual partakers in the attack ; and, moreover, Levoutsky's three Ukraine battalions, though not engaged in the storming, were still so placed at the time as to be aiding the assault by their presence. Upon the whole, therefore, it may be said that, after having undergone an overwhelming cross-fire from the thirty pieces of artillery, which hurled destruction upon them at close range from commanding heights, the one battalion of Turks which defended this feeble breastwork, was now pressed by a number of battalions amounting to no less than eleven, and engaged in close conflict with five.

Close fighting between  
the Turks and the  
Russians.

It commonly happens in modern warfare that the dominion of one body of infantry over another is not found to depend, at the last, upon the physical strength of man, or the quality of his weapons, but rather upon faith, or, in other words

upon sense of power. In this instance, however, the assailants and the assailed were both so resolute that, for once, the actual clash of arms was not to be averted by opinion. The many flooded in upon the few, overwhelming, surrounding, destroying, yet still confronted with heroic desperation, and owing all the way they could make to the sheer fighting of the men, who thus closed with their Mussulman foe, and to the weight of the numbers behind them. With much slaughter of the devoted Turks—who lost, in killed only, no less than 170 out of perhaps about five or six hundred men—the work was carried at half-past seven o'clock, with its standard and its guns; but it seems that, before moving out, the English artilleryman who had been placed in the redoubt to assist the Turks took care to spike the guns which had armed it. The colours of the Azoff regiment now floated from the summit of Canrobert's Hill.

When the Turks in the three next redoubts saw how it had fared with their brethren on Canrobert's Hill, and perceived that, under the eyes of some 1500 English horse, the work was left to fall into the enemy's hands without a squadron being launched to support it by any attack on the foe, they had what to them would seem reason for thinking ill things of the Christians, and were not without warrant for judging that the English would fail to support them in any endeavour they might make to defend the remaining forts. But whether these Osmanlis reasoned, or whether they

The fort  
at length  
carried.

Abandon-  
ment by  
the Turks  
of the  
three next  
redoubts.

CHAP.  
I.

Their flight  
under fire  
of artillery,  
and pursued  
in some  
places by  
Cossacks.

simply caught fear, as people catch plague, by contagion, they at all events loosed their hold.\* Without waiting for a conflict with the three Ukraine battalions, then already advancing to the assault, or the four Odessa battalions, then also advancing, they at once began to make off, taking with them their quilts and the rest of their simple camp treasures. Coming west with these burthens upon them, they looked more like a tribe in a state of migration than troops engaged in retreat. In their flight they were followed for a while by the fire of the Russian artillery ; and although Lord Lucan sought to cover their retreat with his cavalry, the Cossacks, at some points, pursued, and were able to spear many of the fugitives. Captain Tatham, however, the senior naval officer in the harbour of Balaclava, now chanced to come up, and although he knew no Turkish, he yet by his peculiarly cheery voice and gesture was able to rally the fugitives who most nearly approached him, and cause them to align with their brethren on the right of the 93d. Rustem Pasha had a horse shot under him.

The enemy  
entering  
four of the  
redoubts;

The enemy not only established a portion of his forces on Canrobert's Hill, but likewise in the Number Two Redoubt, as well as in the Arabtabia or Number Three ; and he took possession of the seven iron 12-pounder guns with which the three works had been armed. He also, with the Odessa battalions, marched into the Redoubt Number

\* In those redoubts, as in the Number One, the English artilleryman present in each is said to have spiked the guns.

Four; but instead of undertaking to hold the work, he did what he could to raze and dismantle it. He then withdrew, because he deemed the position too far in advance to allow of his undertaking to hold it.

C H A P.  
I.  
and estab-  
lishing  
himself in  
three of  
them.

Our cavalry now became exposed to some musketry shots which were successfully directed against it from the positions of the lost redoubts; and, as it was also apparent that our horsemen were in the line of the fire which the gunners along our inner line of defence might soon have occasion to open, Lord Lucan, in accordance with an arrangement to that effect which had been preconcerted with Sir Colin Campbell, drew off his division to that part of the South Valley which lay opposite to the interval between the Number Four and the Number Five Redoubts. The position he then took up was across the valley, his squadrons facing eastward. He was so placed as to be able to take in flank any enemy's force which might bend away from the valley and endeavour to pass to the south, with intent to assail Balaclava.

Fresh dis-  
position of  
our cavalry

Such, then, was the first period of the battle of Balaclava; and it must be acknowledged that the engagement, if it had closed at this time, would have furnished a distressing page for the military history of England. War often demands bitter sacrifices, and may sometimes force men to repress—not only their generous impulses, but—even those appeals of the conscience which a too fiery

Obser-  
vations upon  
the first  
period of  
the battle.

CHAP. I. soldier might treat as the absolute dictates of honour. It may therefore well be that Lord Lucan performed a stern duty, when (with the sanction of Sir Colin Campbell) he determined that our cavalry must be patient of the attack directed against Canrobert's Hill, must endure to see English guns captured, must suffer our allies to be slaughtered without striking a blow to defend them ; and the soundness of his conclusion can hardly be determined by the casuists, but rather by those who know something of the conditions in which the power of the cavalry arm (when cavalry chances to be the only available force) can be wisely, and therefore rightly, exerted.\*

If our people in general had known the truth, they would have been guilty of unspeakable meanness when they cast off all blame from themselves, and laid it upon the Turkish soldiery—upon men who had been not only entrusted to the honour and friendship of our army, but were actually engaged at a post of danger in defending the first approaches to the English port of supply.†

The truth is, however, that the great bulk of

\* The opinion of our cavalry, so far as I have been able to observe it, tends to sanction Lord Lucan's decision.

† Lord Lucan was never one of those who thus spoke. He could see the nature of the conflict on Canrobert's Hill, and I believe he has always spoken generously of the firmness with which the Turks awaited the onslaught of overpowering numbers. Sir Colin Campbell was also a spectator ; and he says in his despatch,—‘The Turkish troops in No. One persisted as long ‘as they could, and then retired.’

our army (including Lord Raglan himself) had CHAP  
I. regarded the work on Canrobert's Hill as a fast-  
ness susceptible of a protracted defence ; and—  
strange as the statement may seem—were, for a  
long time, unacquainted with the nature of the  
conflict there sustained by the brave Turkish  
soldiery. Several causes contributed to obscure  
the truth. In the first place, the defence of the  
work, though carried to extremity, was still of  
necessity brief ; for when once the men, numbered  
by thousands, had swarmed in over a feeble para-  
pet on the top of an isolated hillock which was  
held by only some 500 or 600 men, the end, of  
course, could not be distant ; and although there  
were numbers of our cavalry men who had been  
so posted as to be able to see that the Turks  
stood their ground with desperation, and were in  
close bodily strife with the enemy before they  
gave way under his overwhelming numbers, yet  
to the great bulk of the spectators, whether Eng-  
lish or French, who gazed from the steeps of the  
Chersonese, no such spectacle was presented.  
They looked from the west ; and, the attack being  
made upon the north-eastern acclivity of Can-  
robert's Hill, they saw nothing of the actual clash  
that occurred between the brave few and the  
resolute many. They descried the enemy on the  
heights of Kamara and on the line of the Woron-  
zoff road, but lost sight of him when from that  
last position he had descended into the hollow to  
make his final assault ; and soon afterwards, with-  
out having been able to make out what had passed

CHAP. I.—in the interval, they saw the Turkish soldiery beginning to stream down from the gorge of the work. Then almost immediately they saw the red fezzes pouring out from the other redoubts, so that what they observed on the whole was a general flight of the Turks. They saw nothing of the fierce though short strife which ended in the slaughter of 170 out of the 500 or 600 men on Canrobert's Hill; and I believe it may be said that the loss sustained by the devoted garrison of this little field-work long remained unknown to the English. Considering that the Turkish soldiery died fighting in defence of the English lines, this may seem very strange and unnatural; but the truth is, that between the soldiers of the Prophet and the men of our Army List there was so great a gulf that it proved much more than broad enough to obstruct the transmission of military statistics. The man temporal who would ask for a 'Morning State,' with its column after column of figures is baffled, of course, by the man spiritual, who replies, that by the blessing of the Almighty his servants are as the leaves of the forest; and soon ceases to apply for a list of 'casualties' if he only elicits an answer asserting the goodness of God and an indefinite accession of believers to the promised gardens of Paradise.\* Certainly, Lord Raglan remained long un-

\* I find in the correspondence between the French and English Headquarters some trace of an attempt on the part of one of the hapless Turkish commanders to have justice done to his people; but probably the remonstrant did not know how to

acquainted with the nature of the defence which the Turks had opposed to the enemy on Canrobert's Hill.\* It was from ignorance of the bare facts, and not from dishonest or ungenerous motives, that our people threw blame on the Turkish soldiery.

CHAP.  
I.

#### IV.

All this while, the French and the English commanders on the Chersonese had been too distant from the scene of the attack against the Turkish redoubts to be able to sway the result; but they, each of them, proceeded to make arrangements for ulterior operations.

Upon being apprised of the impending attack, Lord Raglan had at once ridden up to that part of the ridge which best overlooked the scene of the then commencing engagement. The spot he occupied was one close to the Col, on the north side of the road. Thence he witnessed the capture of the work on Canrobert's Hill, and the flight of the Turks from the other redoubts;—and as soon as his sure, rapid glance had enabled him to apprehend the probable scope and purport of his assailant's design, he determined to move

Lord Raglan:

his dispositions

state a fact in such way as to obtain for it any real access to the European mind, for it does not appear that he succeeded in conveying any clear idea to the mind of General Canrobert.

\* This is shown very clearly by the tenor of his correspondence. Any one who ever had means of judging of Lord Raglan's nature must be able to imagine the eagerness with which, upon learning the truth, he would have hastened to redress the wrong done.

CHAP.  
I.— down two out of his five infantry divisions for the defence of Balaclava. The 1st Division, under the Duke of Cambridge, and the 4th Division, under General Cathcart, were accordingly despatched upon this service.

The order to the Duke of Cambridge was in substance apparently to descend into the south valley by a line some way to the right of the Woronzoff road; and at all events, Lord Raglan was well satisfied with the way in which H.R.H. obeyed the command.

With respect to Cathcart, it was otherwise, and a detailed statement is necessary. On observing the flight of the Turks, Lord Raglan at once called to him a staff-officer, and desired him to proceed as quickly as possible to Sir George Cathcart, and to request him to move his Division immediately to the assistance of Sir Colin Campbell.\* The officer was just starting, when General Airey came up to him and said, ‘Remember you are on ‘no account whatever to conduct the 4th Divi-

\* There was, I think, some ambiguity in this order, for it might either mean that the 4th Division was to make straight for the immediate front of Balaclava, or for that part of Sir Colin’s ground from which the Turks had just fled; but the very able staff-officer entrusted with the mission had no doubt that the first of these objects was the one meant, and as a circumstance favouring that view it should be borne in mind that Balaclava was then in danger of an attack from the east as well as from the north. My impression is, that the second of the two objects was the one contemplated by Lord Raglan; but even on that supposition—for recourse to the Woronzoff road was strictly and rightly prohibited—the route by the Col (which was practicable for artillery) was probably the best that could be taken by a force marching from Cathcart’s camp.

sion by the Woronzoff road. He said this with marked emphasis.' The officer then galloped as fast as he could to the 4th Division camp, and found Sir George Cathcart dressed and seated in his tent. Then followed this colloquy:—

STAFF-OFFICER.—Lord Raglan requests you, Sir George, to move your Division immediately to the assistance of the Turks.

CATHCART.—Quite impossible, sir, for the 4th Division to move.

STAFF-OFFICER.—My orders were very positive, and the Russians are advancing upon Balaklava.

CATHCART.—I can't help that, sir. It is impossible for my Division to move, as the greater portion of the men have only just come from the trenches. The best thing you can do is to sit down and take some breakfast with me.

STAFF-OFFICER (after respectfully declining the invitation).—My orders are to request that you will move your Division immediately to the assistance of Sir Colin Campbell. I feel sure every moment is of consequence. Sir Colin Campbell has only the 93d Highlanders with him. I saw the Turks in full flight from the redoubts.

CATHCART.—Well, sir, if you will not sit down in my tent, you may as well go back to Lord Raglan, and tell him that I cannot move my Division.

The staff-officer touched his cap, left the tent, and rode off a few yards considering how he could best act. After a few moments' consideration, he saw all the terrible consequences that

CHAP.  
I.

CHAP.  
L

might result from his yielding to Cathcart. His mind was soon made up. He returned to Sir George Cathcart, and at once told him that he (the staff-officer) should not return to Lord Raglan; that he had received orders to come for the 4th Division, and that he should remain till it was ready to move off. He pointed out firmly but respectfully that much valuable time had been lost, and said he still hoped that Sir George would give orders for the Division to fall in. Sir George listened attentively to all the staff-officer urged, and then to his great relief said, 'Very well, sir; ' I will consult with my staff-officers, and see if 'anything can be done.' Cathcart then went away, and in a short time some bugles sounded, and the division began to turn out. Under the guidance of the staff-officers (who considered that Kadiköi was the point to make for), the Division marched off to the Col.\*

Lord Raglan, however, was not without suspicion that the operations in the plain of Balaclava might be a feint, and that the real attack might be made from Sebastopol upon the besieging forces. He took care to make provision for such a contingency; and his oral directions for the purpose were conveyed by Lieutenant Calthorpe, one of his aides-de-camp, to Sir Richard England, the Commander of the 3d Division.

General Canrobert, also, upon hearing of the

\* Circumstances indicative of Cathcart's state of temper, and in some measure tending to account for it, will be found narrated *post*, chap. iii.

attack galloped up to the ridge overlooking the Balaclava plain ; and ultimately, though not all at once, the French Commander moved down to the foot of the heights both Vinoy's and Espinasse's brigades of infantry, and also the two cavalry regiments of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, regiments comprising eight squadrons, and commanded by General d'Allonville.

C H A P.  
I.

General  
Canrobert  
also on the  
ridge:  
his dis-  
positions.

There was, however, an evident difference between the opinion which governed the English Commander and the one entertained by Canrobert. Keenly alive, as was natural, to a danger which threatened his only seaport, and hoping besides, I imagine, that the somewhat dimmed prospects of the siege might be cleared by a fight in the plain, Lord Raglan, at this time, had not entertained the idea of surrendering ground to the enemy, and was preparing to recover the heights. General Canrobert, on the other hand, was of course less directly concerned in keeping watch over Balaclava ; and having become impressed with a belief that it was the object of the Russians to draw him down from his vantage-ground on the Chersonese, he seems to have resolved that he would baffle the enemy's supposed policy by clinging fast to the upland. Accordingly, it will be seen (if we chance to speak further of these French infantry reinforcements), that, although General Vinoy's brigade pushed forward, at one time, to ground near the gorge of Kadiköi, it was afterwards withdrawn from its advanced position, and

Apparent  
difference  
of opinion  
between him  
and Lord  
Raglan.

C H A P.

I.

Lord Raglan's dis-position of our cavalry.

ordered to rejoin the other brigade of the 1st Division close under the steeps of the Chersonese.

As a means of covering Balaclava, the position taken up by Lord Lucan near the gorge of Kadiköi is believed to have been very well chosen; but the Commander-in-Chief, at this time, was indulging the expectation of something like a battle to be fought with all arms; and he apparently desired that his cavalry should not be entangled in combat until the arrival of the two divisions of foot then already despatched should give Lord Lucan an opportunity of acting in co-operation with our infantry forces. He accordingly sent down an order which compelled Lord Lucan, though not without reluctance, nor even, indeed, without anger, to withdraw his horsemen to ground on the left of the Redoubt Number Six at the foot of the Chersonese upland.\*

General tendency of the French and English dispositions.

When this retrograde movement of our cavalry had been completed, the whole of the forces of all arms with which Canrobert and Lord Raglan proposed to engage Liprandi might be regarded as approaching to a state of concentration near the westernmost limits of the plain. The ground, however, upon which the Allies were thus gathering lay at distances of not less than a mile from the gorge of Kadiköi; and it not only resulted, from the last disposition of the cavalry, that the

\* Captain Wetherall was the bearer of the order, which ran thus: ‘Cavalry to take ground to the left of second line of redoubts occupied by Turks;’ and the Captain, at Lord Lucan’s request, waited to see the order executed in the way which he judged to be accordant with Lord Raglan’s meaning.

small body under Sir Colin Campbell which defended the approach to Balaclava was left for the moment uncovered, but that (by reason of the period required for the transmission of a fresh order, and for countermarching our squadrons) this state of isolation might continue some time, in despite of all Lord Raglan could do.

CHAP.  
I.

*Isolation of  
Balaclava.*

On the other hand, the position of Liprandi was this: With his victorious infantry and artillery disposed near the captured redoubts, he occupied a slightly curved line, which began at Kamara, and extended thence westward by Canrobert's Hill and the Causeway Heights, till it reached a point somewhat in advance of the Arabtabia.

*Position of  
Liprandi's  
infantry at  
this time.*

The four Odessa battalions, posted near this Arabtabia or Number Three Redoubt, marked the limit of the venture which the Russian Commander was assigning to his infantry in the direction of the Allied camps. Indeed we shall see that this Odessa regiment, for the rest of the day, was a faithful and sensitive index of the enemy's intent, mounting guard over the site of the Arabtabia, so long as the Allies were yet distant, falling back when our cavalry seemed going to attack it, and countermarching at once to the old ground when Liprandi saw that the French and the English Commanders were inclined to acquiesce in his conquest.

*The Odessa  
regiment an  
index of  
the enemy's  
changing  
resolves.*

The Russian Cavalry, supported by its attendant batteries, was drawn up across the North Valley, with its left resting on the lowest slopes

*The Russian  
cavalry.*

CHAP.  
I.

Jabrokrit-  
sky's force.

Liprandi  
secure for  
the time  
against any  
attack by  
infantry:

the period  
of licence  
thus en-  
joyed by  
him.

of the Causeway Heights, and its right on the Fedioukine Hills.

Nor was Liprandi's little army the only force with which the Allies would now have to cope, for Jabrokritsky, having descended from the MacKenzie Heights, was debouching from the Tractir road, and preparing to take up a position on the slopes of the Fedioukine Hills.

These Russian forces had no pretension to match themselves against the troops which the Allies on the Chersonese could, sooner or later, send down for the relief of Balaclava ; but, on the other hand, it was certain that a long time must elapse before the infantry despatched from the upland could be brought into action against the assailants of Balaclava ; and the configuration of the ground was such, that every French or English battalion engaged in its descent from the Chersonese could be, all the while, seen by the enemy. Liprandi, therefore, could act at his ease ; and it was for no trifling space of time that this privileged security lasted. He perhaps under-reckoned the probable duration of the licence which he thus might enjoy ; but the actual result was, that from the seizure of Canrobert's Hill to the moment when the Allies were ready to come into action, there elapsed a period of some three hours.\*

So, although the moment might come when, by

\* Canrobert's Hill is stated to have been taken at 7.30, and it was half-past ten before the Allies had any of their infantry reinforcements so far in advance as to be ready to undertake an attack.

the nearer approach of the Allies marching down from the upland, Liprandi would be reduced to the defensive, or else compelled to retire, yet, for the time, the Russian General was not only secure against the contingency of being attacked by infantry, but also had such prey within reach as might tempt him to become the assailant.

The arrival of Jabrokritsky, now debouching from Tractir, entitled Liprandi to consider that troops which had come thus near were a present accession of strength ; and, taken altogether, the Russian troops actually under Liprandi, or near enough now to co-operate with him, were a force complete in all arms, and numbering, as we saw, some 24,000 or 25,000 men with 78 guns. Yet

Their  
strength

(now that our cavalry had been withdrawn to the foot of the Chersonese), the only field force with which Sir Colin Campbell stood ready to oppose all these Russian troops in front of Kadiköi was

The forces  
that could  
be forthwith  
opposed to  
them.

a single battery of field-pieces, 400 men of the 93d Highlanders, commanded by Colonel Ainslie,\* 100 invalids under Colonel Daveney, who had been sent down to Balaclava for embarkation ; and, besides, two battalions of Turks, not hitherto carried away by the ebb of the Mussulman people.

\* Only six companies of the regiment were at first available for this service in front of Kadiköi ; the two remaining companies of the battalion being on duty, under the command of Major Gordon, in the inner line of defence. Major Gordon, however, with the force under his orders, rejoined the main body of the battalion before the moment of its encounter with the Russian Cavalry.

CHAP.  
I.

CHAP.

I.

---

Liprandi's  
inaction.

Liprandi did not seize the occasion. He, perhaps, had failed to divine the extreme weakness of the little gathering which undertook to defend the gorge of Kadiköi ; but, be that as it may, he attempted no attack with his infantry upon the approaches of Balaclava. For a long time, he remained in a state of inaction ; but at length when his period of licence was approaching its close, he resorted to that singular venture with his cavalry of which we shall now have to speak.

## V.

Liprandi's  
supposed  
design:

By our countrymen it has been commonly imagined that the cavalry enterprise hazarded on this 25th of October was a real attempt by Liprandi to possess himself of nothing less than Balaclava ; but the Russians declare that the object they contemplated was only that of ruining a park of artillery believed to be near Kadiköi ;\* and considering that the enemy's horsemen received no active support from his infantry, there would seem to be ground for believing that that, or some like minor purpose, may have really been the one entertained. The Russian cavalry had been brought into discredit by submitting to be null at the battle of the Alma ; and it seems not unlikely that expiation of former shortcomings was one of the objects in view.

Be this as it may, General Ryjoff with the

\* Todleben.

main body of the Russian cavalry, and supported by field-batteries, began to move up the North Valley.\*

The 93d Highlanders, now augmented to a strength of about 550 by the accession of the two companies under Gordon, were drawn up in line, two deep, upon that rising ground in front of the village of Kadiköi which was afterwards called the 'Dunrobin' or 'Sutherland' Hillock. Verschoyle and Hamilton, two young officers of the Guards, chancing to be in Balaclava this morning with some thirty or forty men, had seized the occasion for showing the warlike qualities of energy, high spirit, and prompt judgment; for they gathered their people together, brought them up to the front, ranged them quickly along with the Highlanders, and in this way brought Campbell a small accession of strength to eke out his scant means of defence.† The hundred invalids, under Colonel Daveney, were drawn up on the left of the 93d.‡ On either flank of the scant body of British infantry thus posted, there stood a battalion of Turks.§

\* With respect to the numerical strength of this great body of cavalry, see *post*, p. 97.

† I am indebted solely to Colonel (now Sir Anthony) Sterling's very valuable MS. letters for the knowledge of the service thus rendered.

‡ Campbell's despatch says the invalids were drawn up 'in support'; but I have reason for thinking that the statement in the text is accurate.

§ This account of the disposition made by Sir Colin Campbell may seem to differ in some minute particulars from his published despatch; but there are matters on which the testimony

CHAP.  
I.

the advance  
of the Rus-  
sian cavalry  
Campbell's ar-  
range-  
ments for  
defending  
the ap-  
proach by  
Kadiköi.

**CHAP.** Campbell's means of defence were materially aided by Barker's field-pieces, already in battery upon convenient ground near the hillock, as well as by a portion of the batteries constituting the inner line of defence, and especially, it seems, by a battery of two heavy guns under the command of Lieutenant Wolfe.

The advance of the Russians soon brought their artillery to a ground within range of Campbell's small force ; and, two of the Highlanders, besides some of the Turks, being wounded by the fire then opened, Campbell sought to give his men shelter. He therefore moved them back to the foot of the hillock which their ranks had hitherto crowned, and caused them there to lie down. Preparing for such an eventuality as that of the gorge being forced, he despatched Colonel Sterling to Balaclava with orders to see the commander of a vessel which lay in the harbour and apprise him of the pending attack.\*

Squadrons  
of Russian  
horse advanc-  
ing towards  
the gorge.

Meanwhile the main body of the Russian cavalry continued to advance up the North Valley ; but some squadrons detached themselves from the mass, and came shaping their way for the gorge of Kadiköi—the ground Campbell stood to defend.† When these horsemen were within

of a subordinate officer is more conclusive than the report of his chief.

\* As to what vessels were in the harbour, see footnote *ante*, p. 31.

† According to Todleben, the force thus detached consisted of nine squadrons or sotnias, partly belonging to the regiment called the 'Saxe-Weimar' Hussars, and partly made up

about a thousand yards of him, Campbell gave a brisk order to his little body of foot, directing them at once to advance, and again crown the top of the hillock. This was done at the instant by the Highland battalion and the few score of English soldiers who had come up to range alongside it. The troops did not throw themselves into a hollow square (as is usual in preparing for cavalry), but simply formed line two deep. On this slender array all was destined to rest; for the two battalions of Turks which had hitherto flanked the Queen's troops were by this time without cohesion. It would seem that the disintegration of the Mussulman force had begun at the moment when Campbell withdrew his line to the foot of the hillock, and was completed, some few instants later, upon the evident approach of the Russian cavalry. At all events, these two battalions of Turks were now dissolved or dissolving. For the most part, both officers and men turned and fled, making straight as they could for the port, and they cried, as they went, Ship ! ship ! ship !

By this defection in presence of the enemy's advancing cavalry, Campbell was suddenly shorn of two-thirds of the numerical strength engaged in defending the gorge; and the few hundred British soldiers who had hitherto constituted but a fraction of his force were now almost all that

of Cossacks; but Campbell estimated the number of these detached horsemen at a number very small by comparison, that is, at only 400.

CHAP.  
I.

Campbell's  
altered dis-  
positions.

Flight of  
the Turks.

Position of  
Campbell  
after the  
flight of the  
Turks.

**C H A P.** I. remained to him upon the hillock in front of Kadiköi.\* Whilst he waited the movements of an enemy who was altogether some 24,000 or 25,000 strong, he could not help seeing how much was now made to depend upon the steadfastness of the few hundred men who remained with him still on the hillock. He had, however, so great a confidence in his Highlanders that he judged he could safely impart to them the gravity of the occasion. He rode down the line, and said: ‘Re-  
‘member there is no retreat from here, men !  
‘ You must die where you stand !’ † The men cheerily answered his appeal saying, ‘Ay, ay,  
‘ Sir Colin ; we’ll do that.’ ‡

**His words  
to the men.**

**Their an-  
swer to his  
appeal**

**Continued  
advance of  
the detached  
Russian  
squadrons.**

It was whilst our men were still lying on their faces at the foot of the hillock that the four Russian squadrons began their advance ; and it is said that the mission of this detached force was to try to seize one of the batteries connected with the inner line of defence. The horsemen, it seems, rode on, not expecting a combat with infantry ; when suddenly they saw the slender line of the Highlanders springing up to the top of the hillock. Not unnaturally the Russian horsemen imagined

\* I say *almost*, because there were men among the Turks who manfully stood their ground. It would be a great error to question the courage of the fugitives. The one bane of the Turkish forces is the want of officers to whom the men can look up. Without that ingredient cohesion is apt to fail, however brave men may be.

† These words were heard by Lieutenant (now Major) Burroughs, the officer then in command of the 6th company of the 93d.

‡ And these.

that they were falling into some ambush ; \* and on the other hand, the men of the 93d, with a wild impetuosity which was characteristic of the battalion as then constituted, showed a mind to rush forward as though undertaking to charge and exterminate cavalry in the open plain ; but in a moment Sir Colin was heard crying fiercely, ' Ninety-third ! Ninety-third ! damn all that eager-ness ! ' and the angry voice of the old soldier quickly steadied the line. The Russian squadrons had come within long musketry range. The Highlanders and the men alongside them delivered their fire ; and although they emptied no saddles, they wounded some horses and men.\* The horse-men thus met abandoned at once their advance upon Campbell's front, and wheeled to their left as though undertaking to turn his right flank. Sir Colin turned to his aide-de-camp, and—speaking of the officer who led the Russian squadrons —said, ' Shadwell ! that man understands his 'business.' To meet his assailant's change of direction, Campbell caused the grenadier company of the 93d, under Captain Ross, to bring the left shoulder forward, and show a front towards the north-east.

Stopped at once by this ready manœuvre, and the fire that it brought on their flank, the horse-men wheeled again to the left, and retreated. They retreated together, but not in good order ; and the fire of our artillery increased their confusion.

CHAP.  
I.

Campbell  
wielding  
his 93d.

The fire  
from their  
line.

Altered  
movement  
of the assailing  
squadrons.

Campbell's  
counter-  
manœuvre.

Its effect.  
Retreat of  
the horse-  
men.

\* Communications from the Russian officers to ours.

CHAP.

I.

Feebleness  
of the attack  
undertaken  
by these  
Russian  
squadrons.

Real nature  
of the trial  
sustained by  
our troops  
on the hil-  
lock.

Thus was easily brought to an end the advance of those horsemen who had found themselves, during a moment, in the front of a Highland battalion. Springing out of no foregone design against Campbell's infantry, the attack fell so short that it scarcely gave any example of what might be attempted by horsemen against a body of foot drawn up in line, and two deep. The Queen's troops arrayed on the hillock were able, indeed, to prove their mettle; but the occasion they found was not such a one as is given to infantry by a resolute onslaught of horse. The trial they had to pass through on this morning of the 25th of October was not one directly resulting from any kind of sharp combat, but still it was a trial imposed upon them by the hitherto adverse tenor of the engagement, and, in that sense, by stress of battle. Without being at all formidable in itself, the advance of the Russian squadrons marked what might well seem at the moment to be an ugly, if not desperate crisis in the defence of the English seaport. Few or none, at the time, could have had safe grounds for believing that, before the arrival of succours sent down from the upland, Liprandi would be all at once stayed in his career of victory; and in the judgment of those, if any there were, who suffered themselves to grow thoughtful, the whole power of our people in the plain and the port of Balaclava must have seemed to be in jeopardy; for not only had the enemy overmastered the outer line of defence, and triumphantly broken in

through it, but also, having a weight of numbers which, for the moment, stood as that of an army to a regiment, he already had made bold to be driving his cavalry at the very heart of the English resources, when the Turkish battalions—troops constituting two-thirds of that small and last body of foot with which Campbell yet sought to withstand his assailant—dissolved all at once into a horde of fugitives thronging down in despair to the port. If, in such a condition of things, some few hundreds of infantry men stood shoulder to shoulder in line, confronting the victor upon open ground, and maintaining, from first to last, their composure, their cheerfulness, nay, even their soldierly mirth, they proved themselves by a test which was other than that of sharp combat, but hardly, perhaps, less trying.

And the Highlanders whilst in this joyous mood were not without a subject of merriment; for they saw how the Turks in their flight met a new and terrible foe. There came out from the camp of the Highland regiment a stalwart and angry Scotch wife, with an uplifted stick in her hand; and then, if ever in history, the fortunes of Islam waned low beneath the manifest ascendant of the cross; for the blows dealt by this Christian woman fell thick on the backs of the Faithful. She believed, it seems, that, besides being guilty of running away, the Turks meant to pillage her camp; and the blows she delivered were not mere expressions of scorn, but actual and fierce

CHAP  
I.

The new foe  
encountered  
by the Turks  
in their  
flight.

CHAP.  
I.—punishment. In one instance, she laid hold of a strong-looking, burly Turk, and held him fast until she had beaten him for some time, and seemingly with great fury. She also applied much invective. Notwithstanding all graver claims upon their attention, the men of the 93d were able to witness this incident. It mightily pleased and amused them. It amuses men still to remember that the Osmanlis, flying from danger and yearning after blissful repose, should have chosen a line of retreat where this pitiless dame mounted guard.\*

## VI.

If a man has to hear that in the open forenoon of an October day a body of Russian horse which numbered itself by thousands could come wandering into the precincts of the English camp without exciting early attention on the part of our cavalry people, he ought to know what was the cause which made such an incident possible.

Towards the west of the Balaclava plain, the ground was so undulating, and the view of it here

\* She was a very powerful woman. In later years—I do not know the origin of the appellation—she used to be known in the regiment by the name of the ‘Kokona.’—*End of Note to First Edition.* Lord Stanley of Alderley has now kindly enabled me to give the meaning of the word. It is a modern Greek word, *κοκωνα*, signifying ‘Lady’ or ‘Madam,’ and is applied by Turks to Christian ladies. It is the very word by which—in deprecation of her wrath—an assaulted Turk would have been likely to address the lady.—*Note to Second Edition.*

and there so obstructed by orchards or vineyards, CHAP.  
I. that although an observer well placed would be able to descry the advance of any enemy's force long, long before it could be close at hand, yet the near approach of even great bodies of troops might be hidden from the mind of a general who contented himself with the knowledge that was to be got from low ground. It may be easily imagined that, in the existing condition of things, our cavalry generals could not venture to separate themselves from their troops by even those slight distances which divided the low ground from neighbouring heights ; but then also they failed to charge others with the duty of maintaining a watchful look-out from any of the commanding knolls and ridges which featured the landscape around them ; and from this single omission there well might come two broods of error—the first brood consisting of ‘surprises,’ like the one which gave rise to this comment—the other brood comprising those ugly misconstructions which must always be likely to occur where he who sends orders can survey the whole field, and he who would try to obey them has only a circumscribed view.

Want of arrangements for an effective look-out.

The main body of the Russian cavalry, under the orders of General Ryjoff, moved briskly up the North Valley, having with it some 32 pieces of field-artillery ; and as yet, the force did not bend southward (as the few detached squadrons had done), but pushed on so far up towards the

Advance of the main body of the Russian cavalry.

CHAP.  
I.

*Its change  
of direction.*

west (without being assailed by our cavalry), that at length it incurred two shots, both discharged from the line of batteries which fringed the edge of the Chersonese. Checked apparently by this fire, the Russian cavalry, which had previously seemed to be one immense column, now showed itself to consist of two distinct masses, and during some moments it seemed disposed to fall back; but presently, the whole force, acting closely together, wheeled obliquely aside towards the line of the Woronzoff road, and began to cross over the Causeway Heights, as though minded to invade the South Valley, or else, at the least, to survey it. Lord Cardigan's brigade had just been moved to a position more advanced than before, and it now fronted towards the east. Therefore, although the configuration of the ground was such as to keep General Ryjoff in ignorance of what he had on his flank, yet, when he thus passed over the heights, he was moving (obliquely) across the front of our Light Cavalry.

*Its sudden  
discovery  
of a great  
opportunity.*

So far as I have heard, there is no ground at all for believing that, when the Russian horse thus wheeled and faced to the south, it had yet had a glimpse of the foe with which, in hard fight, it was destined to be presently striving; but as soon as the foremost horsemen of the leading column had moved up to the top of the ridge, they all at once found that a great occasion was come.

Long before the flight of the Turkish battalions in the gorge of Kadiköi, Lord Raglan's sure glance


had enabled him to detect their unstable condition; and he had, therefore, sent an order directing that eight squadrons of Heavy Dragoons should be moved down to support them. Lord Lucan had entrusted the task to Brigadier-General Scarlett, the officer who commanded our Heavy Brigade ; and Scarlett was in the act of executing Lord Raglan's order, when the Russian cavalry, as we have just been seeing, turned away from the valley and moved up over the summit of the Causeway ridge. Having with him the 5th Dragoon Guards, the Scots Greys, and the Inniskilling Dragoons—regiments numbering altogether six squadrons — and having, besides, provided that to make up the 'eight,' his 4th Dragoon Guards with both its two squadrons should follow him, Scarlett was marching along the South Valley, and making his way towards the east, with the Causeway Heights on his left.

For the purpose of seeing how these troops were brought into action, the order of march should be known. The movement being regarded as a movement within our own lines, and one therefore proceeding through ground in the unchallenged dominion of the English, was not conducted with the military precautions which would have been otherwise judged necessary, and no horsemen covered the march by moving along the top of the Causeway ridge. Scarlett did not apparently entertain an idea that Russian cavalry could come so high up the North Valley as the 'Number ' Five' Redoubt, and manœuvre on the ground

CHAP.  
I.March of  
Scarlett's  
dragoons

CHAP. I.—which it reached, without bringing our Light Cavalry down on it.\* Therefore no special directions were thought to be needed for this little march—a march through our own camping-ground—and no more elaborate operation was intended than that of moving all the three regiments by the same route in open column of troops. It chanced, however, that in turning one of the enclosures which obstructed its path, the 1st squadron of the Inniskillings took the right-hand side of the obstacle, whilst the other squadron passed by the left of it; and in this way it resulted that the movement went on in two columns, the right-hand column being led by the first squadron of the Inniskillings, and closed by the 5th Dragoon Guards; whilst the left-hand column was led by the 2d squadron of the Inniskillings, and closed

\* This sketch—which, however, is not offered as a plan indicating the actual positions of the respective forces—may aid the comprehension of the text.



by the two squadrons of the Scots Greys. Those three last-named squadrons were moving in open column of troops, but the right-hand column marched by 'threes.'\*

At the moment of the sudden discovery which will be presently mentioned, the six squadrons thus led by Scarlett were marching in a direction nearly parallel with the line of the Causeway ridge, at a distance of some seven or eight hundred yards from its summit; and the left-hand column was so shaping its course as to be able to skirt the remains of the Light Brigade camp, and also the lower fence of a vineyard there sloping down southward in the eye of the sun. The camp had been struck, but imperfectly; for some tents were yet standing, and the picket-ropes had not been removed.

General Scarlett, with Elliot, his aide-de-camp, was on the left of the column formed by the 2d squadron of the Inniskillings and the Scots Greys. Intent upon the special duty which had just been assigned to his squadrons by Lord Raglan's last order, he was keenly bending his sight in the direction of the Highland battalion which defended the approaches of Kadiköi, when Elliot cast a glance towards the ridge on his left, and saw its top fretted with lances. Another moment and the sky-line was broken by evident squadrons of

Sudden appearance of the enemy's cavalry on the flank of Scarlett's dragoons.

\* General Scarlett's impression was, that all his six squadrons were moving upon the same line of march, and in open column of troops; but minute inquiry led to the conclusion stated in the text.

CHAP.

I.

horse. Elliot, young as he was, had yet been inured to war, and he quickly was able to assure himself not only that powerful masses of Russian cavalry were gathered, and gathering, on the ridge, but that they fronted towards the South Valley and were looking down almost at right angles upon the flank of our marching column. Of course, the aide-de-camp instantly directed the eyes of his chief to the summit of the ridge on his left. For a moment, Scarlett could hardly accept Elliot's conclusion ; but in the next instant he recognised the full purport of what had happened, and perceived that he was marching across the front of a great mass of Russian cavalry, which looked down upon the flank of his column from a distance of but a few hundred yards, and might be expected, of course, to charge down on it. This, then, was the occasion which fortune had proffered to the Russian cavalry.

Scarlett's resolve.

Scarlett's resolve was instantaneous, and his plan simple. He meant to form line to his left, and to charge with all six of his squadrons. Accordingly he faced his horse's head towards the flank of the column, and called out, 'Are you 'right in front?\*' The answer was, 'Yes, sir!' Then Scarlett gave the word of command, 'Left 'wheel into line!'

The order  
he gave.

'Scarlett's  
'three  
'hundred.

The troops nearest to Scarlett were those which formed the left-hand column — that is, the 2d

\* This was a very apt question ; for, as we shall afterwards see, some portions of the Heavy Brigade were marching 'left 'in front.'

squadron of the Inniskillings, which was in front, and the two squadrons of the Greys which brought up the rear. Those three squadrons were the force which constituted 'Scarlett's three hundred.'

Scarlett conceived at this time that the 5th Dragoon Guards would form up in prolongation of his front on the left of the Greys ; and, to leave a clear front for the regiment thus supposed to be coming into line, he found it necessary that the 'three hundred' should move some way east of the vineyard before commencing their onset. He therefore gave an order to 'take ground to the right.'

The 5th Dragoon Guards had not yet so closely approached as to be ready to align with Scarlett's 'three hundred ;' and it seems that Elliot, the Brigadier's aide-de-camp, delivered to the regiment an order which was regarded as directing it to act in support of the Greys.\* The position which the 5th Dragoon Guards actually took up was on the left rear of the Greys. On the right of the 5th Dragoon Guards, but divided from it by a considerable interval, there stood the 1st squadron of the Inniskillings.

The 4th Dragoon Guards and the Royals were approaching ; so altogether, besides the first line, there were seven squadrons which might ultimately take part in the conflict, though not until after the moment when the foremost 'three hundred' would be already engaged.

CHAP.  
I.

Ground  
taken to  
the right

The 5th  
Dragoon  
Guards.

The 4th  
Dragoon  
Guards  
and the  
Royals ap-  
proaching.

\* I believe General Scarlett has no recollection of having sent this order ; but the proof of the words given in the text seems irresistibly strong.

CHAP.  
I.  

---

Scarlett's  
dilemma:

The embarrassment of determining whether he will direct, or whether he will lead, is one which very commonly besets the mind of a cavalry general who commands several regiments just about to engage in a conflict with powerful adversaries; but it pressed upon Scarlett with a somewhat unusual severity; for he had no time to be delegating authority, or giving effective instructions for the guidance of his supports; and, in one point of view, it might be bold to take it for granted that a general in command of several squadrons could be warranted in leaving a large proportion of them to come into the fight their own way; but then, on the other hand, our troops were young, were new to battle; and, it being determined that a very scant number of them were to be led on—and that, too, uphill—against a vast mass of cavalry which reckoned itself by thousands, there was ground for believing that they might need the example of a general officer, not for the purpose of mere encouragement, but in order to put them above all doubt and question in regard to their true path of duty.

In such a dilemma, shall a man be the Leader or the General? He cannot be both. Shall he strive to retain the control over all his troops, as does an infantry General sending orders this way and that? Or rather, for the sake of leading his first line, shall he abandon for the moment his direct authority over the rest, and content himself with that primitive act of generalship which

is performed by showing the way? The soundness of Scarlett's decision may fairly be questioned;\* but he chose as chose Lord Uxbridge in the last of the battles against the great Napoleon;† nay, he chose as did Murat himself, for when the great cavalry chief was a king and a commander of mighty numbers, he still used to charge in person, and to charge at the head of his squadrons.

CHAP.  
I.

And now, all at once, by the arrival of his Divisional General, Scarlett found himself relieved from any anxiety occasioned by his decision. It seems that, after having despatched Scarlett and his Heavy Dragoons on the mission assigned to them by the Commander - in - Chief, Lord Lucan had been apprised by one of Lord Raglan's aides-de-camp of the enemy's advance up the valley with a large body of cavalry; and that presently, upon having his glance directed to the right quarter, he himself had not only descried Ryjoff's masses of horse, but had been able to see that a portion of them was bending southward across the Causeway ridge. Thereupon, it appears, he

Lord Lucan  
The part  
taken by  
him after  
hearing of  
the advance  
of the Rus-  
sian cavalry

\* For the reason adverted to in the preceding paragraph.

† Our cavalry Generals have very commonly adopted this way of performing their duty; but the decision of Lord Uxbridge (afterwards the Marquess of Anglesea) is a specially convenient example of the dilemma referred to in the text; for on the one hand his personal leadership of the first line resulted in a charge of surpassing splendour; but then also great losses followed, because it was found that practically, his anterior directions to the supports did not seem applicable a few moments later, and at all events, were not obeyed in a manner accordant with Lord Uxbridge's design.

CHAP.  
I.

---

had first given his parting instructions to Lord Cardigan, the commander of the Light Brigade, and had then ridden off at speed in the track of Scarlett's left column. When, upon overtaking the squadrons, he found them moving in column of troops with their left flank towards the enemy, he believed that this operation (though in reality, perhaps, it had resulted from Scarlett's second order to take ground to the right) was a continuance of the march towards Kadiköi. He therefore conceived that, to save time in what he took to be a pressing emergency, it was his duty at once, and in person, to give such directions to the troops as he judged to be needed, without first apprising General Scarlett, and conveying the orders through him. Accordingly, therefore, by his personal word of command, he directed the troops to wheel into line;\* and it seems that he was heard and obeyed by the Greys, but not by the Inniskillings; for that last regiment received no orders except those which came from the lips of General Scarlett. It is evident that, at such a time, any clashing of the words of command which proceeded from the two generals might have been dangerous; but in their actual result,

\* Indeed, if Lord Lucan's impression be accurate, he delivered in succession the same three orders that were given by Scarlett—*i.e.*, orders to wheel into line, to take ground to the right, and (for the second time) to wheel into line. In my judgment, any dispute as to which of the two generals was the first to give the orders would be too trivial to deserve public attention; but if there be a military reader who thinks otherwise, he will probably perceive that the truth can be deduced from the facts stated in the text.

Lord Lucan's separate though concurring orders wrought little or no confusion.

CHAP.  
I.

Hitherto, the divisional commander and his brigadier had not come in sight of one another; but whilst Scarlett (after having once wheeled, and then taken ground to the right) was again giving orders to wheel a second time, into line, Lord Lucan rode up to him; and, in the face of the enemy's masses of horse then closely impending over them, the General of the division and the General of brigade found moments enough for the exchange of a few rapid words. According to General Scarlett's recollection of what passed, he explained why it was that, after first wheeling into line, he had found it necessary to take ground to his right, and received an assurance that his intended attack would be supported by Lord Lucan with other troops.

Lord Lucan, indeed, believes that, in expressing his wish to have the charge executed, he spoke as though giving an order which had originated with himself, and that he said to his Brigadier:—‘General Scarlett, take these four squadrons’—the squadrons of the Greys and the Inniskillings—‘and at once attack the column of the ‘enemy’;’\* but if he used words of command where words of mere sanction were what the occasion required, it seems probable that he ended the conversation with a more appropriate phrase, saying simply to Scarlett:—‘Now, then,

Meeting be-tween Lord Lucan and General Scarlett.

The com-munications between them.

\* What Lord Lucan took to be ‘four’ were in reality three squadrons. See *ante*, pp. 88, 89, 90, 91.

**C H A P.** ‘do as you like.’ Whatever were the words interchanged, they at all events proved that Scarlett’s determination to lead an immediate charge against the enemy’s cavalry had the sanction of his divisional commander.

*Lord Lucan's part in the attack.*

Of course, it must be well understood that the attack we shall have to speak of took place under Lord Lucan’s actual and personal authority. Holding command over the whole division of which the Heavy Dragoons formed a part, he had come up so early as to have ample time for preventing the charge if he had thought fit to do so; and as it happened that, far from preventing, he eagerly sanctioned, the charge, nay, personally helped on the preparations for the measure, and undertook to support it by fresh troops—he made himself in the fullest sense responsible for the operation, and became, in all fairness, entitled to a corresponding share of any merit there was in the design. He either ordered or sanctioned the charge; and the question, ‘Who led it?’ will not be brought into dispute.

*Positions of the six squadrons at the moment anterior to Scarlett's charge.*

When the operation of wheeling a second time into line had been brought to completion by the Inniskillings and the Greys, our six squadrons ranged thus: In first line there stood the second squadron of the Inniskillings, with the Greys on their left. In second line the first squadron of the Inniskillings was on the right rear of the other Inniskilling squadron; and on its left there was the 5th Dragoon Guards, forming up in left rear of the Greys.

The whole force thus ranged or ranging was between 500 and 600 strong; and the three squadrons in front which had first to encounter alone the whole of the enemy's masses, numbered something less than 300. CHAP.  
I.

By the concurring opinions of Lord Lucan and of many French officers, including General Canrobert, and also, I believe, General Morris, the mass of hostile cavalry preparing to descend upon these 300 dragoons was estimated as amounting, at the least, to 3500 men; and from even the official accounts, which, though certainly not late ones, were the latest preceding the battle, it would seem to result that, unless reduced by some causes which have hitherto been left unexplained, this body of Russian horse must have been about 3000 strong.\* So far as concerns weight and massiveness, any numerals, such as two or three thousand, which import but a moderate strength, if applied to foot soldiers, are of course many times more potent when used for the reckoning of cavalry. Our island people rarely cast their eyes upon such a spectacle as that of a large body of cavalry in mass; and yet, without having done so, they can hardly conceive the sense of weight that is laid upon the mind of a man who looks up the slope

The numbers of the Russian cavalry confronting Scarlett.

\* This computation excludes the six squadrons of Jeropkine's Lancers, but on the other hand takes it for granted that the lately detached horsemen, estimated by Sir Colin Campbell at 400, had rejoined their comrades. For further examination of this question, see note in the Appendix.

**CHAP.** of a hill at a distance of a few hundred yards,  
**I.** and sees there a column of horse that is big enough to be numbered by thousands close gathered in oblong or square.

**Deliberate  
and well-  
executed  
manœuvre  
of the  
Russian  
cavalry:**

And that—so far as concerned its power of manœuvring—this great body of horse was in a high state of efficiency, it soon gave proof; for when the squadrons had gathered on the summit of the ridge, their leader for some reason determined that he ought to take ground on his left, and the change was effected with a briskness and precision which wrung admiration from some of our best cavalry officers.

**their  
advance  
down the  
slope:**

So soon as the column had taken all the ground that was thought to be needed, it fronted once more to the English. Then presently, at the sound of the trumpet, this huge mass of horsemen, deep-charged with the weight of its thousands, began to descend the hillside.

Making straight for the ground where our scanty three hundred were ranging, and being presently brought to the trot, it came on at a well-governed speed, swelling broader and broader each instant, yet disclosing its depths more and more. In one of its aspects, the descending of this thicket of horsemen was like what may be imagined of a sudden yet natural displacement of the earth's surface; for to those who gazed from afar, the dusky mass they saw moving showed acreage rather than numbers.

All this while, the string of the 300 red-coats were forming Scarlett's slender first line in the

valley beneath, and they seemed to be playing C H A P.  
T. parade. At the moment I speak of, the troop officers of the Greys were still facing their men; and their drill rules, it seems, had declared that they must continue to do so till the major of the regiment should at length bring them round by giving the order, 'Eyes right!' Not yet would the Greys consent to be disturbed in their ceremonies by the descending column.

It was with seeming confidence that Scarlett sat eyeing the approach of the Russian mass, whilst the three squadrons ranging behind him went composedly on with the work of dressing and re-dressing their front; yet the moment seemed near when, from the great depth of the column and the incline of the ground, the front ranks of the Russians would have less to dread from their foe than from the weight of their own troops behind them; and unless the descent of the column should be presently stayed, even the enemy himself (though by chance his foremost squadrons should falter) might hardly have any choice left but to come sweeping down like a torrent, and overwhelming all mortal resistance.

But before the moment had come when the enemy, whether liking it or not, would find himself condemned to charge home, he began, as it seemed, to falter. He slackened the pace. He still slackened—his trumpets were sounding—he <sup>their slackening pace</sup> slackened, and came to a halt.

Our cavalry-men, so far as I know, have failed to hit on any solution of what they regard as a

**C H A P.** seemingly enormous mistake on the part of General Ryoff; and the Russians, not caring to dwell on the story of their conflict with our Heavy Dragoons, have never thrown light on the question. It, however, seems likely that a commander leading down his massed thousands with design to attack may have judged that he was met by a formidable obstacle when he saw extending before him a camp imperfectly struck, where some of the tents were yet standing and where also some horses were picketed.\* If such was General Ryoff's apprehension, he may well have been strengthened in it by observing the deliberately ceremonious preparations of the scanty red squadrons below: because he would be led to infer that their apparent sense of security must be based on knowledge of the ground in their front, and the hindrances with which it was strewed.

Or, again, it may be that, from the first, the enemy had intended to halt at what he judged a fit distance, for the purpose of executing and perfecting the manœuvre which must now be described.

**Deployment effected by the Russians on each flank of their column.**

Either whilst the mass was descending, or else as soon as it halted, a partial deployment was effected, which brought the force, taken as a whole, into a state of formation not new to St Petersburg, though but little affected elsewhere. In prolongation of the two front ranks of the column both to the right and to the left, two

\* Sick horses.

wings or fore-arms were thrown out, and this in such way that whilst the trunk—if thus one may call it—was a huge weighty mass of great depth, the two limbs which grew out from it were constituted by a formation in *Jihé*. In this way the appalling effect of great weight was supposed to be combined with the advantage which belongs to extension of front; and evidently the designer imagined that, by the process of wheeling them, the two deployed lines might be made puissant engines for defence or for counter-attack. By inclining them more or less back the arms might be made to cover the flanks of the column; whilst, by folding them inwards, they might be so wielded as to crush all close comers with an easy and pitiless hug. The mass which acted in support had a front commensurate with that of the column it followed, but without any deployment from the flanks. It advanced so exactly on the track of the body in front, and soon showed so strong a tendency to close upon it, that virtually it added its weight to the weight of the great mass it followed, without attempting to aid it by any independent manœuvres. So although, whilst these horsemen were marching, and even during part of the conflict, a space could be seen still existing between the first mass and the second, yet, so far as concerns their bearing upon the fight, the two columns were substantially as one.

Around the serried masses thus formed there circled a number of horsemen in open or skirmishing order.

CHAP.

I.

---

Scarlett's  
task.

When the extension of the Russian front had developed itself, Scarlett failed not, of course, to see that, *enormously* as his thin line of two ranks was overweighted by the vast depth of the column before him, the extent to which he was outflanked both on his right hand and on his left was hardly less overwhelming; but whether he still expected that the 5th Dragoon Guards would align with the Greys, or whether he by this time understood that it would be operating on their left rear, he at all events looked trustfully to the help that would be brought him by this his own regiment as a means of resistance to the forces which were outflanking him on his left. Towards his right, however, he equally saw the dark squadrons far, far overlapping his front; and, for the checking of these, he knew not that he had even so much as one troop close at hand, for he supposed at that time that his first line included the whole of the Inniskillings. Scarlett, therefore, despatched Captain Conolly, his brigade-major, with orders to bring forward one or other of the two regiments which had not marched off with the rest, and oppose it to the enemy's left.

It seemed evident that, for the English, all rational hope must depend upon seizing the occasion which the enemy's halt was now proffering; and to the truth of this conviction the Divisional General and his Brigadier were both keenly alive. Lord Lucan, indeed, grew so impatient of delay that he more than once caused his trumpeter to sound the 'charge'; but Scarlett

and all his people were much busied in preparing ; and, so far as I have heard, no attention was awakened by the sound of the divisional trumpet.

CHAP.  
I.

Though our people saw clearly enough that at all hazards, and notwithstanding all disparity of numbers, the enemy's impending masses must be attacked by Scarlett's scant force, they still had no right to imagine that they could achieve victory, or even ward off disaster, by means of the kind which a General of Cavalry is accustomed to contemplate. When an officer undertakes a charge of horse, his accustomed hope is, that he will be able to shatter the array of the foe by the momentum and impact of his close serried squadrons led thundering in at a gallop ; and, indeed, it is a main part of his reckoning that the bare dread of the shock he thus threatens will break down all resistance beforehand. For Scarlett, there could be no such hope. The scantiness of his numbers was not of itself a fatal bar to the prospect of conquering by impact ; but he was so circumstanced as to be obliged to charge uphill and over ground much impeded in some places by the picket-ropes and other remains of the camp. Nor was this the worst. The vast depth of the column forbade all prospect of shattering it by a blow ; for even though the troopers in front might shrink, and incline to give way under the shock of a charge, they would be physically prevented from making a step to the rear by the massiveness of the squadrons behind them.

But, however desperate the task of Scarlett's

CHAP.

I.

three hundred dragoons, no one of them seems to have questioned that it was right to attack; and the element of doubt being thus altogether excluded, they at least had that strength which belongs to men acting with a resolute purpose.

The great numbers of military spectators who were witnesses of the combat.

Except in the instances of combats under the walls of besieged fortresses, it can rarely occur that armies, or large portions of armies, are not only so near and so well placed for the purpose of seeing, but also so unoccupied with harder tasks as to be able to study a combat going on under their eyes; and still more rare must be the occasions which modern warfare allows for seeing a conflict rage without looking through a curtain of smoke; but, besides our Light Cavalry Brigade which stood near at hand, there had gathered large numbers of military observers—including French, English, and Turks—who, being at the edge of the Chersonese upland, were on ground so inclined as to be comparable to that from which tiers upon tiers of spectators in a Roman amphitheatre used to overlook the arena; and the ledges of the hillside were even indeed of such form as to invite men to sit while they gazed. The means that people had of attaining to clear perceptions were largely increased by the difference that there was between the colour of the Russian and that of the English squadrons. With the exception of a few troops which showed their uniform—the pale-blue pelisse and jacket of a hussar regiment—all the Russian horsemen,

Distinctive colours of the uniforms worn by the Russians and the English dragoons.

whether hussars, or lancers, or Cossacks, whether officers or troopers, were enveloped alike in the murky grey outer-coats which, by this time, had become familiar to the eye of the invaders. The grey was of such a hue that, like the grey of many a lake and river, it gathered darkness from quantity; and what people on the Chersonese saw moving down to overwhelm our 'three hundred,' were two masses having that kind of blackness which belongs to dense clouds charged with storm.

The English dragoons, on the other hand, were in their scarlet uniform, and (with the exception of the Greys, who had the famed 'bearskins' for their headgear) they all wore the helmet. The contrast of colour between the grey and the red was so strong that any even slight intermixture of the opposing combatants could be seen from the Chersonese. So great had been the desire of the English in those days, to purchase ease for the soldier at the expense of display, that several portions of our dragoon accoutrements had been discarded. The plumes of the helmets had been laid aside, and our men rode without their shoulder-scales, without the then ridiculed stock, and, moreover, without their gauntlets.

Whilst the gazers observed that troop-officers in front of our first line were still facing to the men, still dressing and re-dressing the ranks, they also now saw that, in front of the centre of the Greys, and at a distance from it of five or six horses' length, there was gathered a group of four

The group  
of four  
horsemen  
now col-  
lected in  
front of  
the Greys

**CHAP****I.**

horsemen. Two of these were side by side, and a little in front of the others. Of the two foremost, the one on the left wore the cocked-hat which indicated the presence of a Staff-officer, and suggested indeed, at first sight, that the wearer might be the General who commanded the brigade; but a field-glass corrected the error, showing instantly that the horseman who thus caught the eye from a distance was no more than a young lieutenant—Lieutenant Alexander Elliot, the aide-de-camp of General Scarlett. But to the right of the young aide-de-camp there was another horseman, on a thorough-bred bay, standing fully, it seemed, sixteen hands. To judge from his head-gear, this last horseman might seem to be no more than a regimental officer of dragoons—for he wore the same helmet as they did—but an outer-coat of dark blue, thrown on, it seemed, over his uniform, served to show that he must be on the Staff. Because of the bright contrast disclosed between the warm summer hue of his features and a drooping mustache white as snow, it was possible to see from afar that this officer must be General Scarlett. Of the two horsemen who kept themselves a little in rear of the General, the one was his trumpeter, the other his orderly. This last man had attained to high skill as a swordsman, and was a valorous, faithful soldier. If it were not for the general spread of incredulity, it would be acknowledged that he drew his lineage from some mighty giantess of former ages, for he bore the surname of Shegog.

Scarlett's yearning at this moment was for the expected prolongation of his line towards its left, and he compelled himself to give yet some moments for the forming of his 5th Dragoon Guards; but on his right, the one squadron of the Inniskillings (the squadron which he took to be the whole regiment) was both ready and more than ready. Differing in that respect from the rest of the 'three hundred,' the squadron had a clear front, and the sense of this blessing so inflamed it with warlike desire, that during the moments of delay, Scarlett had to be restraining the line by waving it back with his sword. The squadron chafed proudly at the touch of the curb, and it seemed that if the General were to relax his care for an instant, it would bound forward up the hillside, and spring all alone at the column.

The custom of the service requires that an officer who has the immediate command of a body of cavalry engaged in the duty of charging shall be the actual leader of the onslaught in the strictest sense, riding forward at a distance of at least some few yards in advance of his squadrons; but it must not be supposed that those who originated or sanctioned this practice were acting in contemplation of any such circumstances as those which now existed, or that they ever intended to subject a general officer, or indeed any other human being, to the peculiar species of personal hazard which Scarlett had resolved to confront. As tested by its general operation, the practice is not one which unduly exposes the life of the

CHAP.  
I.—chief; for when a strong body of horse is hurled at full pace towards the foe, it commonly happens that either the attack or the resistance gives way before the moment of impact; but in this rare example of a slow, yet resolute, charge of three hundred, directed uphill against broad and deep masses of squadrons which reckoned their strength by thousands, it seemed nearly certain from the first that the General leading it must come, and come almost singly, into actual bodily contact with a host of adversaries, and remain for a time engulfed in it because the enemy's front ranks were so barred against all retreat by the squadrons behind them, that there could be no hope of putting the body to flight by the mere approach of our squadrons.

At this time, the distance between the Russians and General Scarlett is believed to have been about 400 yards.

Scarlett's deviation from the accustomed practice:

For the better understanding of what presently followed, it is well to know that when a brigadier is directing a movement which must be executed by only a portion of his force, the notes of the brigade trumpet do not instantly and directly take effect upon the troops; because the order of the brigadier, in the case supposed, must be repeated by the regimental officers. It will also be useful to remember that squadrons in general are not moved from a halt to a charge by a single word of command. When the process is gone through with full deliberation, the first order is this:—

'The line will advance at a walk!' and, the CHAP.  
trumpet successively sounding the orders which I.  
follow, the force is brought on to its final task  
through the stages of 'Trot!' 'Gallop!' 'Charge!' \*

Now, Scarlett well knew how much all depended upon striking at the enemy's masses whilst yet they stood halted; † and, so far as concerned his own orders, he was hardly in the humour for travelling through all the anterior stages. He turned to his trumpeter and said at once, 'Sound the charge!'

Whilst the notes were still pealing, and before they could take full effect upon the squadrons behind him, Scarlett moved forward at a trot; and although the impediments of the camping-ground made it necessary for a rider in this the first part of the onset to pick his way with some care, yet the horse Scarlett rode was a horse of such stride and power, that his rate of advance was not slow, even over the obstructed ground; and, as soon as the clear field which was at length gained enabled the leader to get into a gallop, the distance between him and his squadrons was swiftly increased. In a few moments, he was so far in advance of them that Elliot judged it right to call the attention of the chief to the position of his squadrons. Those squadrons were by this

the order he gave his trumpeter.

Scarlett's advance.

His distance from his squadrons

\* The walk, I believe, is often, if not indeed generally, omitted; but the other three stages are *de règle*.

† According to the impression of Lord Lucan—differing in that respect from those who took part in the execution of the charge—the Russian column by this time had resumed its advance down the hill.

CHAP.  
I.

time advancing; but the impediments of the camping-ground proved of course more obstructing to the serried ranks of the Greys than to a horseman with only one companion and two attendants. Scarlett could not question that the distance between him and his squadrons had become extravagantly great; but still judging, as he had judged from the first, that it was of vital moment to strike the enemy's column whilst halted, he rather desired to accelerate the Greys than much to retard his own pace. Therefore, still pressing forward, though not quite so swiftly as before, he turned partly round in his saddle, shouted out a 'Come on!' to the Greys, and invoked them with a wave of his sword.

When the squadrons attained to clear ground, they began to reduce the space which divided them from their leader; but it is computed that, at the moment of Scarlett's first contact with the enemy's column, the distance between him and the squadrons which followed him was still, at the least, fifty yards.

The Brigadier now found himself nearing the front of the column at a point very near its centre, and the spot at which Scarlett thus rode was marked by the presence of a Russian officer who sat erect in his saddle some few paces in front of his people, and confronting the English intruder.

Scarlett by this time was charging up at high speed, and, conjoined with the swiftness thus attained, the weight of a sixteen-hands horse

Russian  
officer in  
front of  
the column

gave his onset a formidable momentum. The Russian officer turned partly round in his saddle, with a gesture which seemed to indicate that he sought to beckon forward his people, and cause them to flood down over the four coming horsemen; but already Scarlett and his aide-de-camp were closing. Moved perhaps by such indication of rank as was to be gathered in one fleeting moment from the sight of a staff-officer's hat, the Russian officer chose Elliot for his adversary, and was going to make his first thrust, when along the other side of him, rushing close past the elbow of his bridle-arm, General Scarlett swept on without hindrance, and drove his way into the column.

It was by digging his charger right in between the two nearest troopers before him that Scarlett wedged himself into the solid mass of the enemy's squadrons. When a man has done an act of this kind, and has lived to speak of it, it is difficult for him to be sure of what might be happening close around him, but Scarlett observed that of the adversaries nearest to him, whom he had not, he knew, gravely wounded, there were some who dropped off their horses without having been killed or wounded by him; and it seemed to him, if he were to judge only from his own eyes, that they were throwing themselves to the ground of their own accord.

It was well perhaps, after all, that Scarlett, in leading the charge, was extravagantly ahead of his troops; for it seems he was able to drive so

C H A P.  
I.

Scarlett  
sweeping  
past the  
bridle-arm  
of the Rus-  
sian officer,  
and driving  
into the  
column.

CHAP. far into the column as to be protected by the very  
L bodies of his adversaries from the shock which  
must needs be inflicted by the Greys and Innis-  
killings when charging the front of the column.

General  
Scarlett in  
the column.

From the moment when the Brigadier had thus established himself in the midst of his foes, it resulted, of course, that his tenure of life was by the sword, and not by the sword which is a metaphor, but by that which is actual, and of steel. Scarlett, it seems, had no pretension to be more than a passably good swordsman, and he had the disadvantage of being near-sighted; but he knew how to handle his weapon, and in circumstances which exposed him to attack from several at the same time, he had more need of such unflagging industry of the sword-arm as might keep the blade flashing here, there, and on all sides in quickly successive whirls, than of the subtle, the delicate skill which prepares men for combats of two.

Elliot's  
encounter  
with the  
Russian  
officer in  
front of the  
column.

It was partly, perhaps, from the circumstance of Elliot's approaching him on the side of his sword-arm that the Russian officer in front of the column chose the aide - de - camp for his antagonist instead of the chief; but be that as it may, he faced Elliot as he approached and endeavoured to cut him down. Evading or parrying the cut, Elliot drove his sword through the body of the assailant, and the swiftness with which he was galloping up whilst delivering this thrust was so great that the blade darted in to the very hilt; but until the next moment, when

Elliot's charger had rushed past, the weapon, though held fast by its owner, still could not be withdrawn. Thence it resulted that the Russian officer was turned round in his saddle by the leverage of the sword which transfixes him. In the next instant, Elliot, still rushing forward with great impetus, drove into the column between the two troopers who most nearly confronted him, and then, with a now reeking sword, began cleaving his way through the ranks. Shegog and the trumpeter came crashing in after; so that not only Scarlett himself, but all the three horsemen who constituted his immediate following, were now engulfed in the column.

A singular friendship had long subsisted between the Scots Greys and the Inniskilling Dragoons. It dated from the time of that famous brigade in which three cavalry regiments were so brought together as to express by their aggregate title the union of the three kingdoms, yet offer a sample of each;\* but the circumstance of the Greys and the Inniskillings having been brigaded together in the great days can hardly be treated as alone sufficing to account for the existence and duration of this romantic attachment; for it so happens that the sentiment which thus bound together the thistle and the shamrock has never included the rose. The friendship between the Scottish and the Irish regiment had the ardour of personal friendship, and a tenacity not liable to be relaxed

CHAP.  
I.

The three  
horsemen  
riding with  
Scarlett.

The ancient  
friendship  
between the  
Scots Greys  
and the In-  
niskilling  
Dragoons

\* The 'Union Brigade.' The regiment which in that historic brigade represented England was the 'Royals.'

**CHAP.** by mere death ; for a regiment great in history bears so far a resemblance to the immortal gods as to be old in power and glory, yet have always the freshness of youth. Long intervals of years often passed in which the Greys and the Inniskillings remained parted by distance, but whenever it became known that by some new change of quarters the two regiments would once more be brought together, there used to be great joy and preparation ; and whether the in-marching regiment might be the Greys or the Inniskillings, it was sure to be welcomed by the other one with delight and with lavish attentions.

When last the sworn friends were together in what they might deign to call fighting, they were under the field-glass of the great Napoleon. Then, as now, the Greys charged in the first line, and on the left of the Inniskillings.\*

Of the two comrade regiments, each had its distinguishing characteristics. The Inniskillings, with still some remaining traces in their corps of the old warlike Orange enthusiasm, were eager, fiery, impetuous.† The Scots Greys, with a great power of self-restraint, were yet liable to be wrought upon by their native inborn desire for

The distinguishing characteristics of the two regiments.

\* It had been intended by Lord Uxbridge that they should act in support, but circumstances superseded his directions, and caused them to charge in first line.

† The proportion of the regiment reenlisted from Ireland was very much smaller than it had been in former times, but still the Orange element, coupled with the force of regimental tradition, was enough to warrant the statement contained in the text.

a fight, till it raged like a consuming passion. **C H A P.**  
**I.**  
From the exceeding tenacity of their nature, it resulted that the combative impulses, when long baffled by circumstances, were cumulative in their effect; and the events of the day—the capture of British guns under the eyes of our horsemen—the marching, the countermarching, the marching again, without ever striking a blow, and finally, the dainty dressing of ranks under the eyes of the enemy's host—all these antecedent trials of The temper  
of the Greys  
at this time. patience had been heating and still heating the furnace by the very barriers which kept down the flame. If, with the Inniskillings, the impetuosity I spoke of was in a great measure aggregate, that yearning of the Scots for close quarters was, with many, the passion of the individual man, and so plain to the eye that the trooper became something other than a component part of a machine—became visibly a power of himself. English officers who were combative enough in their own way, yet saw with wonder not unmixed with a feeling like awe that long-pent-up rage for the fight which was consuming the men of the Greys.

In the earlier part of the advance now at length commenced by the three squadrons, there was nothing that could much impress the mind of an observer who failed to connect it in his mind with the prospect of what was to follow; and a somewhat young critic was heard to condemn the advance by declaring it ‘tame.’ The truth is—and that we discovered before, whilst tracing the steps of Scarlett—that the Greys had Unavoidable  
slowness of  
the advance  
in its earlier  
moments.

**C H A P.** to pick their way as best they could through the impediments of the camp ; and although Colonel Dalrymple White with the 2d squadron of the Inniskillings had clear ground before him, he was too good an officer to allow the fiery troops he was leading to break from their alignment with the obstructed regiment on his left.

*Progress of  
the advance.*

*Involuntary  
extension of  
our line  
whilst  
advancing.*

But when the Greys got clear of the camping-ground, both they and the Inniskilling squadron on their right began to gather pace ; and when the whole line had settled into its gallop, there began to take effect that spontaneous change of structure which often attends cavalry charges, for the front rank began to spread out, and from time to time the rear-rank men, as opportunities offered, pushed forward into the openings thus made for them. This change was carried so far that in large portions of the line, if not through its whole extent, the two ranks which had begun the advance were converted by degrees into one. The ‘three hundred,’ whilst advancing as they did at first in two ranks, were enormously outflanked by the enemy, and it seems that from this circumstance men were instinctively led to give freer scope to the impulses which tended to a prolongation of front.

There was now but small space between our slender line of ‘three hundred’ and the dark serried mass which had received their leader into its depths ; and the Russian horsemen—because so ill-generalled as to have in hand no graver task—were here and there firing their carbines.

*The Russian  
horsemen  
resorting to  
firearms*

The Greys were led by Colonel Darby Griffith; and the two squadron-leaders who followed him were Major Clarke on the right, and Captain Williams on the left. Handley, Hunter, Buchanan, and Sutherland were the four troop-leaders of the regiment; the adjutant was Lieutenant Miller; the serre-files were Boyd, Nugent, and Lenox Prendergast. And to these, though he did not then hold the Queen's commission, I add the name of John Wilson, now a cornet and the acting adjutant of the regiment, for he took a signal part in the fight.

Besides Colonel Dalrymple White, who was present in person with this moiety of his Inniskillings, the officers who charged with this, the 2d squadron of the regiment, were Captain Manley, the leader of the squadron; Lieutenant Rawlinson, and Lieutenant and Adjutant Weir.

I believe that after General Scarlett and the three horsemen with him, who had already engulfed themselves in the dark sloping thicket of squadrons, the next man who rode into contact with the enemy's horse was Colonel Dalrymple White, the commander of the Inniskillings, and then acting in person in front of his second or left-hand squadron. Straight before him he had a part of the enemy's column so far from where Scarlett went in as to be altogether new ground (if so one may speak of a human mass), whilst, by casting a glance in the direction of his right front, he could see how enormously the enemy was there outflanking him; but he followed in

I.  
The officers  
who charged  
with the  
Greys.

The officers  
who charged  
with the 2d  
squadron of  
the Inniskil-  
lings.

Colonel  
Dalrymple  
White.

**C H A P.** the spirit with which Scarlett had led, and drove  
**I.** his way into the column.

**Major  
Clarke of  
the Greys.**

Whilst Major Clarke was leading in the right squadron of the Greys, an accident befell him, which might seem at first sight—and so indeed he himself apparently judged it—to be one of a very trivial kind, but it is evident that in its effect upon the question of his surviving or being slain it trebled the chances against him. Without being vicious, his charger, then known as the ‘Sultan,’ was liable to be maddened by the rapture of galloping squadrons, and it somehow resulted from the frenzy which seized on the horse that the rider got his bearskin displaced, and suffered it to fall to the ground. Well enough might it appear to the pious simplicity of those Russian troopers who saw the result, and not the accident which caused it, that the red-coated officer on the foremost grey horse rode visibly under the shelter of some Satanic charm, or else with some spell of the Church holding good, by the aid of strong faith, against acres upon acres of swords; for now, when Clarke made the last rush, and dug ‘Sultan’ in through their ranks, he entered among them bare-headed.

**The charge  
of the three  
hundred.**

The difference that there was in the temperaments of the two comrade regiments showed itself in the last moments of the onset. The Scots Greys gave no utterance except to a low, eager, fierce moan of rapture—the moan of outbursting desire. The Inniskillings went in with a cheer.

With a rolling prolongation of clangour which

resulted from the bends of a line now deformed by its speed, the 'three hundred' crashed in upon the front of the column. They crashed in with a momentum so strong that no cavalry, extended in line and halted, could well have withstood the shock if it had been physically able to turn and fall back; but, whatever might be their inclination, the front-rank men of the Russian column were debarred, as we saw, from all means of breaking away to the rear by the weight of their own serried squadrons sloping up the hillside close behind them; and, it being too late for them to evade the concussion by a lateral flight, they had no choice—it was a cruel trial for cavalry to have to endure at the halt—they had no choice but to await and suffer the onslaught. On the other hand, it was certain that if the Russian hussar being halted should so plant and keep himself counter to his assailant as to be brought into diametric collision with the heavier man and the heavier horse of the Inniskillings or the Greys whilst charging direct at his front, he must and would be overborne. It might, therefore, be imagined that many of the troopers in the front rank of the Russian column would now be perforce overthrown, that numbers of our dragoons would in their turn be brought to the ground by that very obstacle—the obstacle of overturned horses and horsemen—which their onset seemed about to build up, and that far along the front of the column the field would be encumbered with a heap or bank of prostrated riders and chargers,

**CHAP.** where Russians would be struggling for extrication intermingled with Inniskillings or Greys. Such a result would apparently have been an evil one for the ‘three hundred,’ because it would have enabled the unshattered masses of the enemy to bring their numbers to bear against such of the redcoats as might still remain in their saddles.

It was not thus, however, that the charge wrought its effect. What had first been done by Scarlett and the three horsemen with him, what had next been done by the leaders of the Greys and the 2d squadron of the Inniskillings, and next again by the squadron-leaders and other regimental officers whose place was in front of their men, that now, after more or less struggle, the whole of these charging ‘three hundred’ were enabled to achieve.

The result of their contact with the enemy was a phenomenon so much spoken of in the days of the old war against the French Empire, that it used to be then described by a peculiar but recognised phrase. Whether our people spoke with knowledge of fact, or whether they spoke in their pride, I do not here stay to question; but in describing the supposed issue of conflicts in which a mass of Continental soldiery was assailed by English troops extended in line, it used to be said of the foreigners that they ‘accepted the files.’\*

\* It was to infantry, I believe, that the words used to be applied; but it has been adjudged that they describe with military accuracy the reception which was given by the Russian

This meant, it seems, that instead of opposing his body to that of the islander with such rigid determination as to necessitate a front-to-front clash, and a front-to-front trial of weight and power, the foreigner who might be steadfast enough to keep his place in the foremost rank of the assailed mass would still be so far yielding as to let the intruder thrust past him and drive a way into the column.

Whatever was the foundation for this superb faith, the phrase, as above interpreted, represents with a singular exactness what the front rank of the Russian column now did. Being physically barred towards their rear by their own dense and close-pressing squadrons, these horsemen could not fall back under the impact of the charge; and, on the other hand, they did not so plant themselves as to be each of them a directly opposing hindrance to an assailant. They found and took a third course. They ‘accepted the files.’ Here, there, and almost everywhere along the assailed part of the column, the troopers who stood in front rank so sidled and shrank that they suffered the Grey or the Inniskillinger to tear in between them with a licence accorded to a cannon-ball which is seen to be coming, and must not be obstructed, but shunned. So, although, by their charge, these few horsemen could deliver no blow of such weight as to shake the depths of

column to Scarlett’s ‘three hundred.’ Lord Seaton—Colonel Colborne of the illustrious 52d Regiment—was one of those who handed down the phrase to a later generation.

CHAP.

I.

a column extending far up the hillside, they more or less shivered or sundered the front rank of the mass, and then, by dint of sheer wedge-work and fighting, they opened and cut their way in. It was in the nature of things that at some parts of the line the hindrance should be greater than at others;\* but, speaking in general terms, it can be said that, as Scarlett had led, so his front line righteously followed; and that, within a brief space from the moment of the first crash, the 'three hundred,' after more or less strife, were received into the enemy's column.

Lord Raglan was so rich in experience of the great times, and so gifted with the somewhat rare power of swiftly apprehending a combat, that he instantly saw the full purport, and even divined the sure issue, of what our dragoons were doing; but it was not without some dismay on the part of other English beholders, that Scarlett and his 'three hundred' were thus seen to bury themselves in the enemy's masses. And with every moment, the few thus engulfed in the many seemed nearer and nearer to extinction. For awhile, indeed, the Inniskillinger and the Grey—the one by his burnished helmet, the other by the hue of his charger and both by the red of their uniforms—could be so followed by the eye of the spectator as to be easily seen commingling with the dark-mantled

\* Such hindrances must have chiefly occurred at spots where a few of our troopers may have chanced to be clumped together for some moments. Amidst all the stores of information on which I rely, I find no proof that any of our people were detained on the outside of the column by stress of combat.

masses around them ; but the more the interfusion increased, the greater became the seeming oppressiveness of the disproportion between the few and the many ; and soon this effect so increased, that if a man gazed from the heights of the Chersonese without the aid of a field-glass, he could hardly ward off a belief that the hundreds had been swamped in the thousands.

Yet all this while General Scarlett and the 'three hundred' horsemen who had followed him into the column were not in such desperate condition as to be helplessly perishing in this thicket of lances and swords. If, indeed, they had faltered and hovered with uncertain step in the front of the great Russian column till it might please General Ryjoff to sound 'the trot,' they must have been crushed or dispersed by the descending weight of his masses ; but our horsemen by first charging home and then forcing their way into the heart of the column, had gained for themselves a strange kind of safety (or rather of comparative safety), in the very density of the squadrons which encompassed them. It is true that every man had to fight for his life, and that too with an industry which must not be suffered to flag ; but still he fought under conditions which were not so overwhelmingly unfair as they seemed to be at first sight.

Scarlett's men, as we know, were 'heavy dragoons,' whilst the Russians were either hussars or troops of other denominations, ranging

CHAP.  
I.—under the head of ‘light cavalry ;’ but in the fight now about to be waged this difference was of less importance than might be imagined. The weight of our men and the weight of their horses had served them well in the charge; and even in the closely-locked combat of few against many to which they had now committed themselves, the red-coated troopers were likely to be advantaged by their greater height from the ground and the longer reach of their sword arms ; but in point of defensive accoutrements they were less protected than the light cavalry were with whom they had to contend. Except the helmets worn by the one squadron of the Inniskillings, the ‘three hundred’ had no sort of covering or accoutrement contrived for defence.\* They were without their shoulder-scales, and even without their gauntlets.

The Russians, on the other hand (with the exception of a very small proportion of them who wore and disclosed their pale-blue hussar jackets), were all encased in what was (for the purpose of this peculiar combat) a not inefficient suit of armour ; for the thick, coarse, long grey outer-coat which they wore gave excellent protection against the cuts of an Englishman’s sabre, and was not altogether incapable of even defeating a thrust ; † whilst the shako was of such strength

\* The bearskins of the Greys gave no doubt great protection, but can hardly be said to have been contrived for the purpose.

† The edges of our men’s sabres seemed to rebound from the loose thick grey cloth, and sometimes—I know one instance especially—the point of a sword thrust hard at a Russian thus clothed was bent back by the resistance it encountered.

and quality as to be more effectual than a helmet against the edge of the sword.\*

In such skill as is gained by the sword exercise, there was not perhaps much disparity between the combatants; but the practice of our service up to that time had failed to provide the troopers with those expedients of fence which he would be needing when assailed in the direction of his bridle-arm; and this of course was a somewhat imperilling defect for a horseman who had to combat in a crowd of enemies, and was liable to be attacked on all sides.

Though reckoned by thousands, and having for the moment no heavier task than that of overwhelming or shaking off somewhat less than three hundred assailants, the Russians were prevented from exerting the strength of their column by the very grossness of its numbers, because they all stood so formed up on a limited space, and so wedged into one compact mass, that for the moment they had become, as it were, their own jailers. Still, no one among the 'three hundred,' whether fighting in knots with others, or fighting all alone in the crowd, could fail to be under such actual stress of simultaneous assailants as to have to confide in his single right arm for all means of defence against numbers; and, upon the whole, it would seem that

\* One day the Vicomte de Nöé and an English officer undertook to test the strength of a Russian shako; and the Vicomte declares that they were actually unable to cleave it with a hatchet.

CHAP.  
—  
<sup>L.</sup> the mere physical conditions of the fight were largely in favour of the Russians; but in regard to the temper of the combatants, there were circumstances which tended to animate the few and to depress the many. Under conditions most trying to cavalry, the Russians evinced a degree of steadfastness not unworthy of a nation which was famous for the valour of its infantry; but kept as they had been at a halt, and condemned (in violation of the principles which govern the use of cavalry) to be passively awaiting the attack, it was impossible for them to be comparable in ardour, self-trust, and moral ascendant to horsemen exalted and impassioned by the rapture of the charge, and now in their towering pride riding this way and that with fierce shouts through the patient, long-suffering mass.

In some parts of the column the combatants were so closely locked as to be almost unable, for awhile, to give the least movement to their chargers; and wherever the red-coated horseman thus found himself inwedged and surrounded by assailants, it was only by the swift circling 'moulinet,' by an almost ceaseless play of his sabre whirling round and round overhead, and by seizing now and then an occasion for a thrust or a cut, that he was able to keep himself among the living; but the horse, it seems, during these stationary fights, instinctively sought and found shelter for his head by bending it down, and leaving free scope for the sabres to circle and

clash overhead. At other places—for the most part perhaps in those lanes of space which were constituted by the usual ‘intervals’ and ‘distances’ intersecting the mass—there was so much more freedom of movement that groups of as many as ten or twelve Russians who had fallen out of their ranks would be here and there seen devoting themselves to a common purpose by confederating themselves, as it were, against particular foes, and endeavouring to overwhelm the knot of two or three Greys or Inniskillingers which they deemed to be the most in their power. Where this occurred, the two or three redcoats, more or less separated from each other, would be seen striving to force their way through the masses before them, and attended on their flanks and in their rear by a band of assailants, who did not, most commonly, succeed in overpowering the tall horsemen, but persisted nevertheless in hanging upon them. Our troopers, thus encompassed, strove hard, as may well be supposed, to cut down the foes within reach; but in general the sabre seemed almost to rebound like a cudgel from the thick grey outer-coat of the Russian horseman; and upon the whole, there was resulting as yet but little carnage from this singular example of a fight between a heavy column of halted cavalry and the knots of the taller horsemen who were riving it deeper and deeper.

With but few exceptions, the Scots Greys were of the race which the name of their regiment imports; and, from a conjuncture of circum-

CHAP. stances which must needs be of rare occurrence  
I. in modern times, the descendants of the Covenanters had come upon an hour when troopers could once more be striving in that kind of close fight which marked the period of our religious wars—in that kind of close fight which withdraws the individual soldier from his fractional state of existence, and exalts him into a self-depending power. A Scots Grey, in the middle of our own century, might have no enraging cause to inflame him ; but he was of the blood of those who are warriors by temperament, and not because of mere reasons. And he, too, had read his Bible. Men who saw the Scots Greys in this close fight of Scarlett's, travel out of humanity's range to find beings with which to compare him. His long-pent-up fire, as they say, had so burst forth as to turn him into a demon of warlike wrath ; but it must not be inferred from such speech that he was under the power of that ' blood frenzy ' of which we shall afterwards see an example ; and the truth can be satisfied by acknowledging that, as his fathers before him had ever been accustomed to rage in battle, so he too, in this later time, was seized and governed by the passion of fight. When numbers upon numbers of docile, obedient Russians crowded round a Scot of this quality, and beset him on all sides, it did not of necessity result that they had the ascendant. Whilst his right arm was busy with the labour of sword against swords, he could so use his bridle-hand as to be fastening its grip

upon the long-coated men of a milder race, and CHAP.  
I.  
tearing them out of their saddles.

Engaged in this ceaseless toil of fighting for life, as well as for victory, the Greys and the Inniskillingers were hardly so self-conscious as to be afterwards able to speak at all surely of the degree of confidence with which they maintained this singular combat of the few against many; but of those who observed from a distance, there was one who more swiftly and more surely than others could apprehend the features of a still pending conflict. Almost from the first, Lord Raglan perceived that our horsemen, though scant in numbers, and acting singly or in small knots, still showed signs of having dominion over the mass they had chosen to invade.\* Whether the cause of this ascendant be traced to the greater height and longer reach of our horsemen, to the unspeakable advantage of being the assailants, to the inborn pride and warlike temperament of our men, or finally, to all these causes united, the actual result was that the redcoats, few as they were, seemed to ride through the crowd like sure tyrants. The demeanour of the Russian horsemen was not unlike what might have been expected. Gazing down as they did from a slope, even those who were not in the foremost ranks could see the exceeding scantiness of the force which had made bold to attack them, and accordingly they seemed to remain steady and free from

\* The conflict, Lord Raglan wrote, 'was never for a moment doubtful.'—Public Despatch.

CHAP.  
I.— alarms of the kind which seize upon masses ; but still the individual trooper who chanced to be so placed in the column as to have to undergo the assaults of one of the Scots Greys or Inniskilling dragoons, seemed to own himself personally overmatched, and to meet the encounter almost hopelessly, like a brave man oppressed by the strong. Without apparently doubting—for there was no sign of panic—that overwhelming numbers must secure the general result, he yet found that, for the moment, those mere numbers could not give him the protection he needed, and he would so rein his charger, and so plant himself in his saddle, and so set his features, as to have the air of standing at bay. Of the objects surrounding our people whilst engaged in this closely locked fight, none stamped themselves more vividly on their minds than those numberless cages of clenched teeth which met them wherever they looked.

From the time when the ‘three hundred’ had fairly closed with the enemy, there was but little recourse to carbine or pistol ; and the movement of the horses within the column being necessarily slight, and on thick herbage, there resulted little sound from their tramp. The clash of sabres overhead had become so steady and ceaseless, and its sound so commingled with the jangle of cavalry accoutrements proceeding from thousands of horsemen, that upon the whole it was but little expressive of the numberless separate conflicts in which each man was holding to life with the strength of his own right arm.

In regard to the use men made of their voices, there was a marked difference between our people and the Russian horsemen. The islanders hurled out, whilst they fought, those blasts of malediction, by which many of our people in the act of hard striving are accustomed to evoke their full strength; whilst the Russians in general fought without using articulate words. Nor, instead, did they utter any truculent, theological yells of the kind which, some few days later, were destined to be heard on the battle-field. They had not, as yet, been sanctified. It was not till the 4th of November that the army of the Czar underwent that fell act of consecration which whetted his people for the morrow, and prepared those strange shrieks of doctrinal hate which were heard on the ridges of Inkerman. But although abstaining from articulate speech and from fierce yells, the grey-mantled horseman in general was not therefore mute. He sometimes evolved, whilst he fought, a deep, gurgling, long-drawn sound, close akin to an inchoate roar; or else—and this last was the predominant utterance—a sustained and continuous ‘zizz,’ of the kind that is made with clenched teeth; and to the ears of those who were themselves engaged in the fight, the aggregate of the sounds coming thus from the mouths of the Russians was like that of some factory in busy England, where numberless wheels hum and buzz. And meanwhile, from those masses of Russian horsemen who stood ranged in such parts of the column as to be unable to engage in bodily

C H A P.  
I.

CHAP. I.—combat, there rose a low murmur of that indefinite kind which attests the presence of a crowd without disclosing its humour. As heard on the edge of the Chersonese, a mile and a half towards the west, the collective roar which ascended from this thicket of intermixed combatants had the unity of sound which belongs to the moan of a distant sea.

If this struggle bore closer resemblance to the fights of earlier ages than to those of modern times, it had also the characteristic of being less destructive than might be imagined to life and limb. General Scarlett's old Eton experience of what used to be there called a 'rooge' was perhaps of more worth to him than many a year of toil in the barrack-yard or the exercise-ground. Close wedged from the first in an enemy's column, and on all sides hemmed in by the Russians, he was neither killed nor maimed, for the sabre which stove in his helmet was stopped before reaching his skull, and the only five wounds he received were, each of them, so slight as to be for the time altogether unheeded. By some chance, or possibly as a consequence of wearing a head-gear which announced the presence of a staff-officer, Lieutenant Elliot, the aide-de-camp of the Brigadier, was beset with great determination by numbers gathering round him on all sides; and although his skill as a swordsman and the more than common length of his blade enabled him for a while to ward off the attacks of his many assailants, they at length closed about him so resolutely that it seemed hardly possible for a single horse-

man thus encompassed by numbers to defend himself many more moments; but at this very time, as it happened, his charger interposed in the combat.\* The horse had become so angered by the pressure of the Russian troop-horses closing in upon his flanks and quarters, that, determining to resent these discourtesies, he began to lash out with his heels, and this so viciously as not only to ward off attacks from the rear, but even in that direction to clear a space. There were four or five Russians, however, who resolutely addressed themselves to the task of extinguishing Elliot; and at a moment when he had somewhat overreached himself in returning the thrust of a Russian trooper—a man with blue-looking nose and a savage, glittering eye—he received a point in the forehead from his hideous adversary. At the same time, another of his assailants divided his face at the centre by a deep-slashing wound, whilst a third dealt a blow on the head which cut through his cocked-hat, and then by the sabre of yet a fourth assailant he was so heavily struck in the part of the skull behind the ear that, irrespectively of the mere wound inflicted by the edge of the weapon, his brain felt the weight of the blow.† There followed a period of unconsciousness, or rather, perhaps, we should call it, a period erased

\* If it had depended upon Elliot himself, I should never have heard of the circumstances here mentioned. He was an entire stranger to me, and it is to others that I owe the great advantage of having been brought into communication with him.

† The wound which divided his face was so well sewn up that it has not much marred his good looks.

CHAP. I. from the memory, for Elliot remained in his saddle, and it is hard to say how he could have been saved if the effect of the blow had been so disabling as to prevent him from using his sword-arm. It is true he was much hacked, having received altogether in this fight no less than fourteen sabre-cuts, but he lived nevertheless,—nay lived, I observe, to be returned as ‘slightly ‘wounded,’ and to find that his name, though most warmly and persistently recommended by Scarlett, was kept out of the public despatches.\*

\* This resulted from a decision of Lord Lucan’s. Lord Lucan conceived it to be his duty to suppress Scarlett’s despatch recommending Elliot’s services for official recognition, and to name only one of the cavalry aides-de-camp as amongst those who had ‘entitled themselves to the notice of the Commander of the Forces;’ but—and now comes what to the uninitiated must seem almost incredible—the aide-de-camp whom Lord Lucan honoured with this distinction, in exclusion of Elliot and in defiance of Scarlett’s despatch, was an officer (Lord Lucan’s first aide-de-camp) who, as it happened, had not had an opportunity of being in any one of the cavalry charges. When I first became acquainted with this monstrous inversion, I believed that I could not do otherwise than ascribe it to Lord Lucan, and I resolved to comment upon his decision in the way which so gross a misfeasance would deserve if it were the act of a free agent. I suspend my determination in this respect, because further inquiry has led me to apprehend that, if Lord Lucan had named the right man instead of the wrong one, he would have been regarded as outraging the custom of the service beyond all the measure of what any one not holding supreme command could be expected to attempt. Supposing that be so, Lord Lucan, of course, cannot fairly be charged with more blame than other men of equal authority who continue a vicious practice without protesting against it; but if he, on this ground, is to be absolved, what is to be said of an army system which compels such a falsification? Well, what in such case would have to be said is this: that the military reputation of England is at the mercy of a Trade-Union, which

Of course, the incursion of the Brigadier and the three horsemen with him had more of the character of a ‘forlorn hope’ than could belong to the enterprise of the squadrons which followed him into the column; but, upon the whole, these combats of Scarlett’s and his aide-de-camp were more or less samples of that war of the one against several which each of the ‘three hundred’ waged.

This close bodily fighting put so great and so ceaseless a strain upon the attention and the bodily power of the combatants, that, with some, it suspended to an extraordinary degree all care about self. Thus Clarke, for example, who had led on his squadron bare-headed, was so deeply cut on the skull by the edge of a sabre as to be startling to the eyes of others by the copious channel of blood which coursed down his head and neck; yet he himself, all the while, did not know he had received any wound. And along with this ennobling interruption of man’s usual care after self, there was often a fanciful waywardness in his choice of the objects to which he inclined attention. Colonel Dalrymple White, for example, after riding alone, as we saw, into an untouched part of the column at the head of his second squadron, had received such a heavy sabre-cut on his helmet as cleaved down home to the

compels people placed in authority to enforce its rules for the repression of excellence by official inversions of fact.

It may be worth while to add that Elliot could not be named for the Victoria Cross because what he did was no more, after all, than his duty. See in the Appendix papers relative to the exclusion of Elliot’s name.

CHAP.  
I.—skull ; and although he remained altogether unconscious of the incident thus occurring to himself, he found his attention attracted and even interested by an object which did not concern him. He saw a fair-haired Russian lad of seventeen, enwrapped like the rest in the coarse heavy over-coat which was common to officers and men ; and what seems to have interested him—for he looked with the eyes of a man who cares much for questions of race—was the powerlessness of a levelling costume to disguise the true breed, and the certainty with which, as he thought, he could detect gentle blood under the common grey cloth of a trooper. ‘He looked,’ says Colonel White,—‘he looked like an Eton boy.’ The boy fought with great bravery ; but it was well if he had no mother, for before the fight ended he fell, his youthful head cloven in two.

Though each man amongst the ‘three hundred’ was guided, of course, in his path by the exigencies of the particular combats in which he engaged, and though many besides were so locked in the column from time to time as to be able to make little progress, yet, upon the whole, the tendency of the assailants was to work their way counter to the ranks of the enemy’s squadrons, and by degrees both Greys and Manley’s squadron of Inniskillings pressed further and further in, till at length, it would seem, there were some who attained to the very rear of the column.\* These

\* This rests rather upon the observation of men who gazed from above than upon the distinct assertion of combatants who had penetrated thus far.

did not, however, emerge into the open ground in rear of the column (where a line of Cossacks stood ranged in open order), but preferred to keep back and remain fighting within the column, taking, each of them, such direction as best consisted with the exigencies of personal combat. The enemy's horsemen, when visited by this fierce intrusion, had before long disclosed an inclination to be hanging in bevies upon the flanks and quarters of some particular Scots Grey singled out here and there as the object of their special attacks, and this in such numbers of instances that, after a while, there was, taking them all together, a whole multitude of these Russian assailants who—without intending retreat—had got to be facing towards their rear, and from this cause apparently it resulted that in seeking, as he naturally would, to be front to front with those who were most keenly besetting him, many a Scots Grey who already had cut his road through from the front to the rear of the column, now once more found himself busied in riving the same mass of horsemen, but riving it in the opposite direction. Whether owing to this cause or some other, there set in, as it were, a back eddy, and numbers of the men of the Greys having now faced about were again cleaving paths through the column, moving this time, however, in directions which tended from its rear towards its front. In the earlier moments of the fight these men of the Greys had seemed to be almost furiously intent upon slaughter, but they now wore the more careless aspect of men who had proved their ascendant. Whilst charging

CHAP. I. back with his men Colonel Darby Griffith received a pistol-shot wound in the head which stunned, and for some time disabled him.

The back current thus formed by the Greys was in reality an actual continuation of their attack, but still, in the literal sense of the term, it was of course a retrograde movement; and towards the proper left of the column where Manley's squadron of the Inniskillings was fighting, men could more or less see the direction in which the Greys moved, without perceiving the circumstances which governed their course. The sight of a number of the Greys with their horses' heads towards the rear was not the only cause which now tended to overcast hope.

The great Russian column was proving that, notwithstanding the mismanagement which had exposed it whilst halted to the almost insulting attack of three squadrons, it still was of too firm a quality to be all at once disintegrated and brought to ruin by the incursion of the small groups of the redcoats who were riving it in opposite directions; and there seemed to be ground for believing that in this conflict of three hundred against a column numbered by thousands, mere time might govern the issue by lessening every minute the relative power of the few. At this juncture also the huge and dense Russian mass began to enforce a sense of the power that there is, after all, in the mere weight of numbers ; for—without by this movement appearing to disclose any weakness—the column now swayed to and fro, and

swayed so mightily as to make a rider own himself powerless under the heavings of a mounted throng which—without mind or purpose of its own—could rock him one way or the other against all the strength of his will. CHAP.  
I.

So although the ‘three hundred’ still toiled at their work of close fighting with a strength of resolve which knew no abatement, there yet were some of their numbers—and that, perhaps, amongst those most gifted with warlike instinct—who hardly now suffered themselves to imagine that the enterprise of the three squadrons which had forced their way into the heart of this column (without having brought it to ruin by the shock of their uphill charge) could be wrought, after all, into a victory by dint of mere personal combats with vastly outnumbering horsemen.

Whilst this was the state of the fight as it seemed to men locked in close strife, there were, all at once, heard British cheers sounding in from outside of the column, sounding in from one quarter first, but then almost instantly from another, and close followed by a new kind of uproar. Presently, from the south-east, there sounded the shout of a squadron which Inniskilling men knew how to recognise, and with it a crash—a crash prolonged for some moments—in the direction of the Russian left front. Then, and from the same quarter, there broke out the roar of fresh tumult which was unlike the din of the fight going on in the midst of the column, and had rather the sound of such combat as

CHAP.

I.

might be waged by armed horsemen when not closely locked. The column, which every moment had been more and more heavily swaying, now heaved itself up the hillside, and, this time, without being commensurately lifted back, as before, by the reaction of the moving power.

But the time has now come for observing the manœuvres of those two deployed Russian wings which, on the right hand as well as the left, prolonged the front ranks of the column.

The man-  
œuvres of  
the two  
Russian  
wings.

At the time when Scarlett's 'three hundred,' after closing upon the front of the column, had hardly done more than begin their labour of man-to-man fighting, the commander of the Russian cavalry made bold to undertake one of those new manœuvres for which the peculiar structure of his winged column is supposed to have been specially fashioned. Remembering, it would seem, the teachings of St Petersburg, he resolved to surround the three squadrons which were charging through the front of his column, and enfold them in the hug of the bear. Therefore on the right hand and on the left, the wings or fore-arms which grew out from the huge massive trunk began to wheel each of them inwards.

There was many an English spectator who watched this phase of the combat with a singular awe, and long remembered the pang that he felt when he lost sight of Scarlett's 'three hundred.' To such a one the dark-mantled squadrons over-casting his sight of the redcoats were as seas

where a ship has gone down, were as earth closing over a grave. One of the ablest of our Light Cavalry officers has striven to record the feelings with which he looked down on this part of the fight:—‘How can such a handful resist much more make way through such a legion? Their huge flanks overlap them, and almost hide them from our view. They are surrounded, and must be annihilated. One can hardly breathe!’

Yet if any observer thus trembling for the fate of Scarlett’s ‘three hundred’ had had his gaze less closely rivetted to one spot, he would have seen that, however desperate might be the condition of this small body of horsemen now seemingly lost in gross numbers, there was no fresh ground for alarm in this singular manœuvre of the Russian cavalry. General Scarlett had attacked the great column with so small a proportion of his brigade, that, when the ‘three hundred’ had engulfed themselves in the column, there still remained four distinct bodies of Heavy Dragoons (consisting altogether of seven squadrons), which, sooner or later, the English might bring to bear upon all the fresh exigencies of the combat; and it is plain that to some, nay, to most, of these seven squadrons, the enemy’s in-wheeling flanks were offering no common occasion. On the other hand, the Russians, notwithstanding their great numerical strength, had so committed themselves to the plan of acting in mass as to be virtually without ‘supports;’ for although, as we saw, there was a part of the force

The circum-  
stances  
under which  
they were  
attempted.

CHAP.

I.

which at first had been placed some way in rear of the main body, the distance was shortened in the course of the advance down the slope; and after the halt of the main column, the supporting force so closed down upon it as virtually to destroy the separation between the two bodies, and to merge them in one cumbrous mass.

The seven squadrons of which we just spoke constituted the forces now preparing to act in support, which Lord Lucan, by his personal directions, might still endeavour to wield. He was on the ground from which the Greys had advanced when beginning their attack. Already he had despatched an order directing Colonel Hodge to charge with the 4th Dragoon Guards,\* and he states that by voice and by gesture—for at the moment he had no aide-de-camp at hand—he tried to enforce the instant advance of a regiment on his left rear; but he adds that nevertheless that regiment remained obstinately

His order  
to the 4th  
Dragoon  
Guards.

His alleged  
direction to  
another  
regiment.

\* And unless Lord Lucan's memory deceives him, the order was to charge the enemy's column *on its right flank*. I should have so stated it in the text, if it were not that the officer (not Colonel Hodge) who *received* the order describes it as merely this:—'Lord Lucan desires him' (Colonel Hodge) 'to charge 'at once with the 4th Dragoon Guards.' I think, however, that Lord Lucan's impression of what he said is probably quite accurate; and, indeed, it would seem that his version of the order which he *gave* may be reconciled with this account of the terms in which it was *delivered*, because, as we shall see, the position which had been already taken up by the regiment made it obvious without words that the column, if attacked by the 4th Dragoon Guards, must be attacked in flank. See *post*.  
page 145.

halted.\* Lord Lucan did not give any other directions to the squadrons constituting his second line. Becoming apparently impatient to push on to the front, he ultimately rode up by our right to the (proper) left flank of the Russian column.

We knew that from the first, three squadrons<sup>†</sup> of the Heavy Brigade had been preparing to second the onslaught of Scarlett's 'three hundred ;' but at the moment of Scarlett's attack two more of his regiments were approaching the scene of the fight; and in speaking successively, as I am now going

The order  
of narration

\* With equal confidence he declares that the regiment thus appealed to was the 1st Dragoons, the regiment we call the Royals. The statements submitted to my consideration oblige me to believe him mistaken ; but he was the commander of the division to which the Royals belonged, and he manfully gave effect to his impression by acts of a decisive kind—by acts of which one, at the least, was public. These are circumstances which make it right for me to acknowledge beforehand that what I shall by-and-by say of the final advance of the Royals is unsanctioned by Lord Lucan's despatch, and diametrically opposed to the impression which his mind has received. With the exception of the Greys, there was nothing in the uniforms of our Heavy Dragoon regiments, as worn on this day, which would enable a spectator at a distance of many paces to distinguish one from another. I at first felt embarrassed by the prospect of being compelled by evidence to reject the firm persuasion of the Divisional General, who was present in person and an actor in the scene ; but I ultimately ascertained that he was mistaken in regard to the identity of the force which stood on his right after Scarlett's final advance, and that the correction of this error would so dislocate his account of what he saw in the direction of his left rear as to remove a main part of the difficulty that I had felt.

† Hunt's squadron of the Inniskillings and the two squadrons of the 5th Dragoon Guards.

CHAP. I. to do, of some movements or attacks which were executed by the 4th Dragoon Guards, by the Royals, by the 5th Dragoon Guards, and by Captain Hunt's squadron of the Inniskillings, I pass simply, for the present, from our left to our right, without intending to represent that these nearly simultaneous operations took place, one after another, in that very order of time which would correspond with the order of narration.

The 4th  
Dragoon  
Guards.

The 4th Dragoon Guards had not yet established itself on the ground pointed out by Lord Raglan's first order, when Colonel Hodge, its commander, became aware of the enemy's advance, and knew that his corps was to follow the squadrons which had already marched with Scarlett. He at once moved off in open column of troops, and the subsequent exigencies of the combat give an interest to the fact that he marched 'left in front.'

Besides Lieutenant-Colonel Hodge, its commander, the officers of this regiment were Major Forrest, Captain Forster, Captain M'Creagh, Captain Webb, Captain Robertson, and five subalterns; namely, Brigstocke, the acting adjutant, M'Donnell, Fisher, Muttlebury, and Deane.

Whilst the regiment was clearing the south of the vineyard, it all at once came in sight of the vast dusky column of Russian cavalry now streaked by the incursions of the redcoats. Indeed, those who looked from beneath were so favoured by the slope of the ground on which the column stood ranged, that from where he now rode with the 1st squadron of the 4th Dragoon Guards,

Captain Forster was able to see General Scarlett—he could distinguish him by the blue frock-coat and the glittering helmet—still fighting in the midst of the column, and some way in front of his men.

The men of the 4th Dragoon Guards had been advancing with their swords in their scabbards ; \* but at sight of a combat going on, though they still were divided from it by a distance of some hundreds of yards, the men instinctively drew. In exact accordance with the design of Lord Lucan, Colonel Hodge at once determined to attack the column in flank.† As soon as he had cleared the south of the vineyard he changed direction ; and, despite the close presence of the enemy, he boldly continued to advance in what may be called marching order ; for, still keeping his regiment in open column of troops, he began to move up the hillside by the somewhat narrow space that there was between the easternmost fence of the vineyard and the (proper) right flank of the column. He said to Captain Forster, who commanded his right squadron, ‘Forster, I am going ‘on with the left squadron. As soon as your ‘squadron gets clear of the vineyard, front, form, ‘and charge.’ Hodge went on in person with his left squadron ; and soon, both that and Forster’s squadron were wheeled and formed up with their

\* Colonel Hodge, I believe, had a theory that the practice of marching with drawn swords was only fitted for peace-time.

† I do not say *in obedience to* the order, because I cannot undertake to say that it had yet been received.

CHAP. I. front towards the enemy's right flank. The operation by which the whole regiment thus fronted to its right with each squadron at once in its place, was made easy and quick by the circumstance that it had been moving 'left in front.'

The enemy made a hasty endeavour to cover the flank thus threatened by an evolution from the rear of his masses ; but the troops which he moved for the purpose were too late to complete their manœuvre, and Colonel Hodge had the satisfaction of seeing that although Russian horsemen engaged in this attempt were interposing themselves between him and the flank of the column, they might be struck in the midst of their effort by the charge of his 4th Dragoon Guards.

In the days of his boyhood when Hodge steered the 'Victory,' there used to be a terse order which readily came to his lips as often as the boat crossed the river ; and now when he had come to be so favoured by Fortune as to find himself at the head of his regiment with no more than a convenient reach of fair galloping ground between him and the flank of the enemy's column, the remainder of the business before him was exactly of such kind as to be expressed by his old Eton word of command. What yet had to be done could be compassed in the syllables of :—'Hard all 'across.'\*

For bringing under one view the several positions from which the Russian column was destined

\* The direction given by the steerer to the crew of an Eton longboat when about to cross the river.

to be assailed by our supports, it was convenient to begin with the regiment on our extreme left; but it must be understood that these movements of the 4th Dragoon Guards took place at a time somewhat later than that which might appear to be assigned to them by the order they have in the narrative.

CHAP.  
I.

The Royals had received no order to leave their position under the steeps of the Chersonese ;\* but from the ground where the regiment stood posted, the preparations for the then impending fight could be easily seen ; and apparently it was assumed that the fact of the regiment being left without orders must have sprung from mistake. At all events, the Royals moved rapidly off towards the scene of the combat.

In its approach to the scene of the fight, this regiment was coming on past the south of the vineyard when Scarlett's 'three hundred,' having already delivered their charge, and being part buried in the column, the right wing of the enemy was all at once seen by the Royals to be folding inwards as though it would envelop the Greys. The sight of the enemy's cavalry deliberately wheeling in upon the rear of a British regiment, kindled so vehement a zeal in the hearts of the Royals, and so eager a desire to press instantly

\* The brigade comprised *ten* squadrons, whilst Lord Raglan's order for the movement towards Kadiköi extended to only *eight*. This difference, I take it, was the cause of the Royals having been left without orders ; but the emergency created by the sudden appearance of the Russian cavalry was regarded as a full warrant for the movement.

CHAP. forward to the rescue, that there was no ceremonious preparation for a charge. A voice cried out, 'By God, the Greys are cut off! Gallop! gallop!' Then there broke from the Royals a cheer. Their trumpets sounded the gallop, and without for a moment halting, but endeavouring to 'form line 'on the move,' the regiment sprang hastily forward. Indeed, the movement of the first or right squadron was so rapid that the left squadron could not perfectly come up with it, and the regiment made its attack in short echelon of squadrons. In this order, but with its ranks imperfectly formed, the regiment advanced at a gallop against the right flank and rear of the in-wheeling line. In spite of this onset, the Russian wing continued its wheeling movement so long as to become defenceless on its extreme right. At the near approach of the Royals, that outer part of the wheeling line which was the most immediately exposed to its assailants broke off from the rest; and then the horsemen who had composed it were either flying or involved in confusion, or else—for several of the Russian hussars made bold to do thus—were valorously advancing and making their way round the flank of the advancing English; but meanwhile, by all this confusion, the inner or left remnant of the Russian wing was so far covered from the attack, and even, it would seem, from the sight of the Royals, that it went on with the execution of the orders received, and continued to wheel inwards.

The English regiment carried on its attack to a

point at which it was just brought into contact with the broken extremity of the enemy's deployed line; and a few sabre-cuts were exchanged;\* but farther than this the Royals did not push their advantage; for the discomfiture of a part of the wing did not visibly involve the great column; and considering the disordered state of the regiment, Colonel Yorke judged it prudent to rally his men before they were thrown into contact with a huge mass of troops still preserving their thickest formation. Accordingly, and at a time when only a few of its pursuing troopers had as yet ridden in amongst the retreating horsemen, the regiment was halted and ordered to re-form.

Besides Colonel Yorke, who commanded the regiment, the officers present with the Royals at the time of its re-forming were Major Wardlaw,† Captain Elmsall, Captain George Campbell, Captain Stocks; and the following subalterns—namely, Pepys, Charlton, Basset, Glyn, Coney, Gilbert Robertson, Hartopp, and Sandeman.

\* Of the Royals I understand two were there wounded, of whom one was Sergeant Pattenden.

† Major Wardlaw (now Colonel Wardlaw, the officer now commanding the regiment), though suffering from illness, had found strength enough to enable him to be with the regiment in the earlier part of the day, but afterwards, his sickness increasing, he had been forced to go back to camp. Afterwards, whilst sitting or lying down outside his tent door, he saw our Heavy Dragoons with the enemy in their front, and then instantly mounting his charger (which he had caused to be kept saddled with a view to such a contingency), he found means to reach the scene of conflict at the time when the regiment was re-forming.

CHAP.  
I.— An exploit performed at this time was observed with some interest by numbers of the Light Brigade men, then gazing down at the fight. Troop-sergeant-major Norris of the Royals, having been separated by a mischance from his regiment, was a little in rear of it, and hastening to overtake his comrades, when he found himself beset on open ground by four Russian hussars, who must have ridden past the flank of our people. Norris, however, though having to act alone against four, found means to kill one of his assailants, to drive off the rest, and to capture the charger of the slain man.

The 5th  
Dragoon  
Guards.

Farther towards our right, and so placed as to be in support to the Greys, though somewhat outflanking their left, there stood the 5th Dragoon Guards. It was commanded by Captain Desart Burton; and the rest of the officers then acting with the corps were Captain Newport Campbell, Captain Inglis, Lieutenant Halford, Lieutenant Swinfen, Lieutenant Temple Godman (the adjutant of the regiment), Cornet Montgomery, Cornet Neville, Cornet Ferguson, and Cornet Hampton. The regiment had at length been formed up in line; but its two squadrons were in inverted order, the first being on the left, and the second on the right. For a moment there seemed to be a question whether it might not be prudent to transpose the squadrons into their respective places, but the pressure of time was too cogent to allow of long ceremony; and, without first correcting its order of formation, the regiment moved

forward. It had to pass over ground much obstructed by remnants of the Light Brigade camp; Captain Campbell's charger, for instance, was overthrown by a picket-rope which crossed his line of advance; and I believe that, though Neville owed his mortal wound to the lance of a Cossack, he had first been brought to the ground by one of these camp obstructions.

CHAP.  
I.

At this time, the inner, and still unbroken part of the enemy's right wing had already wheeled in over an arc represented by an angle of nearly sixty degrees; and, strange as the statement may seem, there still is sound proof of the fact that the obedient Muscovite troopers continued thus to wheel inwards till they had come to be obliquely in front of the column, and with their backs towards our 5th Dragoon Guards. It is true that amongst these wondrously submissive horsemen there were some who so far frouted as to find means of hastily using their carbines against our people; but it seems to be established that a portion, at least, of the in-wheeling line did really suffer itself to be charged in rear by the 5th Dragoon Guards. It could not but be that many of the Russians would be cut down or unhorsed when the English regiment charged in, as it did, amongst troopers thus rendered defenceless by the nature of their own manœuvre; but, on the other hand, very many were protected from the edge of the sword—nay even, indeed, from its point—by the thickness of their long, ample coats; and, upon the whole, there were numbers of horsemen.

**C H A P.** some English, some Russian, who thronged up against that part of the column where the Scots Greys were eddying back; so that Russians belonging to the column, and Russians belonging to the right wing, and men of the Scots Greys and men of the 5th Dragoon Guards, were here forced and crowded together in one indiscriminate melle.\* Nor were these the only components of the crowd. Men of the same brigade, but having tasks assigned them elsewhere, broke away from their duties in camp, and—some of them on invalid chargers—found means to gallop up into the fight. Amongst these, two regimental butchers, each busy with his sword, were conspicuous because of their shirt sleeves. Moreover, there could be seen here and there a man of the Light Brigade, who, for sake of the strife, had stolen away from his regiment, and was mingled with the rest of the combatants.

Change in  
the bearing  
of the com-  
batants.

And, at the part of the column thus assailed by the 5th Dragoon Guards, there was a change in the bearing of the combatants—a change brought about, it would seem, by exceeding weariness of the sword-arm, but in part too by another cause. After three or four minutes of a new experience, it proved that a man could grow accustomed, as it were, to the condition of being in a throng of

\* In strictness, perhaps, this word should be spelt ‘mesley,’ or ‘masly’ (not ‘medley,’ a word from another root), but I follow the mode which obtains in ‘pell-mell.’ The word is so familiar to Englishmen of different classes of life, and so well derived from old French, that there is no reason for allowing it to be supplanted by any such mincing substitute as ‘mêlée.’

assailants, and take his revel of battle in a spirit as fond as at the beginning, yet by this time less anxious, less fierce, less diligent. Those truculent Scots, who had cut their way in without speaking, were now, whilst they fought, hurrahing. The din of sheer fighting had swelled into the roar of a tumult.

Alexander Miller, the acting Adjutant of the Greys, was famous in his regiment for the mighty volume of sound which he drove through the air when he gave the word of command.\* Over all the clangour of arms, and all the multitudinous uproar, his single voice got dominion. It thundered out, ‘Rally !’ Then, still louder, it thundered, ‘The Greys !’†

The Adjutant, as it chanced, was so mounted that his vast, superb form rose high over the men of even his own regiment, and rose higher still over the throng of the Russians. Seized at once by the mighty sound, and turning to whence it came, numbers of the Scots saw their towering Adjutant with his reeking sword high in the air, and again they heard him cry, ‘Rally !’—again hurl his voice at ‘The Greys !’

He did not speak in mere vehemence, like one who, although he cry ‘Rally !’ means only a war-cry or cheer. He spoke as an officer delivering

CHAP.  
I.

Efforts  
made to  
rally the  
Greys.

\* I dare not speak of the distance at which, as I learn, his voice could make itself heard, but I may so far venture as to say that the distance was such as to be computed by the mile.

† It seems that, even when this regiment is addressed in the vocative case, it is customary to retain the definite article, and address it as ‘The Greys.’

**C H A P.** I. the word of command. But to rally?—the Greys to rally? It well might seem a desperate task to attempt what troops call a ‘rally’ in the midst of a raging fight; but the enemy himself at this time had undertaken an analogous task, and was drawing back scattered horsemen into the mass of his thick-set squadrons; so that thus from the rallying effort made at once by both Russians and Scots it resulted that during some moments, there was a space of several horse-lengths between them. As though dressing a line in some barrack-yard, the Adjutant of the Greys had so planted his charger that he now directly confronted the gathering men he addressed, and the giant strength of his voice was thrown full into the ending word when he shouted to the troopers:—‘Face—ME!’ By many of the men of his regiment he was seen. By many more he was heard. And now, also, on the right of the Adjutant, the young Cornet Prendergast, raised high above the ground by the great height of his charger, and on the other side Clarke, the leader of the 1st squadron—Clarke still rode bare-headed and streaming with blood—could be seen with their swords in the air, undertaking to rally the Greys. Men under this guidance were brought before long to make ready for another collective attack; and, by facing towards the Adjutant (as the thunder of his voice had enjoined), they began to show the rudiments of a front. Then they once more charged up, and

again broke into the thicket of the enemy's herded squadrons.

CHAP.  
I.

When Scarlett despatched his Brigade-Major, with orders to bring up some troops which might more or less confront the vastly outflanking strength of the enemy's left, he supposed that Captain Conolly would have to execute this order by riding back in search of the 4th Dragoon Guards or the Royals; and it was not without pain that he thought himself compelled thus to exile a gifted cavalry officer from the fight during several critical minutes. Captain Conolly, however, found means to see the object of the order attained without losing his share of the combat; for, glancing in that direction opposite to the Russian left in which it was judged to be of vital need to have an English force posted, he saw, and saw with great joy, that one of the red squadrons was already there. Quickly reaching the force, he found that it was the 1st squadron of the Inniskillings, commanded by Captain Hunt, who, however, was under the orders of Major Shute, the field-officer then present with this part of the regiment. Conolly was instantly sure that, under the direction of these officers, the squadron would be so wielded as to do all that was possible towards the execution of Scarlett's wish, and he at once determined to act with it in the approaching fight.

The order  
given by  
Scarlett  
to Major  
Conolly.

Hunt's  
squadron  
of the  
Inniskil-  
lings.

With the exception of its leader, no captain was present with this squadron, and only one subaltern—namely, Lieutenant Wheatcroft, who com-

The officers  
present with  
the squad-  
ron.

**C H A P.** manded one of the troops. The other troop was  
**I.** commanded by Sergeant-Major Shields.\*

Major Shute.  
Captain Hunt.

Position of the squadron.

Major Shute's order.

The charge of Hunt's squadron of the Inniskillings.

Major Shute was an officer of a high order of ability ; and Captain Hunt, the squadron-leader, had not only prowess of that quiet and resolute kind which most inspires trust and devotion, but had also that priceless qualification for the wielding of cavalry which is gained by experience of war.

At the moment of the surprise, as we know, this squadron of the Inniskillings had been farther advanced on the road towards Kadiköi than any other of Scarlett's troops ; and it resulted that the position of the squadron at the time when the 'three hundred' had wheeled into line, was in the direction of Scarlett's right rear. The squadron was so placed as to be fronting, not full, but obliquely towards the enemy's left flank.

When the Russian left wing had not only disclosed the intent to wheel inwards, but even had effected good progress in the execution of the manœuvre, Major Shute ordered Hunt to charge it.

Free from the camp impediments which had obstructed Scarlett's 'three hundred,' and afterwards the 5th Dragoon Guards, the interval which divided this squadron of the Inniskillings from the enemy was all good galloping ground, and Hunt moving forward at the head of his squadron, and then rapidly increasing, and still increasing, its swiftness, attained, before the moment of impact, to a full charging pace. The roar of the

\* I learn that Sergeant-Major Shields received seven wounds and that three of those wounds were severe ones.

fight going on was calculated to overlay other sounds, and the thick, stiff elastic herbage which clothed the soil, was well enough fitted to muffle to the utmost the tramp of horses ; but even after giving full weight to these circumstances, it is scarce possible to hear of what happened without more or less of astonishment.

C H A P.  
I.

The troops of the Russian left wing had not only continued their in-wheeling movement, but had carried the manœuvre so far that, at the moment of the impact, they had their backs turned towards the squadron which charged them. Piercing their line like an arrow, Captain Hunt shot through it, and was followed in the next instant by the squadron behind him, which came crashing on upon the rear of the wheeling horsemen, consigning some to slaughter, and driving in the rest of them, a helpless, unresisting throng, upon the front of the column. So swift and so weighty had been the charge that, if so one may say, it welded men into a mass. Of the tightness with which horsemen were locked in the melley, some idea may be formed if I say that, when Conolly found his arms laden and weighed down by the dead body of a Russian trooper which had fallen across them, he was for some time prevented from casting off his unwelcome burthen by the density and close pressure of the throng which encompassed him on all sides. But although in this melley, a horseman, of his own will, could not alter his relative place, yet that throng, of which he had come to be for the moment an almost passive

CHAP.  
L.—component, was not altogether motionless. It heaved; and, this time, as has been already learnt—for we come once again to a moment before spoken of—the swaying of the mass, which before had been to and fro, was perceptibly in the up-hill direction—in the direction that had been given it (as some imagined) by the impact of Captain Hunt's charge, and the weight of the fugitive troops driven in upon the front of the column. It would seem, therefore—for otherwise the swaying of the mass in an up-hill direction could hardly have gone on so continuously—that already the pressure of the squadrons which formed the centre and rear of the column must have been loosening.

The 4th  
Dragoon  
Guards.

And this might well be; for in another quarter, the attack of the 4th Dragoon Guards was now taking effect. Captain Forster, with the right squadron of the regiment, had already charged into the melley which was gathered on the right flank of the column; whilst farther up the hillside, but acting in the same direction against the enemy's right flank, Colonel Hodge, having charged in person at the head of the left squadron of his regiment, and having burst his way into the column, was driving fast through it from flank to flank—driving through it without losing men—and so faithfully working out the old precept of 'hard all across!' as to be already on the point of emerging from the mass of the Russian cavalry at a spot opposite to the one by which he had entered it.

Seeing that the column through which Hodge thus rended his way had been pierced and riven from the first by Scarlett's 'three hundred,' that already it had been brought to such a condition as to allow of the 4th Dragoon Guards cutting through it without getting harmed, and that both its huge wings had been shattered and driven in confusedly upon its front and flanks by the Royals, by the 5th Dragoon Guards, and finally by Hunt's Squadron of the Inniskillings, it would be rash to assign to the attack of any one corps the change which now supervened; but, whatever the cause, that resistance to all rearward movement which had long been exerted by the enemy's deep-serried squadrons now began to relax. Less and less obstructed, and less closely locked than before, the melley or throng that had been jammed into a closely locked mass by the last charge of the Inniskillings continued to heave slowly upwards against the slope of the hill. Presently those of the Russians who had hitherto maintained their array caused or suffered their horses to back a little. The movement was slight, but close followed by surer signs. The ranks visibly loosened. In the next instant, the whole column was breaking. In the next, all the horsemen composing it had dispersed into one immense herd, and—still hanging together as closely as they could without hindrance to their flight—were galloping up the hillside and retreating by the way they had come.

Nearly at the moment when the column began

CHAP.  
I.

The break-  
ing of the  
column.

Retreat of  
the whole  
body.

CHAP.  
I. to break, General Scarlett had at length cut his way through it. He had entered it, as we know, at the centre of its front, and at the head of the Greys. The part of the column from which he emerged was its left flank; and those of his people whom he then had the nearest to him were men of the Inniskilling Dragoons.

Attempts  
of our  
dragoons  
to rally.

We saw that even during the fight, and whilst still involved in the throng, the Scots Greys had endeavoured to rally; and some way to their left, but in the same alignment, the Royals (having numbers of men of other regiments intermixed with their squadrons) were still re-forming their ranks; but no other part of our Heavy Brigade had even attempted as yet to recover its state of formation; and as it was inferred that the enemy might have some force on the other slope of the ridge which would be ready to act in support, our officers were more eager to rally their scattered troopers than to encourage pursuit. Indeed almost at the instant of emerging from the depths of the column—he came out of it panting and vehement as though fresh from violent bodily effort\*—Colonel Hodge had laid his commands on the two first trumpeters he could see, and caused them to sound the rally.

The pur-  
suit of the  
enemy by  
our dra-  
goons.

Notwithstanding this desire to effect a rally at once, many of our dragoons pursued the retreating enemy for some distance, but not with their

\* Lord Lucan, who, as we saw, had ridden up by the (proper) left flank of the Russian column, saw Hodge in the act of coming out from it. He also saw General Scarlett emerge.

strength in such a state of coherence as to be able to make the victory signal by extensive destruction or capture of prisoners; and being happily under good control, they were checked and brought to a halt before coming under the fire which awaited them from the slopes of the Fedioukine Hills.

The troop of horse-artillery which accompanied the Light Brigade had by this time some pieces in battery which discharged a few shots at the retreating horsemen, as did also the battery of Position No. 4, under the orders of Lieutenant Roberts of the Royal Marine Artillery; and under the special directions of Sir Colin Campbell, a like fire was directed against them from two of Barker's guns.

It seems that in this singular combat our Heavy Dragoons had 78 killed or wounded and the Russians a much larger number;\* but it is not by counting the mere losses on either side that this cavalry fight can be judged. On the one hand, our troopers had so great an advantage from their longer, more commanding reach, and, on the other, the Russians were so well protected by their shakoes and their heavy grey coats, that

*Fire of  
artillery.*

*Results of  
the fight  
between  
the Rus-  
sian cav-  
alry and  
Scarlett's  
Brigade.*

\* I have no sufficient means of giving the losses which the Russians sustained in this fight. I can say, however, that (according to General de Todleben) the whole loss which the Russians sustained in the battle was 550, and that, according to Liprandi, their loss in infantry was comparatively small, their loss in cavalry, heavy. I may add, that their loss in cavalry, whatever it was, must have resulted almost entirely from their fight with our Heavy Dragoons.

CHAP.  
I.—the carnage resulting from the actual fight bore no proportion to the scale, the closeness, and the obstinacy of the conflict; but also, for want of the mere slaughtering and capturing power that can be exerted in pursuit by squadrons which are not in a state of dispersion, the English dragoons were prevented from conveying to the world any adequate notion of the victory they had gained. When they had been rallied and re-formed, they not only disclosed no abounding exultation, but even evinced a sense of disappointment which bordered on anger. The men found that at the close of what had seemed to them a life-and-death struggle, the enemy had at last been enabled to gallop off without sustaining grave loss, and their inference was that they had been fighting almost in vain. They were mistaken. Without having wrought a great slaughter or captured a host of prisoners, they had gained so great an ascendant that of all the vast body which is known to have been opposed to them there was hardly one squadron which afterwards proved willing to keep its ground upon the approach of English cavalry.

The admiration excited by the exploit of Scarlett's Brigade.

But if the men of our Heavy Brigade were themselves ill content on account of the seeming barrenness of their victory, it was otherwise with the spectators who had witnessed the fight—who had seen the few wrestling with the many and finally gaining the day. The admiration with which the French had watched the fight was expressed by them with a generous enthu-

siasm. ‘It was truly magnificent’—so spoke a French general officer who had witnessed the fight—‘it was truly magnificent; and to me who could see the enormous numbers opposed to you, the whole valley being filled with Russian cavalry, the victory of the Heavy Brigade was the most glorious thing I ever saw.’\* The moment the Russian column was seen to be broken, our dragoons were greeted from afar by a cheer from the 93d Highlanders; and before the Brigade had completed its rally, Sir Colin Campbell galloped up. When he had come close to the Greys, he uncovered and spoke to the regiment. ‘Greys! gallant Greys!’ he said, according to one of the versions, ‘I am sixty-one years old, and if I were young again I should be proud to be in your ranks.’ Afterwards, accosting Lord Lucan, he declared to him that the oldest officer could not have done better. The French sent to Lord Lucan their tribute of enthusiastic admiration; and an aide-de-camp came down from Lord Raglan with two gracious syllables for Scarlett conveyed in the message, ‘Well done!’

Supposing that General Ryjoff was properly obeyed, it would seem that he became chargeable with several grave errors, and in particular,—

1st, For massing his squadrons in such a way as to be virtually fighting without any force de-

CHAP.  
L

Comments  
upon the  
fight.

\* Colonel (now General) Beatson was the officer to whom the French General—I cannot at this moment give his name—addressed the above words.

CHAP.  
I.—tached from his first line—in other words, without  
any ‘supports.’

2d, For his halt.

3d, For attempting and continuing the wheeling movement of his deployed wings in the face of the English ‘supports.’

Anterior to the actual bodily fighting, there was a phase of the engagement which seems to be deserving of remembrance. I speak of the moments when the Russian column of horse, with all its vast weight, was moving down the hillside against Scarlett’s few horsemen, then suddenly caught in their march, and hastening under great stress of time to prepare a front for the enemy. The admirable composure then evinced by our people of all ranks must have been seen by the enemy, and perhaps may have governed the issue, by inducing him to come to a halt.

A commander of horse, in general, is accustomed to seek his victory by gathering a great momentum, and directing the force of his onset against some object more or less fragile—as, for example, against a body of infantry drawn up in a hollow square; but these were not the conditions under which Scarlett had to attack; and accordingly, his feat has hardly supplied a good instance of what men commonly mean when they speak of a cavalry charge. On the contrary, the physical impossibility of overthrowing the enemy by the mere shock of a cavalry charge was the very circumstance which gave to this

fight its peculiar splendour. When Scarlett rode straight at the centre of a hanging thicket of sabres and lances which not only outflanked him enormously on his right hand as well as his left, but confronted him too with the blackness of squadrons upon squadrons in mass, he did not of course imagine that by any mere impact of his too scanty line he could shake the depths of a column extending far up the hillside; but he thought he might cleave his way in, and he knew that his people would follow him. He survived the enterprise, and even proved to the world that close fighting under the conditions which he accepted might be a task less desperate than it seemed; but his hopefulness, if hopefulness he had when he drove his horse into the column, could hardly have been warranted, at the time, by the then known teachings of human experience.\*

By the judgment of Lord Lucan—not tested, however, by the hand of the watch—it has been computed that from the moment when General Scarlett commenced his charge, to the one when the Russian mass broke, the time was about eight minutes.

In order that the Allies should be able to reap from this fight of our Heavy Brigade any fruits at all proportioned to its brilliancy, it was necessary that they should have had on the ground some fresh and unbroken squadrons which would pursue the retreating mass, and convert its defeat into

\* What is the closest historical parallel that can be found for the charge of Scarlett's three hundred ?

CHAP.  
I. ruin, or at least into grievous disaster. Were no such squadrons at hand ?

## VII.

Whilst this combat of Scarlett's was raging, people witnessed, hard by, a more tranquil scene, and one which indeed was so free from all the tumult of battle as to offer a kind of repose to eyes wearied with gazing at strife. Overlooking the flank of the Russian cavalry in its struggle with Scarlett's brigade, and at a distance from the combatants which has been computed at 400 or 500 yards, there stood ranged in two lines a body of near 700 men. They all of them bore arms; they all wore military uniforms; and each man was either mounted, or else had his charger beside him. They were troops of the same nation as Scarlett's combating regiments. In truth, they were nothing less than the famous Light Brigade of the English; but, strange to say, these superb horsemen were engaged for the time as spectators, maintaining a rigid neutrality in the war which they saw going on between Russia and our Heavy Dragoons.

The Light  
Brigade at  
the time of  
Scarlett's  
engag-  
ment:

its neu-  
trality.

Impatience  
of the  
brigade;

Of the impatience with which our Light Cavalry chafed when they found themselves withheld from the fight, some idea perhaps may be formed by any one who recalls to his mind the far-famed exploit they were destined to be performing at a later hour of the same day. It was not without a grating sense of the contrast that, whilst thus condemned to inaction, they saw Scarlett hotly

engaged ; and although the commander of the Light Brigade, in giving vent to his mortification, used one of those cavalry forms of speech which express approval or endearment in words of imprecation, it is not for that the less true that the sentiment which really blended with his natural vexation was one of admiring and generous envy. Lord Cardigan was himself the public informant who adduced in a court of justice this picturesque proof of his feelings—‘ We were spectators,’ says one of his witnesses, ‘ of that encounter ; and ‘ those who heard and saw Lord Cardigan during ‘ the time that was going on, will not easily forget the chagrin and disappointment he evinced ‘ when riding up and down our line. He constantly repeated, “ Damn those Heavies, they ‘ have the laugh of us this day.” ’

CHAP.  
I.

and of Lord  
Cardigan.

As may well be supposed, this abstention of our Light Cavalry was observed by the Russians with surprise and thankfulness, by the Headquarters Staff of the English with surprise and vexation, by the French with surprise and curiosity. If Canrobert and those of his people who looked down upon the plain of Balaclava grew warm and enthusiastic in their admiration of Scarlett’s exploit, they were all the more ready with questions, surmises, and reasonings when they saw that, during the fight thus maintained by one of our two cavalry brigades against a largely outnumbering force, the other brigade remained motionless—nay, even in part dismounted. The impressions of the French in regard to the English lie

The surprise  
with which  
the neutrality  
of the Light  
Brigade was  
observed.

**C H A P.** deposited for the most part in layers or strata,  
I. disclosing the periods of the several formations; and if the nature of the comments which were uttered could be inferred from known habits of thought and of speech, it might be found that the theory put forward by any French officer as serving to account for the phenomenon was adopted in general by his comrades of the same age, and repudiated by such of them as were either much older or much younger; but whether, with their grey-headed colonel, the more aged officers of a regiment made sure that the Count of Cardigan was a great feudal chief, with a brigade composed of his serfs and retainers, who, for some cause or other, had taken dire umbrage, and resolved, like Achilles, that his myrmidons should be withheld from the fight; or whether, on the authority of the major-less aged, though equally confident—they held that the feudal system in England had been recently mitigated, and that the true solution of the enigma was to be found in the law of ‘Le ‘Box’—the law making it criminal for an Englishman to interrupt a good fight, and enjoining that singular formation which Albion called ‘a ‘ring ; ’—whatever, in short, might be the variety of special theories which these French observers adopted, there was one proposition at least in which all would be sure to agree. All, all would take part in the chorus which asserted that the English were a heap of ‘originals.’

Yet, amongst the French officers thus striving to solve the enigma, one at least was inclined to

trace the neutrality of our Light Brigade to a cause of miscarriage which, far from being exclusively English, has often condemned the great cavalry forces of the Continent to the imputation of losing opportunities. No less clearly than any of his comrades the Vicomte de Nöé perceived the strange error which had been committed; but he traced it to a want of that initiative power which enables a general of cavalry to seize his occasion.\*

When we turn from the surmises of the French to our English sources of knowledge, and there seek to find out the spell which palsied Lord Cardigan's squadrons, we learn that the brigade was kept where it stood by the interpretation which its chief had been putting upon Lord Lucan's parting instructions. The Brigadier had been left in the position he occupied with directions to defend it against any attack; but other words accompanied this direction; and upon the whole, after giving to the terms of the order, as gathered by him at the time, the best construction which his unaided judgment would furnish, Lord Cardigan haplessly came to the conclusion that it was his duty to abstain from attacking the enemy in flank whilst our Heavy Dragoons were attacking him in front, and to suffer the Russian

CHAP

I.

The cause  
which pal-  
sied the  
Light  
Brigade at  
the time of  
Scarlett's  
engage-  
ment.

\* ‘Repulsed with loss,’ says the Vicomte, ‘it [the Russian cavalry] regained the heights, where it might have been annihilated if the English Light Cavalry, under the orders of Lord Cardigan, had charged it during its retreat. There was the occasion, there should have been exercised the initiative of the cavalry general, and later in the day it was made apparent that bravery is no sufficient substitute for initiative.’

CHAP.  
I.—cavalry to retreat from before him—nay, almost, one may say, to retreat across his front—without undertaking to pursue it.\*

Lord Lucan, of course, did not mean that his Light cavalry should meet a conjuncture like the one which actually occurred by remaining in a state of inaction; but how far the mistake may have derived a seeming warrant from any obscurity or from any misleading tendency in his instruction, that, of course, is a question dependent on the words that were used. † If no such

\* See the accompanying sketch-plan representing Lord Cardigan's idea of the respective positions of the Russian cavalry and of the two English brigades. The plate is upon a reduced scale, but is, in other respects, a facsimile of the drawing which Lord Cardigan prepared for me. The special purpose for which he prepared the drawing was to show what the position was which he considered that he had to defend.

† Lord Cardigan's statement is: 'I had been ordered into a particular position by Lieutenant-General the Earl of Lucan, my superior officer, with orders on no account to leave it, and to defend it against any attack of Russians. They did not, however, approach the position.'—Affidavit of Lord Cardigan. Lord Lucan's version of the order he gave is this—'I am going to leave you. Well, you'll remember that you are placed here by Lord Raglan himself for the defence of this position. My instructions to you are to attack anything and everything that shall come within reach of you, but you will be careful of columns or squares of infantry.' Lord Lucan, I believe, considers that when the Russian Cavalry advanced up the North Valley to within a few hundred yards of Lord Cardigan, when they moved (obliquely) across Lord Cardigan's front, and proceeded under his eyes to attack English regiments, they did 'approach the position,' nay, did actually invade it, thereby bringing about the exact contingency under which Lord Cardigan (according to his own version of the instructions) was ordered to defend the position 'against any attack of Russians.' On the other hand, it may be thought that even according to

palliation shall be established, it must be judged that Lord Cardigan's abstention resulted from an honest failure of judgment, from an undue confidence in himself, and from an imperfect acquaintance with the business of war, but also from strong sense of duty — from that same sense of duty, remember, which was destined to be his guide in the hour then coming, and to carry him down the North Valley on a venturesome, nay desperate service. Still, the miscarriage of Lord Cardigan's endeavour to construe the order aright did actually result in the spectacle which we have just been witnessing; and, it being apparent that the inaction to which he imagined himself condemned was calculated to be gravely injurious to the public service, it seems useful to inquire whether the mishap was one of those incidents of war which carry no lesson, or whether, on the contrary, it can be traced to a malpractice on the part of the Home Government which might be avoided in future wars.

The task of endeavouring to put a right con-

Lord Lucan's version of his own words, they were such as, in the judgment of a peace-service man like Lord Cardigan, might not unnaturally appear to have a fettering tendency. Such phrases as '*placed here*,' and '*defencee of this position*,' followed by the instruction to attack whatever might '*come within reach*,' were plainly dangerous. I know not on what ground Lord Lucan thought that Lord Raglan placed the cavalry where he did in order to charge it with the defence of this position. I have always understood that Lord Raglan's object in bringing in his cavalry under the steeps of the Chersonese was—not to defend any position, but—to have it in hand, and prevent it from becoming perniciously entangled in combats.

CHAP. struction upon orders given in war, and especially  
I. in battle, is often an anxious and difficult one, yet so enormously important that the honour, nay, the fate of a nation, may depend upon the way in which it is discharged. Now, it would seem that there is one kind of experience which, if long continued, has a peculiar tendency to disqualify an officer for the duty of putting sensible constructions upon orders concerning the business of war. The experience I speak of is that which is possessed by an officer who has served many years in a standing army without having had the fortune to go through a campaign. Such a man, during his whole military life, has been perpetually dealing with fixed conditions and petty occurrences which are mostly of a kind that can be, in a measure, provided for beforehand by even that limited forecast which the rules of an office imply; and as soon as his training has taken its effect to the utmost, he may be said to represent the true opposite of what a commander should be who has to encounter emergencies. So long as soldierly duties are confined to mere preparation and rehearsal, they can be effectively performed by the industrious formalist; but in war all is changed. There, the enemy interposes, and interposes so roughly that the military clock-work of peace-time is ruthlessly shattered. As a guide for construing momentous orders delivered in the hour of battle to a general of the peace-service training, the experience of the barrack-yard becomes a snare. His new theatre of action is so

strange, so vast, and so dim—for he now has to meet the unknown—that unless he can rise with the occasion, throwing open his mind and changing his old stock of ideas, he becomes dangerous to his country—becomes dangerous, of course, in proportion to the extent of the command with which he has been entrusted. Supposing the natural capacity equal, there is no stirring missionary, no good electioneerer, no revered master of hounds, who might not be more likely to prove himself equal to the unforeseen emergencies of a campaign than the general officer who is a veteran in the military profession, and, at the same time, a novice in war. If indeed a general who has hitherto had no experience of war is still in so early a period of his life as to have unimpaired the natural flexibility of youth, he may quickly adapt his mind to the new exigency; but when a State gives high command to an officer who is not only encased with military experience all acquired in peace-time, but is also advanced in years, it fulfils at least two of the conditions which are the most likely to bring about misconstructions of even the plainest orders: and if to these precautions the Government adds that of taking care that the selected General shall be a man of a narrow disposition and a narrow mind—a man cleaving to technicalities and regulations with a morbid love of uniformity—then, indeed, it exhausts a large proportion of the expedients which can be used for insuring miscarriage.

England, ruling as she does over various and

CHAP.  
I.

CHAP.  
I.

widespread dependencies, is so often forced into warlike operations of more or less magnitude, as to be free from the predicament of having at her command no war-tried officers. Therefore, when, with such means at her disposal, she still trusts important commands to her peace-service officers, she has not the plea of necessity. She acts in sheer wantonness. She needs, as it were, a strong swimmer, and hastens to take a man who never has happened to bathe. She wants a skilful ship's captain to maintain her strength on the ocean, and for this purpose chooses a bargeman who has plied thirty years on canals.

As a warning instance of miscarriage resulting from this evil practice, Lord Cardigan's mistake has great worth; because it was so obviously occasioned both by his experience, and by his want of experience—by the abundant military experience which had gathered upon him in peace-time, and by the want of that other experience which men gain in war. Many an officer long versed in peace-service might have made an equivalent mistake; but, on the other hand, it is probable that in such a conjuncture as that in which Lord Cardigan found himself, no man who ever had wielded a squadron in the field would have thought himself condemned to inaction.

Incident  
making the  
error more  
signal;

The example was made the more signal by an incident which occurred at the time. Whilst Lord Cardigan sat in his saddle, expressing, under cavalry forms of speech, his envy of the

Heavy Dragoons, and adhering to that hapless construction of Lord Lucan's order, which condemned him, as he thought, to a state of neutrality, he had at his side an officer, comparatively young, and with only the rank of a captain, who still was well able to give him that guidance which, by reason of his want of experience in war, he grievously, though unconsciously, needed. Captain Morris, commanding the 17th Lancers, one of the regiments of the Light Brigade, and then in his thirty-fourth year, was a man richly gifted with the natural qualities which tend to make a leader of cavalry, but strengthened also by intellectual cultivation well applied to the business of arms, and clothed above all with that priceless experience which soldiers acquire in war. After having first armed himself with a portion at least of the education which Cambridge bestows, he had served with glory in India. In 1843 he had been present at the battle of Maharajpore. In 1846 he fought at the battle of Buddiwal. At the battle of Aliwal in the same year he was wounded whilst charging with his regiment into a mass of Sikh infantry. He was in the battle of Sobraon; he crossed the Sutlej, and entered Lahore with the army. When opportunities of gaining war-like experience were no longer open to him, he returned to the labour of military study, and carried away from Sandhurst ample evidences of his proficiency in higher departments of military learning. Captain Morris was one of those who might have been wisely entrusted with an ex-

CHAP.  
I.

by bringing  
into public  
contrast the  
qualifica-  
tions of  
Lord Car-  
digan and  
Captain  
Morris.

CHAP. t tended command of cavalry. Few could be more competent to point out to Lord Cardigan the error he was committing—to show him in two words how to construe Lord Lucan's order, and to explain to him that when cavalry has to hold a ‘position,’ it is not, for that reason, forced to abstain from resisting the enemy.\*

Perceiving with vivid distinctness the precious opportunity which the fortune of war was offering, Morris eagerly prayed that the Light Cavalry might advance upon the enemy's column of horse; or, if that could not be conceded, then that he at least, with his regiment, might be suffered to undertake an attack. That he imparted his desire to Lord Cardigan, and that Lord Cardigan rebuffed him, I cannot doubt;† but for the pre-

\* I say ‘resisting,’ because the advance of the Russian cavalry was an actual invasion of the English position—nay, even of the very camping-ground of the Light Brigade.

† I do not forget (as will presently be seen) that Lord Cardigan has denied this; but my proofs are ample: and indeed Lord Cardigan, though he places the incident at a moment when it had become too late to act with effect, has himself acknowledged to me that Captain Morris sought to push forward with his regiment, and that he (Lord Cardigan) stopped the attempt. Both with respect to the fact itself and the time of its occurrence, Captain (afterwards Colonel) Morris has been explicit. In a letter addressed by him to the Horse Guards he wrote thus:—‘Having read . . . . a letter from Major Calthorpe, in which he throws between Lord Cardigan and myself the settlement of the question as to whether I asked Lord Cardigan, on the 25th of October 1854, to attack the Russian cavalry in flank at the time they were engaged with the Heavy Brigade, and which Lord Cardigan most positively denies, I wish to declare most positively that I did ask Lord Cardigan to attack the enemy at the time and in the manner above mentioned.’ See also the conclusive testimony contained

sent purpose—for the purpose, namely, of illustrating the mischief of entrusting high command to a veteran of the peace-service unversed in war—the sworn statement of Lord Cardigan is sufficiently instructive. After speaking of Captain Morris's alleged interposition, he goes on to say that ‘Captain Morris never gave any advice, or ‘made any proposal of the sort;’ that ‘it was not ‘his duty to do so;’ and that he ‘did not commit ‘such an irregularity.’

When the Oxford undergraduate stopped short of presuming to snatch his fellow-student from a watery grave, on the theory that it was indecorous for one lad to rescue another without having first been presented to him, the objection was perhaps overstrained, but, at all events, it proceeded from the formalist who stood on the bank, and not from the one in the river. Here, more wonderfully—for Morris was willing, nay offered, to rescue Lord Cardigan from his error—it was the drowning man who, on grounds of a stiff etiquette, protested against being saved.

If Lord Cardigan's idea of an ‘irregularity’ was upheld by the sanction of the Horse Guards, it must be acknowledged that our Home dispensers of military power had performed their task with a rare completeness. They found a man who was of an age, and endowed with natural qualities, highly favourable to effective command, who had had rich experience in the business of war, who in the second affidavit of the Honourable Godfrey Charles Morgan filed in the suit of Cardigan *v.* Calthorpe.

**CHAP.** had earned for himself a large share of glory in  
I. combats and pitched battles. Him they placed under a General fifty-seven years old, who, without any warlike experience, still sincerely presumed himself competent to the exigencies of high command in the field; and then they crowned their work by causing or allowing the army to understand that it would be an ‘irregularity’ for the man who had learnt war on the Sutlej to tender his opportune counsel to the one who had come from Hyde Park.

A brigade of light cavalry drawn up in two lines on good turf, and employed in the occupation of gazing upon a fight sustained against a great stress of numbers by their comrades the Heavy Dragoons; the man of the Sutlej entreating that the brigade might advance to the rescue, but rebuffed and overruled by the higher authority of the man from the banks of the Serpentine who sits erect in his saddle, and is fitfully ‘damning the Heavies’ instead of taking part in their fight—these might seem to be the creatures of the brain evoked perhaps for some drama of the grossly humorous sort; but because of the sheer truth, their place is historic; and if comedy seems to result, it is comedy prepared in Whitehall. It is comedy too of that kind which sometimes teaches and warns. By the will of our military authorities at home, the man versed in war was placed under the man versed in quarrels. Lord Cardigan had been charged to command; Captain Morris had to obey. The exaggerations

men look for in satire were forestalled and outdone by the Horse Guards.

CHAP.  
I.

In its actual bearing upon events, the neutrality of the Light Cavalry proved less hurtful than at first it seemed likely to be ; because Scarlett's dragoons, after all, found means to achieve their victory without help from the other brigade. If Scarlett's ' three hundred ' had been overwhelmed and destroyed, both the terms of Lord Lucan's instruction and the inaction maintained by Lord Cardigan would have been cruelly judged. As it was, the miscarriage, however pernicious in its other consequences, did at least bring glory upon our arms, because it withheld from Scarlett's dragoons that support which must have dimmed their victory by making it more easy of attainment. It is true that if the Light Brigade, although abstaining from the thick of the fight, had been suffered at the right moment to advance in pursuit, it might possibly have effected captures by a swift and skilled use of the moments during which such a work was practicable ; but any force pursuing the enemy beyond a short distance must have very soon come under fire from the guns on the Fedioukine Hills.

Lord Lucan, as may well be supposed, was bitterly vexed by the inaction of his Light Brigade, and at the close of the combat he sent one of his aides-de-camp with a message which enjoined Lord Cardigan in future, whenever his Divisional General might be attacking in front, to lose no opportunity of making a flank attack.

Lord  
Lucan's  
message  
of reproof  
to Lord  
Cardigan

**CHAP.**    The message added, that Lord Lucan would  
I.                always be ready to give a like support to Lord Cardigan.\*

I have traced the fault up to its sources. If ever there were to be uttered a taunt which should impute the inaction of Lord Cardigan to any cause worse than mistake, this short, cogent answer would follow, ‘He led the “Light Cavalry “charge.”’†

### VIII.

Lord Raglan's instantaneous perception of the new phase into which the battle had passed.

From the easternmost ledges of the Chersonese, the chiefs of the two allied Armies, together with great numbers of their people, had been keenly looking down, as we learned, upon the combat of Scarlett’s dragoons; but the bulk of these spectators—first anxious and afterwards enraptured—were content to regard the encounter as a trial of cavalry prowess resulting in proportionate glory; and, so far as I know, Lord Raglan was the only officer in the field whose swift instinct informed him at the moment of the way in which this isolated engagement of horsemen might be brought

\* It is right to say that Lord Cardigan has questioned this, but to add, that proof which I must regard as conclusive is in my possession.

† There is a curiously strong chain of testimony which goes to show that at or towards the close of the Heavy Cavalry fight, the Light Brigade was moved down into the South Valley, and brought into the rear of the ground from which our Heavy Dragoons had made their attack; but counter-testimony of a very cogent kind opposes itself to this conclusion. The decision of the question, although it might have a personal bearing of some interest, is not important in any other point of view.

to bear upon the issue of the battle. Years after that day, when in times of peace and amity the narratives, the maps and the plans of the once warring nations were collated and studied, it at last became easy enough for the French and the English to understand the extent of the change which had been wrought in the enemy's position by the victory of our heavy dragoons; but it was given to Lord Raglan to perceive all this at the time.

The defeat of the Russian cavalry carried with it, of course, the retreat of the powerful artillery which the horse had escorted; and not only was the English camp and its vicinity now free from even the sight of an assailing force, but all that part of the North Valley which divided the Fedi-oukine Heights from the line of the Turkish redoubts was left without troops. The change wrought by Scarlett's dragoons was therefore such, that whereas the Russians, half an hour before, had had a miniature battle array which enabled them for the moment to take the offensive and penetrate even home to the English cavalry camp, they were now all at once reduced to what one may call two weak columns—two weak columns having the whole breadth of the North Valley between them, no longer connected with one another except by their rear, and each of them so placed as to be impotently protrnding its small narrow head in the face of the divisions coming down from the Chersonese, and debouching in strength upon the plain. An array which

CHAP.  
I.  
  
The change  
wrought in  
the position  
of the Rus-  
sians by  
the defeat  
of their  
cavalry.

**CHAP. I.** before might have been likened to the closed fist of the pugilist, was changed, all at once, to a hand with the two centre fingers retracted and the other two fingers protruding.\* Lord Raglan perceived that in the compass of those brilliant minutes which had been used to such purpose by Scarlett's dragoons, they had done the main part of his appointed task by almost winning a battle for him without the aid of a single foot-soldier or horseman sent down from the main Allied camp. What he instantly sought to do was, to seize on the victory which this cavalry fight seemed to open to him by proceeding at once to the recapture of the Causeway Heights.

Lord Raglan's purpose.

The arrangements for the recovery of the heights had been made, as we saw, long ago, several hours before the occurrence which had now so much lightened the task; and, if the requisite marches of our infantry divisions had attained completion, Sir George Cathcart, at the head of the 4th Division, would have been ready to advance against the Arabtabia† Redoubt by the line of the Causeway ridge; whilst H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge with the 1st Division would have supported the attack by moving along the South Valley. The Duke of Cambridge, it would seem, had lost no time in obeying the order, and was as far in advance towards his assigned place as Lord Raglan expected him to be;‡ but Cathcart unhappily was


\* The diagram on the next page may aid the elucidation.

† The redoubt also called Number Three.

‡ He moved his infantry by a route not far south of the Woronzoff Road, but his artillery descended by the Col.

not yet on his appointed ground.\* Lord Raglan long before had been expressing his astonishment at not seeing Cathcart's battalion in march, and had sent messenger after messenger to endeavour to find where he was, and to learn the

CHAP.  
I.—



→  
H

A B—Jabrokritsky's infantry and artillery disposed on the slopes of the Fedioukine Hills.

C D—Liprandi's infantry and artillery posted along the line of the captured Turkish redoubts, where the English guns remained.

C—The position of the Odessa regiment.

E E—The defeated Russian Cavalry, with a Cossack battery in front of them.

F—Lord Cardigan's Light Cavalry Brigade.

G—General Scarlett's Heavy Cavalry Brigade.

H—The direction by which French and English reinforcements were approaching.

J K—The North Valley.

\* It is only, I believe, too certain that the non-appearance of Catheart at the time expected was caused under the circumstances stated *ante*, p. 67 *et seq.* See also the statement above given, and the one added at p. 219 *et seq.*

CHAP.  
I.

cause of his delay. It is true that, before the moment we speak of, Cathcart's Division had at length made its appearance, but it still had a good way to march before it could commence the intended attack.

And unfortunately the order directing Cathcart to attack was by him left unexecuted. When Cathcart had reached the Col, General Airey rode up to him, and said 'Sir George Cathcart, Lord 'Raglan wishes you to advance immediately and 'recapture the redoubts.' The order was given very plainly, and Airey, after having delivered it, turned to the staff-officer who had carried Lord Raglan's original orders to Cathcart, and said: 'You are acquainted with the position of each 'redoubt, remain with Sir George Cathcart and 'show him where they are.'

After passing the empty redoubts, No. 6 and No. 5, and leaving some troops in each of them, Sir George marched on to the No. 4 redoubt, which was also unoccupied; but there, he came to a halt, deploying his infantry in two lines, and causing it to lie down, at the same time directing his artillery to open fire upon the Arabtabia. The artillery officers soon pointed out that the range was too great to allow of any useful firing, and then, under Cathcart's direction, his rifle battalion went skirmishing towards the Arabtabia, but this was the utmost that Cathcart did towards obeying the order which had enjoined him to recapture the redoubts.

Lord Raglan's vexation was great, for he felt all

the evil of any delay in seizing the advantage  
which the fortune of war was offering. C H A P.  
I.

Being in this strait, and judging also, with what we now know to have been a true foresight, that the weak chain of Russian infantry columns which stretched towards him endwise along the line of the redoubts would prove somewhat soft to the touch, he determined to use his cavalry. Lord Raglan  
determining  
to use his  
cavalry.  
He did not so determine apparently because the cavalry arm was the one which he would most willingly have selected for his purpose if he had any freedom of choice, but because his infantry reinforcements were not yet far enough in advance, and the time was too precious to be lost. Be that as it may, he despatched to Lord Lucan a written instruction which in the subsequent controversies was generally called ‘the third order.’ It ran thus : ‘Cavalry to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights. ‘They will be supported by the infantry which have been ordered [to] advance on two fronts.’\* ‘The third  
order.’

\* It seems that in the original order the word ‘to’ was omitted—that there was what looked like a full stop after the word ‘ordered’—and that the word ‘advance’ was written with a capital A ; but the copy which Lord Lucan afterwards furnished to Lord Raglan was as given in the text, and I therefore imagine that, notwithstanding the clerical errors above mentioned, the order at the time must have been read aright by Lord Lucan. The question seems to be unimportant, for the order is not made at all less cogent by reading it with its clerical errors uncorrected. I should not have adverted to the matter if it were not that Lord Lucan—I do not see why—laid stress upon it in his speech addressed to the House of Lords. The copy in my possession is in the handwriting of Lord Lucan himself, and was furnished by him to Lord Raglan. Therefore,

CHAP.  
I.

Whilst directing that actual attacks against the enemy on the heights should be made to depend upon opportunity, this order, it should be observed, was peremptory and unconditional in requiring that our cavalry should advance; and since it came, not from a distant commander, but from one who looked down upon the whole field, and had before his eyes all the requisite ingredients of a positive resolve, it is difficult to see how the words could become open to misconstruction.

Lord  
Lucan's  
construction of it.

Lord Lucan, however, so read the order as to conceive it his duty to do no more for the moment than mount his cavalry, move the Light Brigade to another position hard by across the North Valley, and cause his Heavy Dragoons to remain on the slope of the rise there awaiting the infantry, which, to use his own language, ‘had ‘not yet arrived.’ Having made these dispositions, Lord Lucan kept his cavalry halted during a period which he has computed at from thirty to forty minutes.\* If it be asked why, when ordered to advance, he kept his cavalry halted during a period of from thirty to forty minutes, the answer is that he reasoned. By choosing his way of proceeding—not because it was enjoined in terms, but—because he imagined it to be ‘the ‘only way that could [have] been rationally intended,’ he effected an actual inversion of Lord

*for the purpose of proving the tenor of the instruction really conveyed to the mind of Lord Lucan, the copy is evidently more authentic than the original.*

\* By computations upon another basis this period is extended to fifty or fifty-five minutes.

Raglan's order, and persuaded himself that, instead of the cavalry advancing (as directed) with the prospect of being supported by the infantry, it was the infantry that ought first to advance, the cavalry acting only in support.\* The avoidance of delay, as we saw, was the very object which the English Commander had in view when he resolved to appeal to his squadrons. In the mind of Lord Raglan, the length of the ground which still had to be traversed by his infantry was a reason for appealing to the cavalry arm ; whilst, on the other hand, Lord Lucan judged that that same length of ground was a reason for delaying his advance ; so that the very exigency which caused Lord Raglan to desire the immediate aid of the cavalry was the one which induced Lord Lucan to withhold it.

From the height which he had occupied during the whole morning, and with the officers of his Staff around him, Lord Raglan watched for the moment when his cavalry, in obedience to the orders he had despatched, would begin its advance, and he watched with the expectation—an expectation which we now know to have been well founded—that the movement would cause

\* Lord Lucan's own account of the way in which he attempted to construe this order, and of the mental process by which he attained his conclusion, is as follows : ‘Lord Lucan having taken up the position clearly directed, was prepared to carry out the remainder of his instructions by endeavouring to effect the only object, and in the only way that could reasonably [have] been intended—viz., to give all the support possible to the infantry in the recapture of the redoubts, and subsequently to cut off all their defenders.’

## CHAP.

I.

The impatience and anger amongst men of the Headquarter Staff.

the enemy to abandon his already relaxing hold, and give up the captured redoubts. He watched in vain. His cavalry did not move forward. From the way in which he saw the Russians withdrawing their cavalry and artillery, but also from the general aspect of the field, he knew that the minutes then passing were minutes of depression to the enemy, and therefore of opportunity for the English. It may well be imagined that at such a time the delayed compliance with his order was provoking; and if his words and his features betrayed mere vexation, or, at all events, well-governed anger, the more youthful men of his Staff were not, I imagine, so careful as to suppress their murmurs of impatience and indignation.

In this temper the Headquarter Staff were gazing upon the field, when some of them who had been pointing their field-glasses along the line of the Causeway ridge perceived all at once, as they thought, that the enemy was bringing forward some teams of artillery horses, with the lasso tackle attached to them;\* and they did not doubt—what otherwise seemed very probable—that the enemy, who was evidently preparing to retreat, must be seeking to carry off with him as trophies the English guns taken from the Turks.

It seems probable that, before this, Lord Raglan's patience must have almost come to its end and that, without any new motive, he would have

\* I do not myself doubt the accuracy of the impression thus formed, though in the absence of proof from Russian sources, I have avoided the language of positive assertion.

presently despatched a reminding and accelerating message to Lord Lucan ; but the announcement of the artillery-teams coming up to carry off English guns may well have determined his choice of the moment for taking the step, and it gave him an opportunity—which, even in a moment of anger, his kind and generous nature would incline him to seize—an opportunity of softening the communication he had to make to the commander of his cavalry ; for evidently the pressure which was to be applied to Lord Lucan would be relieved in some measure of its inculpatory aspect, by basing the necessity for instant action upon a new fact. Accordingly, Lord Raglan determined to repeat with increased urgency his hitherto disobeyed order for the advance of the cavalry, and to give to its commander a fresh motive for despatch, by pressing upon him the special object of endeavouring to prevent the enemy from carrying off the guns. This determination he expressed in terms intimating that the Quartermaster-General, who was close at his side, should give immediate effect to it. With a pencil, and a slip of paper rested upon his sabretash, General Airey quickly embodied in a written order the instruction thus given him ; but before Lord Raglan allowed the paper to go, he dictated some additional words which Airey at once inserted. The paper when thus completed became what men have called ‘the ‘fourth order.’\*

The ‘fourth  
order.’

\* The terms of the order will be given in a later page.

C H A P.  
I.

It was supposed that Lieutenant Calthorpe (an officer of the cavalry, and one of Lord Raglan's aides-de-camp), who chanced to stand ready and expectant, would be charged with the mission ; but Lord Raglan called for Captain Nolan (the aide-de-camp of the Quartermaster-General), and specially desired that the order should be entrusted to him.

Captain  
Nolan.

Nolan was no common man. Surrounded as he was at Headquarters by men of the world whose pleasant society must have been apparently well calculated to moderate a too wild devotion to one idea, he yet was an enthusiast — an enthusiast unchilled and unshaken. His faith was that miracles of war could be wrought by squadrons of horse, that the limits of what could fairly be asked of the cavalry had been wrongly assigned, and that—if only it could be properly constituted and properly led—the cavalry, after all, was the arm which should govern the issue of battles. Then adding to this creed an unbounded trust in the warlike quality of our troopers, he went on to conclude that the dominion of England in the world could be best assured by the sabre. He knew that where the question of cavalry excellence could be narrowed to a question of cavalry fighting, the English horsemen had been used to maintain their ascendant. The great day of Blenheim, he knew, was won in the main by our cavalry. With a single brigade of our cavalry at Salamanca, Le Marchant had cut through a French army. Nolan imagined that nothing but perverse mismanagement and evil choice of

men prevented England from having what he held to be her own—from having an ascendant among nations resting mainly, or at all events largely, upon the prowess of her squadrons. Because this faith was glowing within him, Nolan had sorrowed and chafed at the unobtrusive part taken by our cavalry in the earlier days of the invasion. His journal, going down to the 12th of October, lies open before me. It teems with impatience of the comparative inaction to which our cavalry had been condemned; and discloses a belief—a belief based apparently, in part, upon somewhat wild processes of reason—that the commander of our cavalry was the man upon whom blame should rest. Nolan must have been solaced, one may suppose, nay, enraptured, by the feat of our Heavy Dragoons; but, on the other hand, he could not but be tortured by having to witness the inaction to which the Light Brigade stood condemned whilst their comrades were fighting, and for this (if he knew not that the commander of our cavalry was present elsewhere) he probably blamed Lord Lucan. Besides, at the moment we speak of, an occasion had been offering itself to the cavalry, and Lord Raglan, as we know, had been ordering it to advance without being yet obeyed. Upon the whole, therefore, it is easy to understand that Nolan must have been burning with anger and zeal.

This was the officer to whom, by Lord Raglan's direction, General Airey delivered the order. Without having had their observance quick-

CHAP. I. ened, at the time, by any foreboding sentiments, men still remember how swiftly the messenger sped on his errand. That acclivity of some seven or eight hundred feet, which divided our Head-quarter Staff from the plain of Balaclava below, was of just such a degree of steepness that, whilst no rider of merely ordinary experience and boldness would like to go down it at a high rate of speed, and whilst few of those going slowly would refrain from somewhat easing the abruptness of the path by a more or less zig-zag descent, the ground still was not so precipitous as to defy the rapid purpose of a horseman who had accustomed himself, in such things, to approach the extreme of what is possible. The special skill gained by such trials, with the boldness needed for using it, Nolan had in full measure; and he was armed with cogent words for the man whom he had brought himself to condemn as the obstructor of cavalry enterprise. Straight, swift, and intent—descending, as it were, on sure prey—he swooped angering down into the plain where Lord Lucan and his squadrons were posted.

## IX.

The position  
of the  
Russian  
army at the  
time when  
Nolan  
reached  
Lord Lucan.

Although a period of some thirty, forty, or fifty minutes had since elapsed, the position of the Russian army was still nearly the same that it had been when Lord Lucan received his third order.\* Jabrokritsky, with some 8 battalions,

\* The order directing him to advance, and take advantage of

4 squadrons, and 14 guns, was established on the slopes of the Fedioukine Hills; and Liprandi, with his infantry and field-artillery still lingering upon the sites of the captured redoubts, continued to protrude so far west along the chain of the Causeway Heights as to have one of his regiments—the regiment of Odessa—drawn up near the Arabtabia Redoubt;\* but the whole of his defeated cavalry had been withdrawn to a position so far down the North Valley as to be within less than a mile of the aqueduct, and almost a mile and a half from the ground where Lord Lucan was posted. Drawn up across the North Valley, far in rear of the foremost Russian battalions, this large but discomfited body of horse connected Liprandi's corps-army with the troops of General Jabrokritsky, but connected it only by the rear—connected it in such a way that these forces together were the three sides of an oblong, and could be likened, as we saw, to the hand of a man with the two centre fingers held back and the other two fingers extended.† The Odessa regiment formed the tip of that lesser finger which represents the extension of Liprandi's column along the chain of the Causeway Heights. Except at their rear, the two columns thus protruding were divided the one from the other by the whole breadth of the North Valley; and without straying into surmise, it can be stated any opportunity to recover the Causeway Heights. The words of the order are given *ante*, at p. 185.

CHAP.  
I

\* The Number Three Redoubt.

† See the diagram *ante*, p. 183.

**CHAP.** that they were, each of them, in a condition to  
**I.** be more or less completely rolled up by an at-  
 tack of cavalry, or even—without waiting for  
 actual collision—by the mere sight of squadrons  
 approaching.\*

Close in advance of the discomfited Russian  
 cavalry, and, like them, fronting up the North  
 Valley, some twelve pieces of the Don Cossack  
 ordnance were in battery.†

At a later moment, the smoke from this bat-  
 tery served to screen the horsemen behind it from  
 the sight of the English; but at the time now  
 spoken of, this great body of Russian cavalry,  
 though a mile and a half off, could be descried by  
 one standing on the ground where Lord Cardigan  
 was posted. From the effect of distance and close  
 massing, the dusky, grey columns looked black.

Besides the main body of the Russian cavalry  
 which thus stood drawn up in rear of the Cos-  
 sack guns, Liprandi now had at his disposal  
 six squadrons of lancers under the command  
 of Colonel Jeropkine;‡ and these horsemen,  
 divided into two bodies of three squadrons each,  
 were so posted—the one in a fold of the Fediou-

\* For proof of this—proof by actual experiment—both as re-  
 gards the column posted along the line of the Causeway Heights,  
 and as regards the other column—the one on the Fedioukine  
 Hills—see later pages narrating the retreat of the Odessa bat-  
 talions and (subsequently) of the forces on the Fedioukine  
 Hills which were put to flight by D'Allonville.

† Eight pieces (*i. e.*, one battery), according to Russian offi-  
 cial accounts; but oral testimony shows that the real number  
 of these guns was twelve.

‡ A force called the ‘combined lancers.’

kine Hills, and the other in a ravine on the side of the Causeway Heights—as to be able to fall upon either flank of any Allied troops which, in pressing Liprandi's retreat, might pursue it far down the North Valley.

CHAP.  
I.

The subsequent course of events made it needless and impolitic for Liprandi to say, in his public despatch, that after the combat with Scarlett's dragoons he had determined to retreat, and on that point accordingly he took good care to be silent; but I regard it as certain that, at the time now spoken of, he harboured no idea of defending the Causeway Heights against any real attack. So far as concerned his liability to be assailed by infantry, he was able to prepare his retreat with a great deliberation; for the march of the Allied battalions, creeping down from the Chersonese, was so open to the view of an adversary in the valley below, as to show him how long it must be before they could come into action; but it was otherwise in regard to any attack undertaken by our division of cavalry; and if the tenor of the instructions given to good troops could be safely inferred from their actual movements, it might be treated as certain that the Odessa battalions had orders to fall back upon the near approach of our squadrons.

Intentions  
of Liprandi  
at this  
period of  
the action

Such seems to have been the position and attitude of the forces now confronting Lord Lucan, and such the condition of things that Lord Raglan had sought to deal with by the order which Nolan was bringing. Lord Raglan, as we know,

Lord  
Raglan's  
perfect  
apprehen-  
sion of the  
state of the  
battle.

CHAP.  
I.—had the advantage of seeing all from high, commanding ground ; but nothing less than his peculiar and instinctive faculty for the reading of a battle-field could have enabled him at the instant to grasp the whole import of what to others was a dim, complex scene, devoid of expression, and to send down an order so closely adapted to the exigency as the one which he had despatched. To strike at the nearest of the Russians that could be found on the Causeway Heights—or, in other words, at those Odessa battalions which stood ranged in front of the Arabtabia—this plainly was the task which (by reason of there being no infantry division yet present on the ground) invited the enterprise of our squadrons ; and this also, we shall see, was the task which the order now coming enjoined.

Two points  
in the  
enemy's  
position  
available for  
attack.

We shall see that the French, when so minded, could direct an attack with their cavalry upon the head of the Russian detachment now holding the Fedioukine Hills—an attack somewhat similar in its nature to the one which Lord Raglan desired to have made against the tip of Liprandi's position on the Causeway Heights. In truth, there were two ranges of heights, each affording to the cavalry of the Allies so good a point for attack, that the one was decisively chosen—though chosen in vain—by Lord Raglan, and the other by General Morris, the Commander of the French cavalry division.\*

\* See again the diagram *ante*, p. 183, and Plate 5, taking care to understand that the *first* position of the Odessa regi-

But between the two ranges, thus each of them inviting attack, there unhappily lay a smooth valley, which offered itself to those horsemen who might either be weary of life, or compelled by a sense of duty to go down and commit self-destruction.

Our Heavy Dragoons were on one of the slopes of the Causeway ridge, not far from the scene of their late victory. Lord Cardigan's brigade stood, drawn up in two lines, and so placed as to be fronting straight down the North Valley.

Lord Lucan was sitting in the saddle in front of his troops, and between the two brigades, when Nolan came speeding from the Commander-in-Chief, and made haste to deliver the paper with which we saw him entrusted. By pursuing a theory that he seems to have formed in regard to the real authorship of directions from the English Headquarters, Lord Lucan had taught himself to mistake the channel for the source, and to imagine that General Airey must be often the originator of orders which, in fact, he was only transmitting. For this reason, and as tending, perhaps, to account in some measure for the way in which the order was about to act upon the mind or the temper of the general to whom it was addressed, it is worth while to remember two circumstances which would have been otherwise unimportant. The bearer of the order, as it chanced, was the aide - de - camp of General

CHAP.  
I.  
  
The valley  
that lay  
between  
them.

Arrival of  
Nolan with  
the 'fourth  
'order.'

ment and of the batteries near it is the one applicable to this part of the narrative.

CHAP.  
I. Airey, and its words were in General Airey's handwriting.

<sup>The 'fourth  
'order.'</sup> The order ran thus : 'Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, follow the enemy, and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Troop of horse-artillery may accompany. French cavalry is on your left. Immediate. (Signed) R. AIREY.'

Whether taken alone, or as a command reinforcing the one before sent, this order has really no word in it which is either obscure or misleading. By assigning 'the guns' as the object, Lord Raglan most pointedly fixed the line of the Turkish redoubts as the direction in which to advance ; and it must not be said that the expression left room in the mind of Lord Lucan for a doubt as to what guns were meant. He well knew that the guns indicated by the 'fourth 'order' were the English guns taken in the forts —in the forts crowning those very 'heights' which, more than half an hour before, he had been ordered to retake if he could ; \* and no one,

\* In the controversies arising out of the Light Cavalry charge, it was sometimes argued that there was a doubt as to what were 'the guns' to which the fourth order pointed ; and that circumstance makes it convenient to say and to prove, once for all, that Lord Lucan at the time knew very well what 'the guns' were. In his despatch addressed to Lord Raglan, on the 27th of October 1854—the day next but one after the battle—he writes : 'The Heavy Brigade having now joined the 'Light Brigade, the division took up a position with a view of supporting an attack upon the heights; when, being instructed to make a rapid advance to our front *to prevent the enemy carrying the guns lost by the Turkish troops in the morning*, I ordered,' &c.

indeed, had more poignant reason than Lord Lucan for knowing what the guns were; because he was the commander of the force which—rightly, perhaps, but not, of course, without mortification—had had to stand by and be witness whilst Liprandi effected the capture.

If collated with the third order, the written words brought down by Nolan seem to come with accumulated weight and decisiveness. By the third order, the commander of our cavalry had been directed to advance, and take any opportunity of recovering the heights—those heights, be it remembered, where the enemy was posted with the seven English guns he had captured; and now, by this fourth order, Lord Lucan—being requested to advance rapidly to the front, and try to prevent the enemy from carrying away the guns—was, for the second time, told that he must operate against the Russians on the Causeway Heights, and was furnished with a new and special motive for energy and despatch. Construed singly, the fourth order looks clear as day; read along with the former direction it looks equally clear, but even more cogent; for, when so considered, it appears to visit Lord Lucan with something like an expression of impatience and displeasure for having allowed more than half an hour to pass after the receipt of the third order without trying to recover the ‘heights.’

I am not without means of explaining how it became possible for Lord Lucan to raise a controversy upon the subject, but the circumstance

**CHAP. L** which opened to him that opportunity was one occurring after the battle ; \* and the question we now have to treat is the meaning of the few written words which Nolan delivered. After applying to those simple words all such knowledge as I have of the relevant facts, I remain unable to learn how Lord Lucan could read the fourth order without seeing that it directed him to attempt an advance against the head of Liprandi's column—against the head of the column then occupying those same Causeway Heights where the English guns had been taken. That the order thus interpreted was one which Lord Raglan had most perfectly adapted to the exigency of the hour, we shall by-and-by see valid proof.

Lord  
Lucan's  
reception of  
the order.

Lord Lucan, however, had no sooner read this order, than there was awakened in his mind that spirit of hostile criticism which so marred his usefulness as a subordinate. He proceeded to sit in judgment upon the command of his chief, and at once, without mercy, condemned it. His own account declares that he 'read the order with 'much consideration'—'perhaps consternation,' he says, 'would be the better word — at once 'seeing its impracticability for any useful purpose 'whatever, and the consequent great unnecessary 'risk and loss to be incurred.' The formation of this strangely decisive opinion upon the merits of an order sent him by his Commander-in-Chief, was rendered the more inappropriate by the fact,

\* This will be shown in a later page.

that the Commander who sent the order had the whole field of battle before him, whilst the critic who undertook to condemn it was so placed (upon the lower ground) that to him neither enemy nor guns were in sight;\* nor must it be forgotten that this condemnation of the order was based upon its written words, unalloyed by any oral addition, and stands earlier in point of time than that outbreak of Nolan's which was afterwards alleged as a warrant for the course pursued by Lord Lucan.

But, unhappily, Lord Lucan did not restrict himself to a silent condemnation of the order. With the bearer of the note for his listener, he suffered himself to run out against the order of his chief. Conceiving (erroneously) that he rightly understood the nature of the enterprise which Lord Raglan's written words had enjoined, he urged the uselessness of such an attack, and the dangers attending it.†

By this language apparently Lord Lucan challenged the messenger to encounter him in wordy dispute, and to defend, if he could, the order of the Commander-in-Chief.

Nolan was a man who had gathered in Continental service the habit of such extreme and such rigid deference to any general officer, that his comrades imagined him to be the very last

CHAP.  
I.

The alter-  
cation  
between  
Lord Lucan  
and Nolan.

\* 'Neither enemy nor guns being in sight.'—Speech of Lord Lucan in the House of Lords.

† 'After carefully reading the order, I urged the uselessness of such an attack, and the dangers attending it.'—Lord Lucan's speech in House of Lords.

CHAP. I. man who in such points would ever prove wanting; but perhaps that very reverence for the military hierarchy which had hitherto rendered him so superlatively respectful to general officers, may have made him the more liable to be shocked by the reception which Lord Lucan was giving to the order of the Commander-in-Chief. Up to this moment, however, Nolan was not so ungovernably indignant as to be guilty of more than imparting an authoritative tone to the words in which he answered Lord Lucan's denunciation of the order. 'Lord Raglan's orders,' he said, 'are, that the cavalry should attack immediately.'

Then quickly, and in a tone of impatience, caused, it seems, by what he imagined to be the absurdity of the attack thus enjoined, Lord Lucan said to Nolan, 'Attack, sir! attack what? What 'guns, sir?' \*

This angry, impatient question was destined to put an end to all prospect of eliciting from Nolan any quiet explanation of the mission with which he came charged, or any of that priceless information in regard to the enemy's position which, coming as he did from high ground, the aide-de-camp was well able to give. To use the homely, nay feminine, language which describes the action of the emotional forces, Lord Lucan's words 'set 'Nolan going.' Throwing his head back, and pointing with his hand in a direction which Lord

\* I here follow Lord Lucan's written narrative. According to his speech in the House of Lords, his words were, 'Where 'and what to do?'

Lucan says confidently was towards the left-front corner of the valley, the aide-de-camp replied, 'There, my lord, is your enemy ; there are your ' guns.'\* Lord Lucan declares that these words were addressed to him in a 'most disrespectful but significant manner ;'† and, even without too much relying upon gesture or cadence of voice, it is easy to see that the apostrophe thus uttered by Nolan was almost in the nature of an indignant rebuke—an indignant rebuke inflicted by a captain upon a lieutenant-general in front of his troops.

CHAP.  
I.

Just men will therefore acknowledge that this outbreak of Nolan's was only too well fitted to enrage a general officer, and, by enraging him, to disturb his judgment ; but, apart from the effect they might produce upon the temper of Lord Lucan, the gestures and the words of the aide-de-camp cannot fairly be wrought into the kind of importance which was afterwards assigned to them in controversy. The tenor of the apostrophe as recorded by Lord Lucan himself shows plainly enough that, by pointing generally to the direction in which the enemy might be found, Nolan's gestures and words were meant to convey a taunt, not to give topographical guidance ; and this is made the more evident by taking care to remember that, when the words passed between

\* Lord Lucan's written narrative and speech. As to this answer of Nolan's both those accounts agree ; but the speech, in saying how Nolan pointed, says, 'to the further end of the valley.'

† Ibid.

CHAP. I. the Lieutenant-General and the Aide-de-camp, they were neither of them on ground from which any Russians could be seen ; for a messenger, who was so blindly placed at the moment as not to have a glimpse of the enemy, could hardly have so trusted to his own and his hearer's recollection of the local bearings as to think of attempting to designate a particular object of attack by pointing to its supposed position.

The haze that was at one time engendered by controversy carried on with imperfect materials is yet further cleared off by observing the angle of difference between the route of the Causeway Heights, which Lord Raglan had enjoined, and the fatal way down the North Valley. Vast and terrible as was the contrast in point of consequences between taking the right way and taking the wrong one, the divergence of the one route from the other at the spot where Nolan made the gesture is represented by an angle of little more than twenty degrees. How is it possible that, where the difference of direction between the two routes at the point of departure had so moderate a width, and where also there was no sight of a Russian battalion or squadron to guide the eye or the hand, the aide-de-camp could have even seemed to forbid the one route or to enjoin the other, by the way in which—burning with anger—he tauntingly pointed to the ‘enemy’?

Nolan was one of the last men in the whole army who would have been capable of sending our squadrons down the North Valley instead of

to the line of the heights ; for, besides that he had come fresh from the high ground which commanded a full view of the enemy's position, and had just been gathering the true purpose of the orders from the lips of Lord Raglan himself, it so happened that he had a special and even personal interest in the recapture of the heights and the guns, because he had maintained, and maintained for a time, against the judgment of some of our Engineers, that the construction of redoubts on the line of the Causeway Heights was an expedient measure. With the overstrained notions he had of what squadrons of horse might achieve, he cannot have failed to ascribe the loss of a position thus specially valued by him to the general officer whom he long had regarded as the obstructor of all cavalry enterprise. And it may well be imagined that he came down exulting in the terms of an order which was framed for compelling Lord Lucan to try to recover the guns. The notion of his having intended to divert our cavalry from the Causeway Heights and send it down the North Valley seems altogether untenable.

If Nolan had been the bearer of a mere verbal order, then, indeed, this outbreak of his might have been in a high degree embarrassing. It might have forced Lord Lucan to consider whether he should send for further instructions, or whether he should instantly gallop up to a ground from which he could have such a survey of the enemy as to know where to attempt an attack ; or, finally,

**CHAP.** it might have put him to the task of endeavouring to winnow the communication addressed to him, by calming the over-excited aide-de-camp, and bringing him to say, if he could, how much of the words he had uttered were words really entrusted to him as a message by the Commander-in-Chief. But Lord Raglan, as we saw, had provided that his directions should be set down on paper; and after Nolan's outbreak, it became more than ever the duty of Lord Lucan to bend his mind faithfully to the written words of the order, examining as well as he could the condition of things to which it applied, and not forgetting that he had, all the while, in his hands another order, hitherto unexecuted, which enjoined him to advance and try to recover those same heights on which the guns spoken of in the 'fourth order' had been placed and lost by the Turks.

Lord Lucan has since spoken and written as if his choice lay between the plan of sending the Light Cavalry down the North Valley, and the plan of not advancing at all; but the truth is, that neither in the 'third order,' nor in the 'fourth 'order,' nor, lastly, in the taunting injunctions of the aide-de-camp, was there left any room to set up a doubt upon the question whether our squadrons should or should not advance; for by all these three channels alike there had come down strong mandates enjoining our cavalry to move forward and endeavour something against the enemy. I repeat that the fullest, the most generous, allowance ought to be made for the anger and

consequent disturbance of mental faculty which Nolan's outbreak was but too well fitted to occasion ; but it is not for that the less true that a steady perusal at this time of Lord Raglan's written instructions by a cavalry commander of sound judgment, who was also unruffled in temper, and acquainted with the state of the field, must have led to an immediate advance of our squadrons—to an immediate advance of our squadrons, not, of course, down the fatal North Valley, but against the line of the Causeway Heights, where the English guns had been lost.

CHAP.  
I.

How Lord Lucan should have dealt with an aide-de-camp who had made bold to apostrophise him in the way we have seen, that is a question which soldiers, with their traditional canons, will best determine. Since the messenger came fresh from a spot where he had been hearing the directions of the Commander-in-Chief, and looking down with full command of view upon the position of an enemy invisible from the low ground, he could not but be fraught with knowledge of almost immeasurable worth ; and apparently the immediate interests of the public service required that an effort should be made to undo the mischief which had been caused by provoking his indignation, and endeavouring to bring him back to such a degree of composure as to allow of his imparting what, only a few minutes before, he had been hearing and seeing. On the other hand, the due maintenance of military subordination is, of course, transcendantly important ; and it has been judged,

**C H A P.** as I learn, by men held to be of authority in such matters, that after the utterance by Nolan of his last taunting words, Lieutenant-General Lord Lucan should have put the Captain under arrest. The course least susceptible of a rational defence was that of treating Captain Nolan's indignant apostrophe as a word of command from Headquarters, and regarding the scornful gesture which accompanied his words as a really topographical indication.

*Lord  
Lucan's  
determina-  
tion.*

This last course, however, as I understand him, is the one which Lord Lucan took ; for, as soon as he had heard the taunting words, and marked the insulting gesture, he determined to govern his action, not exclusively by the written instructions which he held in his hand, but in part by the angry and apparently rhetorical apostrophe of the excited Captain. Nay, in spite of the two written orders, one pointing to the 'heights,' and the other to the 'guns' on those heights, as the object of the enterprise, he determined to follow what he judged to be the direction of Nolan's out-pointed arm as a guiding indication of the quarter in which the attack should be made.

Dividing the Causeway Heights (where Lord Raglan desired to attack) from the line of the Fedioukine Hills (where D'Allonville was destined to charge), there opened, as we saw, that North Valley where riders seeking their death—without themselves being able to strike in attack or defence for the first full mile of their road—might nevertheless run the gauntlet between two

prepared lines of fire, having always before them for a goal—which some of the survivors might touch—the front of a Russian battery, and the whole strength of Ryjoff's squadrons.\* Towards this valley, as we saw, Lord Lucan thought Nolan was pointing when he uttered his taunting apostrophe.

So Lord Lucan now proceeded to obey what he judged to be the meaning of the ‘fourth order,’ as illustrated by the aide-de-camp’s words and gesture. Believing that it had really become his duty to send a force down the North Valley, he selected Lord Cardigan and the Light Brigade as the man and the men who must first be offered up in obedience to the supposed commands of Lord Raglan. At a trot and alone, he rode off to the ground in front of the 13th Light Dragoons, where Lord Cardigan sat in his saddle.

Lord Lucan now personally imparted his resolve to Lord Cardigan. There is some difference between the impressions that were formed of this interview by Lord Lucan on the one hand and Lord Cardigan on the other; Lord Lucan believing that with the ‘fourth order’ in his hand he imparted its contents, or at all events the main tenor of it, to Lord Cardigan, and directed him ‘to advance,’ without in terms enjoining an ‘attack;’ whilst Lord Cardigan’s statement is that

Lord  
Lucan’s  
order to  
Lord  
Cardigan

\* This statement is not too extensive; for the 6 squadrons of Jeropkine’s Lancers, and the other small bodies of horsemen which stood posted apart, were not under General Ryjoff, the officer commanding the bulk of the Russian cavalry.

**CHAP.** he was ordered ‘to attack the Russians in the val-  
I. ‘ley about three-quarters of a mile distant with  
‘the 13th Light Dragoons and the 17th Lancers.’\*

Lord Lucan’s idea as to the way in which this direction of his ought to have been executed is as follows:—He says: ‘After giving † to Lord Cardigan the order brought to me from Colonel ‡ Airey by Captain Nolan I urged his Lordship to advance steadily, and to keep his men well in hand. § My idea was that he was to use his discretion and act as circumstances might show themselves; my opinion is that keeping his four squadrons under perfect control he should have halted them so soon as he found that there was no useful object to be gained, but great risk to be incurred; it was clearly his duty to have handled his brigade as I did the Heavy Brigade, and so saved them from much useless and unnecessary loss.’

Lord Cardigan did not so understand the task

\* Private memorandum in Lord Cardigan’s handwriting, and by him forwarded to Lord Raglan 27th October 1854. I prefer this to Lord Cardigan’s subsequent account, as being earlier—within two days of the battle—and being also a statement deliberately prepared for the Commander of the Forces. The ‘three-fourths of a mile’ was, of course, estimate only, and it applied to an extent of ground which was really more than a mile and a quarter. The two regiments which he mentions as those with which he had attacked were the troops constituting his first line.

† He does not mean that he handed the paper to Lord Cardigan, but that he either read it over to him, or gave him the tenor of it. According to Lord Cardigan, no such communication took place.

‡ He means General Airey.

§ The way in which Lord Lucan handled the Heavy Brigade in the North Valley will be seen in a later page.

which was devolving upon him. From the way in which his brigade was fronting at the time, he considered that an indefinite order to advance was an order to advance down the valley against the far distant guns and black masses of cavalry which were seen to be drawn up across it; and whatever were the words really used, Lord Cardigan certainly understood that without assailing either of the enemy's two protruded columns he was ordered to run the gauntlet between them for a distance of more than a mile, with the purpose of then charging the battery which crossed the lower end of the valley, and charging it moreover in front.

Understanding that he was thus instructed, Lord Cardigan judged it right to point out the true import of an order to advance down the valley. So, on hearing the words of his Divisional General, he brought down his sword in salute, and answered, 'Certainly, Sir; but allow me to point out to you that the Russians have a battery in the valley in our front, and batteries and riflemen on each flank.'\* Lord Lucan, after first expressing his concurrence in what he gathered to be the tenor of Lord Cardigan's observation, went on to intimate—he shrugged his shoulders whilst speaking—'that there was no choice but to obey.'†

\* Lord Lucan's belief is that Lord Cardigan's warning pointed only to the forces on the Fedioukine Hills, and not to those in front or those on the right flank.

† He said, according to Lord Lucan, 'I know it, but Lord Raglan will have it. We have no choice but to obey.' Ac-

CHAP.  
I.

Then, without further question or parley, Lord Cardigan tacitly signified his respectful submission to orders, and began that great act of military obedience which is enshrined in the memory of his fellow-countrymen. He turned quietly to his people and said : ‘The brigade will advance !’

Before the two Generals parted, Lord Lucan announced to Lord Cardigan his determination to narrow the front of the Brigade by withdrawing the 11th Hussars from the first line, and causing it to act in support. Unless Lord Lucan’s memory deceives him, he also enjoined Lord Cardigan ‘to advance very steadily and ‘quietly,’ and to ‘keep his men well in hand.’\*

It has been judged, that although the observation ventured by Lord Cardigan in answer to Lord Lucan’s first words of instruction had somewhat the character of a remonstrance, it still was amply warranted by the occasion ; and this, as I gather, was the opinion entertained by the Commander-in-Chief. When Lord Raglan gave the tenor of the remonstrance in a private letter addressed to the Duke of Newcastle, he prefaced the statement by saying that Lord Cardigan was ‘as brave as a lion.’† Indeed, it would seem

cording to Lord Cardigan, Lord Lucan said, ‘I cannot help ‘that ; it is Lord Raglan’s positive orders that the Light ‘Brigade attacks immediately.’

\* I have not ventured to put the statement in an absolutely positive form, because Lord Cardigan, I believe, has no recollection of having received this direction.

† Letter dated the 28th of October 1854. See this letter in the Appendix.

that from the moment in which he learnt the nature of the task imposed upon him to the one when he bowed to authority and composedly accepted his martyrdom, Lord Cardigan's demeanour was faultless.

CHAP.  
I.

## X.

As altered by Lord Lucan at the moment of directing the advance, the disposition of the Light Brigade was as follows:—The 13th Light Dragoons, commanded by Captain Oldham, and the 17th Lancers, commanded by Captain Morris, were to form the first line; the 11th Hussars, commanded by Colonel Douglas, was ordered to follow in support; \* and the third line was composed of the 4th Light Dragoons under Lord George Paget, and the 8th Hussars, or rather, one may say, the main portion of it, under Colonel Shewell.† Lord Cardigan, as commander of the whole brigade, had to place himself at the head of the first line. The second line, consisting of only one regiment, was commanded by Douglas, its colonel; and the two

Dispositions  
for the  
advance of  
the cavalry  
down the  
North  
Valley.

\* Before the change thus ordered by Lord Lucan the three first-named regiments had been all in first line. I speak of the change actually *effected*, and not of the one *contemplated* by Lord Lucan. He meant to have placed the 4th Light Dragoons in the same alignment as the 11th Hussars; but his orders to that last purpose were never communicated to the 4th Light Dragoons. The order for the 11th Hussars to drop back and act in support was given by Lord Lucan in person to Colonel Douglas.

† A troop of the 8th Hussars, commanded by Captain Chetwode, had been abstracted from the regiment to act as escort to the Commander of the Forces, and was at the Headquarters camp.

**C H A P.** regiments comprising the third line were in charge  
I. of Lord George Paget. Each of these regiments stood extended in line two deep. The Light Cavalry was to be supported by Scarlett's victorious brigade; and with two of Scarlett's regiments—that is, the Greys and the Royals brought forward in advance of the other regiments of Heavy Dragoons—Lord Lucan determined to be present in person. We shall have to learn by-and-by that there occurred a conjuncture—and that too at a cardinal time—when the link which connected the two brigades was haplessly suffered to break; but nevertheless it should be understood that the advance of not only our Light Cavalry but also our Heavy Dragoons was meant to form one operation. We shall find that both of the brigades (though not in anything like the same degree) were exposed to the trials and the losses which the nature of the onslaught involved.\*

*Lord Cardigan and his Staff.*

Lord Cardigan placed himself quite alone at a distance of about two horses' lengths in advance of his Staff, and some five horses' lengths in advance of the centre of his first line.

When once a body of cavalry has been launched upon a course which is to end in attack, it has to dispense for a while with reliance upon full, ex-

\* The above observation seems to be rendered necessary by the not unnatural tendency to concentrate attention upon that part of the operation which was performed by the Light Brigade. Besides the casualties in the Divisional Staff which accompanied the Greys and the Royals, those two regiments, as we shall see, sustained no inconsiderable losses whilst engaged in the duty of supporting the Light Brigade.

plicit orders conveyed by word of mouth ; and although there may come the time when the trumpet shall be sounding ‘the gallop,’ and when afterwards it shall be sounding ‘the charge,’ yet, upon the whole, the troops of the first line obtain guidance mainly by carefully watching the leader who rides at the head of the force ; and, the empire of words being thus superseded for the time by the signalling, if so one may call it, which is effected by the pace and the position of a single horseman, it seems right, by a kind of analogy, that one who would listen to the story of a cavalry onslaught extending along a great distance should be able—as well as may be in the mind’s eye—to see and distinguish the leader. There is the more reason for this, since it happens that in the course of the controversies springing out of the Light Cavalry charge there arose a question of mistaken identity which has an important bearing upon Lord Cardigan’s military reputation.

Lord Cardigan had so good a stature that, although somewhat long in the fork, he yet sat rather tall in the saddle, and notwithstanding his fifty-seven years, he had a figure which retained the slenderness of youth. His countenance, highly bred and of the aquiline cast, had not been without such humble share as a mere brother might be expected to have of that beauty which once made famous the ancient name of Brudenell. Far from disclosing the real faults of his character, the features of the man rather tended to confirm the first popular impression that was created by

**C H A P.** the tidings of the Light Cavalry charge, and to indicate a nature which might have in it something of chivalrous, nay even Quixotic exaltation. His blue, frank-looking, genial eyes revealed none of the narrowness of disposition which I have thought myself obliged to ascribe to him. As might be supposed, he had an excellent cavalry seat, and was erect—but also stiff—in the saddle. He wore the uniform of his old regiment, the 11th Hussars; but instead of dangling loose from the shoulders, his pelisse—richly burthened in front with gold lace—was worn closely put on like a coat, and did not at all break or mitigate the rigid outline of his figure.\* The charger he rode was a thorough-bred chestnut, with marks of a kind visible from afar, which in controversy it may be well to remember. On the near side before, as well as on the near side behind, the horse had one white leg.† In the small group which represented the Brigade-Staff, Lieutenant Maxse, assistant aide-de-camp, and Sir George Wombwell,

\* In the Crimea at this time the Hussar regiments wore the pelisse in the same way as Lord Cardigan.

† Under the off' hind fetlock, also, the horse—he still survives, or did a few months ago (1868)—has a stain of white, but so small as not to be visible from a distance. As far as could be seen by any one on the field of battle not coming close to the horse, he had no white stains on his legs, except one high 'white stocking' before and another high 'white stocking' behind, both the 'white stockings' being on the near side. General Liprandi, when questioning English prisoners with a view to identify the English officer whom he had seen galloping back, seems to have spoken of the horse as a chestnut *with white heels*, only one of the witnesses saying that the Russian General asked as to the rider of a chestnut with white *legs*.

extra aide-de-camp to Lord Cardigan, were, it seems, the only officers present.\*

CHAP.  
I.

---

Although the part of the enemy's line which Lord Cardigan meant to attack lay as yet very distant before him, it was evident, from the position of the flanking batteries betwixt which he must pass, that his brigade would not long be in motion without incurring a heavy fire; and, upon the whole, he seems to have considered that almost from the first his advance was in the nature of a charge.

Followed immediately by his first line, and, at a greater distance, by the other regiments of his brigade, Lord Cardigan moved forward at a trot, taking strictly the direction in which his troops before moving had fronted, and making straight down the valley towards the battery which crossed it at the distance of about a mile and a quarter.

Before Lord Cardigan had ridden a hundred paces in advance, he encountered a sight which

Advance of  
Lord Car-  
digan and  
the Light  
Brigade.

\* The death of Captain Lockwood (an excellent officer, who was aide-de-camp to Lord Cardigan) has thrown difficulty in the way of knowing where he was during a considerable period of the combat, except its very last phase; and there is an idea (not confirmed by Lord Cardigan or by Maxse) that he was carrying a message from his chief at the time when the advance began. In a letter addressed to the 'Times' newspaper, Maxse says that at the commencement of the advance, and again when the first line was 'three parts of the way down,' he observed Lockwood in his place some five or six horses' lengths to the right rear of Lord Cardigan, and that that was the last time he saw him. Colonel Mayow, the brigade-major, had been on the sick-list, and although, as we shall learn, he found strength enough, upon seeing the prospect of an engagement, to join the brigade and take a signal part in the combat, he was busied, in general, with the troops, and did not ride much with the Staff.

CHAP.


I.

Captain  
Nolan  
appearing  
in front of  
the brigade.

His pro-  
bable object.

filled him with anger. Right before him he saw Captain Nolan audaciously riding across his front from left to right ; but not content with a trespass which alone would have been shocking enough to Lord Cardigan's orderly mind, Captain Nolan, turning round in his saddle, was shouting, and waving his sword, as though he would address the brigade. We now know that when Nolan thus strangely deported himself, he was riding in a direction which might well give significance to his shouts and his gestures ; for, instead of choosing a line of advance like that pursued by Lord Cardigan, he rode crossing the front of the brigade, and bearing away to the right front of our advancing squadrons, as though he would go on to the spot on the Causeway Heights where the Odessa regiment stood posted.\* Regarded in connection with this significant fact, the anxious entreaties which he sought to express by voice and by signs would apparently mean something like this—‘ You are ‘ going quite wrong ! You are madly going down ‘ this North Valley between flanking fires, where

\* This diagram, by an officer who was one of the nearest of all the observers, points out the way in which Nolan's direction deviated from that of Lord Cardigan :—



' you won't have an enemy in your front for the next mile. This—the way you see me going—this is the direction to take for doing what Lord Raglan has ordered. Bring up the left shoulder, and incline to your right as you see me doing. This, this is the way to get at the enemy !' †

Failing, however, to surmise that Nolan's object

† Lord Cardigan, in writing addressed to myself, has distinctly confirmed the statements which show that Nolan was riding diagonally *across* the front of the brigade. Supposing my interpretation to be right, the desire of an officer not only to have his chief's order faithfully executed, but likewise to save our superb Light Brigade from self-destruction, might well excuse Nolan's interference ; but it may be also observed that there had obtained at our Headquarters a practice of sending an officer of the Quartermaster-General's Staff to guide Lord Lucan (topographically) in the execution of the orders entrusted to him ; and on that special ground, as well as for the more general reason, Nolan might have imagined that he was warranted in trying to save the brigade from the error of taking a route which he knew to be the wrong one. His attempt no doubt was made at a very late moment ; but I have no reason for supposing that Nolan had the least idea of the mistake which was about to be perpetrated, until he saw the brigade begin to advance *without having first changed front*. After that (if my interpretation be right) he did not lose a moment in his efforts to rescue the brigade from the error into which he then saw it falling. He had just been speaking to Morris, announcing to him, in what I understand to have been a sufficiently cool and collected way, that he meant to accompany the brigade ; but the moment the brigade began to advance without having first inclined its front towards what Nolan knew to be the true point of attack he began to move diagonally across the front, and this so fast and with such appearance of excitement—excitement very natural to one who was then in the very act of discovering the fatal error, and eagerly trying to stop it whilst yet it was possible to do so—that Morris shouted out to him, 'That won't do, Nolan ! we've a long way to go, and must be steady.' See Note XI. in the Appendix.

CHAP.  
I. might be that of averting mistake and supplying a much-needed guidance, Lord Cardigan, at the time, only saw in the appeal of the aide-de-camp a ridiculous and unseemly attempt to excite the brigade—nay, even to hurry it forward. Considering, however, that Nolan must have been acting with a full knowledge of the enemy's position, as well as of Lord Raglan's true meaning, and that at the time of his appealing thus eagerly to our Light Cavalry by gesture and voice, he was not only on the right front of our line, but was actually bearing away diagonally in the very direction of the Causeway Heights, there is plainly more room for surmising that the aide-de-camp's anxiety had been roused by seeing our squadrons advance without having first changed their front, and that what he now sought was to undo the mistake of Lord Lucan, to bend our troops from the path which led down the fatal North Valley, and make them incline to their right—make them so incline to their right as to strike the true point of attack which Lord Raglan had twice over assigned.

*Nolan's fate.* But a Russian shell bursting on the right front of Lord Cardigan now threw out a fragment which met Nolan full on the chest, and tore a way into his heart. The sword dropped from his hand; but the arm with which he was waving it the moment before still remained high uplifted in the air, and the grip of the practised horseman remaining as yet unrelaxed still held him firm in his saddle. Missing the perfect hand of his master, and find-

ing the accustomed governance now succeeded by dangling reins, the horse all at once wheeled about, and began to gallop back upon the front of the advancing brigade. Then from what had been Nolan—and his form was still erect in the saddle, his sword-arm still high in the air—there burst forth a cry so strange and appalling that the hearer who rode the nearest to him has always called it ‘unearthly.’ And in truth, I imagine the sound resulted from no human will, but rather from those spasmodic forces which may act upon the bodily frame when life, as a power, has ceased. The firm-seated rider, with arm uplifted and stiff, could hardly be ranked with the living. The shriek men heard rending the air was scarce other than the shriek of a corpse. This dead horseman rode on till he had passed through the interval of the 13th Light Dragoons. Then at last he dropt out of the saddle.

An officer of the Guards, who set down at the time in his journal what he had learnt of this part of the battle, went on to say lightly in passing, that the blame of the error would be laid upon Captain Nolan, because the Captain was dead. Whether based on sound reason or not, the prophecy was amply fulfilled. None, so far as I know, have yet questioned that, when wrought into anger by the reception given to Lord Raglan’s order, the aide-de-camp was guilty of a high military offence—the offence of openly taunting a general officer in front of his troops; and the limit of the evil thus done will never be measured, for no man

Question  
as to the  
degree in  
which  
blame justly  
attached to  
Nolan.

CHAP.  
I.—can reckon and say how much an insulting apostrophe may have tended to disturb the judgment of the Lieutenant-General upon whom at that moment the fate of our cavalry was depending ; but when this has been freely acknowledged, it is hard to see any other or heavier share of the blame that can justly be charged against Nolan's memory. The notion of his not understanding the order he brought, the notion of his mistaking a mile and a quarter of unoccupied valley for those occupied heights which our cavalry was to try to recover, the notion of his seeking to annul Lord Raglan's order in regard to the captured guns, the notion of his intending (by a taunt and an outpointed hand) to send our troops down the North Valley —all these, it would seem, for reasons already disclosed, are too grossly improbable to be worthy of acceptance ; and unless error lurks in fair inference, he was in the very act of striving to bend the advance of our squadrons, and bring them to the true point of attack, when death came and ended his yearnings for the glory of the cavalry arm.

The shell which slew Nolan was the first, I believe, of the missiles which our horsemen, then advancing, encountered ; and the gunners on the Fedioukine Hills were still only awakening—awakening almost incredulously—to the singular occasion which their foe seemed coming to offer them, when—unknown at the time to our people—a movement was made by the Russians, which

shows with how sound a judgment Lord Raglan had acted when he ordered, and ordered twice over, the advance of our cavalry.

In both of the two last orders, as we saw, the position of the enemy on the Causeway Heights was assigned as the ground which our horsemen should endeavour to win; and although our Light Cavalry, now advancing at a trot, had been launched from the first in a wrong direction, yet the ulterior purpose of pushing the attack down the valley had not yet so developed itself as to be discernible by the enemy. To him for the moment, and until our troops had moved down a distance of some hundreds of yards, this superb advance of our cavalry was so far similar to the advance which Lord Raglan had directed, and which Liprandi was plainly expecting, that at the mere sight of our squadrons there began to take place, on the part of the Russians, that very surrender of ground—nay, that very surrender of captured guns—which Lord Raglan had expected to obtain when he sent down his third and fourth orders. The weak and protruding column of infantry by which Liprandi had hitherto clung to the line of the Causeway Heights, and of the captured redoubts, began all at once to curl up. As already we know, the head of that column was formed by the Odessa Regiment, a force numbering four battalions, which stood drawn up on the heights near the Arabtabia Redoubt.\* Well, upon the approach of our Light Brigade those bat-

Significant  
retreat of  
the Odessa  
battalions.  
I.

\* Otherwise called the 'Number Three' Redoubt.

CHAP. I. talions at once fell back, abandoned the defence of the Arabtabia, retreated to such a distance as to be a good way in the rear of even the Redoubt 'Number Two,' and threw themselves at length into hollow squares, thereby apparently indicating that they expected the triumphant advance of our squadrons along the very route which Lord Raglan had assigned, and that, so far at least as concerned the westernmost portion of Liprandi's morning conquest, they had no mind to obstruct our cavalry in its task of effecting a recapture.\* It would be hardly an overstrained use of language to say that without hearing Nolan, or seeing the paper he carried, the Russians understood Lord Raglan's order, and (until they saw it annulled by the advance of our troops down the valley) were full ready to conform to its pressure.

\* In General Todleben's plan—not in the text of his book—this retreat of the Odessa Regiment upon the approach of our Light Brigade is faithfully recorded; but the 'Legende' of the official 'Atlas de la Guerre d'Orient,' which discloses a great amount of careful labour and inquiry on the part of the officers who undertook to record and illustrate the Russian movements at Balaelava, has put the same fact into words; and as I consider that the retrograde movement of the Odessa Regiment is the most satisfactory proof that could well be furnished of the sound judgment with which Lord Raglan acted when he, twice over, ordered his cavalry to advance to the line of the redoubts, I venture to give the passage: 'A l'approche de la cavalerie légère Anglaise, le régiment d'Odessa a quitté sa position près de la Redoute No. 4 [*i.e.*, in front of the Redoubt No. 3, see the 'plan]. Ses bataillons se sont formés en carré plus en arrière.' See the plan. Of course I am not entitled to quote the official French Atlas as an authoritative record of Russian movements, but, as I have said, the statement is in strict accordance with Todleben's plan.

Even at this late moment, and after all the misconception that had occurred, if Lord Lucan had turned at last in the direction assigned to him by his written orders, he would have found himself master at once of two out of the seven captured guns, with (apparently) a rich opportunity of not only securing the ulterior recovery of the two other lost redoubts and the five other English guns, but also inflicting upon Liprandi a calamitous defeat; \* for although the enemy's right wing was untouched, and although towards his left, he still held his ground from Kamara to the second redoubt, yet the means on which he had relied for connecting the head of his column with the troops of General Jabrokritsky had been ruined by the defeat of his cavalry at the hands of Scarlett's dragoons. His grasp of the field was relaxing; and indeed it could hardly be otherwise, for now that the Allies in force were completing their descent into the plain of Balaclava, Liprandi's continued obtrusion of troops in the direction of the Causeway Heights was no longer warranted by his relative strength.

It is distressing to be forced to learn that at Cathcart this critical moment, when Fortune proffered a victory, Sir George Cathcart was still disobeying the order to 'advance immediately and recapture 'the redoubts.' He was still halted by the No. 4 Redoubt with the main body of his infantry. The Riflemen he had sent out skirmishing were, some

\* See the accompanying plan, Plate 5.

CHAP.  
I.— of them, very near to the work when the fire which the enemy had thence been directing came all at once to an end. This change resulted, as we now know, from the retreat of the Odessa battalions ; but Cathcart still remained halted. Indeed, before long, he drew in his Riflemen, and informed the Staff Officer that he should advance no further.\* Thus, from the enemy's temporary alarm on the one side, and on the other from the recusancy of Cathcart, it resulted that the Arabtabia and the next Redoubt beyond—that is, the one called 'Number Two'—remained for a while unoccupied by either Russians or English.

At first, as was natural, the enemy's gunners and riflemen were so far taken by surprise, as to

\* Having heard General Airey tell Cathcart that Lord Raglan wished him to recapture the redoubts, and being under orders to remain with Sir George, the Staff Officer, somewhat later, thought it right to ask Cathcart whether he would not proceed to the No. 3 Redoubt (the Arabtabia), but Cathcart said 'No,' he would not advance further ; for, though he felt sure he could recapture all the redoubts, including even the 'Number One,' no advantage would accrue, because the operation would cause him to lose some men, and, the position being much too extended, the works would have to be evacuated after dark. He said his mind was quite made up, and that he would write to Lord Raglan. I do not find the note amongst Lord Raglan's papers. Before men condemn Lord Raglan for not bringing Cathcart to an account for his conduct on the day of Balaclava, it will be well for them to know that on the morrow—the very time when investigation on this subject might have been otherwise going on—there came a despatch from the Home Government which was calculated to make him stay his hand. For statements respecting Cathcart and the Dormant Commission, see *post*, chap. iii.

be hardly in readiness to seize the opportunity which Lord Cardigan was presenting to them; and indeed for some time, the very extravagance of the operation masked its character from the intelligence of the enemy, preventing him from seeing at once that it must result from some stupendous mistake; but the Russians at length perceived that the distance between our Heavy Brigade and Lord Cardigan's squadrons was every moment increasing, and that, whatever might be the true meaning of the enterprise in which our Light Cavalry had engaged, the red squadrons now every moment left further and further in rear were not under orders to give it that kind of support which the Englishman calls 'thorough-going.' This once understood, the enemy had fair means of inferring that the phenomenon of ten beautiful squadrons moving down the North Valley in well-ordered lines, was not the commencement of anything like a general advance on the part of the Allies, and might prove, after all, to be hardly the result of design. Accordingly, with more or less readiness, the forces on the Causeway Heights, the forces on the Fedioukine Hills, and the twelve-gun battery which crossed the lower end of the valley, became all prepared to inflict upon our Light Cavalry the consequences of the fault which propelled it. It is true that the main body of the Russian cavalry, drawn up in rear of the confronting battery, had been cowed by the result of its encounter with Scarlett's dragoons; but, when that has been acknowledged

CHAP.  
I.  
  
Gradual  
awakening  
of the Rus-  
sians to the  
opportunity  
offered  
them.

**C H A P.** as a qualification of what is coming, it may be  
**I.** said that the three sides of the quadrangle in  
which our cavalry moved, were not only lined  
with Russians, but with Russians standing firm  
to their duty.

Soon, the fated advance of the Light Brigade had proceeded so far as to begin to disclose its strange purpose—the purpose of making straight for the far distant battery which crossed the foot of the valley, by passing for a mile between two Russian forces, and this at such ugly distance from each as to allow of our squadrons going down under a doubly flanking fire of round-shot, grape, and rifle-balls, without the opportunity of yet doing any manner of harm to their assailants.

Powerful fire opened upon the advancing brigade from both flanks

Then, from the slopes of the Causeway Heights on the one side, and the Fedioukine Hills on the other, the Russian artillery brought its power to bear right and left, with an efficiency every moment increasing; and large numbers of riflemen on the slopes of the Causeway Heights who had been placed where they were in order to cover the retreat of the Russian battalions, found means to take their part in the work of destroying our horsemen. Whilst Lord Cardigan and his squadrons rode thus under heavy cross-fire, the visible object they had straight before them was the white bank of smoke, from time to time pierced by issues of flame, which marks the site of a battery in action; for in truth the very goal that had been chosen for our devoted squadrons—a goal rarely before assigned to cavalry—was

the front of a battery—the front of that twelve-gun battery, with the main body of the Russian cavalry in rear of it, which crossed the lower end of the valley ; and so faithful, so resolute, was Lord Cardigan in executing this part of what he understood to be his appointed task, that he chose out one of the guns which he judged to be about the centre of the battery, rode straight at its fire, and made this, from first to last, his sole guiding star.

With the two regiments constituting the first line, there rode the following officers : Besides Captain Oldham, the officer commanding the 13th Light Dragoons, the officers with the regiment were—Captain Goad, Captain Jenyns, Captain Tremayne, Lieutenant Percy Smith (acting Adjutant), Lieutenant Edward Lennox Jervis, Cornet Montgomery, and Cornet Chamberlayne;\* whilst with the 17th Lancers there were Captain Morris (in command of the regiment), Captain Robert White, Captain Winter, Captain Webb, Captain Godfrey Morgan, Lieutenant Thomson, Lieutenant Sir William Gordon, Lieutenant Hartopp, Lieutenant Chadwick (Adjutant), and Cornet Cleveland.†

Pressing always deeper and deeper into this

\* Cornet G. M. Goad was present with this regiment in the earlier part of the battle, but at the time when our cavalry moved westward, after the loss of the Turkish redoubts, he was disabled from the effect of a fragment of shell which struck his charger and caused the animal to fall over him.—*Note to 2d Edition.*

† Cornet Wombwell, though riding near his regiment, the 17th Lancers, was not doing duty with it, because, as we saw, he was on Lord Cardigan's Staff.

CHAP

I.

---

*Continued  
advance of  
the brigade.*

pen of fire, the devoted brigade, with Lord Cardigan still at its head, continued to move down the valley. The fire the brigade was incurring had not yet come to be of that crushing sort which mows down half a troop in one instant, and for some time a steady pace was maintained. As often as a horse was killed or disabled, or deprived of the rider, the fall, or his plunge, or his ungoverned pressure, had commonly the effect of enforcing upon the neighbouring chargers more or less of lateral movement, and in this way there was occasioned a slight distension of the rank in which the casualty had occurred ; but, in the next instant, when the troopers had ridden clear of the disturbing cause, they closed up, and rode on in a line as even as before, though reduced by the loss just sustained. The movement occasioned by each casualty was so constantly recurring, and so constantly followed by the same process,—the process of re-closing the ranks,—that to distant observers, the alternate distension and contraction of the line seemed to have the precision and sameness which belong to mechanic contrivance. Of these distant observers there was one—and that too a soldier—who so felt to the heart the true import of what he saw that, in a paroxysm of admiration and grief, he burst into tears. In well-maintained order, but growing less every instant, our squadrons still moved down the valley.

*The pace.*

Their pace for some time was firmly governed. When horsemen, too valorous to be thinking of

flight, are brought into straits of this kind, their tendency is to be galloping swiftly forward, each man at the greatest pace he can exact from his own charger, thus destroying, of course, the formation of the line; but Lord Cardigan's love of strict, uniform order was a propensity having all the force of a passion; and as long as it seemed possible to exert authority by voice or by gesture, the leader of this singular onset was firm in repressing the fault.

CHAP.  
I.

Thus when Captain White, of the 17th Lancers (who commanded the squadron of direction), became 'anxious,' as he frankly expressed it, 'to get out of such a murderous fire, and into the guns, as being the best of the two evils,' and endeavouring, with that view, to 'force the pace,' pressed forward so much as to be almost alongside of the chief's bridle-arm, Lord Cardigan, checked this impatience by laying his sword across the Captain's breast, telling him at the same time not to try to force the pace, and not to be riding before the leader of the brigade. Otherwise than for this, Lord Cardigan, from the first to the last of the onset, did not speak nor make sign. Riding straight and erect, he never once turned in his saddle with the object of getting a glance at the state of the squadrons which followed him; and to this rigid abstinence—giving proof, as such abstinence did, of an unbending resolve—it was apparently owing that the brigade never fell into doubt concerning its true path of duty, never wavered (as the best

Lord Cardigan's rigid way of leading the brigade.

**CHAP.****I.**

squadrons will, if the leader, for even an instant, appears to be uncertain of purpose), and was guiltless of even inclining to any default except that of failing to keep down the pace.

Increasing difficulty of restraining the pace in the first line.

State of the first line.

So far as concerned the first line, this task was now becoming more and more difficult. When the 13th Light Dragoons and the 17th Lancers had passed so far down the valley as to be under effective fire from the guns in their front, as well as from the flanks right and left, their lines were so torn, so cruelly reduced in numbers, as to be hardly any longer capable of retaining the corporate life or entity of the regiment, the squadron, the troop; and these aggregates began to resolve themselves into their component elements—that is, into brave, eager horsemen, growing fiercely impatient of a trial which had thus long denied them their vengeance, and longing to close with all speed upon the guns which had shattered their ranks. The troopers here and there could no longer be restrained from darting forward in front of the officers; and the moment this licence obtained, the ceremonious advance of the line was soon changed to an ungoverned onset. The racing spirit broke out, some striving to outride their comrades, some determining not to be passed.

Casualties in Lord Cardigan's personal Staff.

In the course of the advance, Lieutenant Maxse, Lord Cardigan's second aide-de-camp, was wounded; and when the line had come down to within about a hundred yards of the guns, Sir George Wombwell, the extra aide-de-camp, had his horse killed under him. We shall afterwards see that this

casualty did not end the part which Wombwell was destined to take in the battle ; but for the moment, of course, it disabled him, and there was no longer any Staff-officer in the immediate personal following of the General who led the brigade.

But although he rode singly, and although, as we have seen, he rigidly abstained from any retro-grade glance, Lord Cardigan, of course, might infer from the tramp of the regiments close-following, and from what (without turning in his saddle) he could easily see of their flanks, that the momentum now gathered and gathering was too strong to be moderated by a commander ; and, rightly perhaps, avoiding the effort to govern it by voice or by gesture, he either became impatient himself, and drew the troops on more and more by first increasing his own speed, or else yielded (under necessity) to the impatience of the now shattered squadrons, and closely adjusted his pace to the flow of the torrent behind him. In one way or in the other, a right distance was always maintained between the leader and his first line. As before, when advancing at a trot, so now, whilst flinging themselves impetuously deep into the jaws of an army, these two regiments of the first line still had in their front the same rigid hussar for their guide, still kept their eyes fastened on the crimson-red overalls and the white near hind-leg of the chestnut which showed them the straight, honest way—the way down to the mouths of the guns.\*

CHAP.  
I.

Continued  
advance of  
Lord Car-  
digan and  
his first line.

\* The chestnut had two ‘white stockings,’ both rather high up the leg. Both these ‘white stockings’ were on the near

CHAP.  
—  
I.

Lord Cardigan insists that he was not the originator of the high speed which they reached in this part of their onset; whilst some, on the other hand, say that the squadrons never ceased from their duty of studiously watching the leader, and that the swiftness of Lord Cardigan was the cause which hurried forward the line. The truth, perhaps, is intermediate; for it seems not unlikely that the rapid pace of the leader, and the eagerness of the squadrons behind him, were causes which acted and reacted alternately the one on the other; but with whomsoever originating, and whether dictated by a sound warlike judgment, or by mere human instinct, the desire to move more and more swiftly was not unwarranted. Even at the cost of sacrificing military order for the moment, it was seemingly wise, after all, in the straits to which our squadrons had been brought, to let every man close upon the battery with all the speed he could gather.\*

Alone, in a sense, though close followed, and with no regimental labour on his hands, Lord Cardigan had more leisure for thought than the chief part of those he was leading; and for that reason simply, if not for any other, there is an interest in hearing him say how it fared with him mentally at the time of undergoing this trial. He

side, and to people following Lord Cardigan the 'white stocking' behind was, of course, the one which most caught the eye.

\* This I understand to be an opinion now recognised as sound by officers most competent to judge.

has not been reluctant to disclose the tenor of CHAP.  
the ideas which possessed themselves of his mind I  
whilst he thus led his troops down the valley.  
From moment to moment he was an expectant of  
death; and it seems that death by some cannon-  
ball dividing his body was the manner of coming  
to an end which his fancy most constantly  
harboured; but there is a waywardness in the  
human mind which often prevents it from lay-  
ing a full stress on any one thought, however  
momentous; and despite the black prospect of  
what the next moment might bring, Lord Cardi-  
gan—not knowing that his anger was with the  
dead—still dwelt, as he rode, on the incident  
which had marked the commencement of the  
advance—still raged, and raged against Nolan  
for having ridden in front of him, for having  
called out to his troops.\* By thus affording dis-  
traction to one who supposed himself doomed, hot  
anger for once, it would seem, did the work of  
faith and philosophy.

Lord Cardigan and his first line had come down  
to within about eighty yards of the mouths of the  
guns, when the battery delivered a fire from so

\* The accuracy of Lord Cardigan's impression as to the thought chiefly occupying his mind at this time is confirmed by what we know from other sources of the first utterances to which he gave vent after coming out of the charge. No one was more struck than Lord Cardigan was by the strange and 'unearthly' shriek which Nolan had uttered; but oddly enough, he failed to infer that the cry was one immediately preceding death.

CHAP.  
I.—many of its pieces at once as to constitute almost a salvo. Numbers and numbers of saddles were emptied, and along its whole length the line of the 13th Light Dragoons and 17th Lancers was subjected to the rending perturbation that must needs be created in a body of cavalry by every man who falls slain or wounded, by the sinking and the plunging of every horse that is killed or disabled, and again by the wild, piteous intrusion of the riderless charger appalled by his sudden freedom coming thus in the midst of a battle, and knowing not whither to rush, unless he can rejoin his old troop, and wedge himself into its ranks. It is believed by Lord Cardigan that this was the time when, in the 13th Light Dragoons, Captain Oldham, the commander of the regiment, and Captain Goad, and Cornet Montgomery, and, in the 17th Lancers, Captain Winter\* and Lieutenant Thomson, were killed—when Captain Robert White and Captain Webb and Lieutenant Sir William Gordon were struck down.† The survi-

\* Captain Winter about this time was seen alive and in his saddle, but it seems probable that he had then already received his mortal wound.

† Sir William Gordon survived and recovered, but afterwards retired from active service. I have heard that he was an officer of great ability, with an enthusiastic zeal for his profession; and his retirement has been quoted to me by cavalry men as an instance of the way in which the perverse arrangements of our military system tend to drive able men from the service. It seems that (upon principles analogous to those adopted by the trades-unions) the sacred rights of mediocrity are maintained with a firmness which too often defeats the patient ambition of a highly gifted soldier.

vors of the first line who remained undisabled were feeble by this time, in numbers scarce more than some fifty or sixty;\* and the object they rode at was a line of twelve guns close supported by the main body of the Russian cavalry, whilst on their right flank as well as on their left, there stood a whole mile's length of hostile array, comprising horse, foot, and artillery. But by virtue of innate warlike passion—the gift, it would seem, of high Heaven to chosen races of men—the mere half of a hundred, carried straight by a resolute leader, were borne on against the strength of the thousands. The few, in their pride, claimed dominion: Rushing clear of the havoc just wrought, and with Cardigan still untouched at their head, they drove thundering into the smoke which enfolded both the front of the battery and the masses of horsemen behind it.

Whilst the first line thus moved in advance, it was followed, at a somewhat less pace, by the three regiments which were to act in support. The officers present with these regiments—I take them from left to right—were as follows: With the 11th Hussars, besides Colonel Douglas who commanded the regiment, there rode Captain Edwin Cook, Lieutenant Trevelyan, Lieutenant

The advance  
of the three  
regiments  
acting in  
support.

Officers  
present with  
the 11th  
Hussars.

\* The grounds of this necessarily rough computation are, 1st, the strength of the two regiments as ascertained at the muster after the battle; and 2d, the absence of proofs showing that any numerous casualties occurred in these two regiments at a later moment.

## C H A P.

## I.

With the  
4th Light  
Dragoons.

Alexander Dunn, Lieutenant Roger Palmer, and George Powell Haughton. With the 4th Light Dragoons, besides Lord George Paget who commanded the regiment, there were present Major Halkett, Captain Alexander Low, Captain George John Brown, Captain Portal, Captain Hutton, Lieutenant Sparke, Lieutenant Hedworth Jolliffe, Cornet Wykeham Martin,\* Cornet William Affleck King, and Cornet Edward Warwick Hunt. With

With the 8th  
Hussars.

the 8th Hussars (which had only three of its troops present), there rode, besides Colonel Shewell who commanded the regiment, Major de Salis, Captain Tomkinson, Lieutenant Seager (the Adjutant), Lieutenant Clutterbuck, Lieutenant Lord Viscount Fitzgibbon, Lieutenant Phillips, Cornet Heneage, Cornet Clowes, and Cornet William Mussenden.

The order in  
which the  
'supports'  
advanced.

Of the regiments thus acting in support the foremost was the 11th Hussars. In obedience to the order personally delivered to Colonel Douglas by Lord Lucan, the regiment had altered its relative position; and, instead of forming the left of the first line, it now advanced in support of the 17th Lancers. Next came Lord George Paget's regiment, the 4th Light Dragoons. Whilst entrusting to Lord George Paget the charge of

\* Thackeray, who once chanced to meet this young officer in society, spoke of him as coming up to the very idea which he (Thackeray) had formed of a 'brave, modest soldier.' Cornet Wykeham Martin survived the Crimean War, but died young, and deeply loved. He was the son of the member for Newport, and the brother of the member for Rochester.—*Note to Second Edition.*

what he had intended to be his second line—that is, the 4th Light Dragoons and the 8th Hussars—Lord Cardigan had said, with what was taken to be a somewhat marked emphasis, ‘I expect your best support; mind, Lord George, your best support!’ Lord George said, ‘Of course, my lord, you shall have my best support;’ but the eager injunction he had received so continued to ring in his ears during the critical minutes which followed, that he was more careful to keep near the first line than to preserve his connection with the 8th Hussars. His order to the 8th Hussars had been, ‘4th Light Dragoons will direct;’ and this order of course, if obeyed, would have sufficiently maintained the connection between the two regiments; but the instruction, it would seem, had not been effectually heard, or, at all events, was not kept in mind; for the officers of the 8th Hussars apparently entertained a belief that theirs was the directing regiment of the line in which it had to act. Whatever the cause, it is certain that Colonel Shewell was most resolute in keeping down the pace of the regiment, and would not allow it to assume the same speed as the 4th Light Dragoons. Also, it happened, from some unknown cause, that the regiment bore more towards its right than did the 4th Light Dragoons; and from the difference of pace thus combined with the difference of direction, it resulted that both the interval and the distance which separated the two regiments were suffered to be continually increasing. For

CHAP.  
I. some time Lord George Paget laboured with voice and gesture to call on, and call in to his side the diverging regiment; and it seems that he despatched a message to Colonel Shewell with the same object; but his efforts were vain; and presently the increasing pace of the first line made him give his whole care to the duty of following it with a sufficient closeness; for the sound of that ‘Mind, Lord George, your best ‘support!’ still haunted his memory, and it seemed to him that there was no evil so great as the evil of lagging behind.

Nor was the task of bringing and keeping the regiment to the pace of the first line so easy as it might seem at first sight; for the squadron-leaders, being both of them men of singular firmness, would not suffer themselves nor their troops to be hurried by stress of fire, nor even by the impatience of their chief; and therefore, whilst Lord George was labouring to force the pace, and from time to time crying ‘Keep up!’ the two imperturbable squadron-leaders so ignored any difference there might be for such purpose between wearisome practice at home and desperate service in battle, that without remission or indulgence the teachings of Hounslow Heath and the Curragh were repeated in this fatal valley. The crash of dragoons overthrown by round-shot, by grape, and by rifle-ball, was alternate with dry technical precepts: ‘Back, right flank!’ ‘Keep back, Private This!’ ‘Keep back, Private That!’ ‘Close in to your centre!’ ‘Do look

'to your dressing!' 'Right squadron, Right CHAP  
'squadron, keep back!'

The increasing distance between the 4th Light Dragoons and the 8th Hussars soon became so great as to make Lord George Paget discard for the time all idea of reuniting them into one line; and, accordingly, with his now isolated regiment, he continued to press forward at a rate which was in great measure dictated to him by the speed of the first line. He observed, however, that in his front there was another regiment which had also become isolated; for, in obedience to Lord Lucan's direction—a direction never communicated to Lord George Paget—the 11th Hussars had by this time dropped back, so as to be acting in support to the left of the first line. In these circumstances, Lord George Paget determined that, by advancing in support to the 13th Light Dragoons, and by somewhat accelerating his pace, he would try to align himself with the 11th Hussars. In coming to this determination Lord George was governed only by the exigency of the occasion; but it so happened that, without knowing it, he was bringing the disposition of the 'supports' to that exact form which his Divisional General had intended to order; for as soon as Lord George should succeed in overtaking the 11th Hussars, the second line would be formed, as Lord Lucan had intended, by two regiments. Meantime, however, and up to the moment when Lord George's purpose attained to completion, the three regiments

**CHAP.** now following the first line were in echelon of regiments.\*

**I** When the 8th Hussars began to encounter the riderless horses dashing back from the first line, there was created some degree of unsteadiness, which showed itself in a spontaneous increase of speed ; but this tendency was rigorously checked by the officers, and they brought back the pace of the regiment to a good trot. Of the three officers commanding the three troops, one—namely, Captain Tomkinson—was at this time disabled. Another, Lord Fitzgibbon, was killed ; and several men and horses fell ; but Lieutenant Seager and Cornet Clowes took the vacant commands, and those of this small and now isolated regiment who had not been yet slain or disabled moved steadily down the valley.

In some respects this advance was even more trying to the supports than to the first line ; for although the supports were destined to suffer much less than our first line from the twelve Cossack guns in their front, yet, passing as they did between batteries and numbers of riflemen and musketeers, where the gunners and the marks-men were now fully on the alert, they incurred

\* Thus :—

---

1

11th Hussars.

---

1

4th Light Dragoons.

---

1

8th Hussars  
(less one of its troops)

heavy loss all the time from the double flank fire through which they were moving; and yet did not (as did ultimately the first line) come under such stress of battle as to be warranted in cutting short their probation by a vehement and uncontrolled rush. Throughout their whole course down the valley the officers and the men of the 11th Hussars, the 4th Light Dragoons, and the 8th Hussars never judged themselves to be absolved from the hard task of maintaining their formation, and patiently enduring to see their ranks torn, without having means for the time of even trying to harm their destroyers. These three regiments, moreover, were subjected to another kind of trial from which the first line was exempt; for men not only had (as had had the first line) to see numbers torn out of their ranks, and then close up and pass on, but were also compelled to be witnesses of the havoc that battle had been making with their comrades in front. The ground they had to pass over was thickly strewn with men and horses lying prostrate in death, or from wounds altogether disabling; but these were less painful to see than the maimed officers or soldiers, still able to walk or to crawl, and the charger moving horribly with three of his limbs, whilst dragging the wreck of the fourth, or convulsively labouring to rise from the ground by the power of the forelegs when the quarters had been shattered by round-shot.

And, although less distressing to see, the horses which had just lost their riders without being

CHAP.

I.

themselves disabled, were formidable disturbers of any regiment which had to encounter them. The extent to which a charger can apprehend the perils of a battle-field may be easily underrated by one who confines his observation to horses still carrying their riders; for, as long as a troop-horse in action feels the weight and the hand of a master, his deep trust in man keeps him seemingly free from great terror, and he goes through the fight, unless wounded, as though it were a field-day at home; but the moment that death or a disabling wound deprives him of his rider, he seems all at once to learn what a battle is—to perceive its real dangers with the clearness of a human being, and to be agonised with horror of the fate he may incur for want of a hand to guide him. Careless of the mere thunders of guns he shows plainly enough that he more or less knows the dread accent that is used by missiles of war whilst cutting their way through the air, for as often as these sounds disclose to him the near passage of bullet or round-shot, he shrinks and cringes. His eyeballs protrude. Wild with fright, he still does not most commonly gallop home into camp. His instinct seems rather to tell him that what safety, if any, there is for him must be found in the ranks; and he rushes at the first squadron he can find, urging piteously, yet with violence, that he too by right is a troop-horse—that he too is willing to charge, but not to be left behind—that he must and he will ‘fall in.’ Sometimes a riderless charger thus

bent on aligning with his fellows, will not be content to range himself on the flank of the line, but dart at some point in the squadron which he seemingly judges to be his own rightful place, and strive to force himself in. Riding, as it is usual for the commander of a regiment to do, some way in advance of his regiment, Lord George Paget was especially tormented and pressed by the riderless horses which chose to turn round and align with him. At one time there were three or four of these horses advancing close abreast of him on one side, and as many as five on the other. Impelled by terror, by gregarious instinct, and by their habit of ranging in line, they so ‘closed’ in upon Lord George as to besmear his overalls with blood from the gory flanks of the nearest intruders, and oblige him to use his sword.

Familiar pulpit reflections concerning man’s frail tenure of life come to have all the air of fresh truths when they are pressed upon the attention of mortals by the ‘ping’ of the bullet, by the sighing, the humming, and at last the ‘whang’ of the round-shot, by the harsh ‘whirr’ of the jagged iron fragments thrown abroad from a bursting shell, by the sound—most abhorred of all those heard in battle—the sound that issues from the moist plunge of the round-shot when it buries itself with a ‘slosh’ in the trunk of a man or a horse. Under tension of this kind prolonged for some minutes, the human mind, without being flurried, may be wrought into so high a state of

**CHAP.** activity as to be capable of well-sustained thought; and a man, if he chose, whilst he rode down the length of this fatal North Valley, could examine and test and criticise—nay, even could change or restore that armour of the soul, by which he had been accustomed to guard his serenity in the trials and dangers of life.

**I.** One of the most gifted of the officers now acting with the supports was able, whilst descending the valley, to construct and adopt such a theory of the divine governance as he judged to be the best-fitted for the battle-field. Without having been hitherto accustomed to let his thoughts dwell very gravely on any such subjects of speculation—he now all at once, whilst he rode, encased himself body and soul in the iron creed of the fatalist; and, connecting destiny in his mind with the inferred will of God, defied any missile to touch him, unless it should come with the warrant of a providential and foregone decree. As soon as he had put on this armour of faith, a shot struck one of his holsters without harming him or his horse; and he was so constituted as to be able to see in this incident a confirmation of his new fatalist doctrine. Then, with something of the confidence often shown by other sectarians not engaged in a cavalry onset, he went on to determine that his, and his only, was the creed which could keep a man firm in battle. There, plainly, he erred; and, indeed, there is reason for saying that it would be ill for our cavalry regiments, if their prowess were really

dependent upon the adoption of any highly spiritual or philosophic theory. I imagine that the great body of our cavalry people, whether officers or men, were borne forward and sustained in their path of duty by moral forces of another kind—by sense of military obligation, by innate love of fighting and of danger—by the shame of disclosing weakness—by pride of nation and of race—by pride of regiment, of squadron, of troop—by personal pride; not least, by the power of that wheel-going mechanism which assigns to each man his task, and inclines him to give but short audience to distracting, irrelevant thoughts.

But, whatever might be the variety of the governing motives which kept every man to his duty through all the long minutes of this trying advance, there was no variety in the results; for what it was his duty to do, that every man did; and as often as a squadron was torn, so often the undischarged survivors made haste to repair it. The same words were ever recurring—‘Close in! ‘Close in! ‘Close in to the centre! ‘Close in!

It was under this kind of stress—stress of powerful fire on each flank, and signs of dire havoc in front—that the three regiments (in echelon order, but with an always diminishing distance between the 11th Hussars and the 4th Light Dragoons) moved down to support the first line. Except that the pace of the 8th Hussars was more tightly restrained than that of the 11th Hussars or the 4th Light Dragoons, the conditions under which the three regiments respectively

CHAP. I. acted were, down to this time, much alike. Sustaining all the way cruel losses without means of reprisal, but always preserving due order, and faithfully running the gauntlet between the fire from the Causeway Heights and the fire from the Fedioukine Hills, they successively descended the valley.

The near approach of our first line to the battery.

Lord Cardigan and his first line, still descending at speed on their goal, had rived their way dimly through the outer folds of the cloud which lay piled up in front of the battery ; but then there came the swift moment when, through what remained of the dimness, men at last saw the brass cannons gleaming with their muzzles towards the chests of our horses ; and visibly the Russian artillerymen—unappalled by the tramp and the aspect of squadrons driving down through the smoke—were as yet standing fast to their guns.

By the material obstacle which they offer to the onset of horsemen, field-pieces in action, with their attendant limber-carriages and tumbrils behind them, add so sure a cause of frustration to the peril that there is in riding at the mouths of the guns, that, upon the whole, the expedient of attacking a battery in front has been forbidden to cavalry leaders by a recognised maxim of war. But the huge misconception of orders which had sent the brigade down this valley was yet to be fulfilled to its utmost conclusion ; and the condition of things had now come to be such that,

whatever might be the madness (in general) of CHAP.  
charging a battery in front, there, by this time,  
I.—  
was no choice of measures. By far the greater  
part of the harm which the guns could inflict had  
already been suffered ; and I believe that the idea  
of stopping short on the verge of the battery did  
not even present itself for a moment to the mind  
of the leader.

Lord Cardigan moved down at a pace which he has estimated at seventeen miles an hour, and already he had come to within some two or three horses' lengths of the mouth of one of the guns—  
a gun believed to have been a twelve-pounder—but then, the piece was discharged ; and its torrent of flame seemed to gush in the direction of his chestnut's off fore-arm. The horse was so governed by the impetus he had gathered, and by the hand and the heel of his rider, as to be able to shy only a little at the blaze and the roar of the gun ; but Lord Cardigan being presently enwrapped in the new column of smoke now all at once piled up around him, some imagined him slain. He had not been struck. In the next moment, and being still some two horses' lengths in advance of his squadrons, he attained to the long-sought battery, and shot in between two of its guns.

Lord Cardigan's charge into the battery at the head of his first line.

There was a portion of the 17th Lancers on our extreme left which outflanked the line of the guns, but with this exception the whole of Lord Cardigan's first line descended on the front of the battery ; and as their leader had just done before

CHAP. them, so now our horsemen drove in between the  
L guns; and some then at the instant tore on to  
assail the grey squadrons drawn up in rear of the  
tumbrils. Others stopped to fight in the battery,  
and sought to make prize of the guns. After a  
long and disastrous advance against clouds and  
invisible foes, they grasped, as it were, at reality.  
What before had been engines of havoc dimly  
seen or only inferred from the jets of their fire  
and their smoke, were now burnished pieces of  
cannon with the brightness and the hue of red  
gold—cannon still in battery, still hot with the  
slaughter of their comrades.\* In defiance of our  
cavalry raging fiercely amongst them, the Russian  
artillerymen with exceeding tenacity still clung  
to their guns. Here and there indeed gunners  
were seen creeping under the wheels for safety,  
but in general they fought with rare devotion,  
striving all that men could, in such conditions of  
fight, against the sabres and lances of horsemen.  
They desired at all hazards to save their Czar's  
cannon from capture by removing them in haste  
from the front; and apparently it was to cover  
this operation—an operation they had already  
begun to attempt—that the gunners, with small  
means of resistance, stood braving the assaults of  
dragoons.

It so happened that Captain Morris, the officer

\* There is reason for believing that the pieces were twelve-pounders. Their metal had that reddish tinge which is observable in the sovereigns coined of late years by the English Mint.

in command of the 17th Lancers, was advancing in front of his left squadron, and thence it resulted that the portion of the regiment which outflanked the battery fell specially under his personal leadership.\*

CHAP  
I.

As soon as Morris had ridden so far through the smoke as to be able to see beyond it, he found that he had before him—with no line of guns intervening—a body of regular cavalry, and he seems to have understood that the force thus immediately opposed to him consisted of not less than two squadrons; † though he could not apparently see whether these two squadrons stood isolated or were acting in conjunction with other bodies of horse. We now know, however, that the body of horse Morris had on his front was one overlapping the battery, and connected with the right wing of that great body of Russian cavalry which stood posted across the valley in rear of the guns. On the other hand, the portion of the 17th Lancers which was thus confronted

Forces  
encountered  
by Morris:

\* Before the change by which Lord Lucan reduced the three regiments of the first line to two, the centre of the 17th Lancers was the centre of the line; and, Lord Cardigan's proper position being then in front of that centre, Captain Morris thought it right to avoid being unduly near the general of the brigade by placing himself in front of his left squadron. Having once taken that place, he kept it, notwithstanding the change.

† In words, so far as I know, Morris spoke only in general terms of the force as a 'body of cavalry'; but whilst lying in bed ill from his many wounds he contrived (though his arm was fractured) to sketch a little plan of the combat; and in this the Russian force immediately opposed to him is represented in a way which indicates the presence of not less than two squadrons.

CHAP.  
I.— by the right wing of the Russian cavalry could hardly have numbered more than some twenty horsemen;\* and this scanty force being now at the close of a rapid advance carried on for more than a mile under destructive fire, was not moving down with such weight and compactness—nor even, in truth, at such a high rate of speed—as to be able to deliver that shock which is the object of a cavalry charge. It was plain, however, that, with all such might as was now possible, the blow must be dealt; for the Russian horsemen, by remaining halted, were offering once more to the English that priceless advantage which they had given to Scarlett in the earlier part of the day. The density of the smoke had prevented the commander of the 17th Lancers from seeing that three-fourths of his horsemen were confronted by the battery;† and he apparently believed that, in executing a charge against the enemy's cavalry, he would be carrying with him the whole remains of his regiment.‡

his charge. Be this as it may, Morris, turning half round

\* It is known that, besides the whole of the right squadron of the 17th Lancers, a large portion of the left squadron (probably not much less than a troop) was confronted by the battery, and entered it; and if also it be true, as I imagine it must be, that by far the greater part of the casualties which ultimately reduced the regiment to a strength of only 37 had already occurred, it would seem to follow that there can hardly be any wide error in the surmise which puts the force engaged in Morris's charge at a number not exceeding twenty.

† This is proved, as I think, by a little sketch-map in which he conveyed his impression as to the position of the guns.

‡ This is inferred from the fact mentioned in the foregoing note and from the general tenor of Colonel Morris's narrative.

in his saddle, called out to his people, and said, CHAP.  
‘Now remember what I have told you, men, and  
‘keep together.’ Then he put his spurs into  
‘Old Treasurer,’ and, followed by that fraction of  
the regiment which ranged clear of the battery,  
drove full at the squadron confronting him.

In resistance to the onset of a handful of Lancers thus descending upon their close serried ranks, the Russians still remained halted ; and in the moments which passed whilst galloping down to attack them, Morris used to the utmost his well-practised eyes without being able to discern any one sign of wavering. The only movement he could detect in the enemy’s ranks was of a kind showing readiness to join in close combat. The Russian troopers in front of him were perceptibly drawing their horses’ heads in the direction of the bridle-arm, as though seeking to gain larger space for the use and free play of their swords.

In the direct front of the ranks thus awaiting the charge of our horsemen, there was sitting in his saddle a Russian who seemed to be the squadron-leader. Morris drove his horse full at this officer, and in the instant which followed the contact, the sword of the assailant had transfixed the trunk of the Russian, passing through with such force that its hilt pressed against the man’s body. The handful of men whom Morris was thus leading against the Russian cavalry followed close on their chief, drove full down at the charge on the enemy’s array of Hussars, and so broke

CHAP. I. their way into his strength as to be presently intermingled, the few with the many—the twenty gay, glittering Lancers, with the ranks of the dusky grey cavalry.

Seeing perhaps, with more or less distinctness, that they were undergoing an attack from only a handful of Lancers, some portions of the Russian Hussars whose ranks had thus been invaded did not choose to confess themselves vanquished, although their array had been broken, and these remained on the ground, but the rest galloped off; and their English assailants, or such of them as were yet undisabled, swept on in pursuit.

Scarcely, however, had this happened, when those Russian Hussars who had not given way were joined by numbers of Cossacks pouring in from the flank; and they now once more had dominion of the very ground where their ranks, half a minute before, had been broken by Morris's charge. For the moment there was nothing to hinder the enemy from capturing any of the English who here remained wounded and disabled.

Of these Morris himself was one; and his misfortune was a consequence of the determination which induced him to 'give point' to his adversary. 'I don't know,' he would afterwards say—'I don't know how I came to use the point of my sword, but it is the last time I ever do.' When his sword, driving home to the hilt, ran through the Russian squadron-leader whom he had singled out for his first adversary, the Russian tumbled over on the off side of his horse,

Morris  
wounded  
and taken  
prisoner.

drawing down with him in his fall the sword which had slain him ; and since Morris, with all his strength, was unable to withdraw the blade, and yet did not choose to let go his grasp of the handle, or to disengage himself from the wrist-knot, it resulted that, though still in his saddle, he was tethered to the ground by his own sword-arm.\*

CHAP.  
I.

Whilst thus disabled, Morris received a sabre-cut on the left side of the head which carried away a large piece of bone above the ear, and a deep, clean cut passing down through the acorn of his forage-cap, which penetrated both plates of the skull. By one or other of these blows he was felled to the ground, and for a time he lay without consciousness. As soon as he had regained his senses, he found himself lying on the ground ; but his sword was once more in his power, for by some means (to him unknown) it had been withdrawn from the body which before held it fast, and being joined to him still by the wrist-knot, was now lying close to his hand. He had hardly recovered his senses and the grasp of his sword when he found himself surrounded by Cossacks thrusting at him with their lances. Against the numbers thus encompassing him Morris sought to defend himself by the almost ceaseless ‘moulinet,’ or circling whirl of his

\* Thrust home with the momentum belonging to a horse charging down at high speed, the blade, it would seem, must have been forced through so much bone and muscle, as to be held fast against any mere pull which Morris could apply.

CHAP.  
I.

sword, and from time to time he found means to deliver some sabre-cuts upon the thighs of his Cossack assailants. Soon, however, he was pierced in the temple by a lance-point, which splintered up a piece of the bone, and forced it in under the scalp. This wound gave him great pain; and, upon the whole, he believed that his life must be nearly at its end; but presently there appeared a Russian officer, who interposed with his sword, striking up two or three of Cossack lances, and calling out loudly to Morris, with assurances that if he would surrender he should be saved. Accordingly Morris yielded up his sword, and became a prisoner of war.

Other incidents in this part of the field.

At nearly the same time, and not far from the same spot, another officer of the 17th Lancers fell alive into the hands of the enemy. This was Lieutenant Chadwick. Before he reached the line of the battery, his charger had received so many wounds, and lost so much blood, as to be all but incapable of stirring, though yet remaining on his legs. In spite of the singular and tormenting disadvantage of thus having under him an almost immovable horse, Chadwick found means to defend himself for some time against the stray Cossacks and other dragoons who, one after another, beset him; but at length he was caught in the neck by a Cossack lance, which lifted him out of his saddle, and threw him to the ground with such force as to stun him. When his senses returned, and whilst he still lay on the ground, he succeeded in defending himself

with his revolver against a Cossack who sought to despatch him ; but presently, from the direction of our right rear, other Cossacks, to the number of eight or ten, rode down yelling, with lances poised, and to these (when they circled around him, and made signs that he might have quarter if he would throw down his pistol) Lieutenant Chadwick at length surrendered.

CHAP.  
I.

At this time, and in this part of the field, several of the wounded English who lay on the ground without means of defending themselves were despatched by the Cossacks ; but I have not been compelled to learn that men were guilty of acts such as these where any Russian officer was present.

It was before our supports had come down, and whilst the English were still combating in the battery or pushing their onset beyond it, that the enemy, for a moment, was thus able to exercise dominion in rear of Lord Cardigan's first line.

Of those who swept on at the instant without staying to subdue the resistance of the artillery-men, Lord Cardigan from the first had been one. After charging into the battery, he continued his onset with but little remission of speed ; and although the smoke was so thick as to put him in danger of crushing his legs against wheels, he pierced his way through at a gallop between the limber-carriages and the tumbrils by a gangway so narrow as hardly to allow a passage for two

Continued  
advance  
by Lord  
Cardigan  
in person.

CHAP.  
I.

His isol-  
ation.

horsemen going abreast. Of necessity, therefore, his people who had hitherto followed him strictly now had to seek out other paths for their still continuing onslaught. Some, by bending a little, when necessary, to their right or to their left, found gangways more or less broad for their passage through the ranks of the artillery-carriages, and others made good their advance by sweeping round the flanks of the battery, but a few only were able to follow close on the track of their leader, and all these, sooner or later, were cut off from him by the incidents of battle.

His advance  
towards a  
large body  
of Russian  
cavalry.

In this way it happened that Lord Cardigan had already become almost entirely isolated, when, still pursuing his onward course, he found himself riding down singly towards a large body of Russian cavalry, then distant, as he has since reckoned, about eighty yards from the battery. This cavalry was retreating, but presently it came to a halt, went about, and fronted. Lord Cardigan stopped, and at this time he was so near to the enemy's squadrons that he has reckoned the intervening distance at so little as twenty yards. The same phenomenon which had enforced the attention of some of Scarlett's dragoons in the morning now presented itself under other conditions to Lord Cardigan. All along the confronting ranks of the grey-coated horsemen, he found himself hungrily eyed by a breed of the human race whose numberless cages of teeth stared out with a wonderful clearness from between the writhed lips, and seemed all to be

gnashing or clenched. It is believed that this peculiar contortion of feature, so often observed in the Russian soldiery, was not, in general, an expression of anything like brutal ferocity, but rather of vexation, and keen, eager care, with a sense of baffled energy. Lord Cardigan himself imagines that with the feelings of the Russian troopers whilst eyeing him, the thought of gain possibly mingled; for his pelisse being rich, and worn close at the time like a coat, showed a blaze of gold lace to the enemy.

It can rarely occur to any man to be able to recognise a friend or acquaintance across the dim barrier of distance or smoke which commonly divides hostile armies in a modern battle-field; but in the part of the valley to which Lord Cardigan's onset had brought him the air was clear, and I am assured that an officer of the house of Radzivill, then serving with the Russian cavalry, was able to recognise in the gorgeous hussar now before him, that same Earl of Cardigan whom he had formerly known or remarked during the period of a visit to England.\* This officer says that he ordered some Cossacks to endeavour to capture his London acquaintance, enjoining them specially to bring in their prisoner unhurt, and that, the better to whet their zeal, he promised them a tempting reward.

Certainly, the bearing of the Cossacks who now came forward against Lord Cardigan was very

CHAP  
I

Endeavour  
to take him  
prisoner.

\* My informant assures me that he had this from Prince Radzivill himself.

CHAP.  
I. much what might have been expected from men who had received such instructions as these. Two of them only, in the first instance, came up close to him, and these not, as I gather, in a truculent way, for they seemed as though they would have liked to make him prisoner. Lord Cardigan, however, showing no signs of an intention to surrender, they began to assail him with their lances, and for a moment his demeanour was like that of a man who regarded the movements of the Cossacks as disorderly rather than hostile ; for—full of high scorn at the wretchedness of their nags—he sat up stiff in his saddle, and kept his sword at the slope. Presently, however, he found himself slightly wounded by a thrust received near the hip, and in peril of being unhorsed by a lance which caught hold of him by the pelisse, and nearly forced him out of his saddle. Yet that last effort seems to have been made by a Cossack who was himself almost in retreat ; for the man at the time had his back half turned to Lord Cardigan, and the thrust he delivered was the one known to science by the name of the ‘right rear ‘point.’ The assailant had possibly learnt by this time that his comrades a little way off were flying from the English cavalry, and that he must not be too slow in conforming.

Lord  
Cardigan  
disengaging  
himself from  
his Cossack  
assailants :

It was right, of course, that instead of submitting to be taken prisoner, or to be butchered by overwhelming numbers, Lord Cardigan, being nearly alone, and altogether unaided, should disengage himself, if he could, from the reach of his

assailants by a sufficing movement of retreat, and this he accordingly did ; but before he had galloped far back, and whilst still on the Russian side of the battery, he found that he already had extricated himself from personal molestation, and had leisure to determine what next he would do.

Being now on the verge of that period in the battle when Lord Cardigan's course of action became such as to leave room for question and controversy, if not for unsparing blame, I would here interpose, and say that, home down to the moment when he found himself almost alone in the presence of the enemy's cavalry, he had pursued his desperate task with a rare, and most valorous persistency. And English officers, I know, will take pleasure in learning that, from the moment when he quietly said, 'The brigade will advance,' to the one when, nearly alone in the presence of the enemy's cavalry, he stiffly awaited his assailants with his sword at the slope, Lord Cardigan performed this historic act of devotion without word or gesture indicative of bravado or excitement, but rather with the air of a man who was performing an everyday duty with his everyday courage and firmness.\*

CHAP.  
I.

the devotion  
with which  
he had been  
leading his  
brigade.

\* During the advance down the valley, Captain Morris, who could not have been under a bias favourable to the commander of the brigade (see *ante*, p. 228), was on the left rear of Lord Cardigan, and at no great distance from him. When asked as to the manner in which Lord Cardigan had led the brigade, Morris used to say, 'Nothing could be better. He [Lord Cardigan] put himself just where he ought, about in front of my right squadron, and went down in capital style.' When specially asked whether Lord Cardigan had led 'quietly.'

CHAP.

I.

Lord  
Cardigan's  
return  
through the  
battery :

his pre-  
dicament:

When Lord Cardigan had withdrawn himself from the reach of his Cossack assailants, he still continued to retire, and passed once more through the battery into which he had led his brigade. He then saw men of the 13th Light Dragoons and the 17th Lancers retreating in knots up the valley, and he apparently imagined that the horsemen whom he thus saw retiring constituted the entire remnants of his first line. There, however, he erred. So far as I have learnt, there was no group of English horsemen still remaining ‘effective’ which, at this time, had moved to the rear; and indeed I have never yet heard of any one ascertained exception of either officer or man which ought to forbid me from saying in general terms that the Light Dragoons and the Lancers whom Lord Cardigan saw retreating were, all of them, men disabled—men either disabled by their own wounds, or else by the wounds of their chargers. It must be remembered, however, that the number of men thus in one way or other disabled was so huge in proportion to the whole strength of the regiments, as to give a seeming though fallacious ground for the wrong impression which their appearance produced upon Lord Cardigan’s mind. It is certain enough, as we shall afterwards learn more fully, that effective remnants of the 13th Light Dragoons and of the 17th Lancers

Morris answered, ‘Quite so; just as it ought to be—in short, ‘like a gentleman’—‘an expression from his lips conveying ‘much,’ so says the narrator of the conversation, ‘to any one ‘who knew him.’

pushed on their attack down the valley in the direction of the aqueduct; but Lord Cardigan solemnly declares—and declares, I believe, with truth—that, at the time, he could see none of his first line except those who, being most of them already some way towards the rear, were retreating up the slope of the valley. In these circumstances, he satisfied himself that, so far as concerned the business of rallying or otherwise interfering with the shattered fragments of his first line, there was nothing he could usefully do, without first following their retreat.

But then Lord Cardigan, though acting as the more immediate leader of the first line, was also in command of the whole brigade, and had charge, amongst others, of the three regiments which formed his supports. Was he warranted in leaving those regiments to fight their way in, or to fight their way out, without giving them the advantage, if any, which the presence of their Brigadier might confer?

Lord Cardigan answers this question by propounding the theory that his primary duty was with the first line, and by also asserting that he could nowhere see his supports. He determined to follow the horsemen whom he saw falling back. Without seeing occasion to deliver any order, or to hold up his sword for a rally, he continued the movement by which he had withdrawn himself from the Cossacks, and remounted the slope of the valley.

It might be thought that, since he left a main

CHAP.  
I.— part of his brigade in the fangs of the Russian army, Lord Cardigan, when resolved to fall back, would have sought to turn his retrograde journey to a saving purpose by flying to Lord Lucan or General Scarlett, and entreating that some squadrons might be pushed forward to extricate the remains of his brigade. Perhaps, though he has not so said, he exerted the utmost resources of his mind in the endeavour to see what, if anything, could be done for the salvation of his troops, then engulfed, as it were, in a hostile army, and was painfully driven to the conclusion that no reinforcements could help them; but, so far as I know, he has not been accustomed to speak of any such mental efforts. Resolved as he was from a sense of personal honour to execute to the letter, and without stint of life, whatever he might make out to be his clear duty, he yet never seemed to attain to such a height above the level of self as to feel what is called public care. And certainly his own account, if taken as being complete, would tend to make people think that, although, as might be expected, he was magnanimously regardless of his mere personal safety, yet in other respects, he much remembered himself, and all but forgot his brigade. It occurred to him, he says, at the time, that it was an anomalous thing for a General to be retreating in the isolated state to which he found himself reduced, and he therefore determined to move at a pace decorously slow.

Whatever were his governing motives, and whatever was his actual pace, he rode back alone to-

wards the spot where Scarlett at this time was halted.\* The first words he uttered were characteristic, and gave curious proof that the anger provoked by an apparent breach of military propriety had not been at all obliterated by even the 'Light Cavalry Charge.' He began to run out against the officer who had galloped across his front at the commencement of the onset, and was continuing his invective when Scarlett stopped him by saying that he had nearly ridden over Captain Nolan's dead body.† Lord Cardigan afterwards resumed his westerly movement, and rode back to the neighbourhood of the ground from which his brigade had advanced.

Supposing Lord Cardigan to be accurate when he says that he could neither see any still-combating remnants of his first line, nor any portion of his supports, there are two monosyllables—more apt than the language of scholars—by which

CHAP.  
I.

\* It is stated by General Scarlett that Lord Lucan was present at this time; but Lord Lucan, on the other hand, has stated that Lord Cardigan did not ride up to or approach him until afterwards when all was over. Whoever is acquainted with the tenor of the affidavits filed in *Cardigan v. Calthorpe* will see, from my use of the word 'towards,' instead of 'to,' that I avoid adopting, and also avoid contradicting, the passage of Lord Lucan's affidavit in which he says: he saw Lord Cardigan pass up the valley at a distance from him of about 200 yards. If Lord Lucan's impression in that respect be accurate, Lord Cardigan must have made a loop movement, passing first up the valley and then riding back to Scarlett.

† General Scarlett states that 'immediately previous' to this conversation he had pointed out to Lord Lucan a body of troops (which he took to be the 4th Light Dragoons and the 11th Hussars) retreating under the Fedioukine Hills.

CHAP. I. hunting-men will be able to describe his predicament, and to sum up a good deal of truth in a spirit of fairness. For eight or ten minutes, Lord Cardigan had led the whole field, going always straight as an arrow : he then was ‘ thrown out.’ Perhaps if he had followed the instincts of the sport from which the phrase has been taken, he would have been all eye, all ear, for a minute, and in the next would have found his brigade. But with him, the sounder lessons of Northamptonshire had been overlaid by a too lengthened experience of the soldiering that is practised in peace-time. In riding back after the troops which he saw in retreat up the valley, he did as he would have done at home after any mock charge in Hyde Park.

It will always be remembered that he who retired from the now silenced battery was the man who, the foremost of all a few minutes before, had charged in through its then blazing front, and that that very isolation which became the immediate cause of his misfortune, was the isolation, after all, of a leader who had first become parted from his troops by shooting on too far ahead of them.

Lord Cardigan was not amongst the last of the horsemen who came out of the fight ; and his movement in retreat was so ordered as to prevent him from sharing with his people in the combats which will next be recorded. It must therefore be acknowledged that his exit from the scene in which he had been playing so great a part was at

least infelicitous, and devoid of that warlike grace which would have belonged to it if he had come out of action only a little while later with the remnant of his shattered brigade ; but despite the mischance, or the want of swift competence in emergency, which marred his last act, he yet gave, on the whole, an example of that kind of devotion which is hardly less than absolute. He construed his orders so proudly, and obeyed them with a persistency at once so brave and so fatal, that—even under the light evolved from a keen, searching controversy—his leadership of this singular charge still keeps its heroic proportions.

The handful of men which had charged under Morris pursued the defeated Hussars in the direction of our left front, and drove them in on their supports ; but when the Russians found out that their heavy squadrons were suffering pressure from what, after all, was no more than a small knot or group of horsemen, they turned upon their assailants ; and the little band of Lancers then beginning at last to retreat, came back intermixed more or less with the enemy's grey-coated horsemen.

Presently they were met by some men of their own regiment who turned with them, and joined their retreating movement.\* The united groups of these 17th Lancer men were pursued by the Russian cavalry, and soon found also that they

CHAP.  
I.

Operations  
by the  
remnants of  
the first  
line :

men of 17th  
Lancers :

\* The men they thus met were those who (as will be presently mentioned) were acting under Sergeant O'Hara.

**C H A P.** I. were threatened on their flank by a large number of Cossacks.\* To avoid being cut off by those Cossacks, they inclined sharply towards their then left, but in vain, for the Cossacks closed upon them. They, however, fought their way through their assailants, and made good their retreat, passing up the valley obliquely towards the ground where Scarlett was posted.

The rest of the first line, having broken straight into the battery, had either engaged themselves in the task of spearing and cutting down the obstinate artillermen, or else had pushed forward betwixt the limbers and the tumbrils to assail the cavalry in rear of the guns. These men of the first line, however, were all broken up into small groups and knots, or else acting, each singly, as skirmishers.

men under  
Captain  
Jenyns :

men of 17th  
Lancers.

One of these groups had in it some of those very few men of the 13th Light Dragoons who yet remained undisabled, and Captain Jenyns, then in command of the regiment, endeavoured to keep it together; but the largest fraction of the first line consisted of that part of the 17th Lancers, which, not having been engaged in Morris's charge, and not having yet pressed on against the enemy's cavalry, was now combating with the Russian artillermen in the battery. Morris, himself, as we saw, having first been cut down, had fallen into the

\* These apparently were the Cossacks who had poured in from the flank and were able to take prisoners as already described whilst the Lancers who charged under Morris were passing on in pursuit.

hands of the enemy; and, there being but few other officers at this time who remained alive and undamaged, the men knew of nothing better to do than to try to complete their capture of the battery.

At the part of the battery which had been entered by these men of the 17th Lancers, the Russian artillerymen were limbering up and making great exertions to carry off their guns, whilst our Lancers, seeing this, began to busy themselves with the task of hindering the withdrawal of the prey, and in particular the leftmost portion of them, under the direction of Sergeant O'Hara, were stopping the withdrawal of one of the guns which already had been moved off some paces when a voice was heard calling, ‘Seventeenth! Seventeenth! this way! this way!’ Mayow's assumption of command over these.

The voice came from Mayow, the officer who held the post of brigade-major; but also it chanced that, with the first line, Mayow was the officer next in seniority to the commander of the brigade (whom he could not, he says, then see), and it was in that condition of things that he took upon himself to direct the operations of this still fighting remnant.

Mayow judged that if these men remained combating in the battery they would be presently overwhelmed by the cavalry which he saw in his front, and that, desperate as the expedient might seem, the course really safest and best was at once, with any force that could be gathered, to attack the Russian horsemen whilst still they

**C H A P.** I. were only impending, and before they became the assailants. Therefore warning the Lancers that if they remained in the battery they would presently be closed in upon and cut to pieces, he called upon them to push forward. He was obeyed ; but from the way in which, at the time, he chanc'd to be carrying the pistol then held in his hand, his order was in part mistaken ; for O'Hara supposed that the brigade-major, by pointing, as he seemed to be doing, towards his left front, must be intending to order an advance in that direction. Accordingly O'Hara, with the Lancers acting under his immediate guidance, moved off towards his left front, and there then only remained about fifteen men who continued to act under Mayow.

Men under  
O'Hara.

Mayow's  
charge.

His advance  
in pursuit.

Putting himself at the head of these last, Mayow led them against a body of Russian cavalry which stood halted in rear of the guns.\* With his handful of Lancers he charged the Russian horsemen and drove them in on their second reserve, pushing forward so far as to be at last some five hundred yards in the rear (Russian rear) of the battery, and in sight of the bridge over the aqueduct on the main road which led to Tchorgoun.

It may well be imagined that, intruding, as he was, with less than a score of horsemen, into the very rear of the Russian position, and dealing with a hostile cavalry which numbered itself

\* This was probably the body which went about and fronted when Lord Cardigan in person approached it.

by thousands, Mayow was not so enticed by the yielding, nay, fugitive, tendency of the squadrons retreating before him, as to forget that the usefulness of the singular venture which had brought him thus far must depend, after all, upon the chance of its being supported. He halted his <sup>His halt</sup> little band; and whether he caught his earliest glimpse of the truth with his own eyes, or whether he gathered it from the mirthful voices of his Lancers saying something of ‘the Busby-bags coming,’ or ‘the Busby-bags taking it coolly,’ he at all events learnt to his joy that exactly at the time when he best could welcome its aid, a fresh English force was at hand.\* The force seen was only one squadron, but a squadron in beautiful order; and, though halted when first discerned, it presently resumed its advance, and was seen to be now fast approaching.

It will now be convenient to observe the operations of the troops which were actively supporting Lord Cardigan’s first line, and to take them in the order of from left to right.

It was with a generous admiration, yet also with a thrilling anxiety, and with a sentiment scarce short of horror, that the French saw our squadrons advance down the valley, and glide on, as it were, to destruction; but especially was strong feeling aroused in that warlike body of

Feelings  
with which  
the French  
saw our  
Light  
Cavalry  
advancee.

\* The ‘Busby-bag’ is the familiar name for the head-gear of the English Hussar, and—upon the *paris pro tota* principle—for the Hussar himself.

CHAP.

I.

---

The Chasseurs  
d'Afrique.

The cele-  
brated 4th  
regiment  
of the  
Chasseurs  
d'Afrique.

horse which stood ranged, as we know, on the left rear of the ground whence our Light Brigade had advanced.

Though originating in arrangements somewhat similar to those by which our Irregular Cavalry in India is constructed, and though mounted on Algerine horses, the horsemen called ‘the Chasseurs d’Afrique’ were French at the time now spoken of, and they constituted an admirably efficient body of horse; but if all the four regiments which composed it were equal the one to the other in intrinsic worth, the one which had had the fortune to be in the greatest number of brilliant actions was the ‘Fourth.’ From the frequency with which the corps had chanced to be moved in Algeria, it went by the name of the ‘Traveller’ regiment. From the period of its merely rudimentary state in 1840, home down to this war against Russia, the career of the regiment had been marked by brilliant enterprises. When the Duc d’Aumale performed that famous exploit of his at Taguin, overruling all the cautions addressed to him by general officers and resisting the entreaties of his Arab allies (who implored him to wait for his infantry), it was with this ‘Fourth’ regiment of the African Chasseurs, supported only by some Spahis or native horsemen, that the youthful Prince broke his way into the great esmala of Abdel Kader, swept through it like a hurricane, overtook and defeated the enemy’s column, cut off its retreat, rode down the Emir’s new battalions of regular infantry, and made him-

self master of all.\* After the Duc d'Aumale himself, no one perhaps knew better what this famous regiment could do than that very General Morris, the officer commanding the whole of the French Cavalry Division, and now present in person with his first brigade; for he it was who with this superb 'Fourth,' and one other of the regiments of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, had issued at the battle of Isly from that famous amassment of troops which Bugeaud used to call his 'boar's 'head,' and carried by his onslaught sheer ruin into the army of Morocco.

CHAP.  
I.

General  
Morris

This was the General who had ridden down to be present in person with the troops of his first brigade, and this 'Fourth' was one of the two regiments of the Chasseurs d'Afrique of which the brigade consisted. General d'Allonville commanded the brigade.

During the earlier moments of the fatal advance down the valley, it could not but be difficult to infer that the operation was to be one of an irrational kind, there being at first no clear reason for imagining that the Light Brigade would really descend betwixt the open jaws of the enemy, instead of proceeding, as Lord Raglan had ordered, to recapture the lost Turkish heights; † but when, after some time, General Morris saw that our

\* In May 1843.

† I have already said that at the point whence our Light Brigade advanced, the angle of difference between the right road and the wrong one was only about twenty degrees; and it well might be some time before a spectator could convince himself that the brigade was really going down the valley.

CHAP.

I.

---

His determination.

Light Brigade was still moving straight down the valley, and avoiding the heads of both the enemy's columns in order to run the gauntlet between them, he could not, of course, help perceiving that a terrible error was in course of perpetration. He was not, however, a man to see this and stand aghast, doing nothing to succour the English. He resolved to venture an enterprise in support of Lord Cardigan's attack, and on one side at least of the valley—Lord Lucan was on the other with his Heavy Dragoons—to endeavour to silence the enemy's fire. The force which he determined to assail was the one which lay the nearest to him—the one under General Jabrokritsky on the slopes of the Fedioukine Hills; and the immediate object of his intended attack was a battery (divided into two half-batteries of four guns each) which was guarded on its right by two battalions of foot and on its left by two squadrons of Cossacks.\*

General Morris chose for this service his famous 'Fourth' or 'Traveller' regiment of the Chasseurs d'Afrique; and General d'Allonville, the officer in command of the brigade, was himself to conduct the attack.

D'Allonville's attack.

Accordingly, the chosen regiment moved forward under D'Allonville. The front of the assaulting force was formed by two squadrons of the regiment under the immediate command of Major Abdellal, and these were supported by the two remaining squadrons of the regiment under Col-

\* The two battalions of foot were 'Black Sea Cossacks.'

onel Champeron. Champeron's two squadrons were in echelon ; and it seems that, though acting in support to the first line during the earlier part of the advance, these two squadrons, upon approaching more closely to the enemy, were to incline away to their left, and then, again, bringing round the left shoulder, to fall upon the two battalions of foot which constituted the infantry support to the guns.

C H A P.  
I.

The ground about to be invaded was much broken and scrubby, being encumbered with a tall undergrowth reaching up to the girths of the saddles ; but the want of smooth even turf was not likely to be discomposing to men who had learnt war in the ranges of the Atlas. Abdelal's two squadrons, advancing briskly in foraging order, and bringing round the left shoulder whilst moving, broke through the enemy's line of skirmishers, and having by this time a front which was nearly at right angles with the front of the Russian guns, drove forward with excellent vigour upon the flank of the nearest half - battery, and already were near to their goal, when, with singular alacrity, the guns of the half-battery thus attacked, and those also of the other half-battery which had not been directly assailed, were limbered up by the Russians and briskly moved off at a trot, whilst the two battalions of foot which constituted the infantry supports to the guns fell back all at once, without waiting for the impact of Champeron's two squadrons then rapidly advancing against them ; and, moreover, the Cossack

CHAP. I. squadrons on the left of the battery which constituted its cavalry supports went about and began to retreat.

Then, to arrest the overthrow with which he seemed menaced, or to cover the retreat of his guns, General Jabrokritsky in person put himself at the head of two battalions of that famous 'Vladimir' regiment which had proved itself well just five weeks before in its fight with our troops on the Alma, and proceeded to hazard the somewhat rare enterprise of advancing with foot-soldiers against cavalry ; but already the object of General Morris had been attained, and—exactly, as it would seem, at the right moment—he caused the 'recall' to be sounded. In an instant the victorious squadrons glided back to their place in the brigade ; and it soon appeared that the losses, though involving certainly a considerable deduction of strength from a body of only a few hundred horsemen, were small in proportion to the brilliancy of the service these squadrons had rendered. They had ten men killed (of whom two were officers) and twenty-eight wounded ; but in the course of the swift moments during which these losses befell them, they had neutralised (for the requisite time) the whole of the enemy's infantry on the Fedioukine Hills, had driven his artillery there posted into instant retreat, and in this way had not only done much towards the attainment of a general victory, but, failing that result, had prepared for our Light Brigade, whenever the moment for its retiring up the valley

Losses  
sustained by  
the 4th  
Chasseurs  
d'Afrique.

should come, a complete immunity from one at least of the two flanking fires under which it had been condemned to advance.

Well imagined, well timed, undertaken with exactly apt means, performed with boldness as well as with skill, and then, suddenly, at the right moment, arrested and brought to a close, this achievement was not only brilliant in itself, but had the merit of being admirably relevant, if so one may speak, to the then passing phase of the battle, and became, upon the whole, a teaching example (on a small scale) of the way in which a competent man strikes a blow with the cavalry arm. The troops engaged in this enterprise were not the fellow countrymen of those whose attack they undertook to support; but that is a circumstance which, far from diminishing the lustre of the exploit, gave it only a more chivalrous grace. The names of General Morris and General d'Allonville are remembered in the English army with admiration and gratitude.

When the 11th Hussars had so far descended the valley as to be close to the battery, it appeared that the right troop of their right squadron was confronted by some of the Russian guns, whilst all the rest of the regiment outflanked the line of the battery, and had clear ground before it. Meeting little or no obstruction to their progress from the mounted and dismounted artillerymen who were busy with their teams in the hope of carrying off their Czar's precious ordnance, this

The brilliancy of their achievement.  
I.

The 11th Hussars

CHAP.  
I. right troop passed in through the battery, and pushed on beyond the limbers and tumbrils which were in rear of the guns. Then the regiment was halted.

The Russians who stood gathered in the most immediate proximity to the 11th Hussars were a confused number, including, it seems, artillery-men and cavalry. They were in a state of apparent helplessness; and one of their officers, not disguised, as was usual, in the grey outer-coat of the soldiers, but wearing the epaulettes of a full colonel, came up, bare-headed, to the stirrup of Lieutenant Roger Palmer, and voluntarily delivered his sword to him. Palmer handed over the sword to a corporal or sergeant at his side, and did not of course molest the disarmed officer, though the condition of things was not such as to allow of taking and securing prisoners.

It soon appeared, however, that this tendency to utter surrender was not as yet general; for when the crowd cleared and made off, it disclosed to the 11th Hussars some squadrons of Russian Lancers formed up and in perfected order.\*

\* These were not Cossacks, but regular Lancers. A reader who might be comparing this narrative with the official accounts of the Russians, would have some right to ask what Lancers these could be, because Jeropkine's Lancers (called by the Russians the 'Combined Lancers') were not in this part of the field, and the official accounts mention no other Lancers. It is, however, a fact proved decisively by the evidence of our officers, that both in the heavy cavalry charge and upon this occasion, squadrons of Lancers (not Cossacks) were present. Supposing that the Russian official accounts did not actually omit any forces really present, the solution, I believe, is this:

The 11th Hussars re-formed their ranks and made ready to charge; whilst on their part the Russian horsemen brought their lances smartly down as though for an immediate attack. They did not, however, advance. Repeating the mistake already committed that day in the face of Scarlett's dragoons, and again under Morris's charge, they remained at a halt, awaiting the attack of our horsemen. Douglas seized the occasion thus given him, and led down his Hussars at the charging pace. For a while, the Russians awaited him with a great steadfastness, and it seemed that, in a few moments, there must needs be a clash of arms; but when our Hussars had charged down to within a short distance of them, the Russians, all at once, went about and retreated. Far on, and into the opening of the gorge which divides the aqueduct from the eastern base of the Fedioukine Hills, the 11th moved down in pursuit.

On the immediate right of the 11th Hussars, and so little in rear of them (by the time they had reached the battery) as to be separated by a distance of no more than some twenty or thirty yards, Lord George Paget was advancing with the 4th Light Dragoons. For some time this regiment had been driving through a cloud of smoke and dust, which so dimmed the air as to hide from them all visible indications of the now

portions of the Russian Hussars had been converted into Lancers, without undergoing a corresponding change in the official designation of the force.

The 4th  
Light  
Dragoons

CHAP. I. silent battery; but upon their nearer approach, the Czar's burnished brass pieces of ordnance were almost suddenly disclosed to view; and our Light Dragoons saw that, at the part of the battery they confronted, the mounted men there appearing were artillery drivers trying to carry off the guns. Then an officer of the regiment—and one, too, strange to say, who had hitherto been most inexorably rigid in enforcing exactness—brought his hand to the ear, and delivered a shrill ‘Tallyho!’ which hurled forward the hitherto well-ordered line, and broke it up into racing horsemen. In the next instant, with an ungovernable rush, our dragoons broke into the battery.

The combat  
which there  
followed.

There, with the artillery teams, brought up for the purpose, and by means of the lasso harness, the Russians were making extreme exertions to carry off their guns; and, since these people were not only bold, strong, and resolute, but contending for an object very dear to them, a fierce struggle began. In their eagerness to be putting forth their bodily strength by cutting and slashing, very many of our men neglected the use of the point; and, for the most part, the edge of the sabre fell harmless upon the thick grey outer-coats of the Russians. In the midst of the strife, one young cornet—Cornet Edward Warwick Hunt—became so eager to prevent the enemy from hauling off one of the pieces that, after first ‘returning’ his sword, he coolly dismounted, and at a moment when the six wretched artillery horses and their drivers were the subject of a raging combat,

applied his mind with persistency to the other end of the traces or ‘prolong,’ and sought to disengage the gun from the harness; a curious act of audacity in the thick of a fight, for which, unless I mistake, his colonel both damned and admired him. There were some amongst our men, and even amongst our officers, who performed hideous wonders in the way of slaughter; for the Russians were under such cogent obligation to save their Czar’s cherished ordnance from capture, and were, many of them, so brave and obstinate, that even the sense of being altogether unequal to strive against an onslaught of English cavalry did not suffice to make them yield. There was one of our officers who became afflicted, if so one may speak, with what has been called the blood-frenzy. Much gore besmeared him, and the result of the contest was such as might seem confirmatory of the vulgar belief as to the mad-dening power of human blood. This officer, whilst under the frenzy, raged wildly against human life, cutting down, it was said, very many of the obstinate Russians with his own reeking hand.\* Other officers of a different temperament made use of their revolvers with a terrible diligence.

From his bearing at this time, it seemed that Lord George Paget scarce approved this kind of industry on the part of his officers. At all events,

\* I have heard that, after the battle, when this officer had calmed down, there was so great a reaction in his nervous system, that he burst into tears, and cried like a little child.

CHAP.  
I.— he so acted as to convey the impression that he reserved his energy and attention for the purposes of command, and did not conceive it his duty (except in actual self-defence) to become, with his own hand, a slayer of men.

As might be expected, the obstinacy of the Russians, interrupted in their task of carrying off the guns, was very unequal; and if some fought so hard as to involve our people in the combat we have just been speaking of, there were others who attempted no active resistance. Several drivers, for instance, threw themselves off their horses, and so crept under them, as in that way to seek and find shelter. In the end our Dragoons got the mastery, and not only succeeded in preventing the withdrawal of all the pieces of cannon which they had seen in the line of the battery at the time of their entering it, but also arrested and disabled some other guns—already a little way from the front—which the enemy was in the act of removing. The business of repressing the enemy's obstinate endeavours to carry off his guns was of such duration that again there interposed a long distance between the 4th Light Dragoons and the regiment (the 11th Hussars) with which Lord George Paget had sought to align himself; for whilst the 4th Light Dragoons remained combating on the site of the battery, Colonel Douglas, as we know, was advancing; but his task in the battery being almost complete, Lord George, with a part if not with the whole of his troops, now

pressed forward once more in the hope of being able to combine the next operations of his regiment with those of the 11th Hussars. C H A P.  
I.

The 8th Hussars, we remember, was on the extreme right of the forces advancing in support. Reduced to one-half of its former strength by that triple fire through which it had been passing, but still in excellent order, and maintaining that well-steadied trot which Colonel Shewell had chosen as the pace best adapted for a lengthened advance of this kind, this regiment had continued its advance down the valley, had moved past the now silent battery at a distance of a few horses' lengths from its (proper) left flank, had pressed on beyond it some three or four hundred yards, and by that time had so passed through the jaws of the enemy's position, as to be actually for the moment in a region almost out of harm's way—in the region, if so one may speak, which lies behind the north wind.\* Colonel Shewell then halted the regiment. Making only now one squadron—and that a very weak one—its remains stood formed up to their front.

Colonel Shewell, it seems, had the hope that an order of some kind would presently reach him; and he well might desire to have guidance, for the position into which he had pushed forward his regiment was somewhat a strange one. On

\* I need hardly say that the idea of referring to the 'country of the Hyperboreans' as a modern illustration, belongs to Mr Lowe. See his celebrated speech in the House of Commons, 1866.

**CHAP.** three sides—that is, on his front, and on the  
I. rising grounds which hemmed in the valley on either flank—Colonel Shewell saw bodies of the enemy's cavalry and infantry; but the Russian forces in front of him, both horse and foot, were in retreat, and numbers of them crowding over the bridges of the aqueduct. Yet nowhere, with the exception of his regiment, now reduced to a very small squadron, could he descry any body of our cavalry in a state of formation, though before him in small knots or groups, or acting as single assailants, he saw a few English horsemen who were pressing the retreat of the enemy, by pursuing and cutting down stragglers.

After continuing this halt during a period which has been reckoned at three, and also at five minutes, Colonel Shewell resumed his advance.

These remains of the 8th Hussars formed the small but still well-ordered squadron, which we saw coming down towards the spot where Mayow had checked the pursuit, and halted his small group of Lancers.

*State of the battle at this period.*

It seems right to survey the circumstances in which the Allied forces stood at this critical and interesting period of the combat. At the bare apprehension of the advance against the Causeway Heights which Lord Raglan had twice over ordered, Liprandi, as we saw, had retracted the head of the column there established in the morning, and had probably at this time no higher hope than that of being able to retreat without seeing his

infantry and artillery involved in the overthrow which was sweeping his cavalry out of the field. On the Fedioukine Hills, the head of Jabrokritsky's column was rolling up under D'Allonville's brilliant attack. In the low ground between the Causeway Heights and the Fedioukine Hills, the condition of things was this: Having intruded itself, as we know, a mile deep into a narrow valley, hemmed in on three sides by Russian forces of all arms, our Light Cavalry Brigade had overthrown all the forces which before confronted it, and was disposed for the moment as follows: The still combating remains of the first line were broken into groups and small knots, numbering perhaps, altogether, after the separation of the men acting under O'Hara, as many as thirty. Of these, some were combating in a desultory way, with little other purpose than that of defending themselves, and endeavouring to make out what best they could do in the confusion; but others, as we saw, were hanging upon the skirts of the Russian squadrons, and, in effect, pressing on the retreat by assailing the people who lagged. The group of some fifteen men under Mayow had coherence enough, as we saw, to be able to put to flight the body of horse which encountered them.

On our extreme left, Colonel Douglas, with his 11th Hussars, now counting a little more than 50 sabres, was pursuing the retreat of the Russian Lancers which had given way under his charge; and on his right rear, Lord George Paget (having quelled the attempts of the Russians to

CHAP.  
I.

**CHAP.** carry off their guns) was advancing with a part  
I. at least of the 4th Light Dragoons, a regiment now reckoning, perhaps, about the same numbers as the 11th Hussars. These two regiments formed our left; and although at this moment they were not so placed as to be visible the one to the other, the direction of Douglas's advance was so far known to Lord George Paget as to make it likely that the two regiments might find means of acting together in concert, with a force, when united, of about 100 sabres. In the event of their doing so, Lord George Paget, as the senior officer, was the one who would be entitled to take the command.

Towards our centre, we had no troops at all in a state of formation; but on our extreme right, as we know, the 8th Hussars, now reduced to a strength of about 55, and commanded by Colonel Shewell, was advancing towards the group under Mayow. The event proved that this group of fifteen under Mayow was still in a state of coherence which rendered it capable of acting with military efficiency in concert with other troops, and it may therefore be said that Colonel Shewell (who was senior to Mayow) had under his orders a force of about 70 sabres.

Altogether, these undisabled combatants numbered perhaps about 220 or 230, of whom only about 170 were in a state of formation. The two wings (if so we may call disconnected forces) were not visible the one to the other, and no communications passed between them.

In the absence of any general who might come to take in person the direction of these combatants, Lord George Paget, as we saw, was the senior officer on our left ; on our right, Colonel Shewell.

From before the 230 English horsemen thus thrust into the very rear of the enemy's position, the bulk of that powerful body of Russian horse which numbered itself by thousands was strangely enough falling back. We now know that the retreat was much more general than our people at the time could perceive, and that, excepting Jeropkine's six squadrons of Lancers, almost the whole of the enemy's cavalry had been not merely beaten but routed.\* Apparently also, as indeed might well be, these fugitive squadrons carried panic along with them as they rode ; † for away, on the eastern slopes of Mount Hasfort, where

CHAP.  
I.

The retreat  
of the  
Russian  
cavalry.

\* Liprandi, in his despatch, admits the retreat of his cavalry, but says that the movement was a ruse of General Ryjoff's to draw the English on. 'The English cavalry,' he says, 'appeared more than 2000 strong. Its impetuous attack induced Lieutenant-General Ryjoff [the commander of the Russian cavalry] to turn back upon the route to Tchorgoun to draw the enemy.' General de Todleben, however, discards that way of explaining the retreat, and says frankly that our Light Cavalry utterly overthrew the bulk of the Russian cavalry. Using the word 'Cardigan' in a sense importing the Light Brigade, he says : 'Cardigan flung himself against the Don Cossack battery which was in advance, sabred the gunners, then charged our cavalry, utterly overthrew it [*la culbuta*], and advanced far beyond the line of the redoubts in pursuit of our cavalry, which retreated towards Tchorgoun.'

† See the plan taken from General de Todleben. To eyes accustomed to such things, it expresses an almost headlong retreat more forcibly than words.

CHAP.  
I. no English could dream of pursuing, battalions of infantry were thrown into hollow squares, as though awaiting from moment to moment a charge of victorious cavalry.

Thus much some brave men were able to do towards wringing an actual victory from even the wildest of blunders.

The need  
there was of  
fresh troops  
in order to  
clench the  
victory.

Thus much ; but considering that this singular overthrow of the many by the few was occurring, after all, a mile deep in the enemy's realms, and that, even although partly rolled up, the forces of Jabrokritsky on the north, and of Liprandi on the south, yet lined on both sides the lower slopes of the valley, it was evident, of course, that the descendant of little more than two hundred horsemen now driving whole thousands before them would only prove momentary and vain, unless it should be upheld by fresh troops coming down in support, or else by an attack on the Causeway Heights of the kind which Lord Raglan had ordered. Were the red squadrons coming to clench the victory, and by victory to rescue their comrades ?

We must turn to the commander of our cavalry, and to the regiments of the Heavy Brigade, with which he was present in person.

Amongst all those struggles between the judgment and the feelings by which man is liable to be tortured, hardly any can be more distressing than that which rends the heart of a chivalrously-minded commander who is bringing himself to

determine that, in obedience to the hard mandates of Duty, and for the preservation of the troops which still remain in his hands, he will suffer an adventured portion of his force to go on to its fate unsupported ; and especially must he be troubled in spirit if the words which drove his people into a desperate path were words from his own lips.

CHAP.  
I.

Wild as was the notion of sending a force to Lord Lucan. run the gauntlet between the Fedioukine Hills and the Causeway Heights, yet, supposing the sacrifice to be irrevocably vowed, Lord Lucan seems to have formed a good conception of the way in which it could best be performed. He saw that in such an undertaking extension of front was an object of vastly less importance than the maintenance of an unfailing connection between the troops employed along the whole line of the advance. In short, he considered that the first line should be followed at intervals by successive lines of support, all forming the links of a chain so connected that, happen what might, the whole British cavalry would be a body of troops acting together under one commander, and constituting a powerful unit. It was in part execution of this plan that he had divided the Light Brigade into three lines ; and, intending to effect a corresponding disposition of Scarlett's Dragoons, he trusted that the several links thus provided would form an unbroken chain of sufficing length.

The advance of our cavalry, however, had gone on but a short time when it became apparent that

CHAP.  
I.

Lord Cardigan's severe and increasing pace was much greater than that which Lord Lucan had adopted for the Heavy Dragoons; and the Russians who lined the two ranges of heights were not only quick in their perception of this difference, but sagacious enough to infer from it a want of connecting purpose in the movements of the two brigades. The moment was approaching when it would be necessary for Lord Lucan to make a painful choice, and either to conform with his Heavy Dragoons to Lord Cardigan's pace, or else — a cruel alternative — to let the chain break asunder.

In his own person—and the keenness of his far-reaching sight made him apt for this service—Lord Lucan strove hard to prolong the connection between his two brigades by riding on in advance of his Heavy Dragoons, and following his Light Cavalry with straining eyes; but he had not long passed the Number Four Redoubt when he was rudely compelled to perceive that he had entered on the path of destruction already traversed by his Light Cavalry, and was drawing forward his Heavy Dragoons to the verge of a like disaster. His aide-de-camp, Captain Charteris—fulfilling an incurable presentiment—fell dead at his side; Lord William Paulet, his Assistant-Adjutant-General, was struck, or unbonneted by a shot or a shell; Major M'Mahon, his Assistant-Quartermaster-General (not, however, at quite the same time), had his horse struck by grape; and Lord Lucan himself was wounded in the leg by a

musket-ball, his horse being also struck by shot  
in two places.\*

CHAP.  
I.

---

Lord Lucan was not, however, disabled by the wound ; and, continuing his advance, he passed quickly so far down the valley as to be on ground nearly parallel with the Arabtabia Redoubt : † but the distance between his two brigades, which he thus, as it were, sought to span or bridge over by his personal presence, was increasing with each stride of our Light Cavalry squadrons. Growing more and more faint to the sight, those splendid, doomed squadrons were sinking and sinking into the thick bank of smoke which now closed in the foot of the valley ; and even if no new motive had interposed, Lord Lucan could scarcely have withheld his decision many moments more. What happened, however, was that, upon looking back, he perceived the Royals and the Greys to be undergoing a destructive cross-fire ; and then, at all events, if it had not done so before, the terrible question forced itself upon him, and peremptorily exacted a decision. Should he risk the loss of his second brigade by flinging it after his first, or submit to one disaster (if disaster it was to be) for the sake of avoiding fresh hazards ? He was the link which connected one brigade with the other ; and so long as he might choose to hold fast to each, he would be realising his own conception of

The ques-  
tion now  
forced  
upon his  
attention

\* The apparently absolute indifference of Lord Lucan under this fire was specially remarked by an officer—not at all an admirer of his divisional chief—whose testimony enabled me to make the statement contained in a former page—p. 10.

† The same as Number Three Redoubt.

**CHAP****I.**

the several successive supports, and sustaining his Light Cavalry force with the power of his Heavy Brigade : but also he would be grievously imperilling this, his second and last brigade, by drawing it down with him into the gulf where his first brigade seemed disappearing. Should he, then, hold fast or let go ?

**His  
decision.**

He let go. Elsewhere, the reasons which governed him shall be given in his own ampler words ; but the sentence which he uttered at the moment contains the pith of his argument. Determining that the Greys and the Royals should at once be halted, he said to Lord William Paulett, ‘ They have sacrificed the Light Brigade : they shall not the Heavy, if I can help it.’

**The Greys  
and the  
Royals  
ordered to  
fall back :****their losses  
at this time**

By his orders the Heavy Dragoons fell back to ground less advanced. It was only after two successive movements in retreat that the Royals and the Greys were relieved from the fire to which they had been exposed.

This fire had indeed been heavy ; and—under conditions very trying to horsemen—both regiments sustained it with a firmness so admirable, that even the out-dazzling splendour of their morning’s achievement did not blind a skilled judge of such things to the merit of this warlike endurance.

In the Royals alone—and this was a more than decimating loss—as many as twenty-one were disabled by death or by wounds, or by having their horses shot under them. Colonel Yorke, the commanding officer, received a wound which cruelly

shattered his leg, and he was disabled for life.\* So also was Captain George Campbell. Captain Elmsall and Lieutenant Hartopp were, both of them, wounded severely; and Lieutenant Robertson had a horse shot under him.

Lord Lucan had come to the conclusion that 'the only use to which the Heavy Brigade could be turned was to protect the Light Cavalry against pursuit in their return;' and he judged that for that service the position to which he had now brought back the Heavy Dragoons was sufficiently advanced. There, accordingly, the brigade remained halted.

Lord Lucan being present in person, General Scarlett had no authority to determine upon the extent to which his brigade should be ventured in supporting the advance of the Light Cavalry; and at the time when the Heavy Dragoons received their first order to retreat, he was still unaware of the decision which had produced this result. Yielding to a natural eagerness, he had ridden forward some sixty yards in advance of his brigade; and I imagine that he and Colonel Beatson (the aide-de-camp then at his side) must have been the last of those acting with the Heavy

CHAP.  
I.

The Heavy  
Brigade  
halted on  
ground  
chosen by  
Lord Lucan.

General  
Scarlett and  
Colonel  
Beatson:

\* In support of Lord Lucan's impression respecting the part taken by the Royals in the Heavy Cavalry charge the alleged acquiescence of Colonel Yorke in words addressed to him by Lord Lucan will probably be insisted upon. If that should happen, it will be well to remember that the shattering and terrible wound above mentioned long made it impossible for Colonel Yorke to undertake any such task as that of remonstrating against Lord Lucan's words.

**CHAP. I.** Dragoons to whom the advancing brigade remained visible.\* They saw our Light Cavalry fade away into the smoke which hung thick at the foot of the valley.

the Light Brigade fading out of their sight.

The full import of Lord Lucan's decision.

This parting was disruption—disruption in the very crisis of the exigency—disruption of that chain which hitherto had been binding into one the strength of the whole English cavalry.

To repress the idea of going down with fresh troops to the rescue, to abstain from all part in the combat below the battery where the Light Brigade was engulfed, to allow the communication between the two brigades to remain broken without risking even one squadron in an attempt to restore it—this, all this was the import of the painful decision to which, by a sense of hard duty, Lord Lucan had found himself driven.

Our present knowledge of what was going on at the foot of the valley tends to show that a decision in the opposite direction would have been likely to produce good and brilliant re-

\* This was the time when General Scarlett (finding suddenly that his brigade was retiring, and not knowing that the movement had been ordered by Lord Lucan) sent back his trumpeter with orders to sound the halt. At the sound the brigade instantly halted, and fronted beautifully, as at parade. As I have named Colonel Beatson, let me here say that I have abundant proofs before me of the warmth with which General Scarlett expressed his grateful recognition of the Colonel's services in the Crimea; and it is only from the want of that detailed information which none but the Colonel himself—who is now (1868) in India—would be able to give me that I have been prevented from narrating the part that he personally took in the battle. See in the Appendix papers illustrative of his distinguished services.

sults; \* but that same present knowledge which we now have is exactly what at the time was most wanting: and of course it is no more than right that the soundness of an officer's judgment should be viewed in its relation to those circumstances only which were fairly within the range of his knowledge or surmise when he had to make his resolve.†

The Heavy Dragoons at this time were but little if at all vexed by fire; and there was nothing to distract their thoughts from the Light Brigade, or from the pain of dwelling on their own condition as bystanders withheld from the combat. At first, the grey boundary of their sight was from time to time pierced by the flashes from the battery at the foot of the valley; the thunder of the guns was still heard, and the round-shot, one after another, came bowling along up the slope; but next there followed a time when the cloud at the foot of the valley remained blank without issues of flame, when a terrible quiet had succeeded to the roar of artillery, when no token of the fight could be seen, except a disabled or straggling horseman or a riderless charger emerging here and there from the smoke. Thenceforth the cause of anguish to those who gazed down the valley was no longer in what they could now see or hear, but in what they

CHAP.  
I.

Our Heavy  
Dragoons  
at this time

\* See the state of the field as shown *ante*, p. 284 *et seq.*, and the plan illustrating the statement.

† With respect to Lord Raglan's opinion as to the way in which Lord Lucan supported the Light Brigade, see his letter of the 16th of December 1854 in the Appendix.

**CHAP.** otherwise knew, and in what they were forced to imagine. They knew that beyond the dim barrier, our Light Brigade was engulfed. On the thought of what might be its fate they had to be dwelling, whilst they themselves remained halted.

**The Light  
Brigade.**

We descend once again to the borders of the aqueduct, where little more than two hundred of our horsemen, divided into several bodies, were hanging upon the retreat of almost the whole Russian cavalry; but we go there, this time, with the knowledge that the descendant of the few over the many will not be supported by the regiments which Lord Lucan was keeping in hand.

**Colonel  
Mayow and  
his fifteen  
lancers.**

**Their  
junction  
with the 8th  
Hussars.**

On our right, and on the line of the principal road which led, over the bridge, to Tchorgoun, we left Colonel Mayow with some fifteen men of the 17th Lancers. Upon descriing the English squadron, which had come down, as we saw, in the direction of his right rear, Mayow hastened to join it, and was presently in contact with the squadron which represented the 8th Hussars. It appeared that Colonel Shewell, the commander of the 8th Hussars, had not been killed or disabled; and, Mayow being now once more in the presence of an officer senior to himself, the temporary command which the chances of battle had cast upon him came at once to an end. He had been commanding less than a score of men during only a few minutes, and yet, with these means and within this limit of time, he had attained to a height of fortune which is not always reached by

those who are described in the army lists as field-marshals and generals. He had had sway in C H A P.  
I.

The fifteen men whom Mayow had brought with him were ranged on the left of the 8th Hussars; and this little addition brought up Colonel Shewell's strength to about seventy. The panic which was driving from the field the whole bulk of the enemy's horse plainly did not extend to the Russian infantry on the eastern part of the Causeway Heights; for looking back towards their then right rear, our Hussars at this time were able to see the grey battalions still holding their ground, in good order. Nor was this all; for presently the glances cast back in nearly the same direction disclosed some newcomers.

Three squadrons of Russian lancers were seen issuing from behind one of the spurs of the Causeway Heights and descending into the valley. Another instant, and this body of Lancers was Liprandi's  
battalions  
on the  
Causeway  
Heights. wheeling into line, and forming a front towards the Russian rear, thus interposing itself as a bar between the English and their line of retreat. These three squadrons of Lancers—the half of Colonel Jeropkine's regiment—were the force which had been placed, as we saw, in one of the folds of the Causeway Heights at the time when Liprandi was making arrangements for covering his retreat.

At the moment when Colonel Mayow joined the 8th Hussars, Colonel Shewell had asked him,

Three  
squadrons of  
Lancers  
seen forming  
in rear of  
the 8th  
Hussars.

## CHAP.

I.

Colonel  
Shewell the  
senior officer  
in this  
emergency.

His charge.

' where Lord Cardigan was ;'\* and Mayow having replied that he did not know, it resulted that Colonel Shewell, as the senior officer present, became charged with the duty of determining how the emergency should be met by the troops within reach of his orders. It does not, however, appear that there was much scope for doubt. After an almost momentary consultation with the senior officers present, including Colonel Mayow and Major de Salis, Colonel Shewell gave the word ' Right about wheel !' and the squadron, with its adjunct of fifteen Lancers, came round at once with the neatness of well-practised troops on parade. Colonel Shewell and Major de Salis put themselves in the front, and Lieutenant Seager commanded the one squadron into which, as we saw, the remains of the 8th Hussars had been fused. Mayow led the small band of Lancers which had attached itself to the Hussars.

The seventy horsemen rode straight at the fluttering line of gay lances which the enemy was then in the very act of forming. The three Russian squadrons thus wheeling into line were at a

\* This question of ' Where is Lord Cardigan ?' will be found recurring ; but commanders of course cannot be everywhere at the same time, and it must not be understood that when an officer asks this question, he inferentially suggests ground of blame against the general for not being visible at a particular moment and on a particular spot. It is right, however, to mention these dialogues ; because they show, or tend to show, a devolution of authority creating fresh responsibilities. Thus, for instance, it resulted from the dialogue given in the text that Colonel Shewell, as senior officer, became the commander of that part of the first line which was within reach of his directions.

distance from Shewell of something less than 300 yards, and the two leading squadrons had already established their line, but the third squadron was still in process of wheeling. Once more in this singular battle of horsemen, our people had before them a body of cavalry which passively awaited the charge. With his seventy against three hundred, Shewell needed some such counterbalancing advantage as that ; but he might have lost his occasion if he had been wanting in that swiftness of decision which is one of the main conditions of excellence in a cavalry officer, for it was to be inferred that upon the completion of the manœuvre by their third squadron, the Russians would charge down on our people.

Colonel Shewell proved equal to the occasion. He lost not one moment. He was a man whose mind had received a deep impress from some of the contents of the Bible ; but those who might differ from his opinions still recognised in him a man of high honour who extended the authority of conscience to the performance of military duties ; and it has not been found in practice that a piety strictly founded on the Holy Testaments (taken fairly, the one with the other) has any such softening tendency as to unfit a man for the task of fierce bodily conflict.\*

\* One of Shewell's companions in arms—a man well entitled to deliver a judgment on the merits of his lost comrade—has said of him, ‘ I knew the man with whom I had to deal—I knew that I was dealing with one of the most honourable, the most gallant, the most conscientious, the most single-minded man it has ever been my good fortune to meet with.’

CHAP.  
I. As in the battles of old times, so now, and not for the first time, this day, he who was the chief on one side singled out for his special foe the man who seemed chief on the other. Shewell had not the advantage of being highly skilled as a swordsman, and being conscious of his deficiency in this respect, he asked himself how best he could act. The result was that he determined to rely upon the power which can be exerted by sheer impact. He resolved that, whilst charging at the head of his little band of horsemen, he would single out the Russian officer whom he perceived to be the leader of the opposing force, and endeavour to overthrow him by the shock of a heavy concussion. To do this the more effectively he discarded the lessons of the riding-school, clenched a rein in each hand, got his head somewhat down ; and, as though he were going at a leap which his horse, unless forced, might refuse, drove full at the Russian chief. The assailant came on so swift, so resolute, and, if so one may speak, with such a conscientious exactness of aim that, for the Russian officer who sat in his saddle under the disadvantage of having to await the onset, there remained no alternative at the last moment but either to move a little aside or else be run down without mercy by this straightforward, pious hussar. As was only natural, the charger of the Russian officer shrank aside to avoid the shock ; and Shewell, still driving straight on, with all his momentum unchecked, broke through the two ranks of the Lancers. He was well followed by

his seventy horsemen. Upon their close approach some of the Russian Lancers turned and made off; but the rest stood their ground and received the shock prepared for them. By that shock, however, they were broken and overthrown. It is true that in the moment of the impact, or in the moments immediately following, men had, some of them, a fleeting opportunity for the use of the sword or the lance, and one at least of our Hussars received a great number of slight wounds from the enemy's spearheads; but the clash was brief. The whole of these three Russian squadrons were quickly in retreat, a part of them going back into the fold betwixt the Causeway Heights, from which just before they had issued, whilst the rest fled across to the Fedioukine Hills; and there is reason for inferring that these last attached themselves to the other three squadrons of their regiment which had been posted, as we saw, on the northern side of the valley.

After having thus conquered their way through the body of Lancers opposed to them, Colonel Shewell and those who had followed him in his victorious charge could see a good way up the valley; but their eyes searched in vain for an English force advancing to their support; and, in truth, the very attempt which Jeropkine's Lancers had just been making, went far to show that no English succours were near; for it is evident that the endeavour to cut off our horsemen by showing a front towards the Russian rear would never have been made by troops which were able to see a red

C H A P.  
I.Defeat and  
flight of the  
Russian  
Lancers.Shewell's  
retreat.

CHAP.

I.

squadron coming down to the support of their comrades. Therefore, having now cut open a retreat not only for themselves, but also for such of the other remnants of the Light Brigade as might be near enough to seize the occasion, Shewell's regiment and the men who had joined it continued to pursue the direction in which they had charged, in other words, to retire. Colonel Shewell, it seems, did not judge that the condition of things was such as to warrant any attempt at the usual operation of governing a retreat by fronting from time to time with a portion of the force; and those who remained of the seventy had only to withdraw up the valley with such speed as they could. In this movement they were followed by Captain Jenyns and the few men of the first line—men chiefly, it is supposed, of the 13th Light Dragoons—who had been acting under his guidance, or riding, at all events, near him.

When our retreating horsemen had ridden clear of Jeropkine's discomfited Lancers, they began once more to incur severe fire from those batteries on the Causeway Heights, and those rifles in the same part of the field, which had thinned their ranks during the advance; but they were not molested by cavalry, and they observed, without knowing the cause of the change, that there was silence on the Fedioukine Hills.\*

It happened, as might be expected, that, in the trail of our small body of retreating horsemen,

\* This result, as we know, was owing to D'Allonville's attack with the Chasseurs d'Afrique.

there were both mounted and dismounted troopers who had been so disabled by their own wounds or by the wounds of the overwearied state of their horses as to be more or less lagging behind. The sight of these disabled horsemen did not so far tempt Jeropkine's defeated squadrons as to bring them all back into the valley ; but his Lancers, here and there coming singly, or else in small knots, pressed on for a time, in pursuit, and killed or took some of the stragglers. Amongst others moving on foot was Major de Salis. With a rare generosity he had given up his own charger to a disabled trooper of the 8th Hussars, and the Major was seen leading the horse whilst the wounded man sat in his saddle.

Soon, the efforts of the enemy's horsemen to kill or take any straggler they might find in their power were checked by their own fellow-countrymen ; for the gunners who manned the batteries on the Causeway Heights would not suffer their energies to be paralysed by the presence of a few Russian Lancers, intermixed here and there with our stragglers ; and, when it became plain that Jeropkine's horsemen were incurring fire from their own brethren, the trumpet sounded the recall, and they desisted from their efforts. Then some of our disabled horsemen, who had been surrounded by Lancers, were enabled, after all, to escape. Thus, for instance, whilst Lieutenant Phillips (who had just had his horse shot under him) stood defending himself with his revolver against the Lancers who attacked him, he sud-

**C H A P.** — **I.** denly found himself relieved from his assailants by the sound of the trumpet recalling them ; and both he and a soldier near him—a disabled soldier named Brown—made good their way back to our lines. In like manner also Lieutenant Clowes, whose horse had been shot under him, and who was himself wounded by grape, found himself freed from the Lancers who had had him in their power; but he was so much exhausted by loss of blood as to be unable to drag himself far. After the close of the battle he was picked up by the Russians, and became, of course, their prisoner.

The 11th  
Hussars  
and the  
4th Light  
Dragoons.

When last we were glancing at the state of the combat on our extreme left, Colonel Douglas with his 11th Hussars was pursuing a body of the enemy's cavalry far down towards the strip of low ground which divides the eastern slope of the Fedioukine Hills from the banks of the aqueduct; whilst Lord George Paget, with the 4th Light Dragoons (excepting, it seems, a part of the regiment still busied in resisting the enemy's attempt to carry off some of the guns), was once more endeavouring to co-operate with Colonel Douglas, and for that purpose pushing on his advance in the right rear of the 11th Hussars. The 4th Light Dragoons was in a somewhat disorganised state, brought about by its recent combat in the battery, where each man, speaking generally, had been fighting in his own way.

Colonel Douglas had carried his pursuit far

down towards the bank of the aqueduct, when at length he found himself confronted by bodies of cavalry too large to be fair opponents for his little band of Hussars. He therefore fell back; and the Russian cavalry, in their turn, made a show of pursuing, but in a harmless, irresolute way. Presently the 4th Light Dragoons, whilst advancing, was met on its left front by the 11th Hussars in retreat; and at the sight of their comrades retiring, the men of the 4th Light Dragoons being still in the disorganised state which had resulted from its desultory combat in the battery, were surprised into an act of imitation. They hesitated, stopped, and, without word of command, went about, aligning themselves in their retreat with the 11th Hussars.

Masses of the enemy's cavalry were at this time pursuing the 11th Hussars, and the foremost bodies of them were already within about forty yards, but in a disorderly state, and disclosing once more that appearance of hesitation and bewilderment which had been observed in the morning at the time of the Heavy Cavalry charge; but the enemy was overwhelmingly strong in numbers, and now that two English regiments had successively retreated before him, it was to be expected, of course, that he would begin to act with increasing boldness.

When Lord George Paget saw the enemy's horse at a distance of only some forty yards from our two retreating regiments, he judged the moment to be critical. With the whole power of

CHAP.  
I.Their  
retreatApproach  
of the  
Russian  
cavalry in  
pursuit.Lord George  
Paget's  
appeal to his  
regiment.

CHAP.  
I.

his voice, he shouted out to his Dragoons, ‘ If you  
‘ don’t front, my boys, we are done ! ’

Lord Anglesea used to say that ‘ cavalry are  
‘ the bravest fellows in the world in advance ; but  
‘ that when once they get into a scrape, and have  
‘ their backs turned to the enemy, it is a difficult  
‘ matter to stop and rally them.’ If Lord George  
was perchance one of those who had heard this  
saying from the lips of his father, he could hardly  
have been without some misgiving. For once,  
however, the saying did not hold good. The men  
of the two regiments who at this moment remained  
together were only, as was computed, about 70 in  
number, and not, as a body, in a good state of  
order ; but nevertheless, at the word of command,  
they came to a halt, and began to front towards  
the enemy. It was at this time that the young  
Lieutenant Jolliffe did opportune service. Facing  
boldly towards the newly fronting troopers in de-  
spite of the numbers advancing against him from  
behind, he held up his sword for a rally, and so  
well used his voice as to be able to cause numbers  
of the 4th Light Dragoon men who were strag-  
gling and bewildered to understand what had to be  
done, and at once form up with their comrades.  
Its effect. At the sight of the front thus presented to them,  
the Russians were instantly checked ; and it is  
believed that our troops saved themselves from a  
crushing disaster by their ready obedience to Lord  
George Paget’s appeal.

But during the very moments that were occu-  
pied by this operation of fronting towards the

pursuers, it was becoming known to our officers and men that the enemy had interposed a fresh body of horse in a new, and indeed opposite quarter. Roger Palmer—that young Lieutenant of the 11th Hussars to whom the Russian colonel had delivered his sword—was singularly gifted with long sight, and casting his glance towards our left rear, he saw in that direction, but at a distance of several hundred yards, a considerable body of cavalry, which he assured himself must be Russian. He reported this to his chief. Colonel Douglas at first scarce believed that the squadrons thus observed could be Russian; and, it being perceptible that the force consisted of Lancers, men were able, for a while, to indulge a pleasant surmise, and to imagine that the Lancers despatched in our rear, at a distance of several hundred yards, must be our own ‘Seventeenth.’ Presently, however, Roger Palmer convinced Colonel Douglas that the head-gear of the cavalry despatched was Russian; and in another moment all doubt was at an end; for our officers and men could then see that the newly-interposed troops were formed up across the slope of the valley, with a front towards the Russian rear, as though barring the retreat of our people. So, there being then certain knowledge that the English were between two powerful bodies of Russian cavalry, it became necessary to use the very next moments in determining how to meet the emergency. Seeing Major Low close to him on the left, Lord George Paget, it seems, exclaimed: ‘We are in a desper-

CHAP.  
I.Discovery  
of a body  
of Russian  
cavalry  
formed up  
across the  
line of  
retreat.Means for  
meeting the  
emergency.

CHAP.  
I. ‘ate scrape. What the devil shall we do?’ And in the next moment Lord George seems to have perceived that the answer to the question he had put should be elicited from some one entitled to command.

It was evidently with that purpose in his mind, and not from any notion of indulging in irony, that Lord George then asked the same question which had been put once before, but on the other side of the valley—the question of ‘Where is ‘Lord Cardigan?’ Whatever were the terms of the answer elicited from Major Low, it became plain that for the moment, at all events, no guidance was to be had from the General commanding the Brigade, and that the emergency must be met without the aid of Lord Cardigan.\* Lord George Paget was the senior officer present; and the few rapid words which he and Colonel Douglas found time to exchange were enough to prove them agreed upon the course that ought to be taken.

It was determined that, with the whole of the little band which had been formed from the remnants of the two united regiments, our men should endeavour as best they could to break through the newly-interposed force of Russian Lancers, and should do this without persisting in the attempt to oppose a front to the cavalry advancing from the opposite direction. Our men well understood the predicament in which they stood; and

\* Of the purport of the answer given to this question I have not yet obtained sufficient proof; but its alleged tenor will be found in the affidavits of Eddle and David Thomas.

Lord George Paget holloaed out to them, ' Well, C H A P.  
' you must go about, and do the best you can. 

---

I.  
' Threes about ! '

The order was obeyed, and both regiments now fronted towards the body of Lancers which stood barring their line of retreat. In both regiments strenuous exertions were made to get the men together ; and wherever, in this little band, an officer sat in his saddle, there also there was a sword in the air and a voice commanding the rally. The force was joined by some troopers belonging to the first line.

In the hastily attempted array which was now in some slight measure formed, the (proper) rear-rank formed the front, and the officers had to follow, instead of leading, their line. In such a position they were evidently more likely than the rest of the force to be cut off by the Russian Lancers : but this was not all ; for behind them, as we know, and at a distance of but a few yards, they had the bodies of the Russian cavalry which had come up in pursuit from the neighbourhood of the aqueduct. Thus placed, our officers were not only exposed beyond measure to the dangers of the hour, but also shut back in positions unfavourable to the exercise of command.

With but little attempt at the preservation of order, the English horsemen moved off at such speed as they could command, driving straight towards the thicket of lances which threatened to bar their retreat. They presently began to incur the fire of some Russian artillery ; but, upon the

CHAP.

I.

whole, this effort of the enemy's gunners proved to be an advantage to our people, for, without inflicting heavy loss upon our retreating horsemen, it delivered them from the pursuit of the cavalry in their then rear.

The body of Russian Lancers which stood barring the retreat of our horsemen was that moiety of Jeropkine's six squadrons which had been placed, as we saw, on the north side of the valley, and in the fold of the hills enclosing the road from Tractir; but there is reason for believing that these three squadrons had been joined by some portions at least, if not by the whole, of those other three squadrons through which Colonel Shewell had broken.

Position of  
the inter-  
posed force.

Hitherto, the position taken up by the Lancers now undertaking to cut off Lord George Paget and Douglas had been exactly of the same kind as that of the three squadrons on the other side of the valley which attempted, and attempted in vain, to bar Colonel Shewell's retreat; for, just as their comrades had done before, these Lancers stood ranged with a front towards the Russian rear; but, upon the nearer approach of our people, the force they were going to assail disclosed a new plan of action; and it is not improbable that the overthrow which the first three squadrons had undergone, may have so far influenced Colonel Jeropkine as to cause this change in his tactics.

The force, it seems, was a double column of squadrons, having two strong squadrons abreast,

and being two, if not three squadrons deep.\* It was in a perfect state of formation, and directly confronting our retreating horsemen; but when the remnants of the two English regiments drew near them, the commander of these Russian Lancers retracted all at once the right shoulder, and wheeled his squadrons half back; so that, instead of continuing to oppose a direct barrier in the face of our returning Dragoons, his force now stood ranged in such way as to flank the line of retreat, and became, in that way, much more formidable than before. The movement was executed with a precision which made the strength of the close serried squadrons seem more than ever overwhelming to the few score of English horsemen now moving, each man as he could, with hardly a trace of formation. The evident purpose of the manœuvre was to enable the Russian column to descend upon the flank of the English,

CHAP.  
I.

Its forma-  
tion and  
apparent  
strength.

Its sudden  
change of  
front

\* We saw that the portion of Jeropkine's Lancers which was originally placed on this side of the valley consisted of only three squadrons; but we also saw, that of the other three squadrons overthrown by Colonel Shewell some part at once crossed the valley, and it is evidently probable that they did this with the intention of joining their comrades in the gorge of the Tractir road. Also, those of the Lancers who at first fled southward, must have found in a few moments that they were flying from nothing; and it seems likely that they too would very soon turn or cross over the valley, to the point where their comrades were stationed. I am able to say, on good grounds, that the time which intervened between Shewell's combat and the affair I am now speaking of, was sufficient to allow of this movement taking place. Upon the whole, it seems probable that all the six squadrons of the regiment were at this time together, and if so, the column, with its front of two, had a depth of three squadrons.

CHAP. and overwhelm them at the moment of passing.  
I. The direction in which the English moved was such that, supposing it to continue unchanged, the Russian column would have a distance of about thirty yards to go through in order to come down upon the flank of our horsemen at the intended moment.

When he saw this manœuvre and detected its purpose, Lord George Paget determined that he would endeavour to oppose some semblance of a front to the new front the enemy had formed; and accordingly he shouted to the men, ‘Throw up your left flank!’ But in the din which prevailed, his words, it would seem, were but little heard; and, instead of attempting, as they moved, to form up a front towards their right, our people, in the course they now took, inclined somewhat to their left.

Advance  
and sudden  
halt of the  
column.

At a moment which seems to have been rightly enough chosen, the Russian column commenced its advance, and descended at a trot to the very verge of the point where the two hostile forces thus moving at right angles with one another seemed going to meet; but then all at once the column was halted, and again the Russian horsemen displayed that same air of hesitation and bewilderment which our people had observed several times before on that day—hesitation and bewilderment not apparently resulting from any want of firmness on the part of the men, but rather from their not knowing what to do next.

When a body of cavalry has been moved for-

ward some way at a gallop, or even at a trot, and then is brought to a halt, it very commonly happens that the flanks overshoot the centre, and render the line concave. It was so with the Russian column ; and its right flank especially, at the moment of the halt, had swung forward in advance of the centre. Therefore now when our horsemen undertook to ride across the front of the column, they had before them some lancers on the extreme right of the enemy's line, who had so far edged forward as to be directly obstructing the path of retreat ; but with this exception, the foe our men had to overcome or evade was entirely on their right flank.

Then there occurred a contact of hostile forces for which, I imagine, it would be hard to find a parallel. In a very irregular body, and with a hardly perceptible trace of their old line formation, the English went on ; and the Russian mass then advancing a little, or rather, it might be said, heaving forward, collision occurred. The body retreating grazed its right flank against the enemy's front ; but, incredible as it may seem, was allowed to scrape by, moving right across the faces of the men in the foremost rank, and receiving or parrying the thrusts of their lances without undergoing any other than that momentary attack which a lancer who remains strictly halted can attempt against a dragoon in the act of galloping past him. What happened was that those of the English horsemen who chanced to be on the extreme right of their retreating body,

The nature  
of the  
collision  
which then  
occurred.

CHAP.  
I. found themselves so close to the enemy's lances as to have to fend them off with the sabre ; but the number of attacks which any one man had to encounter whilst passing along the front of two squadrons, was not, it seems, so great as might be imagined ; and Lord George Paget, whose position exposed him more than most others, has said that the number of lances which he had to ward off with his sword did not exceed three or four. It was well for our horsemen that the foe was on their right flank, where the sword-arm could work with advantage.\*

Along the main part of the Russian front, each collision, if so it can be called, which occurred, between lancer and swordsman, was a collision of barely one moment ; because the assailant, in each instance, was not an unfettered man, but the mere component of a mass which had come to a halt ; whilst every rider assailed was a rider in movement—a rider driving past the fixed column as swiftly as his tired beast could go, and rasped only, if so one may speak, by a thicket of lances in passing : but in that part of the enemy's right flank where his squadrons curled round in front of our people, the struggle which proved to be necessary for forcing a passage was somewhat less momentary ; and Lieutenant Roger Palmer, for one, became engaged at that point in what

\* Since the period spoken of in the text, the broadsword exercise of our cavalry has been so altered, under the suggestion, I believe, of Major Miller (late of the Scots Greys) as to provide better guards than before on the side of the bridle-arm.

may be called a personal combat. This brief combat ended, however, as did the other collisions, in the failure of every attempt to cut off the retreat of the English; and, without receiving much harm in the course of this singular traverse, our people got past.\* ‘We got by them,’ writes one of our officers,—‘we got by them—‘ how, I know not. It is a mystery to me. . . . ‘ There is one explanation, and one only—the ‘ hand of God was upon us ! ’

That is an explanation of the deliverance from a cavalry scrape which lies out of the reach of dispute ; but if any gross mortals, intent on mere War-Office business, were attempting to examine causation at the terrestrial end of the chain, it might be useful for them to know in what stage of each combat it was that this hesitating embarrassment of the Russian cavalry so often evinced itself ; and there is the more reason for the inquiry since the firmness of the Muscovite soldier is so well established as to exclude the explanation which might be applicable to the troops of a less valorous nation, if they were to be frequently disclosing incompetence in the critical moment of a combat. The bewilderment of the Russian cavalry has almost always disclosed itself at that very point where the lessons acquired in the exercise-ground, or even in mock

\* It is possible that men might have been unhorsed and killed by the Russian lancers without it becoming known that the deaths were so occasioned ; but my impression is that few casualties resulted from this encounter.

CHAP.

I.

battles at home, would carry the pupil no further ; and hardly any instance of this could well be more striking than the one we have just seen displayed by Jeropkine's Lancers. Long and painfully trained, those docile Muscovites had come all at once to the border which divides the things that are military from the things that are warlike. Whenever they charged at St Petersburg under the eyes of father Nicholas, the son of Paul, they always, of course, stopped short without doing harm to those other troops of their Czar who might make-believe to oppose them. They had now done no less, but also no more. It might sound paradoxical to say that the remnants of these two English regiments owed their escape to the high state of discipline to which their adversaries had been wrought ; but certainly if this Russian mass had consisted of an equal number of bold, angry ploughmen on horseback, with pitchforks in hand, the eighty or ninety disordered dragoons who might try to brush across the faces of their rough foes, would be in danger of incurring grave losses. As it was, our people found themselves saved yet again, as they had been saved before, by the bewilderment of troops who were too 'military' to be warlike.

Continued  
course of  
the two  
retreating  
regiments.

It was something for our people to be no longer encountered in their homeward course by a barrier of hostile cavalry ; but at the first aspect of it, their plight was still desperate ; for being but few, and in disorder, and having a long extent of uphill ground which must be traversed

before they would stand in safety, they were on horses now cruelly jaded ; whilst the hostile squadrons behind them had not only the strength and the weight of numbers and of solid formation, but also were fresh.

However, those Russian artillerymen who had twice before guarded our cavalry by toiling for its destruction, now once more helped its retreat. It is true that, from a cause then unknown to our retreating horsemen (who, of course, had not witnessed the achievement of D'Allonville and his Chasseurs d'Afrique), the guns on the Fedioukine Hills which had shattered the ranks whilst advancing were now silent ; but from the Causeway Heights on the opposite side of the valley there opened a diligent fire against the remnants of the two retreating regiments ; and, as before had occurred with other bodies of the enemy's cavalry, so now this new effort of the Russian artillerymen served to keep back Jeropkine's Lancers, and prevent them from undertaking the destructive pursuit of our horsemen, which would otherwise have been in their power.

Besides being scanty in numbers, these retreating remnants of the 4th Light Dragoons and the 11th Hussars were by this time so much broken up into small groups, or knots, or single horsemen, that they no longer presented to the enemy's gunners the broad easy mark that is offered by a regiment of cavalry in a state of formation ; but if there was now no formed squadron that could be opened and cleaved by shell or by round-shot,

**C H A P.** each dragoon individually still had to be reckoning on the death that might come the next moment; and this the last trial which the soldier passed through was that of riding for life, with the torment of being forced to ride slowly ; for he had to toil on uphill under a heavy fire at the laggard, and always decreasing pace which represented the utmost remaining power of his wearied horse.

The ground traversed by these remnants of the 4th Light Dragoons and the 11th Hussars was strewn with such ruins of brilliant squadrons as might well be more distressing to them than to any other regiment, except, perhaps, the 17th Lancers. Lord George Paget's and Colonel Douglas's regiments in the course of their advance had encountered ugly traces of battle, but they now, as they rode, saw the marks of a yet more terrible havoc ; and, this time, a great proportion of those they saw dead, or dying, or cruelly disabled, were men of their own regiment. Amongst the wounded comrades and friends thus passed, some were walking erect, though feebly, some limping, some crawling ; and it was grievous to have to see the still living remains of horses with the trappings upon them of the 4th Light Dragoons or the 11th Hussars, some violently struggling to get up, though perhaps with more than one limb shattered, or floundering back with cruel weight upon their disabled riders.

As the pace of each rider had long since had no other limit than the last strength of his sinking horse, it resulted, of course, that, after a while,

the single horsemen and the groups or knots of those who kept together were divided by lengthened intervals. The greater number of them were still toiling on up the valley under heavy fire without knowing how much further they would have to go before they might call their lives their own, when at length—and this came by surprise—they all at once caught a glad sound. In their front they heard an English cheer. It ceased, but was presently followed by another, and then again by another. These greetings were the welcome bestowed by spectators upon each officer or group of horsemen coming up the incline, and returning, as it were, from out of the abyss.

Lord George Paget (whose wearied horse had long been failing him in pace) was one of the last of the shattered brigade who rode labouring in up the valley. Some officers moved forward to greet him, and one of these was Lord Cardigan.

Lord George Paget then uttered an exclamation which has now no importance either historical or personal; but it had a bearing, some thought, upon a question formerly in controversy, and was therefore, at one time, so much spoken of that the suppression of the words (though they are now altogether immaterial) might confuse, and be misunderstood. Seeing Lord Cardigan approach composedly from an opposite direction, Lord George Paget exclaimed to him, ‘Holloa! ‘Lord Cardigan, weren’t you there?’ Naturally, the bystanders smiled; but Lord Cardigan saw that no jest was intended, and answered at once

CHAP.

I.

Lord George  
Paget's  
inquiry as  
to the fate  
of the first  
line

with perfect simplicity and truthfulness as one soldier might to another.\*

Lord George Paget now ventured—he seemed to be speaking in grief, and in apprehension of the dismal answer he might receive—he ventured to ask after the fate of the first line. ‘I am ‘afraid,’ he said, ‘there are no such regiments in ‘existence as the 13th and 17th, for—I can give ‘no account of them.’ Hardly, however, had he spoken, when he saw on the brow of the hill some clusters of men standing by their horses, and among them some Lancers. Then he knew—for the English had only one Lancer regiment—that, so far at least as concerned the 17th, the disaster fell short of extinction.

The escape  
of Sir George  
Wombwell.

One of those who returned to our lines with the remnant of the 4th Light Dragoons had been a prisoner in the hands of the enemy. I speak of Sir George Wombwell, then an extra aide-de-camp to Lord Cardigan. When last we saw Wombwell he was not far from the front of the battery, but

\* According to the version which I prefer—and it does not much differ from others—Lord Cardigan answered, ‘Wasn’t I, ‘though?’ and then turning to Captain Jenyns said, ‘Here, ‘Jenyns, did not you see me at the guns?’ Jenyns answered that he did; and he could well bear witness, because he was very near to Lord Cardigan at the moment of his entering the battery. The colloquy never had any importance, except in so far as it tended to show that there was an interval of time between the retreat of Lord Cardigan and that of Lord George Paget; and its value in that respect has been superseded by the ampler knowledge we now possess—knowledge placing the fact beyond the reach of doubt.

his charger had just been shot under him. He CHAP  
I. so quickly succeeded in catching and mounting a stray horse as to be able to join the 4th Light Dragoons when they came on, and advance with them down to the guns. There, however, his newly-caught horse was killed under him (as his own charger had been some minutes before), and, this time, he found himself surrounded by twenty or thirty Russian Lancers, who took from him his sword and his pistol, and made him prisoner. It happened that Captain Morris (then also, as we know, a prisoner and with his head deeply cut and pierced by sabre and lance) was brought to the spot where Wombwell stood ; and it is interesting to observe that, in spite of his own dreadful condition, Morris had still a word of timely counsel that he could give to a brother officer. ‘Look out,’ he said to Wombwell—‘look out and ‘catch a horse.’ At that moment, two or three loose horses came up, and Wombwell, darting suddenly forward from between the Russian Lancers who had captured him, seized and mounted one of these riderless chargers, and galloped forward to meet the 4th Light Dragoons, which he then saw retiring. He succeeded in joining the regiment, and, with it, returned to our lines.

When Captain Morris (unhorsed and grievously wounded) found himself surrounded by Russian dragoons, it was to an officer, as we saw, that he surrendered his sword.\* That officer, however, quickly disappeared, and then the Russian horse-

The escape  
of Captain  
Morris

\* See *ante*, p. 256.

CHAP.  
I.—men—Morris took them to be Cossacks—rushed in upon their prisoner, and not only robbed him of all he had about him, but convinced him by their manner and bearing that they were inclined to despatch him. Morris, therefore, broke away from them, and ran into the midst of the thickest smoke he could see. Then, a riderless horse passing close to him, Morris caught at the rein, and was dragged by it a short distance, but afterwards fell and became unconscious.

Upon regaining his senses Morris became aware of the presence of a Cossack who presumably had just ridden past him, but was then looking back in a way which seemed to indicate that he had seen the English officer move, and would therefore despatch him. Morris gathered strength from the emergency, found means to get on his feet, and once more sought shelter in the thickest smoke near him. Whilst standing there, he found himself almost run down by another loose charger, but was able to catch hold of the horse's rein, and to mount him. He turned the horse's head up the valley, and rode as fast as he could; but just as he fancied he was getting out of the cross-fire his new horse was shot under him, and fell with him to the ground, giving him a heavy fall, and rolling over his thigh. Then again for some time Morris was unconscious; and when he regained his senses, he found that the dead horse was lying across his leg, and keeping him fastened to the ground. He then 'set to work' to extricate his leg, and at length succeeded in doing so.

Then, getting on his feet, he ran on as well as he could, stumbling and getting up over and over again, but always taking care to be moving up hill, till at last, when quite worn out, he found himself close to the dead body of an English Staff-officer —the body, he presently saw, of his friend Nolan.

CHAP.  
I.

Remembering that Nolan had fallen at a very early period in advance of the brigade, Morris inferred that he must be nearly within the reach of his fellow-countrymen ; so, being now quite exhausted, he laid himself down beside the body of his friend, and again became unconscious.

Besides the three deep ugly wounds received in his head, Morris, in the course of these his struggles for life, had suffered a longitudinal fracture or split of the right arm, and several of his ribs were broken.\*

There was a circumstance in the lives of Nolan and Morris which made it the more remarkable that the dead body of the one and the shattered frame of the other should be thus lying side by side. On the flank march, Morris and Nolan, who were great allies, had communicated to each other a common intention of volunteering for any special service that might be required in the course of the campaign ; and they found that each of them, in anticipation of the early death that might result from such an enterprise, had written a letter which, in that event, was to be delivered.

Morris and  
Nolan.

\* The longitudinal splitting of the arm was of the kind which, it seems, is scientifically described as a ‘Saliswitch fracture.’

CHAP. I.— Morris had addressed a letter to his young wife, Nolan had addressed one to his mother. Under the belief that the opportunity for hazardous service of the kind they were seeking might be close at hand, the two friends had exchanged their respective letters: and now, when they lay side by side, the one dead and the other unconscious, each of them still had in his pocket the letter entrusted to him by the other.\*

When Morris recovered his consciousness he found himself in an English hospital tent.† Terribly as he had been wounded and shattered, he did not succumb.‡

\* The letter found in the pocket of Nolan—*i.e.*, the one addressed to Mrs Morris by her husband—was sent through the usual channels; but it is presumed that counteracting intelligence was sent to her by the same post.

† I believe that the satisfaction of having taken the requisite steps for bringing in the shattered frame of his commanding officer is justly enjoyed by Sergeant O'Hara, the same officer whom we saw exerting himself at the battery captured by the first line. He had been informed by Private John Smith of the spot where Morris lay.

‡ Up to the commencement of the campaign Morris had been keeping himself in an almost constant state of high ‘training;’ and, by some, the possession of the bodily force that was needed for enabling him to go through what he did has been attributed in part to that cause, though the indomitable courage and determination of the man were probably his chief resource. Morris was able the following year to take part again in war service, and did not die till the July of 1858. The suppression of the Bengal mutinies had been the task which, in 1857, drew him and his regiment to the East; and it was to the climate of India that at length he surrendered his life. He was much thought of in our army as a valorous and skilled cavalry officer, and with so high a reputation for straightforwardness and accuracy, that once, when a general officer imprudently ventured to put himself in conflict with Morris upon a matter of fact,

Amongst the remnants of our Light Cavalry, CHAP.  
I.  
now once more gathered together, there was, of course, a sense of the havoc that had been made in what, half an hour before, was Lord Cardigan's splendid brigade ; but, for a while, this feeling was much interrupted by the joy of seeing comrade after comrade trail in from out of the fight, and in spite of the ruin their force had incurred, the men were from time to time cheering.

When the remnants of the brigade had formed up, Lord Cardigan came forward and said, 'Men ! ' it is a mad-brained trick,\* but it is no fault of 'mine.' Some of the men answered, 'Never mind, 'my lord! we are ready to go again.' Lord Cardigan replied, 'No, no, men! you have done enough.'

It was upon one of the slopes which look southward towards Balaclava that the muster took place ; and, for some time, stragglers and riderless chargers were coming in at intervals; but at length there was a numbering of horses, and afterwards the melancholy roll-call began. As often as it appeared that to the name called out there was no one present to answer, men contributed what knowledge they had as to the fate of their missing comrade, saying when and where they last had seen him. More or less truly, if they knew it not before, men learned the fate of their friends from this dismal inquest. And then also came the

The first muster of the Light Brigade after the charge.

there was a smile at the 'impar congressus,' no one who knew Morris consenting to imagine it possible that he could be the one who mistook.

\* According to another version, 'a great blunder.'

The remnants of the brigade at this time.

Lord Cardigan's address to the men.

C H A P.  
I.

The killing  
of the  
disabled  
horses.

The losses  
suffered by  
the brigade.

time for the final and deliberate severance of many a friendship between the dragoon and his charger; for the farriers, with their pistols in hand, were busied in the task of shooting the ruined horses.

Upon counting the brigade, it appeared that the force, which numbered 673 horsemen when it went into action, had been reduced to a mounted strength of 195; \* and there was one regiment, it seems—namely, the 13th Light Dragoons, which, after the charge, mustered only ten mounted troopers. From a later examination it resulted that, in officers and men killed and wounded, the brigade had suffered losses to the number of 247, of whom 113 had been killed and 134 wounded; and that (including 43 horses shot as unserviceable on account of their wounds) the brigade had 475 horses killed, besides having 42 others wounded.†

It has been stated by one who had good means of knowing the truth, that of all the officers acting with the first line, those who came out of action without a wound received by either the horse or the rider, were only two in number.

Lord Cardigan, as we saw, was wounded though not disabled; and of the three officers who acted

\* It will be vain to seek for any correspondence between the result of the first muster and the officially stated casualties. Many wounded men and wounded horses might be present at the muster; and on the other hand, neither the unwounded men whose chargers had been killed, nor the unwounded horses which came back into our lines without their riders, would contribute to the 'mounted strength' as ascertained at the first muster.

† These figures may not agree exactly with other returns, but I have good reason for believing them to be accurate.

as his aides-de-camp, one, Captain Lockwood, was killed; another, Lieutenant Maxse, wounded; and the third, Sir George Wombwell, as we before learned, had two horses shot under him.

CHAP.  
I.

In the 4th Light Dragoons, Major Halkett and Lieutenant Sparke were killed, and Captain Brown and Captain Hutton were both wounded severely.\*

In the 8th Hussars, Lieutenant Lord Fitzgibbon was killed, and Lieutenant Clutterbuck, Lieutenant Seager, and Cornet Clowes were wounded. Of the ten officers who went into action with the regiment, Colonel Shewell and Cornet Heneage were the only two of whom it could be said that both they and their chargers were unstricken.

In the 11th Hussars, Captain Cook, Lieutenant Trevelyan, and Lieutenant Haughton were wounded. The wound of Haughton proved mortal.

In the 13th Light Dragoons, Captain Oldham, its commander, and Captain Goad, and Cornet Montgomery were killed.

In the 17th Lancers, Captain Morris, who commanded the regiment, was, as we saw, grievously wounded; Captain Winter and Lieutenant Thompson were killed; Captain Webb was mortally wounded; Captain Robert White was wounded

\* It is said that Captain Hutton was seen vigorously using his sword in the battery at a time when he had his thigh broken.—*End of Note to First Edition.* ‘On returning from the guns he was shot through the other thigh, and on reaching the English lines, from the desperate nature of his wounds, was lifted out of his saddle in a scarcely conscious state. His charger had eleven wounds.’ Letter to me from a near relative of Captain Hutton’s.—*Note to Second Edition.*

C H A P.  
I.

The supposed fate  
of Captain  
Lockwood.

severely ; Lieutenant Sir William Gordon also was wounded ; and Lieutenant Chadwick, as we saw, was both wounded and taken prisoner.

It is believed that the last man killed was Captain Lockwood, an officer who has been already mentioned as one of the three aides-de-camp of Lord Cardigan. For some time, there was a hope that he might be alive ; and there is still some uncertainty in regard to his movements during the charge, and the way in which he met his death. At the moment when the Light Cavalry began its advance, he was probably in the performance of some duty which separated him from the other aides-de-camp.\* Indeed, there is an idea that he rode to the ground where some of our battalions were halted, addressed a general whom he there found, and announcing that the Light Cavalry was about to engage in an ugly task, urged that it should be supported by infantry.† Supposing that he did this, and that the brigade moved forward before he returned to it, he would have been likely to gallop off in all haste down the valley to regain his place near Lord Cardigan ; but all I have learnt is, that some time after the

\* See, however, the statement by Maxse, the assistant aide-de-camp, referred to *ante* at foot of p. 217, from which it appears that at the beginning, and afterwards when 'three parts of the way down,' Lockwood was in his place.—*Note to Second Edition.*

† It seems to have been understood that Lockwood made the supposed request at the instance of Lord Cardigan ; but this Lord Cardigan entirely denies. The answer of the general thus appealed to was, it is said, to the effect that he had no authority.

retreat of Lord Cardigan, and indeed at a moment when all the remains of the brigade had already come out of action, Captain Lockwood rode up to Lord Lucan, and, speaking in a way which disclosed anxiety and distress as though for the fate of his chief, said, 'My Lord, can you tell me ' where is Lord Cardigan ? ' and that, upon Lord Lucan's replying that Lord Cardigan had passed him some time, Lockwood rode away. It is imagined that he must have mistaken the meaning of the answer, and that, regarding it as an intimation that Lord Cardigan had again advanced, he must have galloped down the fatal valley, and there met his death ; for he was never afterwards seen in the English camp, either dead or alive, and the Russians did not number him among their prisoners. He was an excellent officer, much valued in the 8th Hussars, the regiment to which he belonged.

Seeing that our squadrons drove into the heart, nay into the very rear of the enemy's position, and they had no means of retreat unless they could cut their way back through his interposed forces, the strangest feature in the statistics of the battle is the list of prisoners. With our cavalry so completely in their fangs as to have it a mile and a quarter deep in their position, the Russians took hardly one prisoner who had not been disabled by his own wounds or those inflicted upon his horse. They took but fifteen unwounded prisoners altogether ; and I believe that almost all these—if not indeed all, without even a single

The small  
number of  
prisoners  
taken by the  
Russians.

**CHAP.**I.

The small amount of loss sustained by our troops after closing with the enemy.

exception—were men whose horses had been killed or disabled.

Another strange circumstance of this combat is the comparative impunity which the remnants of our Light Cavalry were suffered to enjoy after once they had closed with the enemy. A detailed statement of the casualties which occurred after the seizure of the battery could hardly be furnished, but I am persuaded that they were few. It was in descending the valley that our people incurred the main loss.

Who brought the first line out of action?

Who brought the first line out of action? If an unwary civilian were to put this question to a soldier, he might find that, without knowing it, he was using a phrase so technical as to bring upon himself a technical and somewhat illusory answer.\* But if it be asked who gave to the main fighting remnants of the first line that guidance and help by which they were ultimately extricated from the enemy's gripe, the answer must be based upon a knowledge of those occurrences which I have sought to record. From this I imagine it

\* In the military art there is a very inconvenient want of words and phrases with an exclusively technical import; and the result is that soldiers find themselves obliged to affix technical meanings to ordinary expressions—a practice insuring ambiguity, and tending, of course, to misconceptions. When a military man speaks of a regiment, or any other force, and says that he ‘brought it out of action,’ he does not mean that he did anything particular; all he means is, that he came out senior officer. In that, the merely technical sense of the phrase, Lord Cardigan, of course, was the officer who ‘brought the first line out of action.’

will be gathered that, although there were individuals of the first line who came out on the northern side of the valley with the 4th Light Dragoons and the 11th Hussars, the number—a very small number—which could best be regarded as representing the first line was that which came out on the south of the valley with the 8th Hussars. It was only during the period of the advance from the battery to the neighbourhood of the aqueduct, and of the movement back thence to where stood the 8th Hussars, that Colonel Mayow had, in any sense, the charge of the first line. As soon as he had joined Colonel Shewell, he was in the presence of his military superior; and he acknowledges, apparently, that any command which he had been assuming in his character of senior officer then came at once to an end. So upon the whole it results that what constituted at last the main, though diminutive remnant of the first line was extricated from the power of the enemy by Colonel Shewell of the 8th Hussars.

With regard to the supports, there was no co-operation at the close of the combat between the force on our right and the force on our left, and they came out in two distinct bodies. The 8th Hussars on our right was brought out by Colonel Shewell, its commanding officer. On our left there were two regiments which co-operated in their retreat, and with these, Lord George Paget was the senior officer.\*

And who  
brought  
out the  
supports?

\* The question whether Lord George as senior officer acquired the command of the whole body formed by the two co-operating

CHAP.

I.

Interview  
between  
Lord Rag-  
lan and Lord  
Cardigan.

Immediately after the muster, Lord Cardigan rode up to Lord Raglan in order to make his report. Lord Raglan said to him, in a severe and very angry way, ‘What did you mean, sir, by attacking a battery in front, contrary to all the usages of warfare, and the customs of the service?’

Lord Cardigan answered: ‘My Lord, I hope you will not blame me, for I received the order to attack from my superior officer in front of the troops;’ and he then proceeded to give an account of the part he had taken.

Subsequently, and after full inquiry, Lord Raglan not only determined that the justification thus offered was sound, but also, it seems, formed an opinion that Lord Cardigan’s whole conduct in the affair of the charge had been admirable. ‘Lord Cardigan,’ he wrote in private, some five days after the action, ‘acted throughout with the greatest steadiness and gallantry, as well as perseverance.’

Lord  
Raglan’s  
opinion of  
Lord  
Cardigan’s  
conduct in  
the charge.

Interview  
between  
Lord Raglan  
and Lord  
Lucan.

Upon meeting Lord Lucan at a later moment, Lord Raglan said to him, ‘You have lost the Light Brigade! ’

Lord Lucan at once denied that he had lost the Light Brigade; and, as the ground for his denial, stated that he had only carried out the orders, written and verbal, conveyed to him by Captain Nolan.

Then it was that Lord Raglan is said to have

regiments (the 4th Light Dragoons Lord George’s own regiment, and the 11th Hussars commanded by Colonel Douglas) is one of a technical kind which soldiers can best determine; but the facts on which the solution depends are given *ante*.

uttered a sentence which, supposing it to be accurately reported, did certainly supply Lord Lucan with fair means of raising a controversy, and even gave him, as many may think, a kind of argumentative victory. The Commander of the Forces had no copy of either the 'third' or the 'fourth' order; and, for that reason alone, even if there were no other, he might not improbably desire to avoid or defer all discussion founded upon the wording of the documents. Accordingly, he did not say, as he might have done: 'I ordered  
' —I ordered in writing—that the cavalry should  
' advance and take advantage of any opportunity  
' to recover the heights, and you kept it halted for  
' more than half an hour. I ordered—I ordered  
' in writing—that the cavalry should advance  
' rapidly to the front, that it should follow the  
' enemy, and try to prevent him from carrying  
' away the guns, meaning of course, as you well  
' know,\* our lost English guns, and yet with this  
' order in your hand you caused Lord Cardigan to  
' go down the valley instead of advancing upon  
' the "heights," and to attack the front of a dis-  
' tant Russian battery, after running the gauntlet  
' for a mile and a quarter between crossing fires.' What Lord Raglan did say, according to Lord Lucan, was to this effect: 'Lord Lucan, you were  
' a Lieutenant-General, and should therefore have  
' exercised your discretion, and, not approving of  
' the charge, should not have caused it to be made.'

\* For proof that Lord Lucan did know this, see the footnote  
*ante*, p. 198.

CHAP.

I.

Whatever, abstractedly speaking, may be the value of the reason thus said to have been adduced by Lord Raglan, it was evidently one so far open to question as to give Lord Lucan an excellent opportunity of raising a controversy against his chief. Up to that moment, the predicament of Lord Lucan was simply the predicament of a man who had misconceived his instructions, and imagined that he must advance down the valley instead of trying to recover the heights; but now, all at once, if his impression of what Lord Raglan said be accurate, he found himself raised into the position of one who, being mortal, and having like other mortals committed an error, has had the good fortune to be rebuked for it in terms fairly open to question; and he was as competent as any man living to make vigorous use of the advantage thus gained. Accordingly, when opportunity offered, he argued with great cogency against the theory that he should have disobeyed an order which he could not approve, urging soundly that Lord Raglan's survey of the field from the high ground of the Chersonese was necessarily much more complete than that which could be commanded by any one in the plain below; and that to venture to disobey the order under such circumstances, would have been to disobey a General who was not only armed with the superior authority of a Commander-in-Chief, but also with superior knowledge.

Thus then it resulted that, independently of the substantial merits of the question as they

stood at the time of the combat, Lord Lucan was so much advantaged afterwards by the alleged tenor of the blaming words as to be able to place himself—not, of course, in the right, but—still in the attitude of one who can take fair exception to the terms in which his chief has reproved him.

CHAP.  
I.

It might be thought at first sight that, correlatively with the anger and the pain evinced by Lord Raglan, there would be exultation on the part of Liprandi; but this was not so. On the contrary, he seems to have been thrown into a state of angry vexation; and perhaps, after all—for in war reputation is strength—he was right in believing that the deduction of three or four hundreds from the numerical strength of our Light Brigade could be no sufficing compensation to him for the moral disaster sustained by the main body of his powerful cavalry—the disaster of having been overthrown and put to flight by the desultory and uncombined onsets of scanty numbers of horsemen. Perceiving, as he could not fail to do, the unspeakable rashness, or rather self-destructiveness, of the charge, he was disposed to attribute it to the maddening power of alcohol; and it would seem that he was rendered all the more indignant by imagining that the disgrace of his cavalry—his cavalry numbered by thousands—was the result of a drunken freak. He found himself obliged to abandon that somewhat easy mode of accounting for heroism when he had examined our prisoners. Upon his asking

General  
Liprandi's  
questions  
respecting  
the exploit  
of the Light  
Brigade.

CHAP. I. them whether they had not been made drunk before the charge, they were able to assure him with truth that the men of our Light Cavalry (as also, indeed, those of Scarlett's brigade who had defeated General Ryjoff in the morning) were not only guiltless of having touched any strong drink, but had been actually fasting all day.\* For proof of this they appealed to the state of their haversacks when taken from them, which contained their untouched rations, including their untouched ration of rum.

Liprandi showed a strong wish to learn the name and rank of an English officer who had been seen retreating on a chestnut horse with white heels; and upon questioning the English prisoners on the subject, he was told by some of them that the officer so seen was Lord Cardigan. Upon receiving this answer General Liprandi remarked that nothing but the advantage of having a good horse could have saved the rider from the Cossacks who pursued him.†

It has been computed that the onset, the com-

\* It was just when they were about to be dismissed to their breakfasts that our cavalry were called upon to advance; and from that time until the Light Cavalry charge they were either kept moving or on the alert.

† Supposing that the prisoners were right in identifying the rider of the chestnut horse as Lord Cardigan, Liprandi's words add another corroboration (if any such were needed) to Lord Cardigan's account of the circumstances under which he began his retreat. There is only one witness—Thomas King—who connects the retreat of the rider of the chestnut horse with the time 'when the second line were going down.'

bat, and the retreat, which are popularly comprised under the name of the ‘Light Cavalry charge,’ lasted twenty minutes.\* What was suffered and done in that time I have sought to record. I will add the opinion respecting this singular passage of arms which was spontaneously and in private expressed by the English Commander. With but two small brigades of cavalry under his orders, Lord Raglan had cogent reason for thinking bitterly of an operation by which one of them had been shattered; and, when writing confidentially to the Secretary of State, he declared that the result of the Light Cavalry charge was a ‘heavy misfortune’—a misfortune he felt ‘most deeply.’† In conversation at Headquarters he not unfrequently expressed his painful sense of the disaster; and foreseeing the enthusiastic admiration which the feat would excite in England, he used sometimes to lament the perverseness with which he believed that his fellow-countrymen would turn from the brilliant and successful achievement of Scarlett’s brigade to dwell, and still dwell, upon the heroic, yet self-destructive exploit of Lord Cardigan’s squadrons; but the truth is that, apart from thoughts military, there was a deep human interest attaching to the devotion of the man and the men who, for

CHAP.  
I.  
  
Duration of  
the Light  
Cavalry  
combat:

Lord  
Raglan’s  
opinion of  
the charge

\* This was General Scarlett’s computation, and it has been generally adopted as likely to be right. Lord Cardigan at first used to speak of twenty-five minutes as the probable period, but he afterwards—and with great urgency—insisted that General Scarlett’s computation was the right one.

† Private letter to Duke of Newcastle, Oct. 28, 1854.

CHAP.  
I. the sheer sake of duty, could go down that fatal north valley as the English Light Cavalry did. This feeling on the part of others Lord Raglan might be willing to repress, but he could not help sharing it himself ; and despite all his anger and grief, despite the kind of protestation he judged it wholesome to utter for the discouragement of rash actions on the part of his officers, I still find him writing in private of the Light Cavalry charge that it ‘was perhaps the finest thing ever attempted.’ \*

General  
Bosquet's  
criticism on  
the charge.

The well-known criticism delivered by General Bosquet was sound and generous. He said of the charge, ‘It is splendid ; but it is not war.’ † He spoke with a most exact justice ; but already the progress of time has been changing the relative significance of that glory and that fault which his terse comment threw into contrast. What were once the impassioned desires of the great nations of the West for the humbling of the Czar are now as cold as the ashes which remind men of flames extinguished ; and our people can cease from deplored the errors which marred a battle, yet refuse to forget an achievement which those very errors provoked. Therefore the perversity which sent our squadrons to their doom is only after all the mortal part of the story. Half-forgotten already, the origin of the ‘Light Cavalry

\* Oct. 30, 1854.

† ‘C'est magnifique ; mais ce n'est pas la guerre.’ This was said by General Bosquet to Mr Layard in the field, and at the time of the charge.

'Charge' is fading away out of sight. Its splendour remains. And splendour like this is something more than the mere outward adornment which graces the life of a nation. It is strength—strength other than that of mere riches, and other than that of gross numbers—strength carried by proud descent from one generation to another—strength awaiting the trials that are to come.

## XI.

Divining apparently that the disaster incurred by our Light Cavalry would chill the ardour of the Allies, Liprandi not only determined to reverse that movement of retreat from the Causeway Heights which Lord Raglan had so swiftly detected, but even wished, it would seem, to make a show of seriously offering resistance to the Allies if assailed in that part of the field. He therefore countermarched the Odessa regiment to the ground near the Arabtabia Redoubt,\* from which it had been withdrawn at the approach of our cavalry, and he moved such additional troops to the same ground as brought up his force on that part of the Causeway Heights to a strength of eight battalions, supported by artillery.

It is probable that Sir Colin Campbell detected this change of disposition on the part of the enemy; for he came to the Duke of Cambridge, and, with a good deal of earnestness, entreated his Royal Highness to dissuade Cathcart from

Liprandi's counter-march of the Odessa battalions.

\* The Number Three Redoubt.

CHAP. I. attacking the redoubts. His Royal Highness declined to interfere ; but it is probable that Sir Colin Campbell may have found some other channel by which to convey his advice.\* At all events, no attack took place. I do not imagine that Sir Colin meant to express any opinion against duly concerted measures for the recovery of the heights, but only to deprecate an isolated attack upon ground where the enemy had just concentrated a large part of his force.

Deliberations  
of General  
Canrobert  
and Lord  
Raglan.

However, General Canrobert and Lord Raglan had a force in the plain which, by this time, was so disposed that they might undertake the recapture of the heights, and they were called upon to determine whether or not it would be well for them to use their power. Lord Raglan, I believe, still desired to do so ; but the loss of the Light Cavalry Brigade, though it did not impair the power of the Allies to recapture the heights, was a reason which made it more difficult than before to maintain an extended dominion in front of Balaclava. Indeed it was evident that the dominion which had there been exercised could now be no longer maintained without either relaxing the siege, or else determining that a portion of the French covering army should come down to take charge in the plain ; and it is evident that this was a condition of things which would fairly entitle General Canrobert to even more than his usual weight in the Anglo-French counsels.

\* I believe he came himself and spoke to Cathecart.—*Note to 3d Edition.*

Now, General Canrobert, as we know, had conceived from the first that the advance of the Russians into the plain of Balaclava was a mere snare by which they were trying to lure him down from the Chersonese ; and it must be acknowledged that, if looked at in a too narrow spirit, the reasons which could be adduced against any attempt to recapture the forts had a great appearance of cogency. It was said that, with their limited strength, and the great business of the siege in hand, the Allies could not afford the troops needed for occupying ground so distant as that on which stood the redoubts ; that if they were that moment in possession of the heights policy would require that they should give them up the next day ; and that, plainly, it must be unwise for belligerents, whose whole prospects depended upon the speedy capture of Sebastopol, to undertake a combat for the recovery of ground which they could not afford to occupy.

In its direct bearing upon what may be called the merely material view of the question, the argument was possibly sound ; but it had the defect which the great Napoleon in the successful part of his career so well knew how to avoid —the defect of leaving out from the reckoning all allowance for those moral forces which govern the actions of men. The events of the day had been such, that if they should be followed by the extrusion of the enemy from the sites of the Turkish redoubts and the recapture of the English guns, the Russians, it was plain, would have to

go out of action not only with the distinct consciousness of a defeat, but of a defeat rendered bitter and humiliating by the overthrow of their powerful cavalry ; whereas, if Liprandi should be left in possession of the hillocks, and the small iron guns which he had been able to capture, he might plausibly claim a victory, and would have some real trophies to show in the Theatre Square at Sebastopol. It is true enough that no such nominal victory as this was calculated to give mighty confidence to Liprandi's own little army —the men who composed it knew the truth too well—but it was for the defenders of Sebastopol rather than for the field army that moral force was vitally needed ; and in Sebastopol, as we now know, the ‘victory of Balaclava,’ and the guns which, though taken from the Turks, could still be truly called ‘English,’ were well fitted to be received as blessings of unspeakable value. They could not fail to give heart to the men—whether soldiers, or sailors, or people—who were engaged in defending the place, and on the other hand it may be taken for granted that if the tidings of so slender a ‘victory’ as that of Balaclava could bring all this accession of moral strength to the beleaguered town, the opposite effect that must have been produced by Liprandi's defeat would have been fully proportionate.

The deter-  
mination of  
the Allies.

It was determined that the Russians should be left in undisturbed possession of the ground which they held.

Sir George Catheart, who had brought his

division to the ground near the Redoubt 'Number Four,' now caused the work to be manned once more by the Turks; and his riflemen took part in a fusilade which appeared to have the effect of silencing two Russian guns.

C H A P.  
I.

At about four o'clock the firing came to an end; but all grave contention had ceased from the moment when the Allied Commanders determined to acquiesce in Liprandi's conquest. He held without further challenge all three of the captured redoubts; and retained to a point so far westward his dominion on the Causeway Heights as to be able to forbid free communication between Balaclava and the main Allied camps by the line of the Woronzoff road.

With the condition of things now shown, both the Allies and the Russians were so far content that they allowed the battle to end.

close of  
the battle.

## XII.

If the scope of this conflict were to be measured by numbering the forces engaged, and the men killed, wounded, or taken, a much slighter record than the one I have framed would be fully enough for the purpose; but from its effect in cramping the English at Balaclava, and exalting the spirit of Sebastopol, this first effort of Prince Mentschikoff's resurgent field-army exerted much power over the subsequent course of events; and, on the other hand, the battle comprised several fights which so happily elicited the quality of

The kind of  
importance  
which can  
be attached  
to the battle  
of Balaclava.

**C H A P.** the soldier, whether English, French, Russian, or Turk, as to have a distinct present bearing on the warlike repute of each nation engaged, and therefore, of course, on its strength, and therefore, again, on its welfare. Under that kind of aspect the glory of fights which sprang out of sheer chance or mistake may come to be of higher moment to England than the objects and the vicissitudes of a somewhat fanciful war long since at an end. What are now the ‘four points of Vienna’ when compared with the achievement of Scarlett’s dragoons and Cardigan’s Light Cavalry charge ?

*Summary of  
the battle.*

Told more shortly, the story is this : Marching by two unconnected routes in the early morning, a portion of Liprandi’s forces established batteries with which they cannonaded the Turkish redoubt on Canrobert’s Hill. Upon being apprised of this movement, Lord Raglan at once sent down two divisions of foot ; but time must necessarily elapse before the troops thus despatched could come into action ; and, in the meanwhile, there were no English forces with which to support the Turks in their defence except our division of cavalry and its attendant troop of horse-artillery.

The question was, whether Lord Lucan, with the cavalry arm alone, could and would aid the Turks in warding off for a few hours the impending attack ? With the approval of Sir Colin Campbell, he abstained from launching any of his squadrons in arrest of the enemy’s progress ; and our horsemen, though compelled to be spec-

tators of what followed, were not suffered to interpose as assailants.

CHAP.  
I.

Being thus let alone by our cavalry, and but slightly molested, if molested at all, by its attendant troop of horse-artillery, the Russian infantry proceeded to storm the work on Canrobert's Hill, and by the strength of their overwhelming numbers they succeeded in carrying it, though not until the brave little Turkish garrison of not more than 500 or 600 men had lost, in killed only, as many as 170.

Upon seeing the fate of the redoubt on Canrobert's Hill, the Turks posted in the three next adjoining works abandoned them at once to the Russians. The enemy having speedily entered them, dismantled and afterwards quitted the one called 'Number Four,' but kept the other three in his grasp, together with their seven English guns.

As the Russians advanced, our cavalry fell back; and Lord Lucan had just taken up a position in the South Valley, where his troops would cover Balaclava, when by an order sent down from Headquarters, all his squadrons were drawn in under the steeps of the Chersonese; but that last order again was presently followed by another, which directed that eight squadrons of Heavy Dragoons should countermarch towards Kadiköi, and aid the defence of the gorge.

Notwithstanding the rapid and almost brilliant success which had hitherto rewarded his enterprise, Liprandi did not hold to the purpose, if ever he had it, of really attacking Balaclava.

---

CHAP.  
I.

Yet by arraying his powerful cavalry, with its attendant batteries, across the North Valley, he not only showed a good front to the troops coming down from the Chersonese, but connected himself by his right with the slopes of the Fedioukine Hills ; and as Jabrokritsky was there establishing himself, it might be said that the Russians at this time were an army taking up a position.

Their array was apparently meant to be the commencing stage of a deliberate, well-conducted retreat.

Since the Russians were attempting nothing against Balaclava, and the Allies had as yet no division of infantry far advanced on the plain, there resulted a pause in the battle.

The Russian cavalry however, having before it a great tract of unoccupied ground, was—without any very large purpose—induced to advance up the valley ; and (after detaching on its way the few squadrons which descended towards Sir Colin Campbell and quickly turned aside from his fire) this great body of horse continued to move forward till it came within range of the Chersonese batteries ; when, after incurring two shots, it turned aside to its left and gained the top of the Causeway ridge.

Then ended that part of the battle which was governed by design, and Chance began to have sway.

It happened that whilst countermarching towards Kadiköi, in obedience to the order last

mentioned, General Scarlett with six of his squadrons had reached that part of the South Valley which lay directly under the Russians now crowning the ridge.

CHAP.  
I.

That which followed was the great fight between the Russian cavalry and our Heavy Dragoons. The Russian cavalry, upon being overthrown, did not merely retreat to the ground whence it came, but moved off far away to the rear with its attendant batteries, leaving the two protruding columns of Liprandi and Jabrokritsky in a state of severance the one from the other—two wings without a body—and each of them very open to attack.

Lord Raglan instantly saw his opportunity, and ordered—in writing—that the cavalry should advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights. This direction not having been executed by the commander of our cavalry, was followed, after an interval, by the yet more peremptory order which Nolan brought down from Lord Raglan.

Upon the delivery of this order there occurred the strange scene which ended in Lord Lucan's conceiving that, instead of attacking the heights, it was his duty to send Lord Cardigan and his Light Brigade down the fatal North Valley, and to follow himself in support with the Heavy Dragoons. The first moments of Lord Cardigan's forward movement proved the wisdom with which Lord Raglan had ordered an attack on the Causeway Heights; for when the Russians perceived

C H A P.  
I.

the advance of the Light Brigade without yet being able to foresee its actual destination, the Odessa battalions—those battalions which stood on the spot to which Lord Raglan had directed the attack—retreated at once from the forward position they had occupied on the Causeway Heights, and formed square a good way to the rear.

The Light Brigade continued to move forward ; and, for a time, Lord Lucan was anxiously following its advance with a portion of his Heavy Dragoons ; but afterwards (though still holding his Heavy Dragoons in readiness to cover his Light Cavalry during a portion at least of its anticipated retreat) he judged that it was his duty to save the rest of his squadrons from the disasters which the Light Brigade was incurring, and determined that Lord Cardigan's attack must thenceforth remain unsupported.

Lord Cardigan persisted in his advance down the valley ; and then followed the rest of the operations which constitute the ‘Light Cavalry ‘Charge.’ It was in advancing down the length of the valley that our Light Cavalry incurred their main losses, and were reduced to a third of their strength ; but the remnant of the brigade seized the battery at the foot of the valley, overthrew the main body of the Russian cavalry, and forced their way back through the rest of them, owing much of their immunity in retreat to the brilliant achievement of D'Allonville and his famous ‘Fourth Chasseurs d'Afrique.’

Emboldened by the disaster which our Light

Cavalry incurred, and possibly, also, by visible signs of hesitation in the counsels of the Allies, Liprandi began to reverse his movement of retreat. The Odessa battalions countermarched to the ground from which they had been withdrawn, and some additional troops were established on the line of the Causeway Heights.

CHAP.  
I.

For reasons based on the difficulty of holding a wide extent of ground in the plain of Balaclava, the Allies determined to acquiesce in Liprandi's conquest of the redoubts ; and with that decision —though vain shots were afterwards fired—the battle came to an end.

In ground the Allies lost the outer line of defence which the English by the aid of the Turks had provided for Balaclava ; and with it, they so lost their freedom of action in the country they had made bold to invade, as to be thenceforth confined during several months within very narrow limits, and that, too, with great strictness. They remained, of course, in the occupation of the whole of the Chersonese ; but there was a question, as we shall hereafter see, of actually abandoning Balaclava ; and although the proposal to that effect was ultimately discarded by the Allies the scope of their dominion on the land side of the place became so contracted as only to include the marine heights on our right, and just so much ground in front of the place as was necessary for maintaining its communications with the Chersonese by the way of 'the Col.'

The loss  
of ground  
sustained  
by the  
Allies.

CHAP.

I.

In submitting to be thus extruded from the Causeway Heights, the Allies gave up the control of the Woronzoff road, and the time was at hand when this loss would become a cause of cruel sufferings to the English army.

The  
casualties  
resulting  
from the  
battle.

The Allies lost in killed and wounded about 600 officers and men, besides some fifteen unwounded English and a small number of Turks who were taken prisoners.\* The Russians, it seems, lost in men killed and wounded about 627.†

Trophies  
taken by the  
Russians.

The Russians took out of the redoubts captured from the Turks seven cast-iron English guns. Also, Liprandi was enabled to send to his chief the welcome trophy of a Turkish standard.

Treatment  
of the  
prisoners  
taken by  
the enemy

It may here be recorded, and recorded with gratitude, that the English prisoners, upon the whole, were treated with great kindness; and I will mention a touching example of good feeling displayed by the poor Muscovite soldiers. Simple, untutored men, they yet had heard so much of the ways of other nations as to be aware that the Englishmen did not live on that strange waxy substance which goes by the name of 'black bread;' and their kindly natures were so moved by the

\* I am not aware that any one unwounded Englishman having under him an unwounded horse was taken prisoner.

† This includes some who were only 'contusionnés,' and also fifteen missing. I include those last because I believe that all who were 'missing' had been either killed or wounded. The basis of the statement as to the Russian losses is the official return, to which (by adopting it) General de Todtlen gives the weight of his authority.

thought of this that they generously subscribed  
out of their humble pittances to buy white loaves  
for the prisoners.\*

CHAP.  
I.

With the knowledge of the kindness thus ex-  
tended to our own people, it is painful to have to  
add that the Turkish prisoners were ill treated.

With which of the two contending forces did <sup>With whom  
the victory ?</sup> the victory rest? If it be believed that—how-  
ever irresolutely—the Russians entertained the  
design of trying to break into Balaclava, the  
failure of their attempt would be a circumstance  
strongly bearing upon the question; for when  
they ventured to descend into that South Valley  
by which Balaclava might be approached, they  
were instantly stopped at one point by the 93d  
Highlanders, and superbly defeated at another by  
Scarlett's Dragoons. If that were all, it might  
seem to follow that the palm was with those who  
repulsed the attacks; but, on the other hand, it  
must be remembered that our Light Cavalry after  
seizing the twelve-gun battery and routing the  
main body of the enemy's horse was itself obliged  
to retreat, and that the Russians, though worsted  
in combat after combat, still were suffered to re-  
main in possession of the ground, the redoubts,  
and the trophies which they had won in the first  
hour of the morning. Upon the whole, therefore,

\* General de Todleben communicated this to me, and I have great confidence in the accuracy of the statement. The statement must not be understood as applying specially to the prisoners taken at Balaclava.

CHAP.

I.

---

The effect  
of the battle  
upon the  
self-confi-  
dence of the  
Russians.

it will probably be thought that there was no such decisive inclination of the balance as to give to one side or the other the advantage which men call a 'victory.'

But, apart from the mere name of victory, one of the weightiest effects of a battle is the change which it commonly works in the self-confidence of the opposing forces ; and under this aspect of its consequences the result of the day's fighting in the plain of Balaclava was somewhat anomalous ; for the action consisted of five several combats not effectually brought into one by any pervading design ; and, excepting only the first, there were none of these combats which ended without shedding glory on the Allies, and inflicting something like humiliation on the enemy. Therefore the effect of the day's conflict was such as to be disheartening—oppressively disheartening—to those of the Russians who actually fought in it ; and it is probable that for a long time afterwards it would have been impracticable to make the Russian cavalry act with anything like confidence in the presence of a few English squadrons ; but, on the other hand, the facts were such that, without any actual misstatement of them, they could be narrated in a way highly encouraging to all Russians who were not on the field, and especially encouraging to the soldiery, the seamen, and the people upon whose spirit the fate of Sebastopol was depending. Liprandi could dwell upon the brilliant assault and capture of the work on Canrobert's Hill, and upon the fall of the other redoubts ;

could pass lightly over the conflicts which his cavalry hazarded with the Highlanders and with Scarlett's dragoons ; could speak frankly of the wondrous pertinacity evinced by our Light Cavalry in its road to destruction ; could state that, in the teeth of all the forces brought down by the Allies, he had persisted in holding the line of the captured redoubts ; could show that he was thus pressing close upon the English camp at Balaclava ; and could end by producing the captured guns and the captured standard as fit tokens of what had been achieved. Despatched from the camp of a relieving army to a beleaguered town, such a narrative as this, with the many and brilliant adornments which rumour would abundantly add, might well carry heart to the garrison ; and we now know that the tidings and the trophies of the battle brought such joy and encouragement to the people defending Sebastopol as to aggravate, and aggravate heavily, the already hard task of the besiegers.

CHAP.  
I.

With each hour of the lapsing time from the night of the 20th of September, that store of moral power over the enemy which the Allies acquired by their victory had been almost ceaselessly dwindling ; and although it be granted that, so far as concerned all those Russians who were assailed by our cavalry, or by D'Allonville's Chasseurs d'Afrique, the old spell was superbly renewed, it is yet, I think, true that with the rest of the enemy's forces, and especially in the lines of Sebastopol, our patience under the capture

CHAP.  
I.— which deprived us of the Turkish redoubts and the English guns which had armed them did much to destroy what was left of the ascendant obtained on the Alma.

## XIII.\*

Lord  
Cardigan.

In general, there is but little disposition on the part of the world to analyse any great feat of arms with the notion of seeing exactly how much was done by the troops, and how much by their leader. Under the ordinary and popular aspect of warlike conflicts, the actions of the chief and his soldiery are blended into one glowing picture; and since it is easier, and even more interesting to contemplate the prowess of one man than the compound deserts of a thousand, the result most commonly is that, without truly learning what guidance was given by the commander, mankind are content to assign him an enormously large share of the glory which he and his people have earned. In the instance of the Light Cavalry charge, this was the more especially likely to be the case, because the General in immediate command of the assailing troops was their actual, bodily leader. I imagine that if Lord Cardigan had remained silent, no painful scrutiny would have been ever applied to the actions of the man who rode the foremost of all between two flanking

\* In the text of what follows, down to the close of the chapter, no alteration has been made since its original publication in 1868.

fires into the front of the twelve-gun battery, and the glory allotted to the chief would have been nearly as free from question as the glory of his martyred brigade. But, as in the disposal of his daily life Lord Cardigan had separated himself from his troops by choosing to live in that home of comparative luxury which a well-supplied yacht could afford, whilst not only his officers and men, but even his immediate commander, lay always camped out in the plain, so also in the graver business of upholding his fair fame as a soldier by argument, assertion, and proof, he acted in such manner as to sever himself from that very brigade with which his renown had been blended.

Under stress of ill health, he returned to England. There, as may well be supposed, he was greeted with the wildest enthusiasm ; and then began the long process by which he mismanaged his military reputation. By consenting to be made the too conspicuous and too solitary hero of public ovations ; by giving to the world his own version of the famous Light Cavalry charge ; by showing—he showed this quite truly—how well he had led the attack, but omitting—and there was the error of errors—to speak of that separation which I have called being ‘thrown out ;’ by continuing in this course of action until he provoked hard attacks ; by submitting to grave specified charges, or meeting them with mere personal abuse ; by writing letters to newspapers ; by sending complaints to the Horse Guards ; by making himself the bitter antagonist of officers,

CHAP. nay, even of regiments, where claims for the least  
—<sup>1.</sup> share of glory seemed clashing at all with his own; and finally by a process of tardy litigation exploding, after eight years of controversy, in one of the law courts at Westminster, he at length forced the world to distinguish between his brigade and himself. He forced men, if so one may speak, to decompose the whole story of the ‘Light Cavalry Charge ;’ and one result is, that the narrator of that part of the combat which began when the chief went about, is driven against his will to an unaccustomed division of subjects, having first to go home with the leader, and then travel back to the fight. In such conditions, it is not possible to do real justice by merely saying what happened. It would be cruel, and wrong to speak dryly of Lord Cardigan’s retreat without giving his justification. Accordingly, at the very moment of narrating his retreat I began to show how he defended it; and I now think it right to impart the nature of his justification with more fulness than could well be allowed me whilst yet in the midst of the story.

So long as he moved down the valley under the guidance of what he understood to be an assigned duty, no danger seemed to appal him, and of a certainty none bent him aside from his course. That which afterwards baffled him was something more perturbing than mere danger to one whose experience had been military without being warlike. What he encountered was an emergency. Acting apparently with the full per-

suation that the leadership of his first line was the one task before him, he all at once found that of that first line he could see nothing, except some horsemen in retreat, and already a good way up the valley.\* It did not, it seems, appear to him that by holding up his sword for a rally he could draw any stragglers to his side, and he had no aide-de-camp, no orderly with him. What was he to do?† Well indeed might it be said that the emergency was an unforeseen one, for what manual had ever explained how a cavalry leader should act if all the troops he could see were out of his reach, and he had no one at his side by whom he could send an order?

Even when in the midst of the narrative, I found time to speak—although shortly—of what Lord Cardigan believes to be the true rule of cavalry practice. His theory is, that a cavalry officer in command of two or more lines when about to undertake a charge should first give sufficient directions to the officers in command of his supports, and thenceforth address himself

His theory  
as to the  
duty of an  
officer cir-  
cumstanced  
as he was.

\* That the theory was no mere afterthought, and that Lord Cardigan really considered the leadership of the first line as the one task before him, is shown, I think, by the terms of the private memorandum which he imparted to Lord Raglan on the second day after the battle, and long before controversy began ; for he there described himself as having been ordered to attack—not with the Light Brigade, but—with the 13th Light Dragoons, and the 17th Lancers, *i.e.*, with the regiments constituting his first line. See note, *ante*, p. 210.

† As was said by the Lord Chief Justice, it would be well for men forming opinions upon Lord Cardigan's conduct 'to ask 'themselves how they would have acted in a similar state of 'things ?'

CHAP.

I.

specially (in the absence of exceptional circumstances) to the leadership of his first line; the principle apparently being that, by reason of the impossibility of transmitting verbal orders to a distance in the midst of a cavalry charge, the movements of the first line are in the nature of signalled directions, which offer a continuous guidance to the squadrons advancing in their rear. The General does not of course cease to be in the actual and effective command of the whole force engaged in the charge, but he exerts his authority over the squadrons advancing in support first by giving them anticipatory directions, and afterwards by showing them through the means of their eyesight and without any further words the way in which he leads his first line.\* If, in short, he gives proper instruction to his supports before the commencement of the charge, and then proceeding to lead his first line, takes care to lead it efficiently, he has done all that in ordinary circumstances could be required of him.

There is a defect in the argument by which Lord Cardigan applies this theory to his own case; for as soon as he had determined that (without first riding off a great way to the rear) there was nothing for him to do towards rallying

\* Supposing the application of the theory to be confined within proper bounds, it seems to be based upon the necessity of the case, and to be, for that reason, sound; but I observe that infantry officers are at first much startled when they hear it propounded as a justification for leaving the supports to themselves.

or otherwise governing the fragments of his first line, the exigency under which a General may be forced to leave his supports to take care of themselves would seem to have lost its force. After the conclusion he had come to in regard to the hopelessness of attempting to rally his first line, or taking any farther part in its combats, Lord Cardigan was so circumstanced that he had leisure to look after his supports ; and, indeed, there was no other public duty of a momentous kind that he well could attempt to discharge.

Lord Cardigan, however, has reinforced this theory by an important assertion. He solemnly declares that when he retreated he nowhere could see his supports ; and after intimating a belief that he could not have reached them without pushing his search through bodies of Russian cavalry, he finally submits that any endeavour on his part to get to his supports under such circumstances would have been absolutely hopeless and therefore wrong.

In explanation of the course that he took in retiring, Lord Cardigan has made written statements, of which the following are a portion :—

After stating that he ‘gradually retreated’ until he reached the battery into which he had led the first line, he goes on to say—‘On arriving there I ‘found no part of the first line remaining there ; ‘those which survived the charge had passed off to ‘the left short of the Russian limber-carriages or ‘retreated up the hill. I can upon my most solemn ‘oath swear that in that position, and looking

His state-  
ments and  
explan-  
ations.

His written  
explanations  
of the course  
he took in  
retiring

CHAP.  
I.

---

' round, I could see none of the first line or of the  
' supports. The supports ought to have followed  
' me in the attack, instead of which they diverged  
' to the right and left. . . . My aides-de-camp  
' were prevented by different causes from being  
' with me. I was consequently nearly or quite  
' alone. I have already positively stated that when  
' I got back to the battery which we had attacked  
' and silenced, I could see none of the first line,  
' and no troops formed either on the right or the  
' left. I therefore found myself alone ; and I ask,  
' was it not my duty to retreat gradually and  
' slowly in rear of the broken parties of the first  
' line up the hill, rather than turn and ride  
' through the Russian cavalry in search of my  
' supports, without knowing at the time which  
' way they had gone, they not having followed  
' the first line in the advance as they ought to  
' have done ? My humble opinion is, that it is  
' quite sufficient for a General of Brigade to re-  
' turn with as well as lead the attack of the front  
' line, unless he should by chance come in contact  
' with his supports, in which case he would re-  
' main with them ; but it may be observed that  
' no general officer could have rendered any ser-  
' vice or assistance in an affair like that of Bal-  
' clava, in which all the loss of men and horses  
' was sustained in twenty minutes, and there were  
' no troops left with which to attack an over-  
' whelming force like that of the Russians in  
' position on that day.\* ' What was the duty

\* Paper furnished to me by Lord Cardigan.

of the Brigadier under such circumstances? In <sup>CHAP.</sup>  
 'such a desperate *mélée* to remain to be taken  
 'prisoner, or was it his duty to retire?' \*

When Lord Cardigan declares that at the time <sup>Counter statements</sup> of his retiring he nowhere saw the supports, he places himself in antagonism to a great body of sworn testimony.†

Is it, can it be true that Lord Cardigan in his retreat met a part of his supports then moving down towards the battery, and that in the face of their continued advance he pursued his way towards the rear, past the left of the 4th Light Dragoons?‡

I acknowledge the apparent weight and the general consistency of the evidence which has been adduced in support of an affirmative answer to this question, and I believe in the good faith of the witnesses. I also acknowledge that, supposing the supports to have reached the guns before Lord Cardigan retreated, it is hard to understand how he could have ridden back through the battery without becoming cognisant of the obstinate and boisterous combat which was there maintained for some time by the 4th Light Dragoons. But, on the other hand, there

\* Another paper furnished to me by Lord Cardigan.

† The affidavits here referred to in *Cardigan v. Calthorpe* were not regarded as being strictly relevant to the exact question *then* at issue, and Lord Cardigan, I believe, had no opportunity of adducing evidence in contradiction of them. The effect of the litigation was to *raise* the question stated in the text, but not to *solve* it.

‡ This was the main question raised by the testimony adduced on behalf of Colonel Calthorpe.

**CHAP.** stands the solemn assertion of Lord Cardigan; **I.** there is the mass of counter-evidence which he has adduced; \* there is a question of mistaken identity; † there is a difficulty in seeing how Lord Cardigan, after his encounter with the Cossacks, could possibly have come back in time to be meeting the 4th Light Dragoons on the English side of the battery: and it will not be forgotten that the officer whose conduct at the time of his retreating has thus been brought into question, was the one who, a minute before, had been leading his brigade down the valley, and charging at its head through the guns with a firmness that was never surpassed.

The question not yet ripe for decision.

The question is not ripe for conclusive decision. ‡ Its issue is one of great moment to the military reputation of Lord Cardigan, but not,

\* Not sworn and filed in a court of law, but verified by the witnesses as their solemn 'declarations,' and laid before me by Lord Cardigan.

† Notwithstanding the great difference in the ages of the two men, an officer who was himself with the 4th Light Dragoons, and who could judge of the extent to which smoke and rapid movement might baffle the sight—I mean Captain E. W. Hunt—believed that Lieutenant Haughton of the 11th Hussars, who rode back mortally wounded, was mistaken for Lord Cardigan. From another source I have ascertained that Lieutenant Haughton (who wore the same conspicuous uniform as the leader of the brigade) rode a chestnut horse very like Lord Cardigan's.

‡ Some of those who, as is supposed, might throw much light on the question, have hitherto maintained silence. The proceeding in Cardigan *v.* Calthorpe was not one well calculated to probe the truth, for besides that the question was narrowed by technical rules, and that the evidence was not given orally, the disputants were without the means of obliging any witnesses to testify.

after all, essential to a due comprehension of the battle ; because all agree that at the time of his retiring Lord Cardigan had become personally isolated, and was giving no orders. Still dwelling now upon the memory of the man who led the Light Cavalry charge—he has died since the last sentence was in type—I am unwilling to withhold all acknowledgment of what—as contradistinguished from a rigorously deduced conclusion—I will call the strong personal **bias** which my mind has received. I cannot, I do not believe that Lord Cardigan, when he retreated, met and saw his supports advancing.\*

Down to the time of his extricating himself from the Cossacks, Lord Cardigan's leadership of this extraordinary charge was so perfect as to be all but proof against even minute criticism. And to say this of his exploit is to say a great deal ; for in the first place, his actions on the 25th of October have been subjected to a piercing scrutiny ; and next, it is evident that his obedience had more the character of a soldier's martyrdom than of what men call 'desperate service.' Whilst he rode down the valley at the head of his splendid brigade with something like a foreknowledge of the fate to which he was leading it, he

\* It is the opinion of an officer of great authority who was so placed in the field as to be highly capable of forming a correct judgment of the effect of the smoke and other baffling causes, that whilst the three supporting regiments were advancing, it would have been quite possible for Lord Cardigan to ride back between two of those regiments without seeing either of them.

CHAP.  
I.— could not but feel that he was giving his chivalrous obedience to a wrongly - interpreted order; and there is nothing more trying to a soldier than the notion of being sacrificed by mistake.

The splendid machine which he had been trusted to wield was so perfectly constituted, and composed of men so resolute, that although ever lessening and lessening in size as the squadrons advanced down the valley, they never broke up until they had entered the battery; and as long as it was possible for the attack to go on in that orderly, disciplined way, so long, notwithstanding all the havoc that round - shot, grape, and rifle-balls were making, and notwithstanding the slenderness of the thread on which his own life seemed each moment hanging, the leader performed what he believed to be his duty with an admirable exactness, and a courage so rigid, that almost one might call it metallic. I cannot but think that by a feat of devotion so brave, so desperate, and yet, during some eight or ten deadly minutes, so deliberately pushed on to extremity, he entitled himself to a generous interpretation of what he next did when his peace-service lessons all failed him.\*

It has been said indeed that Lord Cardigan's attack was deprived of the heroic character which might otherwise have belonged to it by the fact

\* This, as I understand, was the ground on which the Lord Chief Justice proceeded when he said that criticism of the man who led the Light Cavalry charge 'should be a generous and liberal criticism.'—*Judgment of the Lord Chief Justice.*

of his having acted against his will, after actually remonstrating against the decision which consigned him and his brigade to the fatal valley, and that he had no choice but to charge like a hero or else become at his peril a wilful disobeyer of orders which directed him at once to advance.

CHAP.  
I.

But I imagine that this view is erroneous. In the first place, it is not at all usual to strip a leader of the glory naturally attaching to his enterprise by saying that, though acting superbly, he only was brave under orders; but in point of fact no such dilemma as the one supposed was really constituted. We saw what Lord Lucan stated to have been the terms of his order, and whether his version of the words or that of Lord Cardigan be adopted, there was nothing in them which would have caused an irresolute man to think himself compelled to lead his brigade to destruction by taking it down the length of the valley to the mouths of the guns then distant a mile and a quarter. It was only under the chivalrous construction which Lord Cardigan chose to put on the words that he could be compelled or even empowered to hazard the attack which he made.

Besides, if I am rightly informed, there was nothing more easy than for Lord Cardigan to let his advance down the valley come to an early end, not only without doing or omitting any act for which he could have been blamed, but even without being forced to confess to himself that he was so acting as to check the advance. The rapid ad-

CHAP. I. vance of a body of Cavalry cannot of course be perfectly governed by orders like the march of Foot soldiery, and the compactness of squadrons when once fairly launched against the enemy is so much dependent upon what may be called the ‘opinion’ of the force and so liable to be destroyed by the uncertainties, or the faltering, or the impatience of even a few men that, upon the whole, its principle of coherence is fragile and delicate in the extreme. What the troops of the first line have to do is to look carefully to the leader, and if his bearing is such as to convey different impressions to different men, a loosening of the ranks will begin. Therefore on the part of the leader, slight gestures, slight movements in the saddle, slight changes of pace, slight licence given to impatient horsemen are, in general, but too likely to be followed by the further loosening of the ranks, the angry objurgations of the officers, and finally by that impotent fumbling after carbines or pistols which proves that the attempt at a charge has stopped short and will presently cease; but in Lord Cardigan, during those minutes when he silently rode down the valley, none could see that one small sign of faltering or of doubt which alone would have sufficed to arrest the attack. From the first moment of the onset to the one when the battery was entered, the brigade felt the will of its leader.

## CHAPTER II.

## COMBAT OF THE 26TH OF OCTOBER.

THOUGH Liprandi on the 25th of October had for C H A P.  
II.  
the moment stopped short in his enterprise, he \_\_\_\_\_  
yet clung to the ground he had won ; and on the <sup>26th</sup> October.  
morrow of the battle, the true seat of danger was  
still in front of Balaclava.\* There, accordingly,  
we shall soon find Lord Raglan determining how  
best he might baffle the 24,000 troops thus  
threatening his port of supply ; but meanwhile,  
and to divert attention from Liprandi, the Rus-  
sians directed an attack upon the north-eastern  
part of the Chersonese.

Owing to the signal and conspicuous defeats  
inflicted upon Liprandi's masses of cavalry by  
Scarlett's and Lord Cardigan's horsemen, the  
yesterday's battle upon the whole was calculated  
to humiliate his troops ; and it is probable that  
their dispirited condition was the cause of his

Effect of the  
Balaclava  
battle upon  
the spirit of  
Liprandi's  
force :

\* This follows from what we now know—viz., that the move-  
ment against Evans was made to divert attention from Liprandi.  
—Todleben, p. 404.

CHAP.

II.

---

upon other  
Russian  
troops :

still prolonged hesitation in front of Balaclava ; but, on the other hand, the facts were such that,—by means of a partial suppression, and a little of the usual embroidery—they could be narrated in a way highly gratifying to any of the Russians who were not themselves on the field ; for Lord Cardigan's brigade had plainly purchased renown at the cost of huge, ruinous losses, and Liprandi, after all, was still in the unchallenged possession of the ground, the redoubts, and the trophies he had wrenched from the grasp of the Turks. Thus, whilst such of the Russians as had taken part in the battle or witnessed its most famous incidents had good reason for being disheartened, those of their fellow-countrymen who had only heard of the conflict through rumour and official reports might well be transported with joy.

upon the  
garrison of  
Sebastopol.

To this last category the whole garrison of Sebastopol belonged ; and on the morning of the 26th of October, their blood was so heated by a one-sided version of the yesterday's battle, by a public display of its trophies, and finally by an exulting 'Te Deum,' that they rose at last into the mood for warlike enterprise ; and, as though to furnish an outlet for all this exuberant zeal, it was determined that, soon after divine service, a sortie should be directed against our 2d Division —the force which stood guard over the southern part of Mount Inkerman. Whilst in this way diverting attention from Liprandi, the enemy was not unwilling to feel his way upon ground which perhaps might become the arena of a not distant

Object of  
the attack  
there  
planned

conflict ; and apparently, he also cherished a hope CHAP.  
II. that he might be able to fasten himself upon some part of the Inkerman heights, for his troops were to carry entrenching tools.

In the combat thus rapidly planned the Russians did not engage any formidable number of troops, but whilst fighting it on the predestined ground, they rehearsed, as it were, the attack which soon would be made in great earnest; and, on the other hand, their English opponent defended the heights on a plan which afforded a marked and interesting contrast to the one his successor adopted in the subsequent trial of strength. Thus a narrative of the earlier combat will help in more ways than one to illustrate the story of 'Inkerman.'

It was only in general by the presence of a Cossack vedette that the enemy displayed his real power on the northern part of Mount Inkerman; but he there nevertheless (with the aid of a few concealed riflemen) maintained an undisputed dominion; for the ground could be searched by his batteries in the Karabel Faubourg as well as by fire from his ships. So complete was his mastery that, when now he determined to issue in force from the Karabel Faubourg, to ascend Mount Inkerman, to traverse its northern part from west to east, and then—bringing round his left shoulder—to begin his advance towards Shell Hill, he rightly took it for granted that he might

\* Taking place as it did on 'Mount Inkerman'—the scene of the great fight there destined to be raging ten days afterwards—this combat of the 26th of October was often called the 'Little Inkerman.'

CHAP.  
II.his plan  
of attack.

be able to do all this without being molested or even seen by the pickets of our 2d Division. After moving thus far unopposed, he was to enter upon hostilities, to drive in our pickets, to establish himself on Shell Hill, and thence direct an attack against the main body of our 2d Division which lay camped behind its Home Ridge some three-fourths of a mile further south. The assailing force was to be covered on its right by a separate body of troops moving up the Careenage Ravine.

General  
Evans and  
his re-  
sources.

The General to be assailed on Mount Inkerman was Sir De Lacy Evans, a veteran well skilled in that part of the war-craft which belongs to the hour of combat ; and for the purpose of resistance to the feeble attack now attempted, he had, one may say, ample means ; for, although he could bring into action no more than some 2600 infantry against a far greater force of assailants, his numerical inferiority was compensated by the strength of the ground, and besides, by his great ascendant in the artillery arm ; but this was not all.\* The Duke of Cambridge, after sending him an additional battery at the first sound of combat, came up on his right with the Guards ; whilst Cathcart also and Bosquet moved troops towards the scene of the combat. Still, the only force destined this day to be actively engaged on Mount Inkerman was that of Evans's own division — the second — with its two field-batteries,† and

\* Evans had, it seems, on Mount Inkerman 2644 men. The rest of his strength was in the trenches.

† One under Captain Turner, the other under Captain Yates, and both commanded by Colonel Fitzmayer.

the third battery (Wodehouse's) sent up, as we saw, in good time by the Duke of Cambridge.\* CHAP. II.

As regards the Careenage Ravine, the only troops there at first were a picket of the Light Division (which, however, was quickly drawn in) and 60 volunteers of the Guards commanded by Captain Goodlake; † but these last were joined towards the close of the combat by some men of the Rifles under Captain Markham.

On the left bank of the ravine, or in other words upon the Victoria Ridge, there stood the right Lancaster battery, and there, the main picket of the Light Division was stationed. The one gun then remaining in the battery was a 'Lancaster' manned by some seamen under Mr Hewett.

But before the critical moment, which we shall by and by reach, General Codrington had so sagaciously watched the development of Federoff's advance as to be able to detect a spot on which the Russian infantry, if persisting in its southerly movement, might be advantageously assailed in flank by a fire from the Victoria Ridge; and Captain Singleton, ‡ having come up in great haste with half of Morris's battery, was directed to undertake the task. The captain's practised eye told him that it would be vain to make the attempt without bringing forward his guns to a

\* With this battery Colonel Dares was present, as also was Captain Wodehouse (who commanded it), and Captain Hamley.

† Respecting this force under Captain Goodlake, see note, *post*, p. 377.

‡ Now General Singleton, R.A.

Troops occupying the Careenage Ravine.

The Victoria Ridge:

C H A P.  
II.

Captain  
Singleton's  
three field-  
pieces there  
placed in  
battery.

spur of ground so exposed as to be under fire from the ships, but he believed that the promised advantage was more, much more than enough to warrant the risk; and when the Russian advance against our Second Division attained its expected development, he joyfully eyed it in profile, having then his field-pieces already well planted in battery upon the chosen spur.

Federoff's  
advance.

With forces which are stated to have comprised six battalions of infantry and four pieces of light artillery, Colonel Federoff moved out about mid-day from the Karabel Faubourg, crossed the Careenage Ravine by its viaduct, ascended along the sapper's road to the brow of Mount Inkerman, and continued thence to march eastward across the front of our pickets until the head of his column had reached the Volovia gorge.\* Then halting, and facing half about to its right, the column of march was converted all at once into an order of battle, the skirmishers swarming in front supported by company columns, and again by columns of attack. In this new order, the force began to advance against a picket of the 49th Regiment which watched the ground from Shell Hill.†

Even then, for some time, the picket remained undisturbed, its soldiery still lying down, their arms still piled, as was usual, the sentries in front still motionless; but presently two or three

\* The strength of the six battalions was apparently about 4300—4304 as I make it. Taking 700 as the strength of the column in the Careenage Ravine, the whole force of infantry would be about 5000.

† See the Plan.

rifles, discharged by men in the brushwood, began to raise an alert, and the picket then moving at once into extended order became engaged before long with the enemy's skirmishers.\* Upon the right of this picket Colonel Federoff after a while began to press forward in strength ; and, to avoid being cut off, the 49th men fell back by degrees —fighting hard nevertheless all the time—to one of the spurs in their rear. There, with the other companies afterwards aiding them, they maintained a vehement combat—a combat which stopped the assailants in that western part of the field.

His engagement with our pickets and continued advance to Shell Hill.

Upon learning that the picket of the 49th was engaged, Major Champion—the 'field-officer of 'the day' commanding the 1st Brigade pickets—sent forward three of his companies—each one of them about sixty strong—with orders to extend under the brow of Shell Hill, and there await the attack which was to be expected so soon as the picket of the 49th should be forced back. That event, as we saw, occurred after some lapse of time, and Champion's three companies being then face to face with the enemy engaged him in obstinate combat, whilst moreover, some men under

\* Although Colonel Federoff's advance could not for some time be seen by the troops he undertook to attack, it was plainly visible to our people on the Victoria Ridge, and, so far as regards the early stages of the operation, I entirely owe my means of tracing them to an admirable description furnished me by the kindness of an officer there posted, namely Colonel Hibbert (late of the 7th Royal Fusiliers), who watched the movement with great care from across the Careenage Ravine. The movement was reported to General Codrington and (through him, I believe) to Evans.

CHAP.  
II.

Sullivan—a valiant and trusty colour-sergeant—proved able to harass the train of artillery ascending from behind Cossack Knoll.

This strenuous and protracted resistance secured time for our artillerymen to plant their guns on Home Ridge; and no harm would have seemingly resulted, if the pickets thus achieving their task had now been at once driven in. But their obstinacy continued; and indeed the direct pressure put upon the front of Champion's extended line did not of itself suffice to make his men yield any ground. Colonel Federoff's movement, however, applied to the left of these troops that same irresistible leverage which had forced back the picket of the 49th by turning its right; and, General Evans not choosing to reinforce them, the enemy after a while made good his way on to the crest of Shell Hill, there established his guns in battery, and opened fire on Home Ridge.

His guns on  
Shell Hill;and engaged  
by those of  
Evans.Continued  
pressure  
upon our  
pickets.

To these pieces of light artillery the 18 nine-pounders of Evans replied, as may well be supposed, with overpowering effect; but whilst keeping in hand three battalions, Colonel Federoff, with the rest of his foot, still continued to press back our pickets by the leverage of his turning movements; and the combatants—a dense cloud of Russians, with the English lightly flecking its edge—began to move down the hillside. Evans could not at that time interpose with artillery-fire, because the grey overcoat, worn alike by the Russians and the English, made it hard to distinguish between them.

Our people thus combating had a really un-measured conception of the resistance that should be offered by a thin chain of pickets to an enemy advancing in strength. Still new in great measure to war, and ill-brooking that coercion by numbers which old campaigners accept, they, many of them, took offence, as it were, at the notion of being pressed back, grew savage against their assailants, and fought on with an obstinacy that could hardly have been exceeded if, instead of this outpost duty, they had had to defend to the last some only-remaining stronghold.\* It was in this spirit, for instance, that Lieut. Conolly fought, throwing off his grey coat—so that all might distinguish him from the enemy—and flinging himself into a clump of Russians, where he felled one man with his field-glass, whilst he cut down another with his sword. Far from seeking to moderate this zeal on the part of our pickets, Major Champion was himself in one of those warlike ecstasies which alternated with his pious emotions. ‘Slate ’em, slate ’em, my boys !’ was his exulting and often-repeated adjuration, as he moved in great bliss along their line. Even by some of the ablest staff-officers present with the combatants—as, for instance, by Colonel Percy Herbert and Captain Armstrong—it was appar-

CHAP.  
II.The spirit in  
which they  
fought.

\* In the latter years of the Peninsular War, the French and the English, it is said, got to understand each other so well, that our people when advancing in strength could often drive in the French pickets without quarrelling with them, by making recognised signs—signs which meant:—‘ You must be off; ‘ we are advancing in strength.’

**CHAP.  
II.** ently taken for granted that the ground in front of the position should not be thus yielded up; and they, both of them at different moments, petitioned their chief to give the pickets support.

The policy  
of Evans.

Thus there showed itself now that same eager and general desire to maintain a fight ‘out in the front’ which was destined to exert a wild sway over the tenor of the subsequent battle; but on this 26th of October, General Evans, as we saw, still commanded the 2d Division, and his conception of the way in which Mount Inkerman should be defended was the very opposite of the one formed by his successor on the later day. From the first, Evans made up his mind that, whenever attacked, he would draw full advantage from the natural strength of the ground; and this, as he judged, he might best do by declining to reinforce his pickets, by keeping his main strength collected on the Home Ridge, and there awaiting the time when he might deliver over the enemy’s advancing battalions to the mercies of artillery-fire. At one point, it is true—on the left of the combating line—he suffered Captain Armstrong to strengthen the hard-pressed picket of the 49th by bringing it two companies in support; but this was all he conceded, and to Percy Herbert, who asked for a battalion, his answer was—‘Not a man! ’\* With his eighteen field-pieces in battery on the Home Ridge, and the main

\* Colonel Percy Herbert, I believe, did not fail to become a strong admirer of the determination which subjected him to this refusal.

body of his infantry there drawn up in line, he awaited unmoved the yet further development of the attack.

The separate column meanwhile had been ascending the Careenage Ravine, and at first without being visible to its nearest adversaries ; for though Goodlake's sixty men of the Guards stood posted across the ravine at a spot close below the caves, there was a bend in the course of the gorge which concealed the one force from the other. \*

To assure himself against any ambush, Captain Goodlake (taking with him Sergeant Ashton) had gone up to examine the caves, leaving the rest of his sixty men halted across the bed of the chasm,

Advance of  
the separate  
column.

Captain  
Goodlake's  
adventure  
with the  
enemy.

\* Respecting the origin and constitution of this singularly adventurous little body of volunteers under Goodlake of the Coldstream, see 'Invasion of the Crimea,' vol. iv. of Cabinet Edition, note, p. 299. There were two other officers who originally acted with Goodlake in the formation and leadership of this body—namely, Cameron of the Grenadiers, and Baring of the Scots Fusilier Guards ; but Cameron, in one of the expeditions, was wounded. Goodlake carried him out of the fight on his back ; and Baring one day was so high-handed with a man of the Rifles whom he arrested in the act of retreating, that an inquiry on the subject was ordered ; so that ultimately Goodlake was the only one of the three who remained free to act ; and he commanded the force during a period of forty-two days, earning brilliantly his Victoria Cross. A narrative of the exploits of this force would make a volume of extraordinary interest ; but I imagine there is no hope that any such will ever appear ; for they who do these sort of things are apt to be men of few words. No doubt, Goodlake, Cameron, and Baring, and the men acting under them, knew well that by constantly hanging close upon the enemy they gained opportunities of doing really good services ; but they would hardly deny, I believe, that one motive at least, if not the main one, for engaging in these enterprises, was love of adventure and sport.

CHAP  
II. and partly too on each bank. Whilst thus left for the moment without their commander, Goodlake's men were suddenly confronted by the sight of the Russian column thronging up round the corner below. The hostile force seemed like a mob, numbering about six or eight hundred men, and was pressing forward along the bed of the ravine, but also along each of its banks.\* Goodlake's people retreated firing.

Goodlake himself, with Sergeant Ashton at his side, was still by the caves. Hemmed in by assailants, and debarred by the craggy and difficult ground from any possibility of effectual retreat, he thought that he and the sergeant must needs submit to be made prisoners. Sergeant Ashton, however, suggested that, if the captain and he were made prisoners, they would be assuredly put to death, in vengeance for one of their recent exploits;† and, all notion of surrender being thereupon discarded, the alternative of course was resistance. The Russians, whilst closing in upon their two adversaries, fired at them numbers of shots, which all, however, proved harmless. On the other hand, Goodlake and the sergeant fired each of them once into the nearest

\* The Russian military authorities ignore this column, and my impression is that it was a battalion of marines, or of seamen. They wore dark-grey coats, with black belts and caps (rather like those of our Greenwich pensioners), with red bands round them, and leather peaks.

† What the sergeant said was: ‘They would kill us over that picket job.’ He alluded to the fact that this little force under Goodlake had lately attacked a Russian picket, taking an officer and some of the men prisoners.

clump of Russians, and then, with the butt-ends of their rifles, knocked away the foremost of their assailants, and ran down to the foot of the bank. There, however, they were in the midst of a mob of Russians advancing up the ravine. To their great surprise, no one seized them ; and it was evident that, owing to the grey cloaks and plain caps they both wore, the enemy was mistaking them for his own fellow-countrymen. Shielded by this illusion, and favoured, too, by the ruggedness of the ground, and obstructive thickets of brushwood, which enabled them to be constantly changing their neighbours without exciting attention, they moved on unmolested in the midst of their foes ; and, though strange, it is not the less true, that this singular march was continued along a distance of more than half a mile.

At length, with its two interlopers, the Russian throng came to a halt, and not without a reason, for it was confronted by the sixty men of the Guards, who, after the lengthened retreat they had made when their chief was cut off from them, were now plainly making a stand, and had posted themselves some thirty yards off, behind a little trench, which there seamed the bed of the gorge. Goodlake, with his trusty sergeant, soon crossed the intervening space which divided the Russians from the English, and found himself once more amongst his own people.

When halted in front of Goodlake's men, the separate column was not far from being abreast of

C H A P.  
II.

Progress of  
the combat  
in the  
Careenage  
Ravine.

Federoff's foremost combatants on Mount Inkerman, and may therefore be said to have accomplished successfully the early part of its task; but the leader, as may well be imagined, now sought to do more, and for his next step, to overthrow the sixty men of the Guards confronting him from behind their trench. He exerted himself with a valour and energy much admired by our people, making vehement and repeated efforts to draw forward his men; but he every time failed to get a following, for Goodlake's men, with their venturesome chief now restored to them, showed no signs of yielding; and for some time the antagonist forces—the throng of Russians on one side, and the sixty men of the Guards on the other—remained thus standing at bay. Desisting after a lengthened combat from their endeavours to dislodge Goodlake's men, the Russians submitted to stand debarred from any further advance; but they clung to the part of the ravine they had been able to reach, some entering the magazine grotto, where they found abundance of food, others planting themselves in the brushwood, and behind jutting pieces of rock.\*

Continua-  
tion of the  
enemy's  
efforts on  
Mount  
Inkerman.

We left Evans suffering his pickets to be slowly pressed back; and Champion was already under the coercion of a fresh turning movement directed against his left when he received a message announcing that a mass of Russians might be

\* The magazine grotto was a cavern in which the powder for the Lancaster battery had been stored, but it was also used by the men of the neighbouring picket as a place for cooking and eating.

expected to come marching up by the Quarry Ravine, thus threatening him on the opposite flank. The announced danger, if existing at all, was not, it would seem, close at hand ; but Champion could not know this, and he instantly ordered his people to fall back to the main picket wall. In order to attain their goal before the announced mass should reach it, they executed this retrograde movement in all haste, and in truth one may say by a rush.\* Those of Champion's men who had been hitherto combating on his left flank, drew in rapidly towards the same spot ; and his 4th company (which had been on his right) now also acceding to him, he had a strength of nearly 240 men with which to oppose the strong body of Russians still descending the side of Shell Hill, and approaching the main picket wall.† Against this light obstacle—people afterwards called it 'the barrier'—a valiant young ensign, Koudriazeff, led forward some men of the Boutirsk regiment. He fell slain, and his attack was repulsed. Champion even made efforts to bring his men into the mood for a charge, standing up all the time whilst he urged them, on the top of the main picket wall ; and although not

CHAP.  
II.

\* This was evidently the circumstance which led General de Todleben to state that our pickets fell back precipitately.

† Champion, although of an enthusiastic temperament, was regarded by his brother officers as a man truthful to the extent of extreme accuracy, and he estimated this Russian mass at certainly a very high number. He says : 'I suppose our picket 'at the barrier must have stood the attack of 2000.'—Letter, 28th October 1854.

C H A P.  
II.

responding to his almost Quixotic appeal, they some of them advanced a little way and fired a few shots, thus causing the foremost of the Russians to fall back upon their main body. The huge body of Russians on the one side and the small band of two hundred and forty English on the other, stood confronting one another for some length of time, but combating only with firearms. The enemy ceased to gain ground.\*

Defeat of his  
columns  
advancing  
in support.

It was evident that if the Russian Commander would cling to the enterprise, he now must support his first line; and the merit of the plan which Evans had been following might be presently put to the proof. From the crest of Shell Hill, a column began to descend; and at first with impunity, for our gunners were only getting its range. Then round-shot tore in through its ranks; and the column breaking at once abruptly turned flankwise for shelter, dropping down into the Quarry Ravine; but even there it continued to suffer, for our skirmishers gained the edge of the bank, and fired down upon the fugitive crowd. Another strong column began to descend the hill side, but upon encountering the fire of our batteries it broke, and retired the way it came.† A third column showed itself, and met the same fate.‡ Presently the men of the first column, after having descended a little way down the ravine, began

\* Champion's despatch to General Pennefather, 27th Oct. 1854.

† 'Campaign of Sebastopol,' by Colonel Hamley, an eyewitness, p. 83.

‡ Narrative by an eyewitness, Mr Cavendish Taylor, late of the 95th Regiment, vol. i. p. 47. This careful observer specially

to climb up its left bank in order to make good their retreat by thus bending off to the west ; but upon their attaining the high ground, they came under the eyes of our gunners for the second time, were overtaken by round-shot and shell, and pursued, too, by obstinate skirmishers still pressing them in flank and rear.\* The Russians still engaged with our pickets could now be distinguished from their adversaries ; † and being accordingly visited by artillery as well as by infantry fire, they began to fall back. They took care to avoid undue haste, and to turn round and fire as they went ; ‡ but the men of the pickets sprang forward in pursuit. Already the enemy's guns had limbered up and retreated. Colonel Federoff, the commander of the Russian force, was struck down, grievously wounded, and—occurring almost simultaneously with a cluster of other misfortunes—this incident, as may well be imagined, increased the consternation they caused ; but it is plain that the ruin of the three columns stricken by the artillery of Home Ridge in front, and in flank by Captain Singleton's guns, was itself, without more, the ruin of the whole enterprise.§ The whole of testifies that the three columns broke *before* they retired. He writes : ‘They lost their formation—the columns broke before they retired. I saw them.’

CHAP.  
II.

His entire  
defeat on  
Mount  
Inkerman.

The retreat  
and pursuit

\* Hamley, p. 83.

† There was by this time a visible admixture of red coats, caused mainly, I suppose, by the accession of the two reinforcing companies.

‡ Colonel Hamley, p. 83.

§ The effect of the shells thrown from Captain Singleton's half-battery could be well discerned with a field-glass from the

**C H A P.** the enemy's forces on Mount Inkerman were in retreat. On the right, Evans suffered Percy Herbert to advance with four companies of the 41st; and as a support to the men of the pickets now eagerly engaged in pursuit, he threw forward his 30th, 49th, and 95th regiments, but—still wary—he halted them before they had passed over Shell Hill, and even indeed upon ground within seven hundred yards of its summit.

Mr Hewitt's  
fire from the  
Lancaster  
gun.

When at last he had fled clear of his pursuers, the enemy again incurred fire; for Mr Hewitt (the naval officer then acting in the Lancaster battery), threw down the part of the parapet which intercepted the fire he had planned, slewed round his Lancaster gun, and was presently hurling its missiles into the midst of the retreating force.

In the Careenage Ravine, the enemy's discomfiture was completed by Captain Markham with some men of the 2d Rifle battalion; but the Russians, before they succumbed, sustained a sharp combat against him in front of the magazine grotto, and seven of their number were killed, the Rifles having five men wounded. Captain Markham and Captain Goodlake between them took an officer and several men prisoners.

The enemy  
also defeated  
in the  
Careenage  
Ravine.

Whilst engaged at Balaclava in providing against the perils disclosed by the battle of the

Victoria Ridge, and it seems they wrought a great deal of havoc. The half-battery, as had been anticipated, drew fire from the ships, and there followed some narrow escapes amongst its officers and men, but not, I believe, any loss.

previous day, Lord Raglan had received a message from Sir George Brown which apprized him of the attack on Mount Inkerman, and having thereupon galloped back in all haste to the Chersonese Heights, he now—his horse white with foam—came up to the Victoria Ridge, but by that time the combat, though not yet extinct, was dwindling down towards its close. In describing what had passed to Lord Raglan, Sir George Brown laid great stress on the effect produced by the half of Morris's battery under Captain Singleton, and the Captain being present at the moment in this part of the field, had the honour of being there thanked for his services by the Commander-in-Chief.

Lord Raglan bending off to the east, soon reached the position of Evans, and then the firing ceased.\*

In this combat of the 26th of October, the interval between the first and the last exchange of shots—both occurred in the Careenage Ravine—was one of perhaps some three hours; but the period during which Evans and Federoff stood really

\* The circumstances mentioned in the text gave Lord Raglan an opportunity of exercising that thoughtful generosity in which he excelled other men. He knew that the fact of his own presence on the field before the close of the combat might tend, if recorded, to mar the completeness of the personal triumph fairly earned by Sir de Lacy Evans, and he therefore in his despatch passed over as quite immaterial the circumstance of his arrival on the Victoria Ridge, writing simply in reference to the combat :—‘I had not the good fortune to witness it myself, being occupied in front of Balaclava at the time it commenced, and having only reached his (Evans's) position as the affair ceased.’

C H A P.  
II.Lord Raglan  
on the  
Victoria  
RidgeClose of the  
combatDuration of  
the combat

CHAP. II.  
 its results: trying conclusions lay all within a few minutes. The losses acknowledged by the Russians were 270 either killed or wounded ; \* and Evans's people alone took more than eighty prisoners, including two officers. Of the English, twelve were killed and seventy-seven wounded. They did not lose any prisoners.

its pith : Told briefly, the combat was this : an advance of some five thousand Russian infantry encountered for a while by a chain of slowly receding pickets, and then crushed all at once by artillery.

its effect upon the soldiery of our 2d Division. From the moment when the enemy had completed his preliminary operations by establishing himself on Shell Hill, half an hour at the most proved enough to determine the result of his effort ; and indeed the attack was so weak that it scarce gave our people fair warrant for indulging the language of triumph. Still, in Evans's way of repulsing his assailants, there was an easy and masterful grace which could not but give confidence to his troops, and the more so perhaps since the combat for once resembled a field-day at home. The General's plan of suffering the combat to approach his own chosen ground, and then ending it at once with artillery, proved apt for the occasion in hand ; but the immediate success of his tactics was not their only result. By refusing to engage out in front more than three or four hundred of his infantry, he gave to this small portion of his division—and through them to the rest of it—an hour of the most wholesome train-

\* Todleben, p. 406

ing that any good troops could well have. The few left to strive with the many discovered, and discovered with glee, that against extravagant odds they could stand combating Russian infantry for an indefinite time, losing ground indeed, little by little, when coerced by turning movements, but suffering no ruinous carnage, and not having one man taken prisoner. From the success of such an experiment, even if it had been carried no further, they could hardly have failed to acquire a strong sense of their relative power; but this lesson of course impressed them more forcibly still, when they saw that their interesting and even amusing strife against numbers was crowned all at once with a victory. In reality, as we know, Evans so drew advantage from the valour of the pickets, and the sure quality of all his infantry, that he soon became the master of the combat, and determined its issue at exactly the time he judged best by his use of the artillery arm; but this was a truth hardly evident to the English foot-soldier engaged out in front with the enemy. He of course heard the roar of the cannon, and with more or less certainty knew that flights of round-shot and shell were passing over his head, but still he looked chiefly, as was natural, to his own particular task; and when, after a lengthened struggle, maintained at huge odds, he found the hostile crowd at length receding before him, and began to advance in pursuit, he imagined that the result must be owing entirely to the inferior quality of the Russian troops. He

**C H A P.** accordingly came back from the chase with a feeling of contempt for his adversaries which, however unjust, became rooted nevertheless in his mind; and the day was at hand, when, to the soldiers of our 2d Division, with howling throngs of Russians before them, this consciousness of a decisive ascendant might be as the faith that lifts mountains.

*Incursion  
of Russian  
cavalry  
horses.*

At night, and long after this combat, the Allied troops were roused from their slumbers by a singular cause of alarm, for all at once there was heard what sounded as though there must be a squadron of madmen delivering in the midst of the darkness a headlong cavalry charge. A number of Liprandi's cavalry horses, without any bits to their bridles, but otherwise completely caparisoned, had broken loose from their pickets, galloped up by the Woronzoff road, rushed through the French line of outposts, and torn their way into the camp. About a hundred of them were taken, and some portion of our shattered cavalry obtained a welcome re-mount.

## CHAPTER III.

ON this same 26th of October, Lord Raglan received a communication from the Home Government which at once relieved his mind from an irksome and long-pressing weight.

To meet the contingency of Lord Raglan's being killed or becoming disabled, the Home Government had secretly provided that in such case the command of the army should devolve upon Sir George Cathcart, and Sir George was entrusted accordingly with what is called a 'Dormant Commission.' It was known that the arrangement, if divulged, would not only be mortifying in the extreme to Sir George Brown, but might prove in other ways mischievous;\* and no one in the Crimea

C H A P.  
III.The  
Dormant  
Commission  
entrusted to  
Sir George  
Cathcart

\* In reality, Sir John Burgoyne (a General of Engineers), was the officer next in seniority to Lord Raglan; but the Home Government imagined that the notion of his taking the command of the army would be regarded by all (including Sir John himself) as entirely out of the question, and it seems that Brown shared this impression. It was, however, quite erroneous; and Lord Raglan, after the withdrawal of the Commission, undeceived the Government upon this point, assuring them that, in the event of the vacancy occurring, Burgoyne both could and would take the command.

**CHAP.** was to be entrusted with the secret except Lord  
III. Raglan, H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, and Sir George Cathcart himself. For Lord Raglan, who lived in close relations with Brown, it was distressing to have to witness his friend's touching ignorance of the measure which, if so one may speak, had been secretly taken against him, and be forced to avoid every word, every look, which might tend to dispel the illusion. As regards Cathcart, the baneful effect of the Dormant Commission upon his mind is best shown by a paper in his own handwriting, which he left one day at headquarters. It runs thus :—

‘ CAMP ABOVE SEBASTOPOL, 4th Oct. 1854.

State of  
Cathcart's  
feelings and  
temper on  
the 4th of  
October.

‘ MY DEAR LORD RAGLAN,—Finding that I am  
‘ not admitted to your confidence, and that Sir  
‘ George Brown and M. G. Airey appear even to  
‘ act in your name, without your knowledge, in  
‘ the conduct and management of military details  
‘ at this most serious crisis of the campaign in  
‘ the Crimea; also that I have scarcely had an  
‘ opportunity, except at Varna, on my landing,  
‘ of an interview on business, or received a single  
‘ communication, verbally or otherwise, on the  
‘ subject of the state of affairs from you; con-  
‘ sidering also that the circumstances of my  
‘ present position, known only to yourself, the  
‘ Duke of Cambridge, and myself in this country,  
‘ and to H.M.’s Govt. at home, my duty to my  
‘ sovereign demands that I should request an  
‘ interview at the time most convenient to you.

' without delay, at your headquarters.—Your most  
 sincere and devoted friend,

(Signed)      ' GEO. CATHCART.'

CHAP.  
III.

---

Whatever may have been the value of any counsels which Sir George Cathcart was willing to proffer, it is plain that he must have grievously weakened any power of persuasion he had by this display of his feelings; and the note, I think, shows how perniciously the secret of the Dormant Commission had fermented, as it were, in his mind.

Now, however, the Commission was to be withdrawn. The Government, I believe, had no reason for becoming dissatisfied with Sir George Cathcart, but they felt that the step they had taken in secret was one which, if known, would have been cruelly mortifying to Sir George Brown; and, when they came to hear of the great zeal with which Brown had toiled in preparing for the expedition, and the gallant part he took in the battle of the Alma, they determined to undo their act.\* The Duke of Newcastle accordingly requested that Sir George Cathcart would give up the Dormant Commission to Lord Raglan in order that it might be cancelled.† This Sir George Cathcart at once did, and nothing could be better than the tone and temper of his letter. ' My dear

Withdrawal  
of the  
Dormant  
Commission

\* The Duke of Newcastle assigns those two reasons for the change.—Private letter to Lord Raglan, 13th October 1854, received the evening of the 26th.

† Ibid.

C H A P.  
III.

The high tone with which Cathcart met the announcement.

'Lord Raglan,' he writes, 'you have known me long enough, and I hope well enough, to believe me when I say that your communication this moment received is the most gratifying to myself that I could possibly receive, and that the Duke of Newcastle does me no more than justice in saying that he well recollects the obvious reluctance with which I accepted the Dormant Commission.\* The fact is, I considered it a command, and though I did not fail to express my adverse opinion, I felt bound to submit to H.M. commands and obey them, be they what they may. I only now delay placing the Commission in your hands for this night because I will not trust it to an orderly, but I will be the bearer of it myself, to-morrow morning, please God, and in the meantime will not write further on the subject.'†

Lord Raglan's gratification at the change.

Addressing the Duke of Newcastle on this subject, Lord Raglan says: 'I am sure you will agree with me that Cathcart's conduct throughout this matter has been exactly what might be expected from a man of his high feeling. Your decision to annul the Commission is an immense relief to me. In my usual intimate relations with Brown I have felt ever since I knew what you had determined a great deal less comfortable than before, and that I was in possession

\* In confirmation of what Sir George Cathcart here writes, see in the Appendix, Note X., an interesting statement made by the late Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable Gilbert Elliot, who was aide-de-camp to Sir George in the Crimea.

† Dated, Camp above Sebastopol, 26th October 1854, 8 p.m.

of a secret that would come like a thunderbolt upon him if anything should happen to me. ‘Now, all is right, and I need no longer say to myself, “False face must hide what the false heart doth know.”’\*

If it be true, as I have inferred, that the grant of the secret Commission to Cathcart had an ill effect upon his temper and feelings, there would plainly be error in imagining that the withdrawal of it was calculated to restore his equanimity. His letter shows, it is true, that he fervently welcomed the change; but there remained the fact that the Queen’s Government had at one time singled him out as the officer best fitted to succeed Lord Raglan in the command of our army; and it was natural, perhaps, that the recollection of this circumstance should tend to lessen his deference for others—including even Lord Raglan—and to give him what proved to be an undue confidence in his own judgment. To account for his conduct on the day of Balaclava, and for what by-and-by we shall see him doing at Inkerman, there will be need of all the light that can fairly be shed on his motives.

The effect  
of the  
Dormant  
Commission  
not neces-  
sarily re-  
moved by its  
withdrawal.

\* Private letter, Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, October 27, 1854.

## CHAPTER IV.

## C H A P. IV.

26th  
October.  
Lord Raglan providing against the occurrence of a disaster at Balaclava.

AT the time of the combat on Mount Inkerman, Balaclava, as we saw, lay in danger; for Liprandi, though cowed by the results of the yesterday's cavalry fight, remained holding as yet to his purpose, and was not only still close impending with some 24,000 men and 78 guns, but established on the rib of high ground which supports the Woronzoff road, and thence looking straight down the smooth gorge which enters the place from the north. To avert, if he could, the disaster of having Balaclava forcibly wrested from his hold, Lord Raglan had ridden down from headquarters, and was met in front of the place by Sir Colin Campbell, its able commander.

The two plans which seemed open to him.

Lord Raglan could choose, as he thought, between two courses of action. One of these was to endeavour to provide for the defence of Balaclava by the painful and dangerous expedient of withdrawing troops from the Chersonese. The other plan, on the contrary, seemed to offer important advantages, for, if able to adopt it, Lord Raglan might at once effect a wholesome concen-

tration of his scanty forces, and increase by no less than one-fourth the strength of the English infantry disposable for the next day of battle.

As a measure of prudence, which need not of necessity await his final decision, he requested Captain Tatham (the able naval officer then commanding in the port of Balaclava) to embark at once any of the landed ship's guns or stores which were not then in use, to remove from the harbour all the vessels that could well be dispensed with, and to bring down the rest to a lower part of the bay. This step taken, he addressed himself to the question awaiting his judgment.

It was evident that, with Liprandi close by, at the head of some 24,000 men, the continued occupation of Balaclava would necessitate a formidable deduction from the strength of the Allied forces disposed in front of Sebastopol; and no soldier who had glanced at a map could well fail to see that, if the English, as well as the French, could draw all the supplies they required through the bays of Kamiesch or Kazatch, they might add largely to their military power by abandoning a town and port which lay altogether detached from the main position, and concentrating the whole of their strength on the ridges of the Chersonese upland. Upon the question of abandoning his accustomed port of supply, Lord Raglan indeed determined to have the opinion of his Commissary-General; but with that reservation he seems to have adopted the measure, and Captain Heath (then in port with the Niger) received

His direc-  
tions to  
Captain  
Tatham,  
R.N.

The advan-  
tages of  
abandoning  
Balaclava.

Lord  
Raglan's  
inchoate  
resolve.

CHAP.  
IV.

Conclusive  
objection  
interposed  
by the Com-  
missary-  
General.

instructions accordingly. These, however, at night were reversed. Sir Edmund Lyons opposed to the plan an impassioned resistance, which Lord Raglan, however reluctantly, was prepared, I believe, to withstand ; but there is a carnal Providence which commands the commanders of armies, and he who finally determined the question was the Commissary - General. Mr Filder declared that, without the port of Balaclava, he could not undertake to supply the army. This objection proved conclusive ; and our people with their little army, comprising but 16,000 bayonets, continued to go on labouring with their three heavy tasks—that is, with the siege, with the defence of the Chersonese at its most endangered part, and finally with the defence of Balaclava—an undertaking now raised into one of some magnitude by the close presence of Liprandi's forces.

Lord  
Raglan's  
efforts to  
provide  
means of  
defending  
Balaclava.

Lord Raglan thus baffled confronted the peril as best he could, and strained his scanty resources to meet the requirements he had wisely desired to evade. The navy, as ever, was prompt to bring aid. Upon the suggestion of Tatham, a screw line-of-battle ship—the Sanspareil, under Dacres —was sent into the harbour, and in addition to the force of marines already defending the ground, large numbers of seamen were landed. Vinoy, with his whole brigade, was already on the ground, and Sir Colin Campbell had placed at his disposal uncounted battalions of Turks ; but these forces, after all, represented but a part of the sacrifices which the retention of Balaclava in-

Sacrifices  
necessitated  
by the re-  
tention of  
the place.

volved; for out of his own little army—we have seen how huge were its tasks and how scanty its numbers—Lord Raglan devoted to this object more than 2000 men, including a portion of his most superb troops.\*

CHAP.  
IV.

Whatever was the force of those reasons which induced Admiral Lyons to deprecate the abandonment of Balaclava, the greatness of the sacrifice that his policy involved should at least be understood. By-and-by, when we feel the hard strain that was put upon our scanty forces by the exigencies of ‘Inkerman,’ it will be well to remember that in that hour of trial the defence of Balaclava was absorbing not only a splendid force of marines and seamen, but a fifth of Bosquet’s corps and the whole of our Highland Brigade.

In the course of the week which succeeded to the 26th of October, the enemy’s forces in the valley of the Tchernaya were largely increased; and on the 2d of November, after first extending his left, he effected a menacing demonstration against the eastern defences of Balaclava, by throwing forward his pickets in that part of the field, and supporting them too with artillery. It was thought that he might be meditating an attempt to get round into the place by the south; but he did not at the moment do more than try the range of his guns. Considering the enemy’s actual strength in the valley, and his evident

26th Octo-  
ber to 2d  
November.

Continua-  
tion of the  
enemy’s  
apparent  
designs  
against  
Balaclava:

\* 2158—viz., the Highland Brigade 1543, and the provisional battalion 615. Until the evening of the 25th the 93d had been the only part of the Highland Brigade which Balaclava absorbed.

C H A P.  
IV.

and of Lord  
Raglan's  
exertions for  
its defence.

means of augmenting it, Lord Raglan could not help apprehending that Balaclava might be powerfully attacked ; and, down to the 3d of November, he was going on with his exertions to provide for the defence of the place, without even at the last feeling confident that his object had been wholly secured.\*

The enemy's  
now settled  
purpose.

The movement of the 2d of November was, however, a feint intended to divert attention from counsels fast ripening into action. Whether menacing Balaclava, or gathering on the Old City Heights, or still marching up day by day with more and more troops from the north, all the enemy's movements now were conducing to one design.

\* 'I will not conceal from your Grace that I should be more satisfied if I could have occupied the position in considerably greater strength.'—Despatch to the Secretary of War, 3d November 1854. Lord Raglan's determination to make this communication official (instead of putting the words into a private letter) was, I think, significant.

## A P P E N D I X

---

### N O T E I.

RESPECTING THE PERIOD WHEN COLONEL DARBY GRIFFITH,  
THE OFFICER COMMANDING THE GREYS, RECEIVED THE  
WOUND WHICH DISABLED HIM.

At the time of publishing my narrative of the battle of Balaclava in 1868, I shared the very general error of supposing that Colonel, now General, Darby Griffith had received his wound in the first moments of the famous Heavy Cavalry charge. In this, and also in one other of the previous Editions, my error has been corrected, and it is now made clear that the Colonel charged into the Russian column at the head of his regiment—the Greys—and continued to take part in the combat down to the much later moments of what I have called ‘the back eddy,’ where he was struck by a pistol or carbine shot, and—for some time—disabled.

The correspondence which dispelled my error on this subject is not, I think, without interest; and, therefore, although the purpose of the writers has already been answered, I still keep their letters subjoined as a part of this Appendix.

In answer to a letter which Mr Kinglake addressed him, General Griffith wrote as follows:—

‘ MARGARETTA, DUNDRUM,  
‘ COUNTY DUBLIN, November 5, 1868.

‘ SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your courteous letter, and have much pleasure in answering your questions contained therein to the best of my ability. I commanded and led the Greys into the midst of the Russian cavalry column at the battle of Balaclava, and, in charging back again with my men, got surrounded. In cutting my way out, I received a pistol-shot on my head, and, being stunned and stupefied from the effects of the blow, I can recollect little of what then passed around me, except remembering objecting strongly to Dr Ramsay Brush, the surgeon of the Greys, taking me off the field, but which, after an examination of my wound, he considered it his duty to do. On recovering from the immediate effects of the injury, I rejoined my regiment and resumed the command.—I have the honour to be, Sir, very faithfully yours,

(Signed) ‘ H. DARBY GRIFFITH.’

I consider that this statement places the fact beyond all question, and that no corroboration is needed; but nevertheless, I here give the statement which has been made on this subject by an eyewitness—namely, Dr Ramsay Brush, late surgeon of the Scots Greys. The period of the combat at which Colonel Griffith received his wound is indicated *ante*, p. 137; and *then* it was that Dr Ramsay Brush seized the bridle of the Colonel’s horse, and led him towards the field-hospital.

#### *Dr Ramsay Brush’s Narrative.*

In a letter of the 17th August 1868, addressed to the ‘Times,’ Dr Brush (who was an officer of the Greys) says as follows:—‘ I was present in this affair with my regiment, the Greys, and saw Colonel Griffith lead them

‘ into the dense mass of the Russian cavalry, go through  
‘ them, and into their supports, when the regiment went  
‘ about and cut their way back again, Colonel Griffith being  
‘ still in command. Observing that the Colonel was bleed-  
‘ ing from the head, and suffering from the stunning effects  
‘ of the blow he had received, I ordered his trumpeter to go  
‘ in search of Major Clarke, and tell him he had succeeded  
‘ to the command ; and at the same time, perceiving that  
‘ the Russian cavalry were again outflanking us, I seized  
‘ the bridle of Colonel Griffith’s horse, and endeavoured to  
‘ reach my field-hospital in rear of the 93d Highlanders.  
‘ We had not gone many yards when the flank charge of  
‘ the 4th and 5th Dragoon Guards was made, which, with  
‘ a second charge of the Greys and Inniskillings, sent the  
‘ Russian cavalry flying a disorganised mass up the hill,  
‘ and enabled us to reach our destination. When the re-  
‘ port arrived that the Light Cavalry had been destroyed,  
‘ Colonel Griffith left the field-hospital without my know-  
‘ ledge, rejoined his regiment, and resumed the command,  
‘ which he continued to hold throughout the day. The  
‘ above, sir, is a brief statement of facts. Mr Kinglake  
‘ does not seem to be aware that there were two distinct  
‘ and separate charges of “ Scarlett’s Dragoons ”—the first  
‘ in which the Greys and one squadron of the Inniskillings  
‘ were alone engaged, and a second in which those regi-  
‘ ments were assisted by a flank attack of the 4th and 5th  
‘ Dragoon Guards and the Royals. In the interval be-  
‘ tween these two charges, the Russians retired a short  
‘ way up the hill and re-formed, the Greys and Inniskillings  
‘ following suit. Colonel Griffith led the Greys in the first  
‘ charge, which was by far the most formidable one, and  
‘ brought them out of it; and it is the assertion on the part  
‘ of Mr Kinglake that he was prevented from doing this  
‘ that I must request you will permit me to contradict.’

In all he says respecting his Colonel, Dr Brush, I feel

sure, is perfectly accurate; and I trust that he, no less than General Griffith himself, will be satisfied with the correction I have been careful to make.

With respect to the passage beginning ‘Mr Kinglake ‘does not seem, &c.,’ I would refer Dr Brush to my narrative of the Heavy Cavalry charge as given *ante*. Further than is there indicated, the information I have received does not enable me to adopt Dr Brush’s impression.

---

## NOTE II.

### EXPLANATORY STATEMENTS LAID BEFORE MR KINGLAKE BY LORD LUCAN.

*The circumstances under which the forces advancing from the Baidar direction were suffered to occupy Kamara and establish Batteries on the neighbouring heights?*

It was not possible for Sir Colin Campbell to prevent the enemy establishing themselves on the heights commanding Kamara. It was very far from his base, and would have required a strong force of infantry and artillery. We had been obliged to discontinue patrolling this pass a full week before the 25th October, and the enemy were occupying Tchorgonn village and heights between that village and Kamara.

*The grounds on which it was judged right for our cavalry to avoid attacking the forces which assailed the Turkish Redoubts?*

Lord Raglan not having acted on the communication sent to him the day previous by Sir Colin Campbell and myself informing him of the approach of a considerable Russian army, and leaving us altogether without support.

we considered it our first duty to defend the approach to the town of Balaclava ; and as this defence would depend chiefly upon the cavalry, it was necessary to reserve them for this purpose. I therefore confined myself to cannonading the enemy so long as my ammunition lasted, and to threatening demonstrations. We only left the neighbourhood of the forts after they were already captured. My opinion was, that the advance upon Balaclava could only be assisted [qu. ' resisted ' ] by the cavalry on the plain, and I placed them in order of battle for that purpose until removed by Lord Raglan. The soundness of my opinion was established by the check and retreat of the enemy immediately on the repulse of their cavalry ; and be it observed that their cavalry were attacked and repulsed on the very site I had prepared to meet them.

*The circumstances under which it happened that the advance of the Russian Cavalry to the ground where it turned to engage our Heavy Dragoons was a surprise ?*

This advance of the Russian cavalry was *no* surprise, nor did I ever hear it so described. From the time that they descended into the valley they moved very slow, and should have been seen by General Scarlett when still one mile distant. I saw them before they crowned the heights, and found time to travel over double the extent of ground, and to halt, form, and dress the attacking line before it had traversed more than half the breadth of the valley.

*The grounds on which it was thought necessary for the Heavy Brigade to desist from supporting the Light Brigade in its charge ?*

Be it remembered that I had carefully divided the Light Brigade into three lines, to expose as few men as possible in the first line, and that the first line should be efficiently supported. So soon as they had moved off, I instructed

my aide-de-camp to have me followed by the Heavy Brigade formed in the same order of three lines. I then galloped on, and when very far up [qu. 'down'] the valley I observed that the Heavy Brigade in my rear were suffering severely from flanking batteries; and with the remark that they were already sufficiently close to protect the Light Cavalry should they be pursued by the enemy, and that I could not allow them to be sacrificed as had been the Light Brigade, I caused them to be halted. Had not the Chasseurs d'Afrique at this time silenced one of these batteries, it is my opinion that the Heavy Cavalry would have been destroyed.

When the Heavy Brigade was halted, no possible object existed for further exposing them, they could only be useful in protecting the retreat of the Light Brigade; and I am confident that from their position they materially did so.

*The purport of the Order given to Lord Cardigan after the receipt of the Order brought by Nolan.*

With General Airey's order in my hand, I trotted up to Lord Cardigan, and gave him distinctly its contents so far as they concerned him. I would not on my oath say that I did not read the order to him. He at once objected, on the ground that he would be exposed to a flanking battery. When ordered to take up his then position, he had expressed, through his aide-de-camp, the same apprehensions. I told him that I was aware of it. 'I know it,' but that 'Lord Raglan would have it,' and that we had no choice but to obey. I then said that I wished him to advance very steadily and quietly, and that I would narrow his front by removing the 11th Hussars from the first to the second line. This he strenuously opposed; but I moved across his front and directed Colonel Douglas not to advance with the rest of the line, but to form a second line with the 4th Light Dragoons.

## NOTE III.

STATEMENT LAID BEFORE MR KINGLAKE BY  
LORD CARDIGAN.

THE brigade was suddenly ordered to mount, upon which I sent one of my aides-de-camp to reconnoitre the ground.

Lord Lucan then came in front of my brigade and said, ‘Lord Cardigan, you will attack the Russians in the valley.’ I said, ‘Certainly, my lord,’ dropping my sword at the same time; ‘but allow me to point out to you that there is a battery in front, a battery on each flank, and the ground is covered with Russian riflemen.’

Lord Lucan answered: ‘I cannot help that; it is Lord Raglan’s positive order that the Light Brigade is to attack the enemy;’ upon which he ordered the 11th Hussars back to support the 17th Lancers. After advancing about eighty yards, a shell fell within reach of my horse’s feet, and Captain Nolan, who was riding across the front, retreated with his arm up through the intervals of the brigade. I led straight down to the battery without seeing anybody else in front of me. I had to restrain some of the officers, who got very much excited within eighty yards of the battery by the heavy fire. I led into the battery, a shot being fired from one of the largest guns close by my right leg. I led into the battery and through the Russian gun limber-carriages and ammunition-waggons in the rear. I rode within twenty yards of the line of Russian cavalry. I was attacked by two Cossacks, slightly wounded by their lances, and with difficulty got away from them, they trying to surround me. On arriving at the battery through which I had led, I found no part of the brigade. I rode slowly up the hill, and met General Scarlett. I said to him,

' What do you think, General, of the aide-de-camp, after such an order being brought to us which has destroyed the Light Brigade, riding to the rear and screaming like a woman?' Sir J. Scarlett replied, ' Do not say any more, for I have ridden over his body.' Lord Lucan was present at this conversation. I then rode to the place from which we had moved off, and found all my brigade there; and, upon having them counted, there then were 195 mounted men out of 670. I immediately rode to Lord Raglan to make my report; who said, in a very angry way, ' What did you mean, sir, by attacking a battery in front, contrary to all the usages of warfare and the custom of the service?' Upon which, I said: ' My Lord, I hope you will not blame me, for I received the order to attack from my superior officer in front of the troops.' I then narrated what I had done as described above.

Lord Lucan put in an affidavit upon oath that when I retreated I passed eighty yards from him. He was close by when I spoke to General Scarlett. I came up to General Scarlett quite slowly. I afterwards galloped to the remains of the brigade re-forming.

#### NOTE IV.

##### STATEMENT LAID BEFORE MR KINGLAKE BY LORD CARDIGAN.

HAVING been kindly promised by Mr Kinglake that he will make me acquainted with the nature of the observations he intends to make in the third volume of his history of the Crimean war, I am anxious to give him the fullest information with regard to all which occurred connected

with the charge of the Light Cavalry Brigade against the Russian battery at Balaclava.\*

I commence by stating that the time occupied from the movement of the brigade to the attack to the time of re-forming on the same ground did not exceed twenty minutes—the distance passed over was one mile and a quarter, at the lowest calculation—and in that space of time 300 men who had gone into action were killed, wounded, or missing, and 396 horses were put *hors de combat*. Of the 670 men who had gone into action, only 195 were mounted when the brigade re-formed on the ground from which

\* The promise above mentioned by Lord Cardigan was made under these circumstances: Several years ago—I believe in 1864 or 1865—I sought to allay in some measure Lord Cardigan's extreme anxiety by saying that, with respect to those points on which my opinion might be unfavourable to him, I would call his attention to them before the publication should take place, so that he might have an opportunity of submitting to me any considerations tending to change my view, and I intimated that I would do this in the form of queries, asking whether he had any further explanation to offer upon such or such a point. During the years which followed, Lord Cardigan (in his anxiety to do himself justice) honoured me with visits so frequent and with a correspondence so ample (on his part) that I considered the subject as exhausted. Accordingly, when he adverted to my promise, I submitted to him that, considering the great extent to which I had given up my time to him since the period when the promise was made, it would be well for him to release me from it. He showed an indisposition to do this; and the slight feeling of anger which his persistency gave me, tended much to counteract the pain that I felt in fulfilling the promise. I said I would fulfil it at once. Accordingly I wrote the promised queries in Lord Cardigan's presence, read them out to him, and gave him a copy of them. This was on the 15th of February last. Lord Cardigan, under the pain which he thus brought upon himself, showed at the time a perfect command of temper; and though he afterwards brought me a kind of written protest strongly questioning my impartiality, he offered to withdraw this before reading it, and after reading it, expressed a wish that it should be considered as withdrawn. I said I wished that the paper should not be withdrawn, and upon Lord Cardigan saying that he wished to take it away with him, I obtained from him a promise to let me have it afterwards. This he did.

they had moved off, and during the engagement 24 officers were killed or wounded.

I presume that no one doubts that I led the first line of the brigade, consisting of the 13th Light Dragoons and 17th Lancers, through the Russian battery, and that, being the first man into the battery, that I pursued my course until I came up to the line of the Russian cavalry. That, being alone there, in consequence of the officers of my Staff being wounded or disabled, I was attacked by two Cossacks, slightly wounded, and nearly dismounted ; that, on being nearly surrounded by Cossacks, I gradually retreated until I reached the battery into which I had led the first line ; that, on arriving there, I found no part of the first line remaining there. Those which survived the charge had passed off to the left, short of the Russian gun limber-carriages, or retreated up the hill.

I can upon my most solemn oath swear that in that position, and looking round, I could see none of the first line or of the supports. The supports ought to have followed me in the attack, instead of which they diverged to the right and left.

I have already stated that the first line did not follow me after I passed through the battery in leading the charge ; but whilst I was engaged with the Cossacks they passed off to the left, to avoid the Russian limber-carriages, or retreated up the hill.

My aides-de-camp were prevented by different causes from being with me ; I was consequently nearly or quite alone.

I have already positively stated that when I got back to the battery which we had attacked and silenced, I could see none of the first line, except those returning up the hill, and no troops formed either on the right or the left.

I therefore found myself alone, and I ask, Was it not

my duty to retreat gradually and slowly in rear of the broken parties of the first line up the hill, rather than turn and ride through the Russian cavalry in search of my supports, without knowing at the time which way they had gone, they not having followed the first line in the advance, as they ought to have done ?

My humble opinion is that it is quite sufficient for a general of brigade to return with as well as lead the attack of the front line, unless he should by chance come in contact with his supports, in which case he would remain with them ; but it may be observed that no general officer could have rendered any service or assistance in an affair like that of Balaclava, in which all the loss of men and horses was sustained in twenty minutes, and there were no troops left with which to attack an overwhelming force like that of the Russians in position on that day.

Twenty minutes being the time occupied in the affair, and the distance a mile and a quarter at the least, gives eight minutes for the advance, eight minutes for the retreat, and only four minutes for fighting or collision with the enemy.

Before concluding I must revert to a subject already alluded to—viz., that the only point really to be considered is whether, after leading into the battery, and up to the Russian cavalry, and being wounded and nearly taken prisoner by the Cossacks, and having with difficulty got away from them—whether I was justified in returning slowly in rear of my own line, who were retreating up the hill, or whether it was my duty to turn and ride through the Russian cavalry in search of the supports, they not having led straight, but having separated in the advance, one to the right of the valley, and one to the left ; whether I was bound to ride through the Russian cavalry in search of the supports, or to remain on the ground I have referred to, there being none of our troops formed there, or

to be seen in any direction? As to my having retired, as it is asserted, under the Fedioukine Heights, the evidence of the non-commissioned officers in the printed pamphlet completely contradicts such an assertion. The question is, Whether some officer of the 11th Hussars, wounded, was not seen by the men of the 4th Light Dragoons retiring in the rear of that regiment under the Fedioukine Heights?

*References appended by Lord Cardigan to the above Statement, and by him headed ‘Evidence in Proof.’*

1. General Scarlett's evidence, from page 272 to 274 of printed Appendix.
2. Lieutenant Johnston\* of 13th Light Dragoons, from page 267 to page 272.
3. Extract from Colonel Jenyn's evidence: ‘I, with one or two others, tried to rally the few men whom I saw left mounted, but it was utterly impossible to do so, and we returned in broken detachments through the guns, which were then deserted.’
4. Extract from my own evidence: ‘No general officer could have been of any use. The feeble remains of the lines of the brigade could have done nothing more under a general officer than they did under their own officers.’
5. Evidence of William Gray, trumpet-major of the 8th Hussars: ‘The Earl of Cardigan led the charge against the Russian battery at the head of the first line of the brigade. The 8th Hussars and the 4th Light Dragoons formed the rear line of the brigade; but very early in the charge the

\* Lord Cardigan should have written this name ‘Johnson.’ The references made by Lord Cardigan are to a volume, entitled ‘Complete Report of the Proceedings in the Queen's Bench, &c.,’ published in 1863 by Mitchell, Bond Street.

' 8th Hussars and the 4th Light Dragoons became gradually separated, the 8th Hussars bearing to the right, and the 4th Light Dragoons to the left ; and as we advanced farther, the distance between the two regiments increased very materially.'

6. Extract of a letter written by Lord George Paget to H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge in 1856, the following passage occurs : ' On the advance of the first line, I gave the word, " Second line will advance ; 4th Light Dragoons direct." Soon, however, in the advance, I perceived that the 8th Hussars were bearing away to the right, and they kept gradually losing their intervals, and by the same process their alignment, till they finally became separated from us. There are plenty of witnesses who could prove that during the whole of this time I was doing my best, and using the utmost exertions of my voice to keep them in their proper place, and to close them to the 4th ; and at last Lieutenant Martin, 4th Light Dragoons, galloped to Colonel Shewell to assist me in my efforts.'

7. General Scarlett states : ' At the instant when the first line of the Light Brigade charged into the battery, it was almost impossible, from the dense smoke and confusion, to discover what took place ; but a few minutes afterwards I observed the remnants of the Light Brigade, as well as the remains of the second line, retreating towards the ground which they had occupied immediately before the charge ; whilst dismounted men, and horses without riders, were scattered over the space which the brigade had just traversed. I recollect on this occasion pointing out to Lord Cardigan the broken remnants of his line as they were retreating up the hill. I firmly believe, from the information I received both at the time of the engagement and afterwards, that Lord Cardigan was the first to charge into the battery, and that he was

'amongst the last, if not the last, to return from behind  
'the guns.'\*

8. Lieutenant George Johnston † of the 13th Hussars says: 'As to the opinion that we ought to have re-formed, &c., why, sir, there were none to form, had it been possible. Instance in my own regiment. We turned out 112 of all ranks, and lost 84 horses; in fact, there were only 10 of us assembled on the spot from whence we charged. We had 26 men wounded, 13 taken prisoners, and 12 killed; consequently all the generals in the Crimea would have been puzzled how to re-form us.'

---

#### N O T E V.

##### RECORD OF MILITARY SERVICES OF GENERAL WILLIAM FERGUSON BEATSON.

*Entered the Bengal Army in 1820.*

BEING on furlough, he, with sanction of the British Government, served with the British Legion in Spain, in 1835-36, first as Major, afterwards as Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding a regiment, at the head of which he was severely wounded.

For services in Spain received Cross of San Fernando from Queen of Spain; and Her Britannic Majesty's permission to wear it, September 12, 1837.

Returned to India in 1837, and received thanks of Government of India for capture of Jignee, in Bundelkund, in 1840; and of Chirgong in 1841.

\* General Scarlett afterwards explained that he meant among the last of the first line which he [Lord Cardigan] commanded in person.'--  
*Letter to Colonel Calthorpe, 1st May 1863.*

† Lord Cardigan should have written this 'Thomas George Johnson.'

In February 1844 received thanks of Agent, Governor-General, Scindia's dominions, for recovering, for Gwalior Government, forts and strongholds in Kachwahagar.

In March 1844 received thanks of Government for volunteering of Bundelkund Legion for Scinde; which volunteering, the Governor-General declared, placed the Government of India under great obligation.

In March 1845 was mentioned in Sir Charles Napier's despatch regarding campaign in Boogtee Hills; which service called forth approbation of Government.

In July 1846 the conduct of Legion while in Scinde, of which he was Commandant, was praised in general orders by Governor-General Viscount Hardinge.

In July 1848 received approbation of Government of India for taking Jagheer and fort of Rymow from Rohillas.

In November 1850 recaptured Rymow from Arabs.

In February 1851 took the fort of Dharoor, one of the strongest in the Deccan.

In March 1851 the following General Order was issued by the Resident at Hyderabad :—

'Brigadier Beatson having tendered his resignation of the command of the Nizam's Cavalry, from date of his embarkation for England, the Resident begs to express his entire approval of this officer's conduct during the time he has exercised the important command of the Cavalry Division.'

'Brigadier Beatson has not only maintained but improved the interior economy and arrangement of the Cavalry Division; and the value of his active military services in the field has been amply attested, and rendered subject of record, in the several instances of Kamgoan, Rymow, Arnee, and Dharoor.'

*Memorandum dated Headquarters, San Sebastian, March 4. 1837.—For his gallantry in the actions of the 28th of*

May and 6th of June 1836, Lieutenant-Colonel Beatson received the decoration of the first-class of the Royal and Military Order of San Fernando.

*From S. Fraser, Esq., Agent to the Governor-General, August 13, 1839.*—A loyal spirit, so creditable to Captain Beatson as their Commanding Officer, pervades the force under his command.

*From Captain D. Ross, Agent at Jansi, March 18, 1840.*—Commendation of Captain Beatson and the officers and men under his command for their gallant conduct in overcoming the obstinate resistance at Jignee.

*From the Officiating Secretary to Government N. W. P., March 21, 1840.*—The thanks of the Government to Captain Beatson for the gallantry displayed in the attack upon Jignee.

*From the Secretary to the Government of India, April 6, 1840.*—The high satisfaction of the Governor-General in Council with the cool and gallant conduct of the officers and men of the Bundelkund Legion in the attack of the position at Jignee, which his Lordship in Council considers as reflecting the greatest credit on Captain Beatson and the officers who have acted under his authority, in bringing the Legion to its present state of discipline.

*From the Secretary to Government N. W. P., May 1, 1841.*—The Honourable the Lieutenant-Governor has received the highest gratification from the ability and gallantry displayed by Captain Beatson and the force under his command, in the reduction of that fortress.

*From the Secretary to the Government of India, May 17, 1841.*—I am directed to state that the Governor-General in Council warmly concurs in this tribute of praise to the Commanding Officer and the officers and men of the detachment lately employed against Chirgong; and has been pleased to direct a copy of Captain Beatson's report of his operations to be published in the official Gazette, a copy of

which is enclosed. The steady gallantry of the young sepoys of the Bundelkund Legion, emulating that of the older troops employed on the occasion, has been alike creditable to them and to their commandant and other European officers. His Honour is requested to cause these sentiments to be communicated, through the Agent in Bundelkund, to Captain Beatson, and to the other officers and troops engaged in the service.

*Extract of Letter from Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Slee-man, February 9, 1844.*—In conclusion, I beg to offer to you, and the officers and soldiers under your command, my best thanks for the services you have rendered in recovering possession of the forts and strongholds which had been taken by the insurgents from the Gwalior troops.

*March 9, 1845.*—Honourable mention in despatch from Major-General Sir C. Napier, G.C.B., to the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India in Council.

*From the Secretary to Government of India, July 22, 1848.*—Approbation of the efficient manner in which Brigadier Beatson performed the duty entrusted to him—that of taking possession of the Jagheer and Fort of Rhymow; and ridding the district of the Rohillahs after settling their claims.

*Inscription on a sword presented after the Bundelkund Legion was broken up:*—To MAJOR W. S. BEATSON, late Commandant-in-Chief of the Bundelkund Legion, from his friends of the Legion, in token of their admiration of him as a soldier, and their esteem for him as an individual.—1850.

*From General Sir Charles Napier, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief in India, September 26, 1850.*—Speaking of Beatson as ‘one who did right good service when under ‘my command, which I have neither forgotten, nor have I ‘any disposition to forget.’

*Extract from General Order by the Resident, on the part*

*of the Nizam's Government, March 10, 1851.*—The Resident begs to express his entire approval of this officer's conduct during the time he has exercised the important command of the Nizam's Cavalry Division.

Brigadier Beatson has not only maintained but improved the interior economy and arrangements of the Cavalry Division ; and the value of his active military services in the field has been amply attested and rendered subject of record, in the several instances of Kamgaon, Arnee, Raemhow, and Dharoor.

*The following accompanied the presentation of a piece of Plate from the officers of the Nizam's Cavalry, after BRIGADIER BEATSON gave up command:*—‘We have ‘availed ourselves of this method of testifying our regard ‘for you personally, and our admiration of your talents ‘and abilities as a soldier, under whose command we have ‘all served, and some of us have had opportunities of ‘witnessing your gallant conduct in action with the enemy, ‘and your sound judgment upon all occasions, when ‘Brigadier in command of the Nizam's Cavalry, both in ‘quarters and in the field.’

*Extract from Minute by the Most Noble the Governor-General of India, September 1, 1851.*—I was induced to appoint Major Beatson to the Nizam's service in consequence of the very energetic and able manner in which he had commanded the Bundelkund Legion for two years in Scinde, consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery.

*Extract of Letter from the Earl of Ellenborough, G.C.B., April 24, 1852.*—I remain impressed as strongly now as I was then with a sense of the obligation under which you and your noble Legion placed the Government when you volunteered for service in Scinde.

This was the officer who, notwithstanding his length-

ened experience, his military rank, and the high commands he had held, was so animated by an honourable desire to render war-service that he was content to take his part in the campaign with no higher position than that of being attached (with Lord Raglan's consent) to the Staff of General Scarlett. And this was one of the two officers named with high commendation in that report of General Scarlett's which Lord Lucan thought fit to suppress.

---

## NOTE VI.

## GENERAL SCARLETT'S STAFF.

*Report from General Scarlett to Lord Lucan, October 27, 1854.—Extract.*

' My best thanks are due to Brigade-Major Conolly, and  
' to my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Elliot, 5th Dragoon  
' Guards, who afforded me every assistance, and to Colonel  
' Beatson of the Honourable E.I.C. service, who, as a  
' volunteer, is attached to my Staff.'

*General Scarlett to Lord Lucan, December 17, 1854.*

Remonstrance against the omission of the names of  
Colonel Beatson and Lieutenant Elliot.

*General Scarlett to the Military Secretary.— Extract.*

' Lieutenant Elliot, till severely wounded in the head,  
' was at my side in the charge, and previously displayed  
' the greatest coolness and gallantry. Colonel Beatson also  
' gave me all the assistance which his experience and  
' well-known gallantry enabled him to do throughout  
' the day.'

*Lord Lucan to General Scarlett, December 18, 1854.—  
Extract.*

'I did not consider it fitting specially to name him  
'[Lieutenant Elliot] in my report. . . . I do not con-  
'sider that it would have been justice towards regimental  
'officers specially to name all Staff officers, and I think  
'that the obvious consequences of such general and indis-  
'criminate\* recommendations would be that but little  
'value would be attached to general officers' requests, and  
'that the claims of all would suffer.'

---

General Scarlett recommended Elliot for the Victoria Cross, and the application was refused on the plea that to charge and fight hand to hand was nothing more than the duty of a cavalry officer.

---

#### NOTE VII.

##### THE STRENGTH OF THE BODY OF RUSSIAN CAVALRY UNDER GENERAL RYJOFF WHICH ENGAGED GENERAL SCARLETT'S BRIGADE.

IT is right to say that the work prepared under the auspices of General de Todleben puts the strength of the force which met Scarlett at only 1400; but since the compiler discloses the basis of that computation, his error does not mislead. Finding that the cavalry at this time had

\* Certainly Lord Lucan discriminated, and discriminated, as I believe, without acting from 'favour and affection,' but still so infelicitously that he named and commended in his despatch his own first aide-de-

sent in no 'states,' and not apparently thinking that there would attach much importance to a combat which he disposes of in four lines, he thought it would answer the purpose to set down each squadron and sotnia at the round average strength of 100, instead of the 156 which was about the average strength of a squadron at the time of the Alma. By that way of dealing with the numbers, he reduces the strength of the column with which Ryjoff began his advance to 2500, and then wrongly imagining that the force detached against Sir Colin Campbell numbered 1100 instead of only 400 horsemen, he attained the conclusion above stated—*i.e.*, that Ryjoff, when meeting Scarlett, had only 1400 men with him.

So I will now show the grounds on which I submit that the body of horse encountered by Scarlett may be stated at 'about 3000.'

As regards the numbers of Cavalry squadrons and sotnias of Cossacks with which General Ryjoff commenced his advance up the valley, I am content to accept the statement contained in the official work prepared under the auspices of General de Todleben, and accordingly treat the force as consisting only of the 16 squadrons of the Hussar brigade, and 9 sotnias of Cossacks ; but, as regards the numerical strength of these bodies, I cannot agree that the known facts are such as to warrant a rough estimate, bringing down the squadron to a strength of only one hundred.

Resting on the information furnished by the 'states' applicable to the day of the Alma, we should be secure in asserting that (subject only to allowance for 'deductions from strength' occurring during those intermediate five

camp, who had not happened to be in any of the cavalry charges, and (suppressing Scarlett's report) steadfastly refused to allow the name of Elliot to appear, Elliot being a man who had charged at the side of Scarlett, and come out with some fourteen wounds.

weeks), the numbers with which General Ryjoff commenced his advance must have been 3400.\*

Were there then any circumstances which could have materially reduced the numerical strength in the interval between the morning of the 20th of September, and the morning of the 25th of October? And first, were there losses in action? Except the four men forming part of Prince Mentschikoff's escort who were knocked over on the day of the Alma, the enemy's cavalry sustained no known losses in action. Were there then any causes such as hard marches, want of food, want of forage, trying weather, or epidemic disease, that might have reduced the effective mounted strength in the interval? No such causes had been in operation. The cavalry, after moving back from the Alma to Sebastopol, had rested there three full days, had then marched out towards Baktchi Seräi, and had ever since enjoyed both repose and abundance—repose and abundance for the men as well as for their horses, and this in a land where they were free from epidemics, and where they were at home, and favoured all the time by the genial weather of the early autumn.

Under such circumstances, there was apparently a total absence of all the causes which would have been likely to bring about a material reduction of the 'mounted strength'; and accordingly, until special grounds for a different conclusion are shown, we may fairly take it for granted that the numerical strength of the cavalry with which Ryjoff commenced his advance was not far distant from the number before indicated—that is, 3400. From this force General Ryjoff detached a small portion which, under the

\* General de Todleben himself states that at the Alma the 16 squadrons and 11 sotnias of Cossacks there acting had altogether a strength of 3600. With this advance of Ryjoff's the same 16 squadrons were present, and had with them—not eleven but—nine sotnias of Cossacks. The 'sotnia' seems to be generally taken at 100; but the squadron at the Alma had a strength of about 156.

keen and sure glance of Sir Colin Campbell, appeared to comprise just 400 men. The presumption would be that the leader of those 400 men, after wheeling aside from the fire of the 93d, must have felt it his duty to bring them back to the main body from which they had been detached, on a sort of exploring errand ; but, even supposing that he failed to do so, the mode of computation which I have been suggesting would still give 3000 as the strength of the mass which moved down to try an encounter with General Scarlett's dragoons.

With respect to the computations made roughly by those of our people who were present in the action, I may say that Colonel Hamley (an accomplished artillery officer who would be necessarily well skilled in estimating distances, and, as a not improbable consequence, in inferring the numerical strength of a column) was of opinion that the force with which General Ryjoff descended to encounter Scarlett, must have numbered no less than 6000 ; and it is not within my knowledge that any observer who surveyed the column in action with his own eyes has believed it to be of a strength less than that which Lord Lucan assigned it—that is, 3500.

So, upon the whole, I now think that in the absence of 'states,' and in the absence, moreover, of all special information accounting for large 'deductions from strength,' there can hardly be any great error in saying that the body of horse attacked by Scarlett must have numbered about 3000.

## NOTE VIII.

## PAPERS RELATING TO THE RECALL OF LORD LUCAN.

BALACLAVA, October 26, 1854.

DEAR GENERAL AIREY,—I enclose a copy of the order handed me by Captain Nolan yesterday, as desired by Lord Raglan. When his Lordship is enabled to give it his attention, I anxiously hope that he will not still think 'I 'lost the Light Brigade' in that unfortunate affair of yesterday.—Believe me, &c.

(Signed)      LUCAN, *Lieut.-Gen.*

The Quartermaster-General.

*Lord Raglan to the Secretary of State, October 28, 1854.—Extract.*

As the enemy withdrew from the ground which they had momentarily occupied, I directed the cavalry, supported by the Fourth Division under Lieutenant-General Sir George Catheart, to move forward and take advantage of any opportunity to regain the heights ; and not having been able to accomplish this immediately, and it appearing that an attempt was making to remove the captured guns, the Earl of Lucan was desired to advance rapidly, follow the enemy in their retreat, and try to prevent them from effecting their objects.

In the meanwhile, the Russians had time to re-form on their own ground, with artillery in front and upon their flanks.

From some misconception of the instruction to advance, the Lieutenant-General considered that he was bound to attack at all hazards, and he accordingly ordered Major-General the Earl of Cardigan to move forward with the Light Brigade.

This order was obeyed in the most spirited and gallant manner. Lord Cardigan charged with the utmost vigour, attacked a battery which was firing upon the advancing squadrons, and having passed beyond it engaged the Russian cavalry in its rear ; but there, his troops were assailed by artillery and infantry as well as cavalry, and necessarily retired after having committed much havoc upon the enemy.

---

BALACLAVA, Nov. 30, 1854.

MY LORD,—In your lordship's report of the cavalry action of Balaclava of the 25th ultimo, given in the papers which have just arrived from England, you observe that, from some misconception of the instruction to advance, the Lieutenant-General considered that he was bound to attack at all hazards, and he accordingly ordered Lord Cardigan to move forward with the Light Brigade. Surely, my lord, this is a grave charge and imputation reflecting seriously on my professional character.

I cannot remain silent ; it is, I feel, incumbent on me to state those facts which I cannot doubt must clear me from what I respectfully submit is altogether unmerited.

The cavalry was formed to support an intended movement of the infantry, when Captain Nolan, the aide-de-camp of the Quartermaster-General, came up to me at speed, and placed in my hands this written instruction :—

(*Copy.*)

'Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, follow the enemy, and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Troop of horse-artillery may accompany. French cavalry is on your left.'

'Immediate.'

(Signed)

' R. AIREY

After carefully reading this order I hesitated, and urged the uselessness of such an attack, and the dangers attending it; the aide-de-camp, in a most authoritative tone, stated that they were Lord Raglan's orders that the cavalry should attack immediately. I asked him where? and what to do? as neither enemy nor guns were within sight. He replied in a most disrespectful but significant manner, pointing to the further end of the valley, 'There, my lord, 'is your enemy; there are your guns.'

So distinct in my opinion was your written instruction, and so positive and urgent were the orders delivered by the aide-de-camp, that I felt that it was imperative on me to obey, and I informed Lord Cardigan that he was to advance; and to the objections he made, and in which I entirely agreed, I replied that the order was from your lordship. Having decided against my conviction to make the movement, I did all in my power to render it as little perilous as possible. I formed the brigade in two lines, and led to its support two regiments of heavy cavalry, the Scots Greys and Royals, and only halted them when they had reached the spot from which they could protect the retreat of the light cavalry, in the event of their being pursued by the enemy; and when, having already lost many officers and men by the fire from the batteries and forts, any further advance would have exposed them to destruction.

My lord, I considered at the time—I am still of the same opinion—that I followed the only course open to me. As a lieutenant-general, doubtless I have discretionary power; but to take upon myself to disobey an order written by my commander-in-chief within a few minutes of its delivery, and given from an elevated position, commanding an entire view of all the batteries and the position of the enemy, would have been nothing less than direct disobedience of orders, without any other reason than that I pre-

fferred my own opinion to that of my general, and in this instance must have exposed me and the cavalry to aspersions, against which it might have been difficult to have defended ourselves.

It should also be remembered that the aide-de-camp, well informed of the intentions of his general, and the objects he had in view, after first insisting on an immediate charge, then placed himself in front of one of the leading squadrons, where he fell the first victim.

I did not dare so to disobey your lordship; and it is the opinion of every officer of rank in this army, to whom I have shown your instructions, that it was not possible for me to do so.

I hope, my lord, that I have stated the facts temperately, and in a becoming and respectful manner, as it has been my wish to do. I am confident that it will be your desire to do me justice. I will only ask that your lordship should kindly give the same publicity to this letter that has been given to your report, as I am sensitively anxious to satisfy my sovereign, my military superiors, and the public, that I have not, on this unhappy occasion, shown myself undeserving of their confidence, or unfitting the command which I hold.—I have the honour, &c.

(Signed)            LUCAN, Lieut.-Gen.  
                          Commanding Cavalry Division.

His Excellency the Commander  
of the Forces.

---

*Field-Marshal Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle.—  
(Rec. Jan. 8, 1855.)*

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, Dec. 16, 1854.

MY LORD DUKE,—I regret to be under the necessity of forwarding to your Grace the copy of a letter which has been addressed to me by Lieutenant-General the Earl of Lucan.

When I received it, I placed it in the hands of Brigadier-General Airey, the Quartermaster-General, and requested him to suggest to his lordship to withdraw the communication, considering that it would not lead to his advantage in the slightest degree; but Lord Lucan having declined to take the step recommended, I have but one course to pursue—that of laying the letter before your Grace, and submitting to you such observations upon it as I am bound, in justice to myself, to put you in possession of.

Lieutenant-General the Earl of Lucan complains that, in my despatch to your Grace of the 28th of October I stated that, ‘from some misconception of the instruction to advance, the Lieutenant-General considered that he was bound to attack at all hazards.’ His lordship conceives this statement to be a grave charge, and an imputation reflecting seriously on his professional character, and he deems it incumbent upon him to state those facts which he cannot doubt must clear him from what he respectfully submits as altogether unmerited.

I have referred to my despatch, and, far from being willing to recall one word of it, I am prepared to declare, that not only did the Lieutenant-General misconceive the written instruction that was sent him, but that there was nothing in that instruction which called upon him to attack at all hazards, or to undertake the operation which led to such a brilliant display of gallantry on the part of the Light Brigade, and unhappily, at the same time, occasioned such lamentable casualties in every regiment composing it.

In his lordship’s letter, he is wholly silent with respect to a previous order which had been sent him. He merely says that the cavalry was formed to support an intended movement of the infantry.

This previous order was in the following words:—‘The cavalry to advance and take advantage of any oppor-

'tunity to recover the heights. They will be supported  
' by infantry, which has been ordered to advance on two  
' fronts.'

This order did not seem to me to have been attended to, and therefore it was that the instruction by Captain Nolan was forwarded to him. Lord Lucan must have read the first order with very little attention, for he now states that the cavalry was formed to support the infantry, whereas he was told by Brigadier-General Airey, 'that the cavalry 'was to advance, and take advantage of any opportunity 'to recover the heights, and that they would be supported 'by infantry,' not that they were to support the infantry; and so little had he sought to do as he had been directed, that he had no men in advance of his main body, made no attempt to regain the heights, and was so little informed of the position of the enemy that he asked Captain Nolan, 'Where and what he was to attack, as neither enemy nor 'guns were in sight?'

This, your Grace will observe, is the Lieutenant-General's own admission. The result of his inattention to the first order was, that it never occurred to him that the second was connected with, and a repetition of, the first. He viewed it only as a positive order to attack at all hazards (the word 'attack,' be it observed, was not made use of in General Airey's note) an unseen enemy, whose position, numbers, and composition, he was wholly unacquainted with, and whom, in consequence of a previous order, he had taken no step whatever to watch.

I undoubtedly had no intention that he should make such an attack—there was nothing in the instruction to require it; and therefore I conceive I was fully justified in stating to your Grace, what was the exact truth, that the charge arose from the misconception of an order for the advance, which Lord Lucan considered obliged him to attack at all hazards.

I wish I could say with his lordship that, having decided against his conviction to make the movement, he did all he could to render it as little perilous as possible. This, indeed, is far from being the case, in my judgment.

He was told that the horse-artillery might accompany the cavalry. He did not bring it up. He was informed that the French cavalry was on his left. He did not invite their co-operation. He had the whole of the heavy cavalry at his disposal. He mentions having brought up only two regiments in support, and he omits all other precautions, either from want of due consideration, or from the supposition that the unseen enemy was not in such great force as he apprehended, notwithstanding that he was warned of it by Lord Cardigan, after the latter had received the order to attack.

I am much concerned, my Lord Duke, to have to submit these observations to your Grace. I entertain no wish to disparage the Earl of Lucan in your opinion, or to cast a slur upon his professional reputation; but having been accused by his lordship of having stated of him what was unmerited in my despatch, I have felt obliged to enter into the subject, and trouble your Grace at more length than I could have wished, in vindication of a report to your Grace in which I had strictly confined myself to that which I knew to be true, and had indulged in no observations whatever, or in any expression which could be viewed either as harsh or in any way grating to the feelings of his lordship.—I have, &c.,

(Signed)

RAGLAN.

---

*(Copy.)*

WAR DEPARTMENT, Jan. 27, 1855.

MY LORD,—I have to acknowledge your lordship's despatch, dated the 16th December, inclosing the copy of

a letter addressed to you by Lieutenant-General the Earl of Lucan, and submitting to me observations upon its contents.

Upon the receipt of that despatch, I felt that the public service, and the general discipline of the army, must be greatly prejudiced by any misunderstanding between your lordship as the general commanding her Majesty's forces in the field and the Lieutenant-General commanding the Division of Cavalry; but desiring to be fortified in all matters of this nature by the opinion of the General Commanding-in-Chief, I submitted, without delay, your lordship's despatch, and the letter of the Earl of Lucan, for the consideration of General the Viscount Hardinge.

I have now the honour of inclosing, for your lordship's guidance, an extract from the reply which I have this day (26th January) received from Lord Hardinge, and which has been submitted to and approved by the Queen.

I have, therefore, to instruct your lordship to communicate this decision to the Earl of Lucan, and to inform his lordship that he should resign the command of the Cavalry Division, and return to England.

In performing this painful duty, I purposely abstain from any comments upon the correspondence submitted to me; but I must observe that, apart from any consideration of the merits of the question raised by Lord Lucan, the position in which he has now placed himself towards your lordship renders his withdrawal from the army under your command in all respects advisable.—I have, &c.

(Signed)            NEWCASTLE.

Field-Marshal the LORD RAGLAN,  
G.C.B., &c. &c. &c.

---

(*Extract.*)

HORSE GUARDS, January 26, 1855.

MY LORD DUKE,—Lord Lucan, in his letter of the 30th November, objects to the terms used by Lord Raglan in his public despatch, that his orders for the Light Brigade to charge were given under a misconception of the written order, &c.

He declines to withdraw that letter, and adheres to the construction he has put upon the order, that it compelled him to direct a charge.

The papers having being referred by your Grace to me, I concur with Lord Raglan that the terms he used in his despatch were appropriate: and as a good understanding between the Field-Marshal commanding the forces in the field and the Lieutenant-General commanding the Cavalry Division are conditions especially necessary for advantageously carrying on the public service, I recommend that Lieutenant-General Lord Lucan should be recalled; and if your Grace and her Majesty's Government concur in this view, I will submit my recommendation to her Majesty, and take her Majesty's pleasure on the subject.—I have, &c.

(Signed) HARDINGE.

His Grace the DUKE of NEWCASTLE,  
&c. &c. &c.

BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, February 13, 1855.

MY DEAR LORD LUCAN,—It is with much concern that I fulfil the painful duty of transmitting to you a despatch which I received yesterday evening from the Duke of Newcastle.

I have anxiously considered how I could acquit myself of this task with most regard for your feelings; and I have arrived at the conclusion that the best way is to put you

in possession of the Minister for War's communication and orders, without reserve or comment.

If you should desire to see me, I shall be happy to receive you at any time that may be most convenient to you.  
—Believe me, very faithfully yours,

(Signed) RAGLAN.

Lieutenant-General the EARL of LUCAN.

---

20 HANOVER SQUARE, LONDON,  
*March 2, 1855.*

SIR,—I have obeyed her Majesty's commands to resign the command of the cavalry of the Army of the East, and to return to England ; and have now the honour to report my arrival, for the information of the General Commanding-in-Chief.

I consider it due to my professional honour and character to seize the earliest moment of requesting that my conduct in ordering the charge of the Light Cavalry Brigade at Balaclava, on the 25th October, and writing the letter addressed to Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, on the 30th November, may be submitted to, and investigated by, a Court-martial.

I make this appeal to General Lord Hardinge with the greatest confidence, believing it to be the undoubted privilege, if not the positive right, of any soldier to be allowed a military inquiry into his conduct, when, as in my case, he shall consider it to have been unjustly impugned.—I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) LUCAN, *Lieut.-Gen.*

The Adjutant-General.

---

HORSE GUARDS, *March 5, 1855.*

MY LORD,—I have had the honour to submit to the General Commanding-in-Chief your letter of the 2d March instant, reporting your arrival in London from the Army in the East, and requesting that your conduct in ordering the charge of the Light Cavalry Brigade at the action of Balaclava, on the 25th October last, and writing the letter you addressed to Field-Marshal Lord Raglan on the 30th November, may be submitted to, and investigated by, a Court-martial.

I am directed by the General Commanding-in-Chief to state in reply that, after a careful review of the whole correspondence which has passed, he cannot recommend to her Majesty that your lordship's conduct in these transactions should be investigated by a Court-martial.—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed)      G. A. WETHERALL.

Major-General the EARL OF LUCAN.

---

HANOVER SQUARE, *March 5, 1855.*

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter informing me that the Commander-in-Chief cannot recommend that my conduct should be investigated by a Court-martial.

Until this day I have been kept uninformed of the letter from Lord Raglan, which appears to have been addressed by his lordship to the Minister of War, when forwarding mine of the 30th of November last.

This letter contains entirely new matter, and is replete with new charges, reflecting more seriously than before on my professional judgment and character. There is now imputed to me, and for the first time, inattention to, and neglect of, another order; and again, a total incapacity to

carry out my instructions, and to avail myself of the means placed by his lordship at my disposal.

Charges so grave, and of a character so exclusively professional, cannot, I submit, be properly disposed of without a military investigation. I find myself, therefore, compelled to express my anxious wish that the Commander-in-Chief will be induced kindly to reconsider his decision, and consent to my whole conduct on the day of the action of Balaclava (25th of October 1854) being investigated by a Court-martial.—I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) LUCAN, *Lieut.-Gen.*

To the Adjutant-General.

---

*March 12, 1855.*

Letter from the Adjutant-General, stating that the Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards cannot recommend that your conduct on the 25th October should be investigated by a Court-martial. I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) G. A. WETHERALL, *A.G.*

Major-General LORD LUCAN, &c. &c.

---

## NOTE IX.

### THE NATURE OF THE LITIGATION IN THE SUIT OF THE EARL OF CARDIGAN *v.* LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CALTHORPE.

THE tenor of the litigation in Cardigan *v.* Calthorpe was of this kind:—In his ‘Letters from Headquarters’—a book of which the successive editions appeared in 1856, 1857, and 1858—Colonel Calthorpe had substantially maintained that Lord Cardigan, after leading the Light Cavalry, retreated prematurely, and he had also stated in the same

book that Lord Cardigan so retreated without having entered the battery.

In 1863, Lord Cardigan applied in the Court of Queen's Bench for a criminal information against Colonel Calthorpe, and supported his complaint by affidavits which proved that he had not only entered the battery, but had passed on, some way, beyond it.

Colonel Calthorpe being satisfied with the proofs which his adversary had adduced upon this particular point, acknowledged his mistake so far as concerned the spot where Lord Cardigan's retrograde movement began, and declared himself 'satisfied that the Earl of Cardigan entered 'the Russian battery,' but he firmly persisted in maintaining that Lord Cardigan had retreated prematurely;\* and in support of that contention, he adduced a mass of evidence which went to show that whilst the 4th Light Dragoons and the 8th Hussars were in the act of advancing towards the battery, Lord Cardigan rode by, on his way to the rear. Moreover, to show at how early a moment Lord Cardigan had retired, he adduced an affidavit by no less a personage than the commander of the whole English Cavalry in the Crimea—that is, by the Earl of Lucan.

It was considered that Colonel Calthorpe, having thus partly shifted his ground, could not be allowed, in that suit, to sustain the charge of premature retreat in a new form; and Lord Cardigan was not called upon to refute, if he could, the evidence which had been adduced against him.

So, the change wrought by the litigation was substantially this:† On the one hand it had become clear from

\* This he did by formally declaring in an affidavit his adherence to the following passage in his book: 'This was the moment when a general was most required, but unfortunately Lord Cardigan was not then present.'

† The actual decision was that the rule obtained by Lord Cardigan must be discharged; but not for reasons founded on anything that occurred in the battle. The rule was discharged without costs.

the proofs, nay it was even unanimously acknowledged that Lord Cardigan rode into the battery; and the highly favourable comments of the Lord Chief Justice added largely to the advantage thus gained by the plaintiff; but, on the other hand, the substance of the charge which had been brought against Lord Cardigan—the charge of having prematurely retreated—remained still upheld against him as a charge deliberately persisted in by his adversary, and one which now rested no longer upon the mere assertion of an author narrating what he had heard from others, but—upon the testimony of numbers of men who (having at the time of the battle held various ranks in the army from that of the Lieutenant-General commanding the cavalry down to the private soldier) declared upon oath that they had seen with their own eyes, and heard with their own ears, the things to which they bore witness.

Upon the whole, the upshot of the litigation was that, ostensibly, and so far as concerned the immediate impression of the public, Lord Cardigan was clearly the gainer; and yet by the very process which brought him this advantage he had provoked into existence a mass of sworn and written testimony which, though judged to be out of place in the particular suit of *Cardigan v. Calthorpe*, might nevertheless be used against him with formidable effect in any other contention.

When I had imparted to Lord Cardigan my idea of the state in which his military reputation was left by all this sworn testimony, he caused to be prepared some ‘statutory ‘declarations’ by persons present in the combat, and laid these before me with great numbers of other documents. In fairness, these counter-declarations should be read as a sequel to the affidavits filed in *Cardigan v. Calthorpe*. \*

\* Accordingly, if a report of the trial with copies of the affidavits be published, I should wish, in justice to the memory of Lord Cardigan, to have the declarations which were laid before me printed in the same volume.

## NOTE X.

MEMORANDA RELATING TO SIR GEORGE CATHCART AND THE DORMANT COMMISSION, WRITTEN IN 1864 BY THE LATE COLONEL THE HONOURABLE GILBERT ELLIOT, WHO WAS AIDE-DE-CAMP TO SIR GEORGE IN THE CRIMEA.

At the beginning of November I got so bad that I had to give in, and remained in my tent for two days, and on the third was put into a waggon with a number of other sick people and sent to Balaclava.

Sir George (Cathcart) packed me up and put my blanket round me, and that was the last I ever saw of the kind, brave old fellow. On the 5th I heard he had been killed, and there was I in Balaclava and had never been near him in his last fight.

On our way to the Crimea he had told me that he had in his pocket a document by which he would succeed to the command of the army in the event of Lord Raglan's death. He did not at all like the arrangement, and told me that he had only consented to receiving the document on the earnest entreaty of the Queen ; but that even at the time he told me the secret he was trying to be relieved of the thing, feeling how very unpleasant it would be for him to find himself placed over the heads of other generals of divisions who were senior to him in the service. As it was, however, he told me what he wished me to do in, as nearly as I can remember, these words : ‘ We are just going to commence a campaign, and it is very likely I shall be killed or die, ‘ and, of course, you will be very sorry—perhaps you will ‘ be killed first, and, of course, I shall be very sorry—but ‘ if I go first I wish you to put your hand in my breast-‘ pocket, where you will find this precious document in a ‘ waterproof bag and take it at once to Lord Raglan, who

'is the only person in the Army that knows I have got 'it.' A week or two before his death he received permission to give up this document, and told me he had delivered it to Lord Raglan, or sent it home, and felt much happier for having got rid of it. I would not have written this secret even now, had it not become so generally known that he was to have succeeded Lord Raglan had he (Sir George) lived.

---

## NOTE XI.

RESPECTING THE PART TAKEN BY CAPTAIN NOLAN (SEE P. 219) AT THE TIME IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING HIS DEATH.

I HAVE lately received an interesting confirmation of the inference upon which I ventured in p. 219 from the lips of one who was a trooper in the 17th Lancers at the time of the battle. This man says he not only saw Nolan with his right arm uplifted, and eagerly making sign to the troops, but distinctly heard him cry out 'Threes Right!' and he adds that some of the men were obeying the direction when Lord Cardigan countermanded it by vehement gestures, and by crying out 'No! no! Threes back into 'line!' This testimony is the more valuable since it was given simply in the course of a narrative showing the circumstances connected with Nolan's death, and apparently without any idea of either sustaining or resisting any particular conclusion. The witness says that Nolan had but just uttered the words 'Threes Right!' and that his sword-arm was still high uplifted, when he was struck by the shell which killed him.

PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS.



UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY  
Los Angeles

This book is DUE on the last date stamped below.

DEC 14 1952		
DEC 4 1954		
DEC 3 REC'D		
DEC 27 1954		
DEC 27 REC'D		
REC'D LD/AM		
SEP 2 1955		
SEP 2		

Form L9—15m-10-'48 (B1039)444

UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA  
AT  
LOS ANGELES  
LIBRARY

DK Kinglake -  
214 The invasion of  
K59i the Crimea.  
1901  
v.5

JUN 14 1952 *BBB* RFFB

DK  
214  
K59i  
1901  
v.5



3 1158 01132 8795

*[Handwritten mark]*

UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY

A standard linear barcode consisting of vertical black bars of varying widths on a white background.

AA 000747957 9

